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Preface

T

hree years ago the Kauffman Foundation began funding legal scholars and economists to study, research,
and write about the way in which the legal system—the
contents of specific laws, judicial doctrines, and regulation,
as well as the legal processes—affects innovation and
growth. This was both a familiar and novel undertaking for
many of the scholars involved. It was familiar because for
the past several decades, an increasing number of scholars
had already been investigating the way in which the law
affects economic efficiency, in the sense of improving or
adversely affecting the production of goods and services
using existing inputs of labor, capital, and ideas. But the
initiative also was novel in that it asked the scholars to
move beyond the “static” analysis of the extant “law and
economics” literature and begin to investigate how the law
was affecting what economists call “dynamic efficiency,”
or the maximum rate at which the production of goods
and services can grow with the right institutions and
policies in place.
Our Foundation has a special interest in economic growth
because our founder, Ewing Marion Kauffman, strongly
believed that entrepreneurs were the key to innovation and
growth, and that only growth would advance living standards. For many years, we have funded a wide range of
researchers concentrating on entrepreneurship and innovation to better understand the growth process. The
Foundation’s “Law, Innovation, and Growth” initiative represents what we believe is an important extension of
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research aimed not only at understanding the linkages
between innovation and growth, but how the law and the
legal system affect those linkages, and perhaps, most importantly, what changes in the law would be most likely to
accelerate growth.
Each summer, as part of the Foundation’s initiative, we
have convened many of our funded scholars to discuss
their ongoing research and how the emerging field of law,
innovation, and growth might be best advanced. The third
meeting of this annual “Kauffman Summer Legal Institute”
was held in July 2010 and formalized these discussions by
convening the participants—all well-acknowledged experts
in their fields—to present specific proposals for changes in
a particular area of the law that, in the author’s view, would
advance economy-wide innovation and growth. This volume is the product of the work presented at this meeting.
It could not be presented at a more important time in this
nation’s history. As I write this, the U.S. economy is slowly
recovering from the worst recession since the Great
Depression. Conventional macroeconomic stimulus measures—more government spending, tax cuts, and monetary
easing—have been applied to an extraordinary degree. It is
not likely, and in the view of many, not advisable, that
much more stimulus will or should be provided. And yet
the consensus view seems to be that the U.S. economy,
nonetheless, will continue to recover slowly for many
years, consigning millions of Americans to unemployment,
fear of becoming unemployed, and for those employed, relatively slow annual advances in their compensation.
This is not the kind of economy that we should accept. All
economies have rules and institutions that govern the
behavior of their actors. The rules that govern the U.S. economy so far have helped guide unprecedented growth and
well-being; nonetheless, they could be improved so that our
economy can perform even better in the years ahead. This
viii
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volume provides a roadmap for key policymakers in the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches to accomplish
that objective without any additional spending of taxpayer
monies or adding to any government deficit.
The volume also has another important, though narrower,
objective, and that is to help redirect and expand the “law
and economics” field to refocus on the connections between
the law and growth. Given the wealth of experience and
prestige of the authors in this volume, we are hopeful that
this second purpose will quickly be achieved.
Finally, I want to thank Robert Litan, Kauffman’s vice president of Research and Policy, whose energy and continuing
intellectual leadership has made the “Law, Innovation, and
Growth” initiative and this particular volume possible.
I also want to thank Glory Olson for her great work in
organizing the summer conference and monitoring the editing of this book; Lacey Graverson, Sarah Gowen, and Matt
Rees for the editing itself; Melody Dellinger for designing
the book cover; and Barbara Pruitt for managing the publication process.

Carl J. Schramm
President and Chief Executive Officer
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
January 2011

ix

Task Force Members
Robert E. Litan (Task Force Organizer), Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation and The Brookings Institution
Yochai Benkler, Harvard Law School
Henry N. Butler, George Mason University
John Henry Clippinger, Harvard University
Robert Cook-Deegan, Institute for Genome Sciences &
Policy, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University
Robert Cooter, University of California, Berkeley
Aaron Edlin, University of California, Berkeley and
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nicole Garnett, University of Notre Dame Law School
Ronald J. Gilson, Columbia University
Oliver Goodenough, Vermont Law School
Gillian Hadfield, University of Southern California
Mark Lemley, Stanford Law School and Durie Tangri LLP
Frank Partnoy, University of San Diego School of Law
George Priest, Yale Law School
Larry E. Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law
Charles F. Sabel, Columbia University
Peter H. Schuck, Yale University
Hal Scott, Harvard Law School
Robert E. Scott, Columbia University
Alex Stein, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University
Victoria Stodden, Columbia University
John E. Tyler, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
Alan D. Viard, American Enterprise Institute
Benjamin Wittes, The Brookings Institution

xi

1:

The Importance of Law in Promoting
Innovation and Growth

Robert Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Robert E. Litan, and
George L. Priest∗

N

obel Laureate and University of Chicago economist Robert
Lucas, who received his prize for his theories of how people form expectations about the future and how those
expectations arguably should affect economic policymakers, may be remembered by historians more so for one single
famous utterance: “Once one starts thinking about [actions
to accelerate economic growth], it is hard to think about anything else.”1
It is not hard to figure out why. Economic growth is the driving
force behind improvements in people’s living standards.
Although measuring economic progress over long lengths of time
is fraught with difficulties, it is now the received wisdom that, on
∗ Robert Cooter is Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Aaron Edlin

is both Professor of Economics and the Richard Jennings Professor of Law, University of California
at Berkeley, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Robert E. Litan
is Vice President for Research & Policy at the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and Senior Fellow
in the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution. George L. Priest is the Edward J.
Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauffman Distinguished Research Scholar in Law,
Economics, and Entrepreneurship at Yale Law School.
1 Robert Lucas, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 22,
no. 1 (1988): 5.
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average, living standards for the world’s population barely
budged for roughly 2,000 years before the Industrial Revolution
of the late 1700s and early 1800s. Only after the remarkable innovations that in retrospect make up that revolution—notably the
steam engine and, shortly thereafter, the railroad—did living
standards begin to rapidly advance, first in the United Kingdom
and the United States, and eventually around the world.
Growth since has been the norm in most locations, though with
frequent interruptions in different places and at different times
due to wars and civil conflicts, financial crises, and temporary
economic downturns. The average American in the early twentyfirst century, for example, is roughly seven times better off than
he or she was at the beginning of the twentieth century.2 Similar
or even greater advances have been achieved in other developed
economies. Even faster progress has been made since as recently
as 1980 in large parts of the developing world. The economies of
China and India, once thought to be hopelessly moribund, have
grown at annual rates of between 6 and 8 percent for more than
two decades running, chalking up a record that Lawrence
Summers has labeled the most remarkable example of progress in
human history.3 Even portions of Africa, home to some of the
poorest nations on earth, began to show sustained vigorous
growth in the 1990s and beyond (even through the 2008–9 nearglobal recession).
Although many concerns remain about how the gains from
growth are distributed—a topic we briefly revisit at the end of
this introductory chapter—there is little doubt that growth has
had broad benefits. One widely used measure of extreme poverty is those who live on less than $1.25 a day. The share of the population in developing countries living below that standard shrank
by half, from 52 percent to 25 percent—between 1981 and 2005.4
2 Measured as per capita Gross Domestic Product, see Angus Maddison, The World Economy:
Historical Statistics (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2003).
3 Lawrence Summers, remarks at the Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship, Washington, DC,
April 27, 2010.
4 World Bank, Poverty Brief, March 2010, www.worldbank.org.
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That was possible only because the economies in which these
people live were able to greatly expand their production of goods
and services.
The gains from growth are not exclusively material. Richer societies are also healthier and permit people to live longer. It is no
accident that life spans throughout the world, but especially in
richer countries, have grown significantly at the same time that
output per capita has expanded. With more resources, people and
the societies they live in eat better and are able to afford more frequent and better health care, lowering rates of infant mortality
and adding years to the average life.
Why do economies grow? This question, which once occupied the
attention of the first “economists”—among them, Adam Smith,
David Ricardo, and others—has continued to bedevil economists
over the past several decades. By and large, economists have been
better able to describe how growth happens rather than to predict
it or to prove that particular policies are responsible for it.
Broadly speaking, the accepted framework for describing growth
over the long run (putting aside the inevitable short-run fluctuations due to constant changes in aggregate demand) specifies it as
the product of a series of inputs: physical capital (buildings and
machines), human capital (human work, adjusted for the skills
people bring to their jobs), and “innovation,” a catchall term that
economists use to capture all growth that is not due to the first
two factors. MIT economist Robert Solow won his Nobel Prize for
showing in the 1950s that in the United States innovation was by
far the most important “factor of production” of the three.
Subsequent empirical work by Edward Denison, Robert Barro,
and others has confirmed this to be the case in developed
economies. There is a broader range of opinion about the relative
contribution of the three factors of production in lesser-developed economies, which have the advantage of being able to copy
or import cutting-edge technologies from the developed world,
and thus seem to rely more heavily on investment in physical
capital and education to achieve growth rather than innovation
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(although this has been changing in parts of the world where
innovations aimed at satisfying the wants of low-income individuals are more likely to come from local residents than from
abroad).
As important as the construction of the basic growth framework
has been, a number of questions remain unanswered. What is
inside the “black box” called innovation? What factors influence
it and to what degrees? If policymakers had definitive answers to
these questions, they would be in a far better position than they
are now to boost rates of economic growth on a sustained basis in
many different locations.
One standard answer is that innovation is driven by advances in
knowledge, which in turn seem to be correlated with spending on
research and development, more so by governments (which in
principle focus more on basic science where the gains are true
“public goods”) than by the private sector (where the advances
are more applied, and the gains more easily captured by those
who discover them, but even then most of these gains, too, accrue
to society at large). Any connection between R&D spending and
innovation, however, must be loose since there is a large random
component to discovery, although in principle—to borrow an
analogy from the sport of hockey—it seems logical that more
goals are likely to be scored the higher the number of “shots on
goal.” Still, because not all R&D spending is fungible, any aggregate number for R&D effort is difficult, if not impossible, to adjust
for the quality of the researcher or the research itself. More fundamentally, R&D spending is unlikely to translate into new products, services, and modes of production—and thus, to advance
growth—unless those innovations are commercialized and then
meet the test of the market. Too often, too much attention is paid
to just R&D efforts and not enough to commercialization activities; the two may not always be highly correlated. Recently, economist William Baumol has drummed this distinction home by
theorizing about the critical role played by “innovative entrepreneurs” in the growth process.5
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Economists also have sought other keys to unlock the mystery of
what accounts for innovation and growth. Perhaps their favorite
empirical technique is the “cross-country regression” in which
data on GDP for different countries over an extended time period
are “regressed” against a number of independent, supposedly
causal variables (capital, labor, R&D intensity, and other factors).6
In principle, these regressions permit the testing of various
hypotheses about what factors are correlated with growth, controlling for the influence of a range of other factors. In practice,
however, the literature based on these cross-country regressions
is far from definitive. Apart from the obvious and unsurprising
connections between growth and the basic factors of production
already identified, researchers have found, depending on the
sample periods and the identities of the countries in the regressions, that growth can be influenced (or not) by such other factors
as openness to trade and foreign investment, religious intensity of
the population, and measures of violence representing civil conflict or crime, among other variables. Yet another line of research,
pioneered by Stanford economist Paul Romer, suggests that
growth and innovation may be “endogenous”—that is, innovation is not some independent or autonomous factor that cannot be
explained, but instead is the product of, or is heavily influenced
by, other factors of production, notably investments in physical
and human capital.7
This book focuses primarily on still one other broad driving force
behind growth—the types and quality of the “institutions” (the
formal and informal rules societies set or establish over time)—
that either foster or discourage people’s engagement in growth5 William J. Baumol, The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2010).
6 Perhaps the most prominent example of such work can be found in Robert J. Barro, Determinants
of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (Lionel Robbins Lectures) (Boston, MA: The
MIT Press, 1998).
7 Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 5 (October
1986): 1002–37; Romer, and “The Origins of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 1
(Winter 1994): 3–22. For a popular guide to Romer’s growth theory, see David Warsh, Knowledge and the
Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).
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enhancing activities. The importance of this principle has been
explicitly validated by the Nobel prizes given to the several economists who have explained why institutions matter.8 Economies,
like games, cannot function effectively without clear rules set and
enforced by someone or some bodies or organizations. Examples
include rules of property and contract ultimately enforced by
judicial systems, which ensure that those who undertake and succeed at productive endeavors are able to retain a sufficient portion of the gains from their labors to induce them to undertake
these actions in the first place.9
Yet beyond this basic insight—that certain fundamental “rules of
law” should be protected, formally or even informally through
norms and customs—not much attention has been paid by economists (or lawyers) to the institutions, laws and legal systems in
particular, that are best suited for promoting innovation and economic growth. A noteworthy exception is the running debate
between researchers who continue to argue whether Anglo-Saxon
legal systems are more conducive to growth (and the coincident
development of financial systems) than civil law systems, or vice
versa.10 In principle, so one argument goes, Anglo-Saxon systems
rely more on judicial doctrine and administrative rules, and thus
are supposedly more flexible and adaptable to change than civil
8 These Nobel Laureates include Douglas North, James Buchanan, and Oliver Williamson.
9 The vast proportion of the gains from true innovation rightly “leak out” to the rest of the society and
greatly exceed the benefits to the innovators themselves. See William D. Nordhaus, “Schumpeterian
Profits and the Alchemist Fallacy,” Yale Working Papers on Economic Applications and Policy, Discussion
Paper No. 6 (2005), http://www.econ.yale.edu/ddp/ddp00/ddp0006.pdf. In contrast, the social benefits of investment in physical capital are not likely to be that much greater than the private benefits to
those who undertake the investment.
10 See, e.g., the work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature 46, no. 4 (2008): 285–332
and Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. “Legal Origins,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 no. 4
(2002): 1193–1229 (favoring the Anglo-Saxon view); Curtis J. Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and
Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development Around
the World (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2008) and Kenneth Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2006) (challenging the view that legal origins matter); and Mark J. Roe, and Jordan I. Siegel. “Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth
Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus,” Journal of Economic Literature, 47, no.
3 (2009): 781–800 (who support the notion that legal origins matter).
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law systems that rest more heavily on less flexible statutes. An
opposing view credits the statutory civil law systems with providing more certainty than the judicial/regulatory systems.
Others contend that these distinctions are more theoretical than
real, and that “legal origins” have very little or no effect on the
recent or current growth of economies.11 Wherever one comes out
on this debate—on which we take no position here—it doesn’t
provide policymakers in any branch of government with clear
direction about what specific rules are best for growth. The arguments take place instead at a broad systems level and do not provide much practical guidance on the narrower issues that guide
the everyday life of citizens and firms in real economies.
A much larger “law and economics” literature has developed
over several decades that has focused on the economic impact of
a broad range of specific rules, but the principal focus of the
scholars who have led the way—Aaron Director, Ronald Coase,
Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, and Gary Becker, among others—has been largely about what economists call “static efficiency” rather than “dynamic efficiency” or growth. The distinction is
critical. Static efficiency refers to how effective any set of social
and economic arrangements is in generating the maximum output of goods and services for any current level of inputs using
existing technologies. Most of the law and economics scholarship to
date has been about figuring out which rules—first in antitrust,
then in the basic areas of common law (contracts, property, and
torts), and subsequently in virtually every legal field—are most
“efficient” in this sense.
Such a task is necessarily forward-looking, though as we will
highlight shortly, it does not strictly focus on economic growth in
the main sense in which we will use the term here. A useful analogy may be to view law as akin to a guide or a pathfinder in the
western part of the United States in the nineteenth century. At any
point in time, there was a most efficient direction of transit for a
party wanting to travel from, say, St. Louis to San Francisco. The
11 For an excellent guide to this literature, see Roe and Siegel, “Finance and Politics.”
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various available alternative routes—through New Mexico,
Colorado, or Wyoming, for example—each entailed a different set
of obstacles or costs: mountains, hostile Native Americans, rivers
or deserts to cross, and the like, which changed in various ways
over time. The role of the guide was to determine the route that
maximized the chances of arrival, preferably at the lowest cost.
Legal rules serve a similar function with respect to economic
activity. Rules defined to be “efficient” guide human activity in
the direction that will maximize output from existing resources
(analogous to the routes in the travel story just described).
This sense of “static” efficiency does not capture, however, the
impact of rules on what can be usefully called “dynamic efficiency,” or the maximum rate of production of new products, services, or modes of operation, given any existing level of resources
(capital and labor). Broadly speaking, the law and economics literature has not tackled this much more difficult, and we believe
more important, challenge of designing rules to maximize economic growth that generates more resources over time for the
inhabitants of any society.
In making this distinction between static and dynamic efficiency,
we do not dismiss the huge contribution of the law and economics pioneers. They have helped to change legal conversations:
from what obligations people owe to each other or what rights
people should have, to what the economic impact is likely to be
of specifying those obligations or granting those rights. This primarily has been a “positive” conversation in the sense that it is
about understanding the consequences of legal decisions.
Whether society should actually adopt certain rules, once understanding their likely impacts, is a normative question that, strictly speaking, is not necessarily to be decided with only static economic efficiency considerations in mind. Considerations of how
rules affect the distribution of income in general, and which parties or groups stand to gain or lose in particular, are always
important as a fundamental matter of political economy.

8
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THE PURPOSE

OF THIS

BOOK

Our main purpose here is to try to change legal conversations yet
again, hopefully in an even more useful direction. We have both
positive and normative objectives in mind.
Continuing in the law and economics tradition, it is thus critical
to pin down the connection—both the direction (positive or negative) and the magnitude or importance—between certain legal
rules and institutions and innovation and growth. But it is also
equally important to identify changes in those rules—whether
they are set by judges, legislators, or regulators—that might plausibly enhance growth on a sustained basis. As Harvard economist
Benjamin Friedman has powerfully argued, growth has a critical
moral and political dimension as well.12 In particular, growth acts
as a “social lubricant” that eases potential demographic and ethnic tensions within and across societies. Conversely, as history
reminds us all too often, the absence of growth can trigger horrible outbreaks of conflict. The clearest example is the global devastation of World War II and the Depression that preceded it.
More pertinent to the matters at hand, growth vastly trumps static efficiency in importance, assuming the two to be in conflict,
which they can be in some cases. Take the case of proposals to
extend patent lives: These will increase monopoly power of the
patent holder and thus distort prices during the extended life of
the patent, but in the long run may enhance incentives for invention and thus growth. It is probably more generally true, however, that policies that enhance growth also improve static efficiency, such as when antitrust law (properly applied) enhances competition. In any event, even a highly inefficient economy in the
static sense cannot generate the kinds of gains from becoming
vastly more efficient that are possible from the gains in wealth
generated by sustained growth highlighted at the outset of this
chapter. As Cooter and Edlin have put it, sustained growth is

12 Benjamin Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (New York: Knopf, 2005).
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exponential; improvements in static efficiency, at best, have only
multiplicative effects.13
This is not to say that growth should be pursued for its own sake
without regard to anything else. Economic progress has not been
achieved without such “externalities” as air and water pollution,
whose ill effects are not well accounted for in the prices of goods
and services whose output gets counted in measures of output.
There is a deep and growing literature on how best to “internalize” these externalities, whether through well-enforced property
rights (as Ronald Coase and his intellectual descendants would
argue) or through well-designed taxes and regulation (as many
other economists have argued).14
Likewise, there are important reasons why societies should take
into account how the benefits of growth—namely, incomes and
wealth—are distributed across groups and individuals.
Distributional or equity concerns are important considerations
for their own moral and political reasons. Efforts to improve equity may or may not hurt growth. For example, when government
uses tax revenue to improve education and health of the poor, it
can lead both to more equitable outcomes and enhance growth by
providing more educated, healthy workers and potentially entrepreneurs. Likewise, too much inequality can trigger populist
backlashes that may result in growth-penalizing regulatory,
trade, and tax policies.15 Indeed, progressive income taxes, however much they make (after-tax) incomes more equal, also can
penalize work and entrepreneurship and thus diminish growth.
13 Robert D. Cooter and Aaron Edlin, “Maximizing Growth vs. Static Efficiency or Redistribution”
(working paper, University of California at Berkeley, 2010).
14 The central assumption underlying Coase’s famous theorem—that assignment of property rules
has no impact on the allocation of resources—is that transactions costs are essentially zero so that
the parties can costlessly rearrange rights to achieve the most welfare-enhancing outcome. In the
typical pollution case, however, there may be only one or a few polluters and many harmed parties who cannot costly negotiate with the polluter to quit. In that event, taxes or regulation may
be the preferred solution.
15 See William Russell Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).
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The magnitudes of these effects on growth, both positive and negative, will vary and likely be subjects of continuing dispute.
Citizens and policymakers must bring their own value judgments
to policy questions and weigh the trade-offs between equity and
growth, if there are any.
Nonetheless, while addressing externalities and distributional
equity are important objectives, they are not the central focus of
this book, which is about growth and how legal systems can best
foster it, primarily through boosting innovation. The book also
concentrates on the legal system we collectively know best—that
of the United States—although many of the suggestions and
themes we advance here should be relevant to many other countries at all stages of economic development.

CAN GROWTH CONTINUE?
At various times, critics have questioned whether growth can
continue indefinitely—though, importantly, not during and after
the 2008–9 recession that has highlighted the importance of
growth by its absence. After all, it is argued, the world has only a
finite amount of resources (energy-producing sources in particular), and thus, once those are exhausted, must not growth come to
a halt? If this is the case, then there would be no point to this book
or attempts to design laws and institutions to promote growth.
Fortunately, finiteness in resources does not mean that growth
must eventually stop. To see why, it is essential to contrast inexhaustible ideas with scarce or exhaustible resources.
Products of the mind—theorems, principles, designs, inventions,
expressions, and compositions—can be used without excluding
others from using them. Economists call this characteristic “nonrivalry.” Looking into the future, nonrivalry implies non-depletion. When anyone from the present generation uses an idea, it
remains available for future generations to use. In contrast, scarce
“real” resources—like capital, labor, land and fuel—have rival
uses. When one uses a scarce resource, it is unavailable for others
11
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to use. To be sure, some scarce resources renew—like a forest, a
river, or grains. But other resources—like oil or iron—deplete
irrevocably as they are used.
By making people richer, innovations induce and enable people
to consume more goods and services. Some innovations conserve
resources, while others hasten resource exhaustion. Many scholars believe that, on balance, the world is depleting its resources at
an unsustainable rate. Addressing this danger will require faster
innovation or less consumption. Faster innovation, and thus continued economic growth, is obviously the preferred approach of
the two. All of the chapter authors proceed on this premise.

THE PLAN OF THE BOOK AND SUMMARY
RECOMMENDATIONS

OF

The book is divided into several sections, each containing one or
more chapters on particular legal topics. The initial section covers
legal issues affecting entrepreneurship, including policies toward
high-skilled immigrants who have displayed higher propensity
to be entrepreneurs than native-born Americans, ways to enhance
entrepreneurship in the academic community, and related issues
covering the replication of scientific research, which is an important precondition for successful commercialization of new ideas.
Given the importance of finance to the startup and growth of new
companies, and hence to general economic growth, the second
section includes three chapters devoted to law and finance.
Because the taxation of income directly affects how companies are
financed, the first of these chapters examines ways to change the
federal tax laws to enhance growth. The other finance-related
chapters address from different perspectives how changes in the
regulation of financial institutions and markets and financial
reporting, especially in light of the financial crisis of 2007–8 and
its aftermath, could add to growth.
The law affects the ways firms operate in many different ways,
and the third section of the book contains multiple chapters
12
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addressing various aspects of this broad topic. The subjects in this
section include changes aimed at making the market for legal
services more competitive, revisions in contracts and tort doctrines, changes in choice of law rules and antitrust law, and at the
local level, changes in zoning. Many of the recommendations in
this section were vigorously debated among the authors, especially in the case of changes in tort doctrines, where two very different views (by Stein and Parchomovsky on the one hand, and
Priest on the other) about how to proceed are found in this
volume.
Finally, given that innovation is driven and characterized largely
by changes in technology, the fourth section of the book covers
emerging legal subjects relating to this subject in particular. One
of the new legal areas that has perforce grown up and around the
Internet is the area loosely known as “cyberlaw.” The first three
chapters in this section cover aspects of this subject, ranging from
copyright doctrines, to new digital ways to incorporate and govern corporations and other legal entities, to the important issues
surrounding identity and privacy on the Internet. The next chapter broadly covers the important topic of intellectual property,
with a special focus on possible ways to improve the patent system so that it better promotes innovation and growth. The final
chapter in this section examines some of the novel security issues
that modern technological innovations force us to confront and
looks at the question of how to ensure that growth and innovation do not create conditions that are, in turn, hostile to growth
and innovation.
Table 1.1 summarizes the specific legal recommendations
advanced in the chapters that follow. The list of suggestions
includes changes in judicial doctrine, regulation or administrative
action, statutes (at different levels of government), or changes in
private law or organization (the kinds of changes required are
indicated by the letters next to each item). The recommendations
are advanced solely by the authors of each respective chapter, and
although the authors in this project may agree with many of
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them, all of the authors were not asked to and therefore do not
endorse each of the items on the list.
The range of pro-growth ideas outlined in the chapters that follow is certainly not exhaustive. Other legal scholars, economists,
and interested parties no doubt will be able to add to this list,
including reforms that might enhance the effectiveness of the U.S.
educational system, the American workforce, and U.S. trade policy, among other topics. Moreover, since we are concentrating
here solely on legal reforms, we do not examine the host of expenditures, government guarantees, and other reforms that might
also enhance growth.
Nonetheless, the wide-ranging discussion of just the legal topics
that the subsequent chapters do cover reveals several broad or
cross-cutting themes that readers may wish to keep in mind as
they read through all or some of the specific essays that follow.
For example, one broad theme running through the recommendations outlined in many of the chapters is that in order to best promote innovation, the legal system—both the rules and the rulemaking institutions—must be flexible and adaptable. Rigid rules
and processes for generating them can be quickly outmoded by
changes in technology. Inflexibility impedes innovation itself.
Second, count on private actors, especially entrepreneurs in a
highly entrepreneurial society such as the United States, to constantly try to evade rules that get in their way. These acts of circumvention can be, and generally are, entirely “legal.” Whether
they are “good” or “bad” however is entirely context specific.
Innovations that circumvent inefficient rules that were eventually abolished—such as the long-standing rules that fixed the prices
that airlines, trucks, and securities brokers could charge, or the
interest rates that banks could pay their depositors—are socially
useful and should not be condemned or inhibited. But “innovations” that end-run constructive rules, such as those requiring
banks to maintain certain minimum levels of capital to ensure
their financial safety and to protect the deposit insurance fund,
can be socially destructive. Broadly speaking, it is our view—and
14
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we believe the view of the majority of the authors in this volume—that, with perhaps a few exceptions, rules and policy
should not prescreen innovations, but rather let the market take
the first crack. Only where social ills prove to outweigh the social
benefits should regulators constrain, punish, or in extreme cases
ban, innovative products and services.
Third, and related to the first two themes, the law must allow for
constant uncertainty. Change by definition is uncertain. We can’t
predict where it will come from and shouldn’t try. The chapters
on contracts and torts, in particular, urge judges, lawmakers, and
agencies not to penalize newness by giving too much deference to
existing customs or methods of compliance, while recognizing
the benefits that certainty in rules gives to private actors.
Fourth, laws and institutions going forward need to permit collaboration, especially in the age of the Internet, which has dramatically lowered the cost for parties in different cities, states, or
countries to work cooperatively together. The creation of new
ways for companies to incorporate and be governed digitally, a
subject explored by Goodenough in chapter 14, is an example of
how changes in the law can do more than permit collaboration;
they actually facilitate it.16
We conclude the book with some brief thoughts about the political economy of implementing the changes outlined here. We
worked on this book during the recovery from what is likely to be
the worst recession since the Depression, and even at this writing,
the strength and durability of the recovery are open to question.
While debate will certainly continue over the effectiveness of the
massive fiscal and monetary stimulus implemented during the
onset and depth of the recession, the virtue of legal reforms
such as those outlined here is that, with few exceptions (such as
16 Successful commercialization of new ideas requires not only collaboration but also trust—
what Cooter and Edlin (2010) have called the “double trust dilemma.” Combining a new idea
with capital requires the innovator to trust the financier not to steal the idea, while the financier must trust the innovator not to steal the money the financier provides. Much commercial
law has developed to address these twin challenges.
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possibly in the tax arena), they cost governments little or nothing.
Indeed, to the extent that legal reforms increase growth, they generate more tax revenue and thus ease budget pressures (which in
the wake of the recession and heading into years of baby-boomer
retirement are intense). For this reason alone, we believe that policymakers at all levels of government should have some interest
in the ideas that follow.
More generally, the authors of this book believe that both scholars of the legal system and legislators and judges who design and
implement the system should begin to consider seriously the
effects of law on innovation and growth. The ideas presented here
and the proposals that follow from them represent a first effort
toward that end. Because there is no limit on the extent to which
the United States or any other society can grow economically,
there is much more to be done. The authors of the book remain
committed to the proposition that careful attention in the future
to law and its effects on innovation will improve the rate of
growth itself, and thus enhance living standards for Americans
now and in future generations.
Accordingly, we hope that policymakers at all levels of government will be receptive, at least in principle, to the kinds of ideas
broached in this book. We do not expect any of them to be adopted all at once, or even many of them to be implemented. But we
modestly hope to have stimulated a much-needed discussion
among academic scholars, policymakers, and interested citizens
over the linkages between laws, legal systems, and innovation
and growth that will be both continuing and beneficial for years
to come.
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TABLE 1.1 RULES FOR GROWTH:
A SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
Note:
J = changes in judicial doctrine
P = private law/organizational change
R = changes in regulation or administrative actions
S = statutory change
Law and the Entrepreneur
Importing Entrepreneurs: Immigration Reform
• (S) Increase the number and allocation of H1B and EB visas.
• (S) Grant new visas for immigrant graduates of U.S. universities.
• (S) Grant new visas for immigrant entrepreneurs.
Enhancing Academic Entrepreneurship
• (P) Standardize licensing of technologies developed by faculty
inventors.
• (P) Create multi-university technology commercialization consortiums to realize economies of scale.
• (P) Use successful serial entrepreneurs to screen technologies for
commercialization.
• (P) Allow faculty inventors freedom to license (Free Agency).
• (P) Permit faculty inventors to own all intellectual property in
their innovations.
Enhancing Replication and thus Effectiveness of Scientific Research
• (P) Legal obstacles to dissemination, sharing, use and re-use of
scientific research should be minimized and require strong and
compelling rationale before use.
• (R, S) Government funding agency policy should require openness
and sharing of data (including greater enforcement of current
sharing policies, promoting public access to final manuscripts by
the creation of digital archives, and documenting and disseminating best practices).
• (S) An automatic exception from patent use restriction on code
used for academic research purposes should be created.

17

RULES FOR GROWTH
Law and Finance
Growth-Enhancing Tax Reform
•
•
•
•

(S) Shift toward a consumption tax.
(S) Make research and development (R&D) tax credit permanent.
(S) Make R&D credit flat rather than incremental.
(S) Narrow the definition of qualified research to require that
research exceed, expand, or refine commonly held knowledge.

Improving Financial Regulation and Reporting
• (R) Accounting rules should require public corporations to list all
of their assets and liabilities on their balance sheets.
• (R) Policymakers and regulators should rely more on private
market signals (such as those from the credit default swap
market) to set and enforce rules.
• (S, R) Regulators could implement rules that rely on market
measures of risk instead of measures of risk generated by oligopolistic regulated institutions (such as credit rating agencies).
• (S, R) Policymakers should consider consolidating rather than
expanding the number of regulatory agencies.
• (S) Cost-benefit requirement for rule making should be extended
to independent agencies.
• (S, R) Regulators should more explicitly consider a range of
regulatory options that could achieve a targeted benefit, and
adopt an approach that opposes the minimum regulatory cost for
a given benefit.
• (R) Regulators should increase disclosure as to how ratings of
securities are determined.
• (S, R) The Federal Reserve’s independence should be maintained.
• (S, R) Securities class actions should be reformed; shareholders
should be allowed to decide whether to keep them at all and, if
so, in what form.
Law and Firm Operations
Public and Private Law Production
• (J, S) Open legal markets to competition, initially by creating a
federal licensing regime that exempts providers from state-based
regulation by the bar and state supreme courts.
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• (S) Develop a public-law framework for privately produced legal
regimes.
• (S) Reduce barriers to trade in legal regimes in both state-bystate and international transactions.
Contracts
• (J) Induce efficient, transaction-specific investment by both parties.
• (J) Establish a framework for iterative collaboration and adjustment of the parties’ obligations under conditions of continuing
uncertainty.
• (J) Limit the risk of opportunism that could undermine parties’
incentive to make relation-specific investments in the first place.
Torts (Contrasting Recommendations)
• (J, S) Some participating authors favor eliminating courts’ reliance
on custom in making liability determinations; others disagree.
• (J, S) Some participating authors support using fault only in the
context of comparative negligence and otherwise moving toward
strict liability; others sharply disagree, believing that further movements toward strict liability would stifle innovation.
Legal Process
• (S) Proposals aimed at increasing growth through a change in
law or legal institutions should recognize the existence of
multiple jurisdictions and the potential for jurisdictional choice
and competition.
• (S) Federal law could impose procedural constraints on state laws
blocking enforcement of choice law contracts.
Antitrust
• (R, J) Markets should be defined to include the prospect of global,
not simply U.S. domestic, competition.
• (R) The United States should aggressively oppose the application
of antitrust laws of other countries that have less economically
sound antitrust regimes.
• (S) The United States should expand antitrust laws to prohibit
protectionism and industry subsidies wherever they appear.
• (R, J) Special antitrust rules should take account of the unique
characteristics of network industries.
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Land Use and Zone Laws
• (R, S) Price growth, don’t prohibit it; properly calibrated exactions
can enable efficient growth by pricing it, thereby forcing developers and consumers to internalize the costs of new development.
• (R, S) Promote interjurisdictional competition, don’t stifle it; interjurisdictional competition subjects local governments to some
approximation of market competition and may spur regulatory
innovations that themselves promote growth and innovation.
• (R, S) Develop alternatives to traditional zoning regulations.
Law and Technology
Cyberlaw
• (S, J) Courts and legislatures should consistently limit the extent
to which existing players that own elements of platform technologies use the law to extract value from new parties dependent on
those platforms.
• (J) Accept the chaotic, complex, open nature of a system that has
been important to innovation and growth; do not try to make
order with law.
• (S, J) Employ a narrow construction of scope and applicability of
control points based on copyrights or patents (such as employing
a broad reading of the de minimis doctrine and continuing to
expand Digital Millennium Copyright Act exemptions through the
Librarian of Congress).
• (S) Create a new kind of injunctive relief in copyright cases that
would tie damage-like payments to actual revenue of entrepreneurs who use existing copyrighted materials without permission.
• (S) Eliminate business method patents.
Digital Incorporation
• (S) Authorize a fully digital formation process for corporations
and LLCs.
• (S) Authorize a wide range of digital communication as ways in
which the formal actions of the corporation and LLC may be
taken.
• (S) Authorize the use of software as the original means for setting
out agreements and bylaws that govern the actions of LLCs and
corporation.
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Identity and Privacy
• (R) Subjecting social rule making to scientific and technological
modeling and experimentation will spur technological competition
and innovation for governance.
• (S, R) Statutes and regulations must encourage and incentivize
the innovative use of technologies to create spaces where the
expectation of privacy can be met and enforced.
• (S, R) Provide protections to those innovators who take legitimate risks to improve the protection and sharing of private
information.
• (R) Establish an open, evolving governance platform for privacy
and security that encourages and engages an ongoing series of
real world market experiments.
• (R) Encourage the adoption of independent digital auditing and
rating mechanisms.
Intellectual Property
• (S, R) Apply evenhandedly a second-pair-of-eyes review (SPER),
in which patent applications undergo a second examination, if
adopted, to weed out bad patents.
• (R) Change training and incentives so that patent examiners
search prior art more effectively.
• (R) The U.S. Patent Office should focus its examination resources
on important patents and place less emphasis on the rest; importance would be determined by a tiered review process in which
inventors would pay for patent reviews, which would serve as a
signal for validity (in theory, by only paying for those they viewed
as most important).
• (S) Develop a post-grant opposition process—triggered by
competitors—that further scrutinizes a patent and can harness
private information from patent competitors; this would signal to
the Patent and Trademark Office which patents are the most
serious and important.
Secure Platforms for Future Growth
• Develop a comfort level with a certain degree of platform
surveillance.
• Develop clear rules assigning liability for platform vulnerabilities
that are recklessly introduced or maintained in the system.
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• Most challenging, recognize that certain companies, by dint of
their businesses, may have unique affirmative obligations to the
security of platforms.
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Producing Law for Innovation1

Gillian Hadfield∗

I

t is a lesson we know well from the events of the past several
decades: Whatever their flaws, regulated markets do a better
job than central planners in governing the production and distribution of goods and services. They do so because they harness private incentives to seek out the potential for creating value
and because they are capable of processing massive quantities of
data and responding to complexity. They don’t accomplish these
goals without legal structure and constraints—to provide the
basic framework for transactions and cooperation (property and
contract, for example) and to control externalities and exploitation of the disparities created by the unequal distribution of information and resources. But the problem of creating the legal
framework to support and regulate markets to produce goods
1 This chapter is largely based on Gillian K. Hadfield, “Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets,” Stanford Law Review 60
(2008): 1689-1732; Hadfield, “The Role of International Law Firms in Harmonizing Legal Regimes,” in
Multijuralism: Manifestations, Causes and Consequences, ed. Albert Breton et al. (Surrey: Ashgate,
2010); and Hadfield, “Law for a Flat World: Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy,” 2010, available at works.bepress.com/ghadfield.
∗ Gillian Hadfield is Kirtland Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at the University of
Southern California where she also directs the Southern California Innovation Project. She currently is a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.
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and services, while daunting, is still an easier one to solve than
the massive one of how to direct individual flows of economic
inputs and outputs.
Regardless of how well we have learned this lesson when it
comes to goods and services, however, we have yet to recognize
that it applies as much to the complex task of producing the legal
inputs that structure and regulate markets as it does to the task of
producing more familiar economic goods and services. Deciding
how to regulate a financial institution to forestall massive coordinated failure is as complex a task as determining how to portion
and price the risky assets the institution buys and sells, what
algorithms will most efficiently conduct trades, and what organizational structures will create the best incentives. Yet by and large
we allocate all the latter tasks to the market—private, generally
profit-driven firms and entrepreneurs—and the former task to
central planning by public actors: politicians, regulators, and
judges. Even the ostensibly private players in the legal field—
lawyers—operate within a highly insulated market that leaves it
up to judges (but, practically speaking, lawyers themselves) to
determine who may provide legal services, where, and through
what type of organization.
The neat distinction we take for granted—private actors decide
how much to produce and how to price it through decentralized
market decision making, while public actors set the rules for markets through deliberative and political decision making—may
have served us well in a far less complex economy. And indeed,
until the late nineteenth century, the legal needs of a (still heavily
agrarian) market economy were largely taken care of by the rules
of property and contract generated by common law judges and
courts. The rise of mass-market manufacturing, transportation
and communications in the late nineteenth century fostered the
growth of large-scale federal regulation: The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was established in 1887 and one of the first major federal regulatory
statutes, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890. But even as the
economy grew more complex, the goal for regulation remained
24
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relatively simple: control the capacity of large-scale enterprises to
increase prices and reduce wages.
The regulatory goals of the twenty-first century are far more complex. We do not want merely to constrain monopoly power; we
also want to foster economic growth and innovation to achieve a
diverse set of public and private goals. Moreover, the environment in which our regulatory efforts must operate is characterized by high levels of complexity and rapid change. This puts
great pressure on the capacity of deliberative central planning to
generate the structural and regulatory rules necessary to coax the
results we want out of decentralized agents. The information
demands alone are staggering and beyond the ken of isolated
institutions or comprehensive rational analysis. Again, we know
this in the context of ordinary economic production. We call this
the “knowledge economy” because information is an increasingly essential input into the production process and a key economic output. In order to compete, producers of goods and services
have to be deeply in touch with and capable of responding to
exploding amounts of information. To do so, they are moving
away from the model of hierarchical organization—the prototypical twentieth-century “managerial enterprise” engaged in the
rational top-down planning that Alfred Chandler (1977)
described2—and toward highly decentralized models that rely on
networks, open innovation and flexible alliances in order to harness the capacity to process and respond rapidly to new information.3 Moreover, they are doing so on a web-based platform that
is fundamentally global and not national in structure. And yet we
still are looking to centralized bodies such as national and state
legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts to write the rules of
the system.
As we explore the nature of the legal rules necessary to achieve
the dynamic goals of growth and innovation, we need also to consider the fundamental question of the production methods by
2 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977).
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which these rules will be generated. Much of our discussion
about the rules for growth assumes that the rules can be developed by deliberation and rational analysis—by law professors,
economists, judges, regulators, legislators (and their lobbyists)—
and implemented by rational processes: voting, agency rule making, judicial argument, and decision. We undoubtedly have to
continue to rely heavily on these methods to produce legal rules
and procedures to foster growth and innovation. But it is essential—in order to cope with the staggering information and adaptation demands of a high-velocity, innovation-intensive global
economy—also to harness for the benefit of legal production the
same decentralized and market-based methods we rely on for the
innovation and production of ordinary goods and services.
We should be looking for ways to foster the development, for
example, of competitive private providers of legal rules and procedures, providers who succeed or fail based on the success of
their systems in achieving the goals established for them. Instead
of or in addition to the jurisdictional competition between the legislatures of Delaware, Nevada, and Pennsylvania for the business
of incorporation and corporate governance systems that Butler
and Ribstein discuss in this volume,4 we also should be looking
for competition between “Governance Inc.,” “Corporation.com,”
and “Enterprise Partners.” Similarly, instead of competition
between California and New York for the business of providing
contract law, we should be looking for competition between
3 Todd R. Zenger and William S. Hesterly, “The Disaggregation of Corporations: Selective
Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units,” Organization Science 8 (1997):
209–22; Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts, “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 12 (1998): 73-94; Timothy J. Sturgeon, “Modular Production Networks: A
New American Model of Industrial Organization,” Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (2002):
451–96; Richard N. Langlois, “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,”
Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (2003): 351–85; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and
Peter Temin, “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business
History” American Historical Review 108 (2003): 404–33; and Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel and
Robert E. Scott, “Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration,”
Columbia Law Review 109 (2009): 431.
4 Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein, “Legal Process and the Discovery of Better Policies for Fostering
Innovation and Growth,” this volume, chapter 19.
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“Contract Management Ltd.” and “Simple Contracting
Unlimited.” Instead of competition between the United
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, we should be looking for competition
among multiple private, for-profit and nonprofit entities for the
business of supplying approved regulatory regimes. And instead
of a single monopolized “legal” profession controlled by bar associations, we should be looking for a wide variety of alternative
suppliers of legal advice, documents, relationship management,
liability predictions, and representation. In this more open and
competitive world of legal production, we could turn not only to
the expert judgment of traditional legal practitioners operating in
law firm partnerships to decide what language to include in a
contract or what pretrial motions to bring, but also to data analysis companies that use sophisticated software to analyze liability
risks and rewards. We also could turn to not only contracts and
threatened litigation to manage business deals, but also to relationship management companies that integrate legal and nonlegal tools to help commercial parties allocate risk, coordinate the
efforts, distribute rewards, and resolve disputes. Similarly, we
could turn not only to traditional bylaws and board meetings to
govern the corporation, but also to digital platforms that coordinate and implement corporate activity.
In this chapter, I first discuss why we need to think of legal infrastructure as economic infrastructure requiring focused economic
policymaking, what is wrong with our existing legal infrastructure, and why we need to change our modes of legal production.
I then set out a vision of what greater reliance on market-based
production of legal infrastructure could look like. Finally, I suggest some concrete steps that policymakers can take to move us
toward a more open, competitive system of legal production.
These include:
• Opening up access to the provision of legal services, initially
by creating a federal licensing regime that exempts providers
from state-based regulation by the bar and state supreme
courts. Among other things, the federal regime should
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eliminate restrictions on the ownership and management of the
providers of legal goods and services to commercial clients and
geographical restrictions on where these entities supply their
products.
• Establishing the public law framework necessary to enable
competitive private legal providers to emerge. An easy place
to start with this is authorizing private (not necessarily lawyerowned and managed) firms to supply commercial contracting
and recognized incorporation/corporate governance regimes.
• Reducing barriers to trade in legal services. In addition to
reducing the state-by-state barriers now imposed on the provision of legal services domestically, policymakers also should
move to eliminate international restrictions on legal services
transactions that cross international borders—protecting overseas legal process outsourcers and law firms, for example, from
the threat of unauthorized practice of law charges and obtaining reciprocal trade benefits for U.S. legal providers in foreign
markets.

LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE

IS

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE

If the first lesson of the collapse of centrally planned economies
during the past several decades was that regulated markets are
better at directing resources to produce and distribute value, the
second lesson was that markets require a great deal of legal infrastructure in order to function effectively. Comparing Russia and
Poland after the fall of the Soviet state, Jeffrey Sachs (a principal
economic advisor to both countries in the early 1990s) concluded
that “the contrast in reform outcomes . . . revolve centrally around
the differing roles of law in the two societies” and that “it is in the
legal realm that we find many of the deepest weaknesses and
greatest hopes for our age.”5

5 Jeffrey Sachs, “Globalization and the Rule of Law,” Yale Law School Occasional Papers, paper 2
(2008), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsop_papers/2.
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I define legal infrastructure as the set of legal inputs available to
the participants in an economy to structure and regulate their economic relationships. This set includes formal legal rules and principles, but it goes well beyond the laws on the books. It also
includes:
• the formal and informal elements of procedure for invoking or
challenging the enforcement of rules—such as civil procedure
and evidence codes;
• the norms and practices, and costs, of legal advising;
• the standard forms and collected contract and other document
templates available in legal databases, and the procedures and
rules that govern access to those databases;
• the accumulated conventional wisdom about regulatory and
dispute-resolution strategies; and
• the stock of knowledge accumulated by legal practitioners
through formal education, trade publications, conferences, patterns of training and expertise, and anecdotal experiences.
These features of the legal environment influence the cost and
efficacy of any particular legal solution that might appear on the
books, and they affect the likelihood of learning about and
deploying such a solution. They are inputs to an economic output, namely the structuring of a particular economic relationship.
Why call this legal “infrastructure” and not legal “system” or
“regime”? The concepts of legal “system” or “regime” generally
refer to the formal elements of a legal environment—and in particular, its formal institutional structures such as the role of the
judiciary or constitutional allocation of powers—and focus on the
law as seen from the vantage point of the lawyer and judge. These
concepts frame deliberative legal analysis, the formal design of
legal processes and argument. The concept of infrastructure, in
contrast, emphasizes that, like the classical forms of physical
infrastructure—highways, railways, electric power grids, telephone lines—and the critical infrastructure of the information
economy—the Internet—legal infrastructure “lies beneath” the
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economic relationships it helps to structure. It is “embedded in
other structures, social arrangements and technologies,” and
while designed, it is ultimately organic and emergent:
“Infrastructure does not grow de novo; it wrestles with the inertia
of the installed base.”6 Perhaps most importantly, the concept of
infrastructure shifts the focus away from the perspective of legal
analysts and onto the perspective of those who use law to structure their relationships. It emphasizes the pervasive role of law in
everyday efforts to coordinate and support cooperative economic activity. If we want to speak to someone in a distant place, our
ability to do so is structured by the quality and reach of the voice
communications infrastructure. If we want to risk investing time,
opportunity, and wealth into a joint venture with someone, our
ability to do so is structured by the quality and reach of our legal
infrastructure. And like physical infrastructure, what we care
about is what we can do and at what cost with the tools actually
available to us in this infrastructure, not the blueprint for the system as designed by its engineers. A telephone system is no good
to us if it requires an overly expensive handset or if the system
has been hacked to broadcast our conversations. Similarly, a legal
system is no good to us if it requires overly expensive lawyers, or
if in practice the application of legal rules is distorted by graft or
incompetence.
Legal infrastructure as I’ve defined it is economic infrastructure.
This is not true of all law, of course. Law also provides the fundamental architecture of democratic political relationships: the
rights and duties of citizens and the authority and limits of democratic institutions. But the elements of law on which I want to
focus are those that structure and regulate economic relationships—these account for a very large share of law in modern market democracies. It is in this context that I emphasize that legal
inputs such as rules of contract or the practices of corporate attorneys are fundamentally economic inputs. It is also in this context
that we need to approach the question of legal policy—what
6 Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and
Access for Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research 7 (1996): 111–134.

30

2: PRODUCING LAW FOR INNOVATION
should our legal rules and institutions look like and how should
they be produced?—as a question of economic policy. This is why
I take as my starting point in analyzing the production of law the
same starting point that we adopt when analyzing how other economic goods and services should be produced: Should this be
produced by the state or by the market? If by the market, what is
the proper role of government in supporting and regulating this
market? In the normative framework we adopt in this book, these
are questions that I analyze with reference to dynamic efficiency,
innovation, and growth. This is not to deny an important role for
political constraints based on the goals of equality, fairness,
autonomy, security, dignity, and so on. These are legal objectives
that are legitimately produced within accountable political institutions and not private markets. But it is important to see clearly
that much of our legal policy is not fundamentally political
or jurisprudential; it is economic. There is therefore a much
broader scope for market-based legal production than currently
recognized.

WHAT

DOES OUR EXISTING LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE

LOOK LIKE?

Most people take it as definitional that law is a political, bureaucratic, and judicial product generated by legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts. And indeed, the more formal elements
of our current legal infrastructure—legal rules and principles—
are largely produced by federal and state governments and judiciaries. There are pockets of nongovernmental rule production. In
the financial industry, for example, individual exchanges and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) generate rules
for their members under the oversight of the SEC. Many trade
associations, including those for grain, cotton, and diamond merchants, provide systems of contracting and dispute resolution to
govern their members.7 Many think of contracting itself in the
Anglo-American tradition—in which contracting parties rather
than the state design the rules governing their relationships—as
an example of private lawmaking. But these are relatively limited
31

RULES FOR GROWTH
exceptions to the dominant reliance on legislatures, government
agencies, and courts to formally generate binding legal rules. This
means that nearly all of our legal rules are produced through
political and deliberative mechanisms: committees, lobbying,
voting, litigation, and formal abstract reasoning. Rules emerge, or
do not emerge, based on whether they appeal to voters, experts,
and judges—not necessarily on the basis of how well or efficiently they accomplish a task or whether they can survive competition with an alternative that achieves the goals of legal regulation
better or more cheaply, or with greater product differentiation. To
the extent there is competition, it is regulatory or jurisdictional
competition between legislatures and public regulators. While
such competition can promote better legal rules,8 it is important
to recognize that it does not follow the same logic or necessarily
produce the same results as competition between private profitmaximizing firms.9
Legal services are provided in markets—almost all lawyers are
private individuals who charge for their services (1 percent are
public defenders and legal aid attorneys who may be employed
by governments or funded by nonprofit agencies)—but our markets for legal services are among the most closed and highly regulated markets in the U.S. economy. Entry into the legal services
markets is heavily restricted: Bar associations and state supreme
courts claim regulatory authority over the entire “practice of
law,” which is vaguely defined but generally amounts to “anything lawyers do.”10 Providers must obtain a law degree, the
requirements of which are set by state bar associations, which
7 Lisa Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relationships in the
Diamond Industry,” Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1992): 115; Bernstein, “Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms,” University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 144 (1996): 1765; and Bernstein, “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions,” Michigan Law Review 99 (2001): 1724.
8 Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein, The Law Market (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2009).
9 Gillian K. Hadfield and Eric Talley, “On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law,” Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 22 (2006): 414–441.
10 Hadfield, “Legal Barriers to Innovation.”
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serve as the exclusive accreditation body. Accreditation standards
for law schools are significantly more intrusive than other professions such as engineering. Moreover, because a license to practice
is dependent on passing an exam set by the bar association, law
school curricula are heavily oriented toward achieving educational objectives controlled by lawyers themselves. Collectively,
these entry requirements generate a homogenous pool from
which the entire industry is supplied—there is little room for
entrepreneurial entrants who might devise unconventional methods of achieving the goals of law more quickly, cheaply, and effectively. If a similar regulatory structure had been in place in the
1990s in the “practice of information cataloging and search,” we
wouldn’t have Google. Its founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page,
who were PhD students in engineering at the time, would have
been required to obtain advanced degrees in library science
before being authorized to develop new methods of organizing
and finding information.
Once admitted into the industry, any legal entrepreneurs who
have survived the homogenizing forces of law school and the bar
exam face further barriers. In the ostensible name of ethics, bar
associations (endorsed by state supreme courts) place severe
restrictions on the organizational and financial structure of legal
businesses. Legal services can only be provided to the market by
lawyers who operate within firms owned, managed, and 100 percent financed by lawyers. (Lawyers who are employed by other
types of organizations can only provide in-house legal services to
their employer.) This means that legal inputs cannot be provided
by corporations that are financed with public or private equity or
that are created or managed by nonlawyers. Nor can entrepreneurs seek the backing of friends and family, angel investors, or
venture capital firms to support the development of new legal
business tools, markets, and models. This severely restricts the
potential for innovation. Entrepreneurs outside of law who see a
better way to do things are prevented even from engaging in a
joint venture with lawyers to deliver services. Even law firms
owned by lawyers cannot put in place the kind of covenants not
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to compete that other businesses routinely implement to protect
the business against losing customers to departing employees
who rely on firm contacts to build their business. This limits the
potential for a law firm to build firm capital and diminishes the
incentive for the firm to invest in innovation, training, and
growth.
Our heavy reliance on government production and a professional monopoly administered by lawyers generates a legal infrastructure characterized by several features that hamper our ability to support innovation and growth. These features include:
Heavy reliance on document/text-based rules: Our legal environment
is awash in a high volume of document-based rules. There are
more relevant documents, and the length and density of documents such as statutes, legal opinions, and contracts are, by all
accounts, much greater today than fifty years ago. (Compare the
length of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933—thirty-six pages—to the
length of the 2010 Financial Services Reform Act—almost 2,000
pages.) The problem is not merely volume. Growing specialization within legal practice11 makes skilled interpretation of many
legal documents the province of a shrinking subset of legal
experts.
Human capital–intensive craft production: Legal services are characteristically provided on a scholarly craft model: The legal situation facing an individual client is evaluated by an attorney on an
individual basis and an individualized strategy or plan is developed and implemented. Lawyers rely heavily on acquired experience and personal judgment in assessing the likely content and
consequences of a legal relationship. There is little systematic and
quantitative data either available or put to use in developing legal
advice or documents. There is minimal use of automated or computer-based methods to produce or deliver legal inputs, such as
the predicted effect of different contract clauses or compliance
strategies.
11 John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson, Edward O. Laumann, and Ethan Michelson, “The Changing
Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995,” Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 751.
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Undiversified production models: With the important exception of
in-house counsel (approximately 8–10 percent of the profession),
almost all lawyers work in all-lawyer environments where they
are exposed to the ideas and problem-solving techniques of people with their same training and intellectual orientation.12 There
are few collaborative enterprises that merge legal expertise with
other business expertise. Legal enterprises must be exclusively
financed by withheld profits and bank loans, cutting innovators
off from large-scale capital markets, private equity, and thirdparty financing and insurance. This lack of financial diversification limits the risk-bearing capacity of the firm and may account
in part for the high levels of risk aversion we see in legal practitioners more generally.
Mandatory rules: Most of the legal rules governing the conduct of
a company or organization and available to it for structuring its
business dealings are the product of government actors and are
by and large mandatory: Their applicability is not a matter of
choice for the affected entities. There are important exceptions—
such as the choice of state of incorporation or governing contract
law—but there is little scope for choosing a regulatory or liability
regime. Moreover, with the potential for claims to be framed as
legal questions in multiple ways, the set of mandatory rules
applicable to a given activity is frequently fragmented and overlapping.13

WHAT’S WRONG WITH
INFRASTRUCTURE?

OUR EXISTING LEGAL

Of course, there is no reason to explore the potential for law to be
supplied by competitive private markets if the largely nonmarket
12 Heinz et al.
13 Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 25–29, presents a detailed picture of how multiple federal, state and municipal regulatory agencies, along with federal and state courts, generated a tangled web of litigation
and regulatory process that delayed by several years the dredging of the harbor in Oakland,
California to accommodate larger containerships.
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legal infrastructure we currently have is serving our policy objectives of dynamic efficiency, innovation, and growth. But there are
solid theoretical reasons to think it is not, particularly as the new
web-based global economy moves into full swing and innovation
and dynamic adaptation become key drivers of growth. The
transformations in the economy that we have witnessed in the
past two decades, with globalization and the migration of much
of the organization of work, trade, and communication onto the
Internet, also has transformed the nature of what we need law to
do in order to support and regulate economic activity.
Compared to the prototypical firm in the early to mid-twentieth
century, when our current legal infrastructure was laid down, the
prototypical twenty-first century firm demands more and different legal inputs to meet several shifts in the economic demand for
law. These shifts include:
Increased firm-boundary crossing: The pervasive shift away from
vertical integration to increased reliance on networks, alliances,
and global supply chains generates heavy demand for contracting inputs that are capable of managing more complex, flexible,
and information-rich relationships. Today the paradigmatic contractual relationship is a joint venture or outsourcing contract,
posing very different contracting challenges than the paradigmatic sales contract of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Increased jurisdictional boundary crossing: A greater demand for
complex contracting inputs is also prompted by the significant
increase in cross-border transactions. Regulatory approaches also
have to cross jurisdictional boundaries more frequently and in
more complex ways as the extent of global interconnection
increases.
More pervasive and complex transactions in information: In the new
economy, information is a prime object of economic transactions,
and information asymmetries are a pervasive attribute of bargaining relationships. But transactions in information or under
information asymmetries are especially difficult to structure.
There is therefore a greater demand for various forms of protec36
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tion for intellectual property—particularly IP that is not embodied in a concrete product—and for more tools to address the contracting obstacles information assets pose.
Faster depreciation and obsolescence of legal solutions: The higher
velocity of the new economy reduces the lifespan of any particular legal solution, and shifts the relative value of adaptable as
opposed to fixed solutions. This requires greater emphasis on
dynamic as opposed to static legal analysis.
Increased differentiation of demand: The new economy is characterized by more heterogeneity in products and business relationships. This implies a more differentiated demand for legal solutions. As firms innovate new products and relationships, they
face challenges often highly specific to their circumstances.
Unlike the sales relationships that dominated the “old” economy,
one size does not fit all, or even very many, very well.
Lower margins for legal transaction costs: Legal solutions that have a
shorter lifespan and that are developed to address particular
rather than standardized products, contexts, or relationships
have to be cheaper. The global scale of competition can also put
more pressure on transaction costs than was the case in the era of
relatively insulated megafirms. And the startups and entrepreneurs who are the lifeblood of the innovation economy lack the
scale and financial wherewithal to take on substantial legal
expenses.
Greater demand for integration of legal and business expertise: In an
economy with high levels of standardization, we can expect legal
solutions to effectively capitalize knowledge about the business
or regulatory considerations that, for example, a sales contract or
employment policy needs to address. But in an environment of
heterogeneity and rapid change, the essential problem solving
that is at the core of legal work is an ongoing task. This requires
legal analysis that is explicitly integrated with all of the elements
of business problem solving, rather than unexamined reliance on
the solutions found in standardized processes, strategies, and
documents.
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The changes in what we need in order to address the legal needs
of the new economy are now substantially mismatched with what
our old-economy legal infrastructure has to offer. The scholarly
craft orientation of law implies that lawyers, regulators, judges,
and legislators respond to the complexities of the globalizing new
economy with the idea that more complexity in the environment
must be met with more, and more complex, documents: more
words and more specialized drafting. But this is a very costly and
slow process and runs counter to factors that are increasing the
demand for less costly legal solutions to deal with an increasing
number of heterogeneous relationships that are bound to change
in short order. Longer, more complex documents and statutes
increase the specialization in human capital required to implement and engage in adversarial (often winner-take-all) contests
organized around these written materials. But human capital specialization is a key reason why legal markets are noncompetitive—raising the price of legal solutions in a profound way that
goes beyond the simple notion that it takes more work to draft
100 pages than it does ten.14 Greater legal specialization also
increases rather than decreases the challenges of integrating
legal and business problem solving. This increases the gap
between what legal solutions provide and what enterprises
and regulators need to address novel, challenging, and rapidly
changing environments.
In a competitive environment, we would expect legal providers
to adapt to and fix these problems. But the structural features of
our legal infrastructure largely prevent competitive responses
such as these. Many of the rules are publicly provided and politicians and regulators do not face competitive incentives organized
around the efficiency of the statutes and regulations they produce. Because most legal rules are mandatory, there is little scope
for businesses or those with regulatory goals to shift to a more
productive legal environment. And because of the tight regulation lawyers have imposed on their own profession, there is little
14 Gillian K. Hadfield, “The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System,”
Michigan Law Review 98 (2000): 953–1006.

38

2: PRODUCING LAW FOR INNOVATION
scope or incentive for innovation in even the ostensibly marketbased aspects of our legal infrastructure. These are the features of
our legal system that are most in need of change in order to promote innovation in the legal infrastructure that will better serve
the needs of dynamic efficiency, innovation, and growth.

WHAT WOULD

MARKET-BASED LEGAL PRODUCTION

LOOK LIKE AND WHY COULD IT DO BETTER?

Market-based production of legal inputs already can be found to
some degree in our existing legal system. Private nonprofit organizations such as the American Institute of Architects create and
distribute (and sometimes copyright) standard contracting forms
for the use of their members and the general public. Commercial
entities such as Nolo Press and LegalZoom sell blank documents
or software to help people create documents. Most organizations,
largely on a contract basis, develop and implement their own
internal grievance and human resources procedures. Private dispute resolution services are widely available either as arbitration
or mediation. There are market-based document preparers who
can fill in documents such as bankruptcy petitions, and e-discovery providers who store and sift through high volumes of electronic documents for litigation purposes.
But these represent ultimately small and still fairly restricted
slices of the legal pie. In a world with fewer restrictions on market-based provision of legal inputs, the array of market options
would be far greater than it is now. Although one of the key
attributes of markets is that they can produce surprising solutions
that abstract analysis cannot, we can make some conjectures
about what this world would look like.
We would expect a more open legal market to include a variety of
providers of legal services, not just JD-trained bar-examined
lawyers. Indeed, England and Wales already have eight alternative training and licensing regimes for different types of legal
providers, many of whom compete to serve the same clients with
legal advice, planning, and representation. Some of these regimes
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require the traditional university degrees; others are based on
community college programs or practical training and experience-based qualification. In this kind of environment, different
demand characteristics operating through this market can sort
out who works for whom doing what kind of work, increasing
the differentiation and variety required by a more heterogeneous
economy.
We would expect a more open market also to be characterized by
corporate legal providers, not just lawyer partnerships, and by
entities that integrate legal services with a broader array of goods
and services. Large retailers such as Office Depot, which now provide banking, copying, or postal services, could add to their
repertoire legal services such as regulatory information and document filing for small businesses. These services then could be
provided by employed professionals who have available to them
practices and procedures developed on the basis of market testing and data and backed by the quality incentives and malpractice liability of a large organization, rather than the resources and
experience of relatively isolated solo practitioners or small local
partnerships. The megafirms now providing e-discovery services
on a national (if not global) scale, but limited to document storage
and filtering, could integrate these services with legal expertise,
likely informed not only by traditional legal judgment based on
human capital, but also on large-scale data analysis. Legal process
outsourcers such as CPA Global would not be required, as they
now are in most states, only to provide services under the supervision of a licensed attorney who retains them, assumes liability
for them, and serves as a middleman. In a less restrictive environment they could compete head-to-head for clients on a bundled
or unbundled basis. This is especially important for startups, as
well as small and medium-sized businesses that lack large legal
departments. Faced with regulatory, contract, or litigation concerns, these smaller entities could turn to lower-cost and differentiated sources of information and advice (summaries of the law,
legal research, document selection, and advice in preparation
comparable to accounting advice on taxes, for example), and
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likely obtain delivery in formats that are better attuned to their
needs and budget.
More radically, greater market-based provision of law would also
include a greater role for private for-profit and nonprofit entities
in providing legal rules.15 While there is an extensive role for private contracting, private contracts still are subject to state-provided rules of validity, interpretation, and enforcement. But a market-based provider of such rules with an incentive to gain market
share and access to investment capital to devote to the costly
process of designing better solutions could conceivably shift the
entire function of designing and managing contractual relationships away from adversarial dickering over contract language
and toward creative multipronged methods for allocating risks,
coordinating activities, adapting to change, and resolving disputes. A private competitive corporate governance regime—supplying the rules that are now supplied by state legislatures—
could conceivably offer dramatically different models for creating
and managing the corporation. In this volume, for example,
Oliver Goodenough describes a privately provided digital corporate governance platform that incorporates and then coordinates
the relations among owners, managers, and agents. Many of
these functions could be performed via algorithms, including
algorithms that organically adapt to changing conditions and
environmental feedback. Developing systems like this requires
entrepreneurial energy, creativity, and investment capital—things
lacking from our current deliberative and public systems of law
production.
Shifting the provision of the rules governing contractual and corporate governance relationships to more market-based providers
is a relatively easy step. Farther on the horizon we can imagine,
however, a greater role for privately provided regimes to substitute for or complement existing publicly provided securities,
15 Gillian K. Hadfield, “Privatizing Commercial Law” Regulation 40 (2001); and Hadfield, “Delivering
Legality on the Internet: Developing Principles for the Private Provision of Commercial Law,”
American Law and Economics Review 6 (2004): 154.
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environmental, product safety, intellectual property, and other
regulation. Organizations in this world would choose their regulator from a competitive array of providers, including private
providers. Legal scholars already are discussing the potential for
a “portable” securities regulation scheme under which issuers
select their regulatory regime from those offered by participating
countries, regardless of where they physically issue securities.16
Expanding the set of available regulators to include private
providers requires rethinking the role for public actors in this
process, shifting that role from the detailed enactment of thousands of pages of statutory and regulatory provisions to the certification and oversight of competitive private regulatory bodies.
In the United States, securities regulation has included government oversight of self-regulatory bodies such as stock exchanges
and broker-dealer associations since the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Other professions, including the legal profession, are also private sources of self regulation. There are two
key, related, differences between our existing self-regulatory
model and the model of competitive private regulatory bodies
that I am envisioning. First, self regulation generally refers to a
membership organization’s regulation of its members. FINRA,
for example, regulates those who are members of the New York
Stock Exchange. This ties the provision (and hence incentives) of
the regulatory product to the provision of the underlying product—in the case of the NYSE, access to a dominant exchange.
Second, and related, the providers of regulation are generally
monopolists within a broadly defined field. The NYSE might
compete with other exchanges for business, but there are no competing regulatory providers for those who want to be members of
the NYSE. These features of self regulation weaken the market
incentives directed toward better regulation, and raise an almost
insurmountable barrier to deauthorizing a private regulator gone
16 Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, “Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation,” Southern California Law Review 71 (1998): 903; Roberta Romano,
“The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2
(2001): 387; and Howell E. Jackson and Eric J. Pan, “Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999: Part I,” Business Law Review 56 (2001): 653.
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astray: Deregistering the NYSE as an authorized exchange
because of regulatory failures is probably not on anyone’s reform
agenda. In a more open system of privately supplied regulatory
systems, the provision of regulatory services could be provided
separately from membership in an underlying economic entity.
We could expect to see the emergence of regulatory service firms,
specializing in the design and implementation of regulation to
achieve publicly established performance goals. These firms
would compete, and would be exposed to the risk of product
innovation and cost reduction from other regulation providers
and new entrants. We would expect them to rely more on the
tools of the marketplace to develop their “product”—investing in
research, testing products in the market, collecting and analyzing
data, retaining a wide variety of specialists—than on the (often
weakly funded and weakly researched) governmental processes
of hearings, committee meetings, and rule making that self-regulatory membership organizations often employ.
The regulation of the legal profession embodied in the United
Kingdom’s Legal Services Act of 2007 is an example of this new
model: a publicly accountable and appointed body (the Legal
Services Board, which must be dominated by nonlawyers) manages the designation and oversees the performance of private regulators. Any entity may apply to be an approved regulator. While
the current set of eight approved regulators reflects significant
continuation of historical models of self regulation by membership organizations engaged in differentiated activities—the
Solicitors Regulatory Authority regulates solicitors and the Bar
Council regulates barristers—it is clear that the new model will
allow alternative regulators, which are not membership organizations, to seek approval and compete for the business of licensing
practitioners. Indeed, the Institute for Legal Executives, which
sets out an alternative non-University path to qualification to perform many of the same tasks historically performed by solicitors,
although also a membership organization, is clearly a step in this
direction. More generally, given the erosion of limitations on the
scope of approved practice for members of these different legal
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professions—barristers in England now may contract directly
with clients and need not be retained exclusively by a solicitor,
while solicitors and legal executives now may gain rights of audience in some higher level courts—these multiple professional
bodies (as well as new entrants) can begin to compete and differentiate across training and regulatory requirements. This competition can reduce the need for excessive and expensive training of
those who provide many legal services.
On the farthest horizon, we can envision a world in which specialized private regulatory services firms (not industry membership organizations) design and implement regulations in a wide
variety of areas such as health care, environmental protection,
intellectual property, product safety, and workplace conduct. In
this world, public regulators—legislators and administrative
agencies—could focus on identifying performance and outcome
targets for regulation and monitor the success of the regulatory
body at a relatively macro level. Private firms seeking status as
approved regulators would have to demonstrate success in
achieving regulatory objectives and would then compete for the
business of those who require, in turn, regulatory approval.

WHAT

DO WE HAVE TO CHANGE TO FACILITATE MORE

MARKET-BASED PRODUCTION OF LAW?

Three essential changes are needed to move toward a greater role
for market-based production of law:
1) Open legal markets to competition.
2) Develop a public-law framework for privately produced legal
regimes.
3) Reduce barriers to trade in legal services.
I discuss each of these changes in turn.
1) Open legal markets to competition, initially by creating a federal
licensing regime that will exempt legal services supplied to commer-

44

2: PRODUCING LAW FOR INNOVATION
cial clients from state-by-state bar and state supreme court regulation.
Opening legal markets to competition requires a substantial shift
in the U.S. regulatory environment. The current state-by-state
regulatory regime is a major obstacle to reform. Not only is the
potential for reform highly fragmented, it is dominated by the
voting interests of individual lawyers (who, for example, can
have a private interest in expanding the scope of unauthorized
practice rules to protect market share) and the deliberative reasoning of those trained in legal analysis. The point that legal
infrastructure is, in large part, economic infrastructure is one that
a profession at least rhetorically organized around concepts of
rights, justice, and due process is likely to have difficulty hearing.
More importantly, state judiciaries and bar associations are not
really designed to be policymaking institutions, much less economic policymaking institutions. They often lack full-time leadership (like law firm managing partners, most of those who participate in the leadership of bar associations continue their practice)
and they lack expert policy staff and resources to devote to policy, particularly data collection and analysis.
At a substantive level, the state-by-state licensing regime limits
the potential for significant innovation in legal production by limiting the mobility and scale of legal businesses. Although these
limits are routinely ignored in large corporate practice and recent
rule changes have softened their edges, on the books it is
nonetheless an unauthorized practice of law for a New York
lawyer to “practice law” on behalf of a California client or in
Californian proceedings involving a New York client. This obviously limits the mobility of individual practitioners. Moreover, by
burdening the achievement of scale in the distribution of legal
services, state-by-state licensing has a significant impact on the
development of innovations such as data-intensive methods for
improving on the anecdotal judgment that now drives the
human-capital intensive craft model of legal production. It also
restricts the development of web-based tools to deliver legal services. Although online providers (such as LegalZoom and Intuit-
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owned MyCorporation.com) can provide documents online and
conduct guided interviews to assist users in the completion of the
documents, these providers cannot enrich their offering with
legal advice, either through data-driven analysis of interview
answers or a “chat with a lawyer now!” link on the website. Not
only would the provider have to be fully owned, managed, and
financed by lawyers in order to provide that service, it would
have to ensure that a client in Idaho only received advice from a
lawyer licensed to practice in Idaho.
To open competition in legal markets, it is therefore critical to
establish a national regulatory regime guided by both legal and
economic policymakers. Preempting state regulation, perhaps initially for only subsets of lawyers (such as those providing services to corporations only), is a necessary step both to reduce the
fragmentation of the industry and to shift regulation onto an economic policy–based footing. Such a regime should drop the
requirement of lawyer ownership, control, and financing of legal
businesses and sharply curtail the scope of activities for which
formal legal training and bar admission is required. Arguably,
business consumers of legal services—particularly larger businesses and those with expert in-house purchasers of these services—should not be under any limitation on who they can hire,
domestic or foreign, to perform “legal” work. Where necessary,
consumer protection can be much more carefully targeted than it
is now; much of the consumer protection that lawyers’ regulation
now claims it seeks to provide can be provided by existing protections rooted in laws against false advertising, negligence, and
related issues. Competition and differentiation in training and
practices can be further encouraged by allowing multiple competing national bodies to provide accreditation and licensing
where needed. And all limitations imposed on the practice of law
by professional associations or accrediting bodies should be subject to ordinary application of antitrust law. Recent restructuring
of the legal system in the United Kingdom, where many of these
reforms have already been implemented, provides a useful model
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for the development of a much more competitive and innovative
legal market in the United States.
2) Develop a public-law framework for privately produced legal regimes.
Like markets for other goods and services, markets for legal
goods and services require a legal framework in which to operate.
To move in a policy direction toward a greater role for marketbased production of legal goods and services (including formal
rules and procedures) does not imply disconnecting entirely from
public provision. It merely shifts the locus of public provision
back a level, in the same way that the well-understood effort to
“privatize” the production of steel in formerly communist states
shifts the role of government upstream—out of the daily determination of production volumes and pricing and into the determination of ownership rights over a manufacturing facility, contract
dispute resolution, and employment regulation.
In order to create a reasonably competitive market in private contract law systems, for example, we would require publicly provided law that recognized the authority of the private provider to
be the exclusive provider of “contract law” for its customers.
Note that this is more than providing contract terms: It means
establishing the framework in which obligations and commitments become binding on the parties and the basis on which obligations and commitments are implemented, as well as the scope
of the authority for the provider to act to manage and adjust the
parties’ relationship. It also requires enabling private providers to
issue orders resolving a contractual dispute (examples include
paying damages, delivering promised goods, participating in
information exchanges, or resolution procedures) enforceable in
state-provided courts. This is what the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) in the United States accomplishes now: It makes an arbitrator’s resolution of a case as effective as if it were resolved by a
state court itself. Arguably this is all that we require of the publiclaw framework to make private contracting systems effective.
The fact that we have yet to see robust private contracting
providers in the nearly 100 years of experience with the FAA,
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however, suggests that more may be needed to support the creation of such a system. Public law would have to make it clear, for
example, that providing such a system is not an “unauthorized
practice of law” (as some may argue is now the case under existing state-by-state professional regulation), enabling corporate
entities with public financing and nonlawyer owners and managers to participate and to provide the service across state lines.
That such restrictions have constricted the scope for arbitration as
an alternative system is evident in the fact that in some cases arbitrators are required to be licensed attorneys,17 and in many states
lawyers have argued and state supreme courts have agreed that
representing a party in an arbitration is “the practice of law”
and hence nonlawyers and out-of-state lawyers may not provide
this service.18
Building the framework to support a competitive market in bankruptcy law or corporate law would also seem to be relatively
straightforward. In the case of bankruptcy, it would require federal courts to recognize bankruptcy contracts19 as effectively displacing federally provided default rules. In the case of corporate
governance, it would require individual states to recognize incorporation under a privately provided legal regime (governing, for
example, duties of directors and meeting requirements) as being
as effective as incorporation under the legal regime provided by
another state. This would imply according the benefits of incorporation to those who chose the incorporation regime as against
third parties, such as tort claimants (who would not be able to sue
individual shareholders for their losses in the absence of reasons
to pierce the corporate veil), and interpreting contractual or statutory obligations (such as taxes) based on corporate form or bank17 See FINRA, Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (FINRA Manual), §10211 available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096.
18 See, e.g., Rappoport v. Florida Bar, 540 U.S. 967 (2003); Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on NonLawyer Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So.2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1997); Virginia State Bar,
UPL Opinion 214 (April 8, 2008) available at http://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/upl-opinion-214.
19 Alan Schwartz, “Contracting about Bankruptcy,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 13
(1998): 127–146.
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ruptcy status to apply equally to corporations formed, liquidated,
or reorganized under private as well as under public legal rules.
It is conceivable that a market for privately provided corporate
governance, bankruptcy, or contracting regimes would require
some form of intellectual property protection to generate appropriate incentives to invest in potentially appropriable system
design—as Ribstein (2010) argues.20 And we should expect that a
competitive market for private legal regimes would require the
oversight of antitrust law and other regulations intended to balance market power or protect consumers against fraud. But these
issues should be approached on the same terms that we approach
them when we are deciding how best to structure and regulate
private markets for ordinary economic goods and services, such
as business consulting or computer operating systems.
The much harder case for public framework development arises
when there are substantial public interests affected by the content
of the private legal regime. Environmental regulations, for example, clearly cannot simply be shunted off to the elections made by
the entities that would be subject to the regulation: With no political oversight, those regulations would quite predictably offer
next to no environmental protection for the benefit of the public
generally. But it is conceivable that we could design public law
requirements for a private regime, such as a targeted level of
industrial pollution. The key would be to allow and facilitate
competition between regulatory bodies and minimize capture by
regulated entities. We would also have to address the question of
how “conflicts of law” would be resolved in these noncontractual settings where we cannot rely on a negotiated ex ante “choice of
law” by all involved parties. (Compare, O’Hara, and Ribstein
2009). Understanding how to resolve these difficult design issues
is probably beyond the reach of our existing state of knowledge—
and the recent regulatory failures attributable in part to self regulation in the financial industry certainly emphasize how difficult
the design problem is—but the prospect for building these
20 Larry Ribstein, “The Death of Big Law,” Wisconsin Law Review (forthcoming).
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markets to better meet the demands of increasingly more complex economic activity is something that should be seriously
addressed by policy analysis and debate.
3) Reduce barriers to trade in legal goods and services.
Just as domestic restrictions on the practice of law need to be dismantled in order to promote more competitive production of
legal inputs, so too do international restrictions need to come
down in order to support a truly global market for legal inputs.
The global base for the economy and the fundamentally multijurisdictional nature of a growing share of economic activity
makes reduction in the barriers to mobility of legal inputs a critical reform for the twenty-first century. But globalization of trade
in legal services lags far behind globalization more generally.
Most countries have strict local requirements that erect substantial barriers to entry by foreign providers. These restrictions significantly repress the economic incentives for legal practitioners
to invest in the invention of transborder legal solutions to address
the key feature of the globalizing economy.21 General counsels of
some of our most innovative companies complain that they have
no choice but to rely on a “patchwork of providers” to resolve the
multijurisdictional issues they face, often long before they achieve
the kind of scale that could justify hiring armies of lawyers from
different countries: today’s innovative firms are “Global from
Day One.” And even when scale is not the problem, the absence
of providers capable of developing solutions to multijurisdictional legal problems—such as those faced by Google distributing
YouTube in more than 100 countries around the globe, each with
its own laws on privacy, intellectual property, defamation,
and national security—is a significant obstacle to growth and
innovation.22
Around the world, domestic lawyers are protected by requirements that in order to provide services within their borders or on
21 Hadfield, “The Role of International Law Firms.”
22 Hadfield, “Law for a Flat World.”
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issues related to domestic laws, they must possess a local law
degree and pass a local qualifying examination (generally available only in domestic languages). Some countries impose citizenship or residency requirements, or demand that legal providers
operate a physical office in the country (inhibiting electronic services). Local restrictions on advertising abound in the United
States but they often are even more restrictive in other locations,
preventing lawyers from advertising specialties, for example. The
effect is to limit competition. Organizational restrictions—such as
requirements that lawyers operate only in partnerships, preventing the employment of a lawyer by another lawyer, and prohibiting multiple offices—limit the capacity for growth of law firms to
meet global demand. The European Union has reduced many of
these barriers, prohibiting differential restriction on the practice
of law by lawyers from one member country in another member
country. But these benefits do not extend to countries outside
the EU.
Domestically, an easy first step to globalizing legal markets
would be to eliminate U.S. restrictions on the purchase of overseas legal services by U.S. corporations. This is emerging as a significant issue for U.S. companies as they increasingly seek to
reduce burgeoning legal expenditures through the use of low-cost
and data-intensive legal services provided by legal process outsourcers such as CPA Global, which is headquartered in the
United Kingdom but maintains a large office performing legal
support work in India. These companies review, organize, and
draft documents, manage contracting processes, conduct legal
research, prepare deposition summaries, and more. Currently,
such outsourcing is required by state bar association rules to be
channeled through and supervised by state-licensed lawyers.
Again, federal law may be required to cut through this limitation,
reducing the cost of supervision and expanding the availability of
these low-cost services to small and medium-sized businesses
that lack the in-house resources to perform supervision of offshore legal work.
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Internationally, any efforts to open up U.S. markets to offshore
providers should also seek reciprocal benefits in other countries.
Legal services are covered by the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), thus requiring WTO member states to take steps
to ensure that licensing requirements are based on objective criteria and are not overly restrictive. Arguably, then, the framework
is already in place to promote these efforts. But on the basis of the
assertion that law is fundamentally political in nature and that
the independence of the legal profession is a pillar of democratic
governance, legal professions worldwide thus far have faced little difficulty protecting restrictive practices from scrutiny. This is
why I emphasize that a large share of legal infrastructure is fundamentally economic infrastructure—distinct from the political
components of a legal system that are indeed critical to effective
democracy.

SUMMARY
A clear recognition of the economic impact of legal policy is
essential for the production of the legal infrastructure necessary
to promote dynamic efficiency, innovation, and growth in a global economy. Having grown up largely under the stewardship of
lawyers informed by distinctively legal analysis, and in the context of a far more stable, homogeneous, and vertically integrated
economy, our existing legal infrastructure is increasingly ill suited to meet the needs of our new globalized and increasingly webbased economy. So long as we rely exclusively on lawyers, judges,
bureaucrats, and politicians to design our legal rules, and allow
lawyers to severely restrict competition in legal markets, we are
unlikely to see the kind of entrepreneurial innovation in legal
rules, practices, and procedures necessary to meet the rapidly
changing demand for the legal inputs that structure and regulate
activity in the new economy. A greater role for market-based production of legal inputs promises to harness greater resources and
diverse ways of thinking about how to do what law aspires to do
more effectively and at lower cost. Some of the reforms needed to
open up our legal markets to the kind of competition we need are
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relatively straightforward to identify and implement, such as
eliminating the state-by-state restrictive regulation of legal markets by lawyers and judges who lack both the resources and the
orientation (as well as the legitimacy) to approach the task as the
problem of economic policy that it is. Other relatively straightforward reforms involve the facilitation of markets for privately provided regimes in areas such as commercial contracting, corporate
governance, and bankruptcy. The broader challenges are to
design the appropriate framework law to create and oversee competition among private regulatory bodies in a wider range of
areas that reach beyond the contracting interests of commercial
parties—to areas touching more directly on the public interest
such as intellectual property, environmental regulation, and
product safety. We should not be surprised if the task is daunting,
however; the very reason the task is so necessary is that the complexity of the world that law structures and regulates is already
outstripping the capacity of conventional political, bureaucratic,
and judicial methods of producing law (as we have witnessed
with recent efforts to reform the regulation of massively complex
systems such as health care and the financial industry). Matching
the radical innovations we have witnessed throughout the global
economy, we need to find a way to harness the creativity and
investment potential of markets to generate radical innovations
in the production of law.
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Universities and Economic Growth:
The Importance of Academic
Entrepreneurship
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T

hough economists continue to debate how best to promote
economic growth, there is at least some broad agreement
about some elements that contribute to it. Roughly speaking,
the growth of the output of any economy is a product of the
growth of its key inputs: physical capital, “human” capital (labor
hours adjusted for skill), and a catch-all term labeled “innovation” (or “multifactor productivity” in economic jargon).
Furthermore, there is a general agreement that of these three factors, physical capital is probably the least important, and that the
sum of the other two—advances in skill levels of people and
innovation—are the dominant driving forces.
Given the role of universities in education and in knowledge creation, it is readily apparent why they play an essential role in economic growth. They add to skills of the labor force by disseminating existing and new knowledge through their traditional teaching functions. Although much of the benefit of added skills
∗ Robert M. Cook-Deegan is a Research Professor of Public Policy; Research Professor, Department
of Internal Medicine, School of Medicine; Research Professor, Department of Biology; and Director,
Center for Genome Ethics, Law and Policy, Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy at Duke
University.
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accrues to individual students—especially if they are taught not
only specific content but how to learn new content and skills continuously throughout their working lives—there are important
benefits for society as a whole of having a more skilled workforce.
Generally speaking, more skilled workers are more adaptable
and are able to learn and apply new skills as economies change
and grow and, in the process, work requirements change. Skilled
workers also have the tools to be more resourceful entrepreneurs—those who found new businesses—who are important
drivers of innovation and job creation.
But universities, especially “research universities,” do a lot more
than teach. Through the research of their faculty (and sometimes
their students), universities develop new knowledge, which is the
basis for the innovation that economists now widely agree is the
most important driver of growth in the long run. Some new
knowledge is only distantly related to the marketplace for
lengthy periods, until enterprising researchers and/or entrepreneurs find ways to combine or refashion it to generate new products, services, or ways of producing them. Examples include fundamental theorems in math and sciences. In other cases, however, university-generated knowledge is more applied in nature at
the outset and, with some further experimentation and refinements, can be more quickly disseminated throughout society.
Indeed, university-generated knowledge cannot benefit society,
not just in the countries of origin but eventually elsewhere
throughout the world, unless it is disseminated. University
research reaches others through academic publications, instruction, meetings and symposia, and today, increasingly, via the
Internet. When transmitted this way, knowledge is a true “public
good,” available to anyone, including those who find useful ways
of combining the “new” with what they already know or is otherwise publicly available to develop and market some new commercial applications.
Increasingly, universities also engage in commercialization of the
innovations developed by their faculty, either by licensing tech-
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nologies to ongoing businesses or through the launch of new
enterprises, in which faculty may—and often do—take a leading
role. Some contest whether commercialization should be a university function at all, however. Perhaps the broadest claim is that
universities exist to further the creation of new basic knowledge,
and it is not their role or that of their faculty to engage in commercialization. Based on this view, some worry that commercial
activities distort the research interests and detract from the time
that faculty members have to give to their basic research and
instructional activities. Moreover, it is sometimes claimed that
commercialization can distort the values and culture of the university, its faculty, and its leaders.
Universities’ primary goals are and should always continue to be
the discovery and dissemination of new knowledge. But at the
same time, universities are not monasteries. New knowledge for
its sake cannot benefit human beings unless it also is applied to
real world problems and challenges, and when this is done, the
results must be disseminated to society. In market economies, dissemination is often best accomplished when innovations are commercialized, for it is the infusion of human and financial capital
that enables innovations to “scale.” To take the academic inventors out of this process can significantly reduce the likelihood that
discoveries in the lab will be turned quickly to constructive uses
by the larger society that exists outside university walls.
Presuming there is a dichotomy between basic and applied
knowledge, moreover, is quite frequently a deep conceptual mistake. Some fields of academic research are indeed quite remote
from application, but most are not. In the life sciences, in particular, most research is conducted squarely in what Donald Stokes
termed “Pasteur’s Quadrant,” where research is both scientifically valuable and also immensely practical. Most university
research is supported by public funds precisely because it promises to contribute to a government mission, such as health, national defense, energy production, or environmental protection.
One common pathway entails commercialization of a product or
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service arising in research funded by government or nonprofit
organizations.
In fact, the notion that universities must play an integral role in
the commercialization of faculty-generated innovations has been
national policy for some time. In 1980, Congress codified this
notion in the Bayh-Dole Act, which among other things explicitly
grants universities, small businesses, or nonprofit institutions
rights to retain intellectual property (IP) in inventions funded by
the federal government.
Scholars continue to debate the effectiveness of Bayh-Dole, a subject explored in more detail shortly.1 Two features of the BayhDole Act are, however, not much in dispute: it made policies far
more consistent among agencies, reducing the need for costly and
protracted case-by-case negotiation; and it set strong default rules
for ownership of intellectual property, again avoiding transaction
costs. The act thus increased the efficiency of commercializing
technologies arising from federal funding.
Federal funding for research is itself a policy central to achieving
social benefit through translation into goods and services. Federal
funding of university research has resulted in numerous and
important commercial applications. As just one illustration, consider the list of the fifty most important innovations and discoveries funded by the National Science Foundation in its first fifty
years, according to the NSF itself in 2000. Although this Nifty Fifty
list includes some huge basic advances—such as the discovery
that the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate—most items
on the list are innovations that have been commercialized or have
become platforms for many commercial products and services
and are widely in use: barcodes, CAD/CAM software, data compression technology used in compact discs, and perhaps most sig1 For an excellent summary of the literature on this question, see Frank T. Rothaermel, Shanti D.
Agung, and Lin Jiang, “University Entrepreneurship: A Taxonomy of the Literature,” Industrial and
Corporate Change 16, no. 4 (2007): 739-40.
2 National Science Foundation, Nifty Fifty (2000), available at www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/nsffoutreach/htm/home.htm.
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nificant of all, the Internet (which the NSF funded along with
DARPA, a defense research agency).2 Not all of the Nifty Fifty
innovations are high tech, however, but their importance is indisputable. These include yellow barrels used on the sides of
highways to slow down out-of-control vehicles before they hit
barriers and walls, and the American Sign Language Dictionary,
which has changed the lives of the Deaf and hard of hearing.
Another, more recent accounting of the importance of universitygenerated innovations is reflected in an analysis of the top 100
“most technologically significant new products” listed each year
in R&D magazine. Fred Block and Matthew Keller report that
universities and federal laboratories have become much more
important sources of the top 100 innovations over the last thirtyfive years.3 In 1975, for example, they note that private firms
accounted for over 70 percent of the R&D 100, while the academic institution share was just 15 percent. By 2006, just three decades
later, these two shares were reversed: academia contributed over
70 percent of the top 100 innovations, while private firms
accounted for about 25 percent. Presumptively, the primary reason for the turnaround is that after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,
academic institutions became far more active in research with
potential commercial outcomes. The real story is more likely,
however, that the huge growth of federal funding for research
over the six decades after World War II took a couple decades to
begin to translate into commercially significant innovation, and
such federal funding for research will continue to be a crucial federal policy affecting the national innovation system.
University-generated innovations should be even more important to the U.S. economy and society in the years ahead. As
Jonathan Cole states in his impressive history of universities in
3 Fred Block and Matthew Keller, “Where Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in the U.S.
National Innovation System, 1970-2006.” (Washington, DC: The Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation, 2008).
4 Jonathan Cole, The Great American University: Its Rise to Preeminence, Its Indispensable
National Role, Why It Must Be Protected (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 4.
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the United States, “In the future, virtually every new industry will
depend on research conducted at America’s research universities.”4
(emphasis added) Moreover, the federal government is heavily
involved in bringing this future about. In 2009, the various federal agencies channeled approximately 60 percent of the $147
billion they spent on research and development—or roughly $90
billion—directly to U.S. universities.5
Given the importance of university research to many commercial
goods and services, it is critical that university-generated innovation is quickly and efficiently commercialized, for it is often primarily through commercialization that the benefits of innovation
are widely disseminated and translated into increases in GDP
(and other measures of welfare). This chapter argues that
although there is much to applaud in the current system of federal research support and commercialization, like any system or
process, it can be improved. Indeed, the innovative process itself
requires those within it never to be totally satisfied with the way
things are, and to be constantly on the lookout for ways to do better. Indeed, all those participating in the system need constantly
to learn from experience, based on careful analysis of what works
and what does not.
Special attention is given here to one important aspect of the commercialization of university innovation: the process governing
the licensing of intellectual property rights in innovations developed by faculty inventors. The chapter outlines several reasons
why this process at most universities is suboptimal and offers
several possible improvements. All of them involve changes in
the relationships between faculty inventors and their universities.
The federal government, as a principal funder of university
research, is in a position to accelerate these changes, if it so
chooses.

5 National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010, Chapter 4.
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THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY-GENERATED
INNOVATION: NOT ALL IT CAN BE
By at least one well-accepted measure—revenues from licensing
agreements—universities have had increasing success commercializing the innovations of their faculty members. According to
the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM),
which compiles these data for most universities annually, universities earned $1.9 billion in licensing revenues from faculty-generated IP in 2008, up from just $221 million in 1996, when these data
were first available.6 The top ten university earners over the
entire 1996-2008 period are listed in table 1.
How important are these figures? One conventional way to
answer that question is to compare licensing revenue to invested
funds from all sources (not just federal government support) in
order to compute a “rate of return.” Table 1 also lists these rates
of return for the top ten schools for the thirteen-year period,
which range from lows of 0.3 percent (for the University of
California system and the University of Washington) to a high of
4.3 percent for the top-earning school, NYU.7 Admittedly, these
rates of return are imperfect measures because they do not take
account of the different kinds of research on which the faculty at
different universities are engaged. For example, almost by definition, if a school is focused largely on basic research that is not likely to have any immediate commercial payoff, then its rate of
return will be close to zero. At the other end of the spectrum, if
much of the research is concentrated on projects likely to have
more immediate commercial uses, then rates of return should be
higher. In addition, a university may be engaged largely in basic
6 Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity Survey¸ available
at www.autm.net/Licensing_Surveys_AUTM.htm. The AUTM data are not a complete census as
participation is voluntary, but since they cover virtually all of the top research universities, the
reported licensing figures are likely to come close to an actual total for all university licensing revenues.
7 The average annual rates of return are calculated by dividing total licensing income by total
research expenditures for each university, and then dividing that figure by thirteen, or the number
of years in the 1996-2008 period.
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research, but have one or two commercial “big hits” that bump
up the reported return for the school as a whole. Only very few
university inventions become financial blockbusters, and the
returns are highly skewed; luck plays a large role in those “home
run” financial successes. The rates of return shown in table 1 are
not adjusted for these differences in research types and outputs,
and in the absence of other data, it is impossible to do so.
Moreover, in all fairness, licensing revenue certainly is not and
should not be the only measure of the effectiveness of university
research and its dissemination. The better metrics for success
would be measures of how knowledge, not money, changes
hands to foster innovation. Much of what universities produce
are true public goods. The knowledge from faculty research finds
its way into the research of others, thus changing the way firms
and other organizations operate. And people trained in academe
go on to found businesses or bring their expertise to private firms
that innovate. These impacts do not readily show up in market
transactions or prices, and even when the knowledge and the
people have direct commercial benefit, their contributions cannot
be easily attributable to any particular research finding. Indeed,
as William Nordhaus has shown, inventors generally capture for
themselves only about 4 percent of the value of their inventions.8
Licensing revenues are nonetheless a useful indicator of commercial success, indeed more useful than some other hard counts of
research output, such as papers published in prestigious journals
(many of which may have no commercial value), or numbers of
patents filed or issued. It also would be useful to have measures
of the numbers and performance of companies launched by university faculty members, but such data are generally not available. MIT did study the number of firms and jobs associated with
its faculty and alumni and found that MIT alumni had founded
8 William D. Nordhaus, “Schumpeterian Profits and the Alchemist Fallacy,” Yale Working Papers on
Economic Applications and Policy, Discussion Paper No. 6 (2005), http://www.econ.yale.
edu/ddp/ddp00/ddp0006.pdf.
9 Edward B. Roberts and Charles Eesley, “Entrepreneurial Impact: The Role of MIT,” 2009.
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25,800 active companies that employed 3.3 million people, generating annual world sales of $2 trillion. This production is equivalent to the eleventh-largest economy in the world.9 But such studies are few and far between, and MIT is an unusually productive
entrepreneurial institution by any account.
Even with all of the foregoing caveats, the rates of return reported in table 1 are quite low. Collectively, they indicate either that
most research by most universities has very little commercial
value, or that the commercial potential is there but is far from
being fully realized. Both of these assertions could be, and probably are, true. In fact, there are three reasons—in addition to any
inferences about suboptimality that may be drawn from the rates
of return—for believing that more innovations developed by
university faculty could be commercialized more quickly and
effectively.
First, by one industry-specific output measure—the number of
drugs approved for marketing by the Food and Drug
Administration—compared to federal support of university
research devoted to or related to the development of new drugs,
performance looks less than stellar. Whereas federal funding
for health-related research, which is primarily channeled to university faculty through the National Institutes of Health, has
increased substantially—from under $20 billion in 1993 to almost
$30 billion in 2008—the number of new FDA-approved drugs has
dropped fairly consistently since 1996, when it peaked at over
fifty, to just fifteen in 2008.10 Many factors contribute to this drop
in new drug approvals, but the underlying point is that a rise in
R&D expenditure and drop in new drug approval happened during the same period, suggesting that federal research support for
the health sciences, which is the dominant way in which federal
university-research dollars are spent, has been becoming less
commercially productive.

10 See Robert E. Litan and Lesa Mitchell, “A Faster Path from Lab to Market,” Harvard Business
Review (January/February 2010): 7.
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Admittedly, the pattern of declining productivity is just part of
the broader story of the pharmaceutical industry, which from
1993 to 2004 increased its R&D spending by 147 percent, but
increased the number of new drug applications to the FDA annually only by 38 percent.11 Clearly, there is something at work that
is causing health sciences research, however it is funded and
pursued, to become less productive of commercially valuable
drugs and biologics. Perhaps it is just a process of diminishing
returns. But there also may be underlying inefficiencies in the
research and commercialization process in both private industry
and on campus, as well as legal and regulatory impediments.
With respect to universities in particular, there are additional reasons for believing that the current commercialization process is
suboptimal. For starters, with some notable exceptions, university technology licensing offices (TLOs) or technology transfer
offices (TTOs), the bodies that have come to have sole responsibility on university campuses for licensing faculty-generated innovations, are not all equally well funded or staffed. Most such
offices have to ration the attention they are able to give to university faculty. Furthermore, in principle, a successful TTO employee should have the same skill set as a partner in a private venture
capital firm. In practice, this is rarely possible because VCs pay
their staff and partners much more than a university could afford
or justify.
In addition, some university faculty do not technically comply
with their employment contracts that require them to use the TTO
for licensing, and instead commercialize their innovations
“through the back door,” in part for the reason just stated, and
also because TTOs themselves have their own bureaucratic tendencies. Indeed, the extent to which this occurs is an indicator of
the suboptimality of the current university commercialization
system.

11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, New Drug Development: Science, Business, Regulatory,
and Intellectual Property Issues Cited as Hampering Drug Development Efforts, November 2006.
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How much back-door activity takes place? This is difficult to
answer with any precision, since many faculty innovators will be
reluctant to admit this is what they are doing, and universities
may have difficulty finding out. Nonetheless, the best research on
this subject, by Jerry Thursby, Anne Fuller, and Marie Thursby,
suggest that the volume of back-door patenting and thus, by
implication, commercialization is substantial. The university can
elect to forego patent rights, leaving them to the faculty inventor,
or research may have taken place abroad or under terms giving
faculty ownership rights, so not all such cases represent “backdoor” commercialization. The frequency of apparent back-door
commercialization seems high enough, however, to suggest that
it is a very real phenomenon. In their study of eighty-seven
research universities, this research team found that almost 38 percent of the more than 5,800 patents in their sample are not
assigned solely to the university, which the authors note is surprising in light of the standard faculty employment contract that
expressly requires that universities own faculty inventions when
university resources are used in the research.12
In effect, back-door commercialization acts as a safety valve, but
it is an inefficient one. Not every faculty innovator who is frustrated with the university’s TTO will take the risk or go to the
effort of commercializing “in the dark” and instead will simply
take his or her place in the queue at the TTO. When this happens,
useful commercialization activity may be slowed or halted.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the licensing systems that
universities have established are structured to generate suboptimal results. Since the passage of Bayh-Dole, virtually all research
universities have centralized licensing activities and decisions in
their TTOs. Universities apparently did this to realize economies
of scale in licensing; to comply with Bayh-Dole reporting requirements; to assure that faculty members reported their discoveries
to the universities so that universities could thus accurately keep
12 Jerry Thursby, Anne Fuller, and Marie Thursby, “U.S. Faculty Patenting: Inside and Outside the
University,” Research Policy 38 (2009): 14-25.
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tabs on royalties they were owed under faculty employment
agreements; to coordinate patenting decisions when multiple faculty and students were involved; to coordinate licensing arrangements when faculty from other universities were coinventors;
and presumably out of a belief that TTOs would accumulate more
knowledge about the most advantageous licensing opportunities
than individual faculty members.
All these were and are worthy reasons for centralization. But centralization also had the likely unintended effect of creating a
monopoly bureaucracy that leaves faculty inventors with little
choice about how, to whom, and at what pace to license or otherwise commercialize their innovations. If universities applied the
same model to faculty research, it would mean that all faculty
members would be required, by contract, to first obtain the
approval of a central “publications office” that would coordinate
the submission of articles to journals and books to publishers. It
almost goes without saying that faculty would not stand for such
an approach to their publications, nor would universities voluntarily adopt it for fear of frustrating the dissemination of research
results to the academic community and the wider public. Yet
when it comes to commercial activity, universities have taken a
very different approach.
It has not always been this way. Prior to the passage of Bayh-Dole
in 1980, few academic institutions—Wisconsin’s independent
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) established in
1925 being the notable exception—had formal TTOs, inside or
independent of the university. Only after Bayh-Dole was enacted
did universities gradually begin to centralize the commercialization functions that the act legitimated. Now, as noted, virtually all
research universities have a TTO, which in the typical case has
exclusive control over the licensing and commercialization activities related to innovations developed by university faculty.
In theory, of course, TTOs can be structured or can operate in such
a way as to facilitate rather than hinder licensing and commercialization. There are examples where this in fact is the case. But

66

3: UNIVERSITIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
monopolies, especially those wielding legal rights to that status
by virtue of university employment contracts, also have wellknown incentives to behave suboptimally.
Perhaps most recognized is the incentive for monopolies to
reduce output. In the university commercialization context, this
tendency manifests itself in the limited attention, given limited
resources, that TTOs have to give to all innovations developed by
university faculty, and the inherent need therefore to focus on
only a few potential “winners.” But with talent and experience no
better than private venture firms, and without the same or similar gain-sharing incentives for success that motivate general partners of VC firms (who typically take 20 percent of the profits of
the enterprise), there is no reason to believe that the TTOs can be
any more effective than the market itself in determining the true
winners. This leaves potentially many innovations by faculty
members not given favored treatment by the TTO staff in bureaucratic limbo until someone in that office can give them proper
attention, if ever. Indeed, the well-known tendency toward
bureaucracy and inefficiency of monopolies, to which TTOs certainly are not immune, aggravates this problem.
The monopoly that each TTO has over its university’s licensing
and commercialization of faculty inventions also leads to a potentially even more significant systemwide flaw. Given their exclusive
control over licensing, TTOs are required to be jacks-of-all-trades
and thus cannot, without ignoring innovations across many technologies by many different faculty members, specialize in one or
a few technologies. Even in cases where TTOs choose to specialize in their search for “home runs,” they cannot exploit any
economies of scale since, with all research universities relying on
their own TTOs for licensing, there is no opportunity for all of
them to offer their services to faculty of other academic institutions (a situation that can be remedied under at least one of the
reform options outlined below). The net result is that the market
for the licensing of university-developed technologies is highly
and almost certainly inefficiently fragmented.
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In sum, despite the clear progress that universities have made
since 1980 in commercializing innovations by their faculty, there
are several reasons for believing that they could do even better.
Rates of return on research investment, however imperfect as a
measure of success, are disappointingly low. Research productivity in one particular field where university research is amply
supported by the federal government—pharmaceuticals—has
been declining. Most technology transfer offices are underresourced and cannot effectively compete in the market for talent in
identifying promising commercial opportunities. And perhaps
most important, the university technology licensing market is
structured to inhibit competition, which almost certainly leaves
some commercial opportunities on the shelf while slowing others
from reaching the marketplace and consumers. Finally, although
it has not been said to date but should be obvious, no system in
any organization can be perfect. The search for improvements is
or should be never ending.
None of this is to suggest that fixing the technology transfer
model will necessarily improve the productivity of pharmacological research in particular, where the productivity statistics are
especially disturbing. Much more far-reaching changes in the
structure of that particular industry are probably necessary.

POSSIBLE REFORMS
The suboptimal performance of university commercialization
operations as a whole not only hurts society, but also universities
and faculty innovators. A more efficient system would generate
more commercially useful products more quickly, which not only
would help consumers, but also bring greater revenue more
quickly to universities and to faculty innovators whose employment contracts typically give them some share in the royalties or
revenues when their technologies are commercialized. University
faculty are not in a position to change the status quo, however,
since no single faculty member has enough bargaining position to
compel his or her university employers to change the system in
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any meaningful way. Why then, do university leaders follow a
path that seemingly is not in their own interest?
This important question is not well addressed in the literature, so
it is possible here only to speculate on the possible reasons. One
possible answer is that, at least for universities that have had
some commercialization successes such as those listed in table 1,
university presidents and trustees probably are pleased with their
performance and thus unlikely aware that they could do even
better. This is true even though there is no evidence that a university’s ranking on the top ten list of cumulative licensing revenue
has anything to do with the effectiveness of its TTO. One or a few
blockbuster innovations may account for most of the revenue,
and these events are more likely to be random than the product
of successful staff work at the TTO. Nonetheless, for reasons
already given, the current monopoly TTO structure is not well
suited to quickly identifying and speeding the commercialization
of even these random successful innovations.
Universities with far less success at commercial licensing may
also be unaware of how much better they might do under different arrangements. While perhaps disappointed at their relative
(and absolute) lack of success at commercialization, their leaders
may attribute this result also to randomness of a different sort:
their faculty, either because of disinterest in commercially relevant research or because they have just been unlucky, haven’t yet
had the big hits that drive commercial success.
Another factor at work may be the fact that technology transfer
officials have no interest in calling attention to university presidents or other university leaders the suboptimality of the current
system, assuming they believe this to be the case. Indeed, there is
little evidence that technology transfer officials even believe the
current system is suboptimal in any way. But for those few who
might recognize this to be the case, it still is not in their self-interest to want to disturb the status quo, especially in any way that
might compel them to compete against other licensing agents.
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The Great Recession and its aftermath, however, may induce
some university leaders and/or trustees to begin searching for
ways to improve commercialization outcomes. With the drop in
university endowments caused by the decline in equity and real
estate values, the corresponding falloffs in wealth among alumni
donors, and the potential decline in federal research monies poststimulus due to continuing budget pressures, universities will be
looking even harder for other ways to raise funds (other than by
raising tuition even more than otherwise would be the case). One
obvious target is increased revenue from technology commercialization.
An intensified focus on commercialization could be a mixed
blessing. It could reinforce TTOs’ incentives and tendencies to
concentrate their time and efforts on what they believe are home
run opportunities, to the detriment of perhaps many other singles
and doubles. Certain licensing agents in a freer market can be
expected to behave in the same fashion, but at least they would
be competing against each other for deals, and thus some agents
who might not have access to the true home runs would be content to work on the doubles and singles if they only had the
chance. Given the difficult economic circumstances confronting
universities, it is possible that leaders of some of them would recognize the advantages of harnessing free-market forces in licensing, or at the very least, be open to some fundamental rethinking
about the ways they want to commercialize their faculties’ inventions in the future.
In that spirit, some ways to improve upon the current university
technology licensing system are catalogued and discussed below.
It bears emphasis that each of these ideas can be implemented by
universities on their own—primarily through changes in their
relationships and legal agreements with their faculty. This section
closes, however, with some thoughts on how the federal government, as a significant funder of university research and as the
originator of the concept that universities have a right to commercialize federally funded research (under the Bayh-Dole Act),
might encourage universities to adopt one or more of these ideas.
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Standardized or “Express” Licensing
One method to make licensing more efficient and provide
stronger incentives to faculty innovators, who may be closer to
market opportunities than less-specialized TTO staff, to explore
commercially relevant opportunities (either by starting their own
companies or licensing their technologies to existing enterprises)
is to standardize the license agreements themselves. This would
eliminate the need for potentially time-consuming and costly
negotiations between university TTO staff, potential licensees,
and faculty inventors.
The University of North Carolina implemented its form of this
idea in early 2010 for start-up company licensees only through its
“Express License Agreement.” The Express License can be chosen
by any UNC faculty member, student, or staff who is a founder of
a company using IP rights owned solely by the university, and
after a detailed business plan is reviewed and approved by the
TTO. Key provisions of the standard agreement include a 1 percent royalty on products requiring FDA approval and 2 percent
for all other products. In addition, the standard agreement
requires the licensee to make a cash payout of 0.75 percent of the
company’s fair market value upon its merger, stock or asset sale,
or initial public offering. The license also encourages the licensee
to make products available for humanitarian purposes in developing countries.13
Something like the UNC Express License should be easily replicable at other universities and also federal labs. Admittedly, one
limitation of the idea is that it presumes capability within the university’s TTO to evaluate the innovator’s business plan. Not all
TTOs are well equipped to do this. One way to address this
potential problem is for universities wanting to use the Express
License approach to establish an outside panel of experienced

13 Joseph M. DeSimone, William R. Kenan, Jr., and Lesa Mitchell, Facilitating the Commercialization
of University Innovation: The Carolina Express License Agreement (Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, April 2010), www.kauffman.org.
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entrepreneurs (comprising alumni and local residents with interest in the university) to review these plans.
One other possible objection, which on closer inspection may be
an advantage, is that since the standard license would be available only for startups, it might bias university faculty, staff, and
students toward launching new companies, which is likely to be
a riskier source of revenue, rather than licensing to existing companies. The advantage of such a bias, however, is that the payoff
to the launch of a new business, if it succeeds, may be much larger than any royalty that might be realized from a license to an
already established company.
To help ensure the best possible outcome for the university, innovators, and society, it therefore is in universities’ best interest—
regardless of which, if any, of the reform ideas outlined here (or
others) they may wish to adopt—to provide entrepreneurial
training and mentoring to faculty and students who want to
launch a business around their innovations. There are successful
models of this idea at multiple universities—MIT, Washington
University of St. Louis, the University of Miami, and the
University of North Carolina, among others—that can and
should be replicated.

Multi-university Technology Commercialization Consortiums
TTOs have inherent difficulties realizing economies of scale, both
because of resource limits at their universities and also because of
the broad range of technologies developed by the faculty at their
universities. Licensing and commercialization activity thus cries
out for specialized providers—those who can serve a sufficient
volume of similar innovations to develop expertise and realize
some economies of scale.
One way of doing this would be for university TTOs to join
forces, either in full-scale mergers or in less-than-full-scale joint
ventures. Such consortia could be developed along regional lines,
within specific technological fields, or both. A single consortium
could replace an individual TTO, or a single TTO might join mul72
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tiple consortia. Obviously, there are many different possible combinations of these alternatives.
While participation in one or more consortia would enable universities to better realize economies of scale and the advantages
of specialization, this option has its drawbacks. It may be difficult
specifying ex ante rules for distributing the gains from various
royalty or equity participations arrangements, and possibly also
for splitting expenses. Likewise, there may be disputes over these
matters ex post in individual cases where faculty members from
different universities in a consortium are involved in creating the
innovation. At the same time, these issues may be no more difficult than is the case now, where faculty from multiple universities
share in the invention and the universities involved have to
decide how to split the IP rights and any related gains.
The advantages of the consortium option(s) may be enhanced if
the consortia also adopt a standardized license for startups. This
would combine the benefits of both approaches while eliminating
at the outset some potential disputes or negotiating difficulties
that otherwise could later arise.

Commercialization Decision Making by Successful
Entrepreneurs
A more far-reaching reform would devolve decisions about
which university-developed innovations to commercialize, in
what order and in what manner, to a special board of successful
entrepreneurs who have close affiliations with the university.
Successful alumni are obvious candidates, but so also are successful local entrepreneurs who care about and have worked with or
supported the university.
The case for doing this should be obvious, regardless of what
other reforms might be adopted. Successful entrepreneurs, especially if they have backgrounds in areas of innovation developed
by university faculty, almost certainly have more experience and
expertise in commercialization than the typical employees of the
university TTO (unless, by chance, those employees have had
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successful entrepreneurial careers themselves, which is surely the
exception and not the rule). If none of the permanent members of
the special board have sufficient expertise to evaluate a particular
technology, they and the university should have the ability to
recruit ad hoc members who would have such knowledge.
It is important that the board be more than advisory, but actually
have a decision-making role. For this purpose, it probably will be
necessary to compensate the board members in some manner,
though given their ties to the university some members are likely
to donate any such amounts back. Faculty members may be
included on the selection boards, but priority should be given to
“star scientists,” or those relatively few faculty members who
have also had successful entrepreneurial careers.
Turning the decision making over priorities and deal structures
for commercialization activities to a board of entrepreneurs
would, of course, fundamentally change the function of university TTOs. While they may continue to perform ministerial functions relating to licensing, their focus instead (assuming they
would continue to exist) would turn to education of faculty members about the entrepreneurial process. However, as suggested as
part of the next option, it is not clear that TTOs are best equipped
to provide this service, and if not, it should be outsourced to more
capable hands.

Choice in Licensing (or “Free Agency”)
As meritorious as they may be, however, neither consortia nor the
standardized license get at the root cause of most of the likely
underperformance of university commercialization efforts. That
is, neither option would break up the monopoly control each university TTO has over its own faculty, which as argued above has
likely led to excessive bureaucracy and slowed or inhibited the
commercialization of innovations that TTOs deem not to be
potential home runs.
The solution to these problems is to let the market decide—more
than it does now—which innovations should be commercialized
74

3: UNIVERSITIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
and at what pace, rather than gatekeeper TTOs. In particular, the
third reform option offered here would grant faculty (or staff and
student) innovators the same freedom in choosing the licensing
agent for their innovations that they now have in choosing where
to publish their research. This would require, of course, a change
in the standard university faculty employment agreement, but it
would extend only to the licensing decision and not affect the university’s financial and reporting arrangements with respect to
faculty innovations, and would not require statutory change or
altering the fundamentals of the Bayh-Dole framework.
Freeing up the market in technology licensing should bring big
benefits to all parties concerned. It would provide much stronger
incentives for faculty to commercialize their discoveries more
quickly, eliminating the potentially long waits at the TTO to get
recognition. This would generate benefits for society, for faculty
innovators, and for the universities who will share in their success. Choice in licensing would also encourage specialization and
thus economies of scale among licensing agents, whether or not
they are affiliated with universities. Some universities might even
decide to drop their TTOs, merge or pool them with other
research institutions, or significantly reduce their staff as a result
and thereby save money and generate better returns. Or, universities could decide to keep their TTOs to compete with other
licensing agents and/or transform them into technology consulting offices that would give advice to faculty about the commercialization and licensing process.
Several objections to the so-called “free agency model” in technology commercialization can be anticipated. One question that may
arise relates to who will pay for patent filing fees in a system of
free agency. Under the current system, a faculty or staff innovator
who can persuade the university TTO that a patent should be
filed will have that cost underwritten by the university itself. But
under free agency, might faculty inventors have no ways other
than by digging into their own pockets to fund their patent filings, in which case IP might be underprotected?
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The answer to this question is that markets would (and should)
determine how patent filings are funded. The university could
often retain ownership while delegating some choice of technology licensing authority to faculty. Some nonuniversity licensing
agents or attorneys may choose to take royalties or a small equity interest in the innovator’s company as payment for patent
filings that innovators cannot fund themselves. Since there are
many such potential agents, competition among them can be
counted on to protect innovators. Alternatively, even under free
agency, faculty innovators would retain the right to choose their
own university’s TTO, or any new commercialization consortia
that may be formed in a freer and more competitive environment,
and any one of these entities could front the costs of the patent filing. Moreover, in many cases, the university does not pay patent
prosecution costs even now, but rather the licensing firm pays
those costs.
Another possible objection to free agency is the belief that many
faculty innovators need the guidance of their TTOs since they are
unlikely to have significant experience in this area or as entrepreneurs more broadly. It is precisely for this reason, however, that it
is important that universities more generally help train and mentor entrepreneurial faculty. But this training need not be done by
the TTO; indeed, there should be a presumption against this since
TTO staff members are not likely to have the requisite entrepreneurial experience.
Furthermore, the notion that many faculty innovators need the
helping hand of TTOs in licensing is wrong often enough that an
alternative is prudent policy. There are cases where faculty does
need TTO expertise, but other cases when faculty expertise far
outstrips TTO capacity. Current policy only makes sense in situations where the TTO adds value. Consistent with the “80/20” rule
applicable in so many other realms of life, a relatively small group
of the most successful serial faculty innovators are probably
14 See, e.g. Lynne Zucker and Michael Darby, “Star Scientists, Innovation and Regional and National
Immigration” (working paper no. 13547, National Bureau of Economics Research, 2007).
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responsible for most of the successful innovations university
TTOs are now licensing. Indeed, such “rock star” scientists have
been demonstrated to be critical to the economic success of the
local areas where they live and work.14 These individuals are not
likely to be in need of the counseling that TTOs provide; to
the contrary, many of these innovators are likely to have more
experience and a stronger social network than TTO staff members. As for other faculty members with less commercial experience, in a free market, many would almost surely do what consumers who are looking for a doctor, a repair specialist, or an auto
mechanic routinely do: they ask others (in the university case,
most likely, more senior or more experienced faculty innovators)
for their suggestions. In addition, in a freer market, it is likely that
information providers would build Internet-accessible databases
and rating services of the most effective licensing agents, generally and in particular technological fields.
A third potential concern is whether free agency complicates the
commercialization of innovations developed by faculty innovators from multiple laboratories within a university, or from multiple universities. In particular, with innovators having the right
to choose their licensing agents, will this lead to more disputes
over ownership of the IP, which would slow commercialization?
Although it is difficult to know the answer to this question with
any precision, there are reasons to doubt that free agency would
lead to significantly more intra- or interuniversity disputes.
Problems of attributing IP to different inventors and universities
already exist under the current system, with TTO offices and university general counsel having to resolve them. Indeed, the
nature of research is evolving to bigger teams and more institutions involved in invention and its commercialization. The problem of multiagency is very real and likely to intensify, but it is not
necessarily a problem solved by centralization at the university
level, which is the current default framework.15

15 In the intrauniversity case, which is frequent, however, the university administration does have
many channels to address the problem without “taking it to the outside.”
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Of course, if free agency were to lead to more cross-university faculty collaborations—some of which may result in IP ownership
disputes—this is not necessarily a bad outcome. To the contrary,
the more cross-fertilization of ideas takes place, the more innovative the entire university ecosystem is likely to be. Having to
resolve some increased level of IP disputes seems a price worth
paying for more commercialized innovation.
In the end, opponents to free agency have a difficult question to
answer: why only in the particular case of technology licensing,
but not in research, should faculty members lack the freedom to
choose the best method for advancing their innovation (especially when the exercise of choice does not disrupt the university’s
royalty or gain-sharing arrangement in the faculty member’s contract)? To be more precise, on what grounds can monopoly and
central control in this narrow sphere of highly expert activity be
justified (when the presumption in virtually every other sphere of
economic activity favors competition)? At the very least, opponents to free agency would seem to have the burden of proof in
carrying the day on each of these questions.

Inventor IP Ownership
The final, and arguably most extreme, option for accelerating the
university commercialization process is for universities to give up
their IP rights in faculty inventions, or at least not to pursue them
so aggressively (as has been the norm in a number of universities). This could easily be accomplished by revising the standard
university faculty employment contract so that any university
rights to inventions under Bayh-Dole would be assigned on a
royalty-free basis to faculty, staff, or students.16
Letting faculty inventors have full rights in their innovations
clearly would provide the maximum incentives possible for rapid
16 Some reform advocates argue that even under the current standard employment contract, universities cannot claim ownership of the IP of faculty innovators, even those who conduct their
research using university resources. This hot-button issue is not addressed here, except to note
that if this position were upheld by a court, universities could override any such ruling by revising
their faculty contracts to make it explicit that universities have full rights to the IP.
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commercialization, and for that reason the idea should be seriously considered, though perhaps on an experimental basis, or in
cases where that appears to be the optimal solution because of the
nature of the invention and the inventor. The major reason for
proceeding incrementally is that universities need to test both
whether giving up their IP does in fact lead to more commercialization—which is a social good—but also whether faculty inventors, so legally empowered, would feel morally obligated to share
with their universities some of their private gains from commercializing their innovations. This has happened already under the
existing system, and it is likely that loyal faculty would continue
sharing their wealth if they had full rights to the IP. Even if, on a
per-transaction basis, faculty givebacks were not as generous as
the current standard royalty arrangements, if university assignments of IP rights to faculty led to more commercialization, the
“pie” of what there is to share would grow, and universities, individually and collectively, would be better off. Only by experimenting with this option can universities learn whether this
would be true.
There are some powerful counterarguments to taking faculty free
agency to the level of ownership that must be acknowledged. One
is that some faculty will selfishly abuse the system. This is probably the case, but faculty who want to remain part of a university are subject to many other criteria for evaluation of their performance. Another objection is that the university itself is responsible for creating the environment in which creative innovation
takes place, and it deserves part of the reward. This argument is
sound, but the formulas used for allocating licensing revenues
among faculty inventors, departments, schools, and overall university coffers are the real focus for revenue sharing, and this
could be done with faculty ownership as well as institutional
ownership, as a condition of the faculty employment agreement.
If the real driving force is “star” scientists as much or more than
“star” universities, then the current default ownership policies
are suboptimal.
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Role of Federal Policy
Each one or all of these reform options can be adopted by universities on their own. But given the broad social interest in more
rapid commercialization of faculty-generated innovation,
coupled with the substantial federal taxpayer commitment to
university research, the federal government has good reasons for
wanting to encourage universities to adopt one or more of the
foregoing reforms (or perhaps different ones).
There are several possible ways for the government to go about
this. One “soft” option would be for the funding agencies, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, to issue guidance
about implemention and interpretation of licensing procedures
and terms. The National Institutes of Health has done this, in
effect, for research tools and for genomic inventions.17 Perhaps
the broadest approach would be for the Commerce Department,
which has rule-making authority implementing the provisions of
Bayh-Dole, to issue a proposed rule, meant to apply to all federally funded research, to encourage more effective commercialization of faculty-generated innovations. That rule might outline a
“default” standardized license that universities could decide to
adopt, while making clear that although Bayh-Dole gave universities the rights to the IP from faculty innovations, it does not confer on universities the exclusive rights to control licensing.
However, the Commerce Department does not have the legal
authority to overrule Bayh-Dole and thus require universities to
give up their IP rights to faculty inventors. As just noted, this is
something that universities can do voluntarily.
Individual federal agencies that fund university research—
notably the Department of Energy, the National Science
Foundation, the Department of Defense, and the National
17 For research tools, see National Institutes of Health, “Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of
NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research
Resources: Final Notice,” Federal Register 64, no. 246 (December 23, 1999): 72090-72096,
http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf. For genomic inventions, see National Institutes of
Health, “Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions—Final Notice,” Federal Register 70,
no. 68 (April 11, 2005): 18413-18415, http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/70FR18413.pdf.
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Institutes of Health—could go further and condition their grants
on universities adopting any one of the first four proposals (the
notion that the government would condition a grant on universities giving up their IP rights is almost certainly too extreme). As a
step in this direction, they could at least open the door to experimentation. Of course, Congress could impose similar conditions
in its annual appropriations to these and other funding agencies,
and through oversight of the federal funding agencies.

CONCLUSION
Universities are critical to economic growth in a number of ways:
through the students they teach and equip with skills; through
the production of new knowledge, both basic and applied;
and through the commercialization of research by some faculty
members.
The Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in 1980 explicitly to promote economic growth through the last of these channels. It appears to
have been effective in stimulating universities to pay more attention to commercialization opportunities. At the time, the act unintentionally led to the centralization of commercialization
decisions in licensing offices that have gained de facto monopoly
control over the licensing of faculty-developed innovations.
This chapter has outlined several reasons why this system is not
as effective as it could and should be in bringing to market innovations developed at universities. It has outlined several reforms
that individually or in combination could speed commercialization of new technologies, thereby accelerating economic growth
and benefiting society, innovators, and the universities that
employ them.
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TABLE 1. LICENSING INCOMES AND RESEARCH
EXPENDITURES,TOP TEN UNIVERSITIES
1996-2008 (CUMULATIVE)

School Name

Licensing
Research
% Return
Income
Expenditure
Annual
(billions of dollars) (billions of dollars) Average

New York University
University of California
System
Northwestern
Emory University
MIT
University of Minnesota
University of Washington
University of Florida
Florida State University
Wake Forest University

1.49
1.40

2.67
33.28

4.3
0.3

0.96
0.76
0.49
0.42
0.41
0.41
0.37
0.36

3.81
3.48
12.23
6.01
9.25
4.76
2.05
1.43

1.9
1.7
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.7
1.4
3.4

Source: AUTM Licensing Survey, 1996-2008
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U.S. Policy Regarding Highly Skilled
Immigrants:
Change Whose Time Has Come

John E. Tyler and Peter H. Schuck∗

1. INTRODUCTION

H

ighly skilled immigrants to the United States (HSIs), particularly those with graduate degrees in science, engineering, technology, and math (STEM) fields, have helped catalyze innovation, economic growth, jobs, wealth, and
advances in human welfare. America has been attractive to HSIs
and other innovators at least in part because of its fundamental
freedoms, market-friendly values, and reliable infrastructure. But
this past success provides no assurances for our future. Consider
three questions.
First, could our nation have achieved substantially more if our
policy had focused more deliberately on HSIs’ potential economic contributions? Second, how can the United States ensure that
∗ John Tyler is Vice President and Secretary of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Peter
Schuck is Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale University and visiting professor at
New York University School of Law. The authors are grateful for the assistance of David Back and
the comments and feedback of their colleagues on the Kauffman Task Force for Economic Growth.
A longer version of this chapter also appears in the January 2011 symposium edition of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal. The authors are grateful to the Foundation and Fordham for their
respective permissions and to those from each who contributed to editing, cite checking, and otherwise improving both piece.
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we continue to benefit from HSIs in the face of increased competition from other countries seeking to attract (or retain) them?
And finally, is our economic leadership being compromised by
clinging to old policies not well adapted to current and future
circumstances?
In this chapter, we marshal data and evidence demonstrating that
HSIs spur innovation and entrepreneurship, particularly in STEM
fields. We also show that new approaches could better deploy
these talents and increase economic growth. Among changes that
we advocate are allowing state and local governments to target
their efforts to recruit and arrange for permanent or at least provisional visas to HSIs; guaranteeing such visas to HSIs who
receive degrees, particularly at the graduate level, from U.S. universities in STEM disciplines; and adopting a new system that
uses points, an auction, and/or job creation potential to direct
visas to HSIs who can advance innovation, entrepreneurship, and
economic growth.
Part two of this chapter identifies economic problems that new
HSI policies might address. Part three summarizes current U.S.
policies regarding HSIs. Part four advances specific proposals to
increase economic growth, innovation, jobs, wealth, and human
welfare through a more effective approach to HSIs.

2. UNDERSTANDING HOW HSIS CAN HELP EXPAND
THE U.S. ECONOMY
The United States can use HSI policies to address at least two
macro-level economic problems: sluggish economic growth with
too few new firms and jobs; and competition from increasingly
educated and productive countries in the developed and developing worlds.†
2.1. HSIs are Innovative and Entrepreneurial
HSIs innovate and engage in entrepreneurial activity, particularly in STEM industries, at levels disproportionate both to their
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presence in the population and to native-born Americans, generating new firms, jobs, and economic growth.
2.1.1. Measuring HSI Innovation by Education Levels and
Patenting Activity
Researchers often consider two indicators of innovation in the
United States: education in a STEM discipline and patenting
activity.1 They find a correlation between advanced education in
a STEM field and “high rates of entrepreneurship and innovation,”2 high rates of patenting activity by foreign-born inventors
relative to their presence in both the general population and the
workforce more specifically, and substantial spillover effects or
indirect benefits.
For instance, increasing the number of H-1B visas strongly correlates with an increase in the number of patent applications filed
in the United States, while times of decreased H-1B visas show
decreases in the number of patent applications with immigrant
filers.‡ 3 Moreover, innovation by noncitizen residents, as measured by patent applications, appears to be twice the rate of their
presence in both the population and workforce.4 In addition,
immigrants with bachelor’s degrees were granted patents at
twice the rate of native-born Americans with bachelor’s degrees
with the difference rising to almost three times when comparing
those with graduate degrees. The differences in patenting activity were less pronounced when the comparison is with scientists
and engineers but such immigrants still received about 20 percent
more patents than native-born scientists and engineers.5

† Although many studies show that legal immigration in general improves job growth and eco-

nomic development, particularly in disadvantaged areas (Herman and Smith, 2010, see endnote 32),
we focus here on HSIs.
‡ For instance, non-citizen U.S. residents were named on 7.3 percent of patent applications filed in

1998 with the World Intellectual Property Organization from the United States. The rate increased
to 13.8 percent in 2003, rose to 23.5 percent in 2005 and then to 24.2 percent in 2006 (Wadhwa et
al., 2007a, see endnote 15), thereby doubling and then tripling along with the number of available
H-1B visas between 1999 and 2003 (NFAP, 2010, see endnote 32).
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In addition to contributing directly to U.S. innovation, HSIs also
contribute in the form of “spillover” effects6—that is, indirect
benefits to native-born workers and the broader population.
Spillover benefits include helping achieve critical mass in
researching specialized areas and providing skills that complement native-born researchers.§ Some commentators contend that
immigrants crowd out native-born STEM innovation by interfering with access to graduate education,7 taking jobs,8 and depressing wages.9 On the other hand, several researchers find no evidence that increasing the number of H-1B visas reduced innovation by nonimmigrant researchers, as measured by patent applications.10 Still others have found either no crowding out or even
an affirmative crowding in, a positive spillover effect.11
Ultimately, because knowledge is fundamentally cumulative,
iterative, and arguably infinitely expandable, whatever crowding
out may occur must be weighed against the widely distributed,
substantial benefits produced by the quickened pace of scientific
progress and discovery. The United States, then, benefits from
having foreign-born people create and pursue their ideas and
innovations here,12 but we have not adequately pursued the
potential for those benefits. Policy changes that encourage HSIs
to work here are likely to increase overall U.S. innovation and, by
extension, economic growth and job creation.
2.1.2. HSIs Start and Grow Firms and Create Jobs
HSIs have contributed significantly to U.S. economic growth over
time,13 and they have a “striking propensity” to start and grow
companies that create jobs, particularly in technology fields.14
HSIs have been integrally involved with founding about onequarter of the technology and engineering companies started
between 1995 and 2005 that comprise the Dun & Bradstreet
Million Dollar Database.15 Other research corroborates this 25
§ Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle found that a 1 percent increase in immigrant college graduates is

associated with a 12-15 percent increase in total patenting per capita, thereby implying spillover
effect. Their correlations are even more substantive for graduate education and for science and
engineering fields more particularly (2009, see endnote 1).
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percent ratio, including studies of Silicon Valley,16 biotech companies in New England (Immigrant Learning Center 2007),17 and
publicly traded companies that receive venture capital.18
The consistent finding that immigrants create a quarter of businesses is particularly impressive when compared with their presence in the population and workforce. Immigrants start companies at twice their share of both the U.S. population and workforce, and at more than two-and-a-half times the proportion of
legal immigrants in the overall population.** However, these
comparisons may actually understate immigrant entrepreneurial
activity for at least two reasons: the lag effect, and evidence of
even higher rates of firm formation.
With regard to lag effect, it would be unusual for immigrants to
found their companies in the year in which they arrive in the
United States because most immigrants come to America to study
or work, rather than to start companies.19 Also, it generally takes
time for the ideas, networks, and other entrepreneurial factors to
coalesce and motivate visa holders to start a company.20 For these
reasons, a more accurate analysis would compare immigrants as
founders or cofounders of companies begun between 1995 and
2005 with the proportion of immigrants in the population in earlier years, such as 1990, when immigrants were less than 8 percent
of the overall population,21 or in 1995, when they were just over
9 percent of the population.22 Comparing immigrants in this way,
they arguably founded companies at about three times the rate of
their overall presence in the United States during the relevant
years.

** Immigrants, legal and illegal, comprise only about 12 percent of both the overall United States
population and workforce (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2009; Robert W. Fairlie, PhD, Estimating the
Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy, prepared for the SBA Office of
Advocacy, November 2008), with legal immigrants at just under 9 percent (United States Census
Bureau; United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics). (The
illegal population has declined somewhat since 2007.) One study showed that immigrants started
businesses at a monthly rate of about 530 per 100,000 compared with 280 among native born people, or just under a two-to-one ratio (Herman and Smith, 2010), while another study found immigrants to be 30 percent more likely than native born people to start a business (see Fairlie, 2008).
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Moreover, some studies indicate that immigrants have founded
substantially more than 25 percent of companies;†† indeed, some
data suggests double that rate.‡‡ If these higher rates are accurate,
and if the lag effect is ignored so that 2008 is the relevant year for
comparing population (12 percent), workforce (12 percent), and
legal presence in the population (9 percent), then the rate of
immigrants involved with founding companies is three to five
times their presence in the relevant comparison population. If the
lag effect is also factored in so that the relevant population comparison years are 1990 and 1995, then the relative rate of new
company involvement becomes five to six-and-a-half times, an
astonishing statistic.
This phenomenon is critical for our nation’s economic growth
because new firms disproportionately create new jobs. For
instance, firms between one and five years old account for about
two-thirds of net new job creation23 with firms between three and
five years old generating about 10 percent of net new jobs even
though they comprise less than 1 percent of the total number of
companies.24 Because about one-third of all new firms close by
year two and about half do not survive to age five, the firms that
do reach age five are largely responsible for that net new job creation. Obviously, a continuous procession and a large number of
new firms are needed to sustain or expand on that job creation
trend. Yet in recent decades, the United States has experienced a
consistent pattern of about 500,000 new firm starts each year,
despite sharp changes in economic conditions and markets

†† If narrowed to technology companies, immigrants were part of starting 40 percent of publicly
traded venture backed technology companies started between 1990 and 2007 and 47 percent of
privately held venture backed companies (Anderson and Platzer, 2006, see endnote 14). Foreignborn people could have had a role in founding up to 40 percent of New England’s biotechnology
companies, instead of only 25.7 percent of them (Monti et al., 2007, see endnote 25).
‡ About 52 percent of technology and engineering companies started in Silicon Valley between

1995 and 2005 had at least one immigrant founder (Wadhwa et al., 2007a, see endnote 15). This
ratio falls slightly to 47 percent of Silicon Valley technology and engineering companies started
between 1980 and 2005 (Ibid.).
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and the presence of longer cycle changes in population and
education.25
It is in U.S. economic and policy interests, then, to find ways to
increase the number of firm starts and their survival rates. As the
rest of the world has discovered, attracting and retaining entrepreneurial HSIs could produce more new firms that contribute
more net new jobs and grow into mature firms.
2.2. The United States Faces Increasing Competition for HSIs
Competition in knowledge-based, STEM industries is increasing
from both developed and developing countries, endangering U.S.
leadership in innovation.26 Other countries have raised their standard of living, improved educational quality, provide attractive
environments for professional growth and development, and
produce more sophisticated products and services. Although
many of the factors that contribute to this competition and affect
U.S. stature in the world economy are beyond our control, there
is much that policymakers can do, including altering immigration
policy to target HSIs most likely to contribute to economic
growth.27
Science and technology are no longer the exclusive province of
developed nations as many parts of the developing world now
view science and technology as “integral to economic growth and
development,” and they are building “more knowledge-intensive
economies in which research, its commercial exploitation, and
intellectual work would play a growing role.”28 They also have
increasingly opened their markets to trade and foreign investment, improved relevant infrastructures, stimulated research and
development, and expanded higher education that produces
more scientists and engineers. China and developing countries in
Asia have been particularly aggressive in these fields, as have
Brazil and South Africa. More intense competition from the
European Union, Israel, Canada, and Australia adds to the competitive pressure.29
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An objective indicator of these developments is the United States’
declining share of global research and development activity,§§ of
the number of researchers,*** and of the volume of patenting
activity††† and degree production in STEM disciplines.‡‡‡
In addition, other nations’ immigration policies are often more
welcoming and less restrictive than U.S. policies.30 Other nations
offer streamlined processes for hiring foreign workers and potential entrepreneurs,31 special visa and entry requirements for
immigrants who may be entrepreneurs,32 and fewer barriers to
HSIs employment.33
The United States is no longer the only or even primary option for
HSIs seeking to find work or start and grow companies.34
Foreign-born students and workers now frequently return to
their home countries for reasons that include increasingly sophisticated work, including in primary research and development in
such industries as aerospace, medical devices, pharmaceuticals,
and software;35 growing demand for their skills;36 a belief that
their home country offers better long-run career opportunities;37
a belief that the U.S. economy will soon lag global growth rates;38
and a higher standard of living and social status for successful
people in their home country compared with the United States.
Our policies and procedures must adapt to this new reality. We
can no longer expect to satisfy our unfulfilled high-skill labor and
innovation needs at our will and discretion.39
§§ The North American share of global R&D activity between 1996 and 2007 dropped from 40 per-

cent to 35 percent while the Asia/Pacific region increased its share from 24 percent to 31 percent
(NSF, 2010).
*** The United States, European Union, and China all had about 1.4 million researchers in 2007. The
number of researchers in the United States and European Union grew by about 40 percent
between 1995 and 2007, but China’s growth in these years was 173 percent (NSF, 2010).
††† Moreover, in 2009, non-natives obtained more patents than did Americans, further confirm-

ing that U.S. innovation is declining (West, 2010, see endnote 12).
‡‡‡ Only 16 percent of U.S. students receive science or engineering degrees compared to 38 per-

cent in Korea, 33 percent in Germany, 28 percent in France, 27 percent in England, and 26 percent
in Japan (West, 2010).
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Even so, this worldwide competition can benefit us. The global
marketplace is not a zero-sum game. Instead, economic growth
here and abroad will create complementary new jobs, innovations, and opportunities. Moreover, robust entrepreneurial
economies abroad may presage greater political stability there,
relieving the strain on U.S. economic and other resources. And
because the world still looks to us as an engine for economic
growth, global competition can benefit the United States and its
enterprises. Our current immigration policies are inhibiting
America’s economic strength and leadership.40

3. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY
REGARDING HSIS
The most relevant visa programs for HSIs to work or start businesses in the United States are the H-1B and the EB series.
3.1. H-1B Nonimmigrant,Temporary Visa Program
The H-1B is a temporary work visa for specialty jobs requiring
theoretical and practical application of a body of specialized
knowledge and requiring at least a bachelor’s degree.41 The visa
requires a sponsoring employer and permits the holder to work
in the United States for up to three years with the potential to
renew once for an additional three years.42 §§§ Since 1990, those
receiving H-1B visas have been allowed to choose to apply for
permanent residency, which can lead to citizenship,43 but of
course they do not always receive one of the limited number of
such visas.
Current law allocates 65,000 H-1B visas, with an additional 20,000
available since 2004 for those receiving advanced degrees from
U.S. universities.44 At different times, Congress has changed the

§§§ Recipients of these visas are determined on a first in/first out basis among qualified appli-

cants or by a lottery when there are more applications filed prior to the fiscal year than there are
visas available (73 Federal Register 15,389 at 15, 389-92) (March 24, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 214).

91

RULES FOR GROWTH
cap in response to economic conditions. The chart below shows
the applicable cap and the number of H-1B visas issued.45

Fiscal Year
1990-1996
1997-1998
1999-2000
2001
2002
2003
2004-2010

Number of H-1B
Visas Authorized
Per Fiscal Year
65,000
65,000
115,000
195,000
195,000
195,000
65,000

Number of H-1B
Visas Issued
Per Fiscal Year
Less than 65,000
65,000
115,000
163,000
79,100
78,000
65,000

Historically, about 163,000 applicants annually have sought these
visas, so demand has generally overwhelmed supply,46 and the
annual quota was often exhausted within the first few months of
availability, if not sooner.47
The current cap on H1-B visas, while too low, is not the most significant factor limiting applicability of this visa. As of November
12, 2010, only 47,800 H1-B visa cap eligible petitions had been
filed under the first category, and only 17,400 had been filed
under the second category.48 The recent economic downturn certainly explains part of this decline, but many in Congress (and not
only congressional Democrats) were dissatisfied with the terms of
the visa—even before the recent downturn.
The H-1B visa program has other substantial drawbacks. For
instance, labor unions oppose H-1B visas for a variety of reasons,
including their belief that visa holders compete with American
workers and are vulnerable to employer exploitation because the
visas are temporary, can only be renewed with the employer’s
cooperation, may not lead to permanent employment, and do not
allow spouses to work in the United States. Republicans are more
concerned about the temporary nature and limited number of the
H-1B visas and the uncertainty that these factors create for their
workforce. Employers like Google complain that the HSIs the
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company wants most to recruit often resist H1-Bs for this reason.****
Both parties agree on the need to expand, and perhaps even
uncap, the number of permanent visas for HSIs, particularly in
STEM fields, and during the 111th Congress, Representative Zoe
Lofgren (D-Calif.) was developing legislation to accomplish this
goal.††††
Some consider the most significant drawback of the H-1B visas to
be the worker’s lack of employment mobility; indeed, some have
characterized this condition as a form of indentured servitude.49
Certainly, it interferes with efficient labor markets.50 The H-1B
visa holder cannot change employers without initiating the entire
process again and jeopardizing his presence in the United States,
unless the worker convinces his or her new employer to sponsor
him/her.51 Those seeking permanent residency also depend on
the sponsoring employer, so they may feel compelled to accept
lower compensation, work longer hours, and tolerate otherwise
intolerable and unacceptable conditions and behavior by employers.52 Along these lines, some argue that H-1B holders are a
source of “cheap labor” that reduces compensation for native
workers in the same jobs,53 and that they take jobs from American
citizens.54 What seems clear, however, is that the direct impact of
the relatively small number of H-1B visa holders on the overall
civilian workforce is negligible.‡‡‡‡ In fact, as we have seen, these
visa holders may actually create jobs.§§§§

**** Interview with a staff member of the Subcommittee on Citizenship, Refugees, Immigration,

and Border Security, House Judiciary Committee, August 5, 2010.
†††† Ibid.
‡‡‡‡ New H-1B visa holders constitute only 0.06 percent of a civilian workforce of 154 million

(NFAP, 2010). Over six years and assuming efficient visa processing, there would be about 510,000
H-1B workers in the United States at any given time—only about 0.3 percent of the U.S. civilian
workforce.
§§§§ Studies report that employers hire an additional four or five for each H-1B worker they bring
here (Herman and Smith, 2010; NFAP, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln, 2008, see endnote 1).
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More relevant to our purposes, the lack of mobility inhibits H-1B
holders from starting and growing companies and creating new
jobs, unless they can do so outside of their regular employment or
employer sponsorship. The inability to fully focus on and dedicate time and attention to a new company limits prospects for
success and growth.
3.2. EB Series Immigrant, Permanent Resident Visa Program
The EB visa series, which generally affords permanent resident or
“green card” status, contains five categories. The EB-1 targets
“priority workers.”55 ***** The EB-2 applies to professionals with
advanced degrees or people with exceptional ability.56 ††††† The
EB-3 covers skilled or professional workers with a bachelor’s
degree but not otherwise qualified under EB-1 or EB-2, skilled
workers with at least two years of training or experience, and
unskilled workers.57 The EB-4 applies to ministers and other religious workers.58
The EB-5 or “investor” visa is available for people who invest at
least $1 million and create or sustain at least ten full-time jobs or
who invest $500,000 in a “targeted employment area”‡‡‡‡‡ and
create or sustain ten jobs.59 The EB-5 also requires direct involvement by the investor in supervising operations.60 Unlike the other
EB categories, the EB-5 is a conditional visa that lasts for only two
years.61

***** EB-1 workers must meet one of three criteria: have extraordinary ability in sciences, arts, edu-

cation, business, or athletics; be an outstanding professors or researchers; or be a manager or executive subject to international transfer (8 USC § 1153(b)(1); 8 CFR § 204.5(b)(2)).
††††† EB-2 visa holders claiming “exceptional ability” must satisfy one of three criteria: have
exceptional ability in sciences, arts or business; be an advanced degree professional; or be a qualified physicians who will practice in underserved areas of the United States (8 USC § 1153(b)(2); 8
CFR § 204.5(k)).
‡‡‡‡‡ The EB-5 category also has a regional center pilot program in which 3000 of the EB-5 visas
are reserved for investors targeting one of the 90 government-designated regional centers (8 USC
§ 1153(b)(5); 8 CFR § 204.6). Under this program, permanent residence is available if certain requirements are met and the conditional period has passed (8 USC § 1153(b)(5); 8 CFR § 204.6).
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No more than 7 percent of the EB series visas may go to citizens
of any one country annually.62 Therefore, countries like India and
China receive the same number of EB series visas in each year as
Malawi, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Costa Rica.63
The United States issues approximately one million permanent
resident visas (green cards) each year.64 Currently, about 40,000
visas are available for people with extraordinary ability (EB-1),
40,000 for professionals with advanced degrees (EB-2), and 10,000
for investors (EB-5).65 This is only about 9 percent of the annual
allotment of permanent resident visas.66 Because these allotments
must cover spouses and unmarried children,67 HSIs themselves
only comprise about one-third of the visa recipients in these categories—
and a paltry 3 percent of the green cards issued annually. Compared
with the U.S. workforce of 154 million people, the allotment of
relevant EB visas increases that workforce by 0.08 percent each
year. Considering the infusion of innovation, new firms, new
jobs, and other benefits contributed by HSIs to the U.S. economy,
this increase is vanishingly small and the foregone benefits
(opportunity costs) correspondingly huge.
There is also a category of investor visas referred to as the E-2,
which affords temporary status for foreign-born persons from
countries with relevant treaties and whose sole purpose for coming to the United States is to direct and develop a “real operating
commercial enterprise”.68 §§§§§ E-2 visas are not capped, but they
are only valid for up to five years with indefinite renewals possible as long as eligibility continues and the treaty remains.69
Approximately 150,000 holders of E-2 visas employ more than
one million people in the United States.70 Two notable differences
between the EB-5 and E-2 visas are that the E-2 is limited to treaty
countries, and it does not allow the visa holder to petition for permanent residency.

§§§§§ An E-2 visa holder is not eligible for permanent status and must establish intent to leave

as part of his or her application (8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii); 8 CFR § 214.2(e)(2)). About 150,000 E-2 visa
holders employ over one million people in the U.S. (Mold, 2010, see endnote 68).
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4. PROPOSED CHANGES

IN

U.S. POLICY

The pace, strength, and magnitude of our economic growth will
be shaped by U.S. policy regarding HSIs. A major constraint is
that U.S. immigration policy allots a very large share of permanent visas to family members without regard to their skills.71
Current policy shows only a negligible interest in highly skilled
labor and the economic benefits that it tends to generate.72 Giving
greater weight to economic growth and entrepreneurship will
require major reforms and new priorities, principles, and
approaches. Merely tinkering around the edges may produce
incremental improvements, but more far-reaching changes are
required to yield larger gains. More than family-oriented policies
(and especially refugee/asylee policies), immigration policy that
is oriented toward innovation, growth, and entrepreneurship can
be measured in its effects, diversified in its targeting, and adapted to the changing macro needs of our economy.
Several of the recommendations below suggest the need for a
new class of “provisional” visa that would permit the holder to
work in the United States as long as they satisfy certain conditions such as English fluency, a STEM graduate degree, no criminal record, etc. Unlike “temporary” status that requires a later
bureaucratic decision to be rendered permanent, the holder of a
“provisional” visa automatically transitions to permanent status
after passage of specified time(s) and having met additional
expectations, such as regular employment or starting and growing a business, etc. Some of these conditions are discussed below.
Properly designed, a provisional visa can be better than a temporary visa characterized by uncertainty and delays in processing
renewals (when available) or by the need to start over when
applying for permanent status. A provisional visa could also minimize certain social risks relating to uncertainties about whether
the holder will in fact make the anticipated contributions to economic growth while avoiding the use of welfare benefits.******
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4.1. Intensive Recruiting Efforts
To the extent that our current system considers economic factors
at all, it relies on employers to recruit for their specific labor
needs, but this reliance may not always suffice to produce the
desired scale of economic growth and innovation that goes
beyond the needs of specific, existing employers. Therefore, states
and local communities should also be encouraged to actively
advertise for and recruit HSIs with preferred characteristics,
experiences, and skills, such as in life sciences, clean energy, or
other disciplines that they deem important to their area’s economic future. Such recruitment overseas was common in the
nineteenth century when states advertised extensively in Europe
to attract foreign workers,73 and some has occurred more recently during tight labor markets. To be sure, the skills sought during
the nineteenth century were much lower and they also were
recruiting to populate a relatively empty continent. Although the
number of such entrepreneurs to be recruited may not be large,
their effect on the economy is likely to be disproportionately
great. Of course, such recruitment will be of limited use if visa
allotments for HSIs remain as under current policy.
Among those who might be recruited are immigrants who have
demonstrated entrepreneurial success or capacity for scaling
high-growth companies. Congress could create a provisional visa,
with permanent status conditioned on satisfying specific criteria
such as experience starting and scaling companies that reach
defined levels of revenue, profit, and employees; or commercializing university research results to specified degrees of marketability or utility. Although the criteria for this visa should be
demanding and reasonably detailed, formal educational requirements should not be used to exclude successful entrepreneurs
who have followed nontraditional paths to starting and growing
****** Papademetriou and his colleagues advocate a provisional system that combines the H-1B
and EB series 2 and 3 levels because such a such a large percentage of EB series visas—90 percent—
are awarded to workers adjusting from temporary status (Papademetriou et al., 2009, endnote 77).
Orrenius and Zavodny call for a system through which provisional visas are auctioned to employers (Orrenius et al., 2010, endnote 6).
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companies. Even so, foreign graduates of U.S. universities are
most likely to contribute to and take advantage of the qualities of
America that foster innovation and entrepreneurship.
4.2. Recruit Graduates of U.S. Colleges and Universities
Many advocates of economic growth propose allowing almost all
foreign-born graduates of U.S. universities to stay in the United
States,†††††† another form of recruiting. The United States makes
a substantial economic and training investment in foreign students.‡‡‡‡‡‡74 It should reap, rather than export, the benefits
delivered by a high-quality American education and experience.
Foreign graduates of U.S. university programs can contribute significantly to a pipeline of talent for high-skill labor, innovation,
firms, and jobs.75
In addition, economic communities and networks develop
around strong academic programs and their graduates, both
native- and foreign-born. Silicon Valley, Boston’s Route 128, and
the Research Triangle are only the best-known examples.76 It is
foolish and self-defeating to force foreign-born graduates of U.S.
schools to abandon their professional communities, thus denying
these communities the fruits of their labor in educating them at
great cost.
Therefore, the United States should award a green card or at least
a provisional visa as described above to any foreign-born person
who earns a graduate degree from a U.S. university, particularly
in a STEM discipline, provided that they meet other nominal criteria such as English fluency, no criminal record, job offer, etc. At
a minimum, degree recipients should have more than one year
after graduation within which to qualify for alternative visa
†††††† Among these supporters are Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Craig Barrett from Intel, Senators

Schumer and Graham, Robert Litan and Tim Kane from the Kauffman Foundation, Vivek Wadhwa,
and many others (West, 2010; Kerr and Schlosser, 2010; Alden, 2010; Herman and Smith, 2010;
Wadhwa, et al. 2009c).
‡‡‡‡‡‡ For instance, graduate students generally and regardless of citizenship can receive free

tuition to PhD programs, grants for research, and funding for teaching positions (West, 2010).
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status by starting a company, creating jobs, working in a STEM
job, or otherwise.
Variations on this theme could specifically target those who may
be most likely to advance innovation and economic growth. For
instance, the STAPLE Act proposes offering visas to those who
earn a doctorate from a U.S. university in various STEM disciplines.§§§§§§ Given the disproportionate numbers of foreign-born
people with doctorates or in doctoral programs who have founded STEM-oriented firms in the United States or who work at
STEM-based firms, this approach would be fruitful. Another variation extends the offer to those who earn a master’s degree in a
STEM discipline from a U.S. university, as those with either master’s or doctorate degrees in science or engineering are more likely to be involved with patenting activity.77 Approximately
260,000 foreign-born students were enrolled at various stages
of graduate STEM programs at U.S. universities in the 2005-6
academic year.78
A provisional visa for STEM graduates, rather than a temporary
visa, might be more politically attractive and practical. Even welldesigned temporary visas can be unpredictable and subject to
exploitation and abuse.79 As discussed below, temporary visas
also can inhibit entrepreneurship. A provisional visa for graduates addresses those problems while also requiring that the graduate demonstrate that permanent residence is deserved, which
balances against the “supply shock” risk and permanent increase
in the labor market that accompanies an immediate green card.80
If a visa for STEM graduates does not provide for permanent
residence, portability between employers or to entrepreneurship
must be permitted at a minimum. The H-1B limits portability
partly to allow the sponsoring employer to recoup its expenditures in recruiting and bringing the immigrant to the United
States, but this rationale does not apply to students. Portability
to a new employer allows the labor market to operate more
§§§§§§ The STAPLE Act, HR 1791, 111th Cong. (2009-10).
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efficiently,81 while portability to self-employment or entrepreneurship acknowledges that foreign students do not necessarily
plan to start businesses at the outset but evolve into the idea.82
4.3. A Point System
Many immigration specialists and some legislators, including the
late Senator Edward Kennedy, have advocated a system that
awards points based on an applicant’s potential contributions,
including to economic growth.83 Such a system could be used to
identify entrepreneurs in emerging, strategic industries such as
clean energy technologies.84 It could be particularly effective as
the global “race” for talent intensifies (“as it is widely projected to
do”).85 Papademetriou cautions, however, that point systems
are not intended for government to undertake job matching or
to meet specific needs of specific employers within narrow
timeframes.86 Other nations have been using point systems
for decades to target and attract immigrant entrepreneurs and
innovators.
In addition to conventional point categories such as educational
attainment, a U.S. system targeted on economic growth through
innovation and entrepreneurship could award points and establish weights for attributes or experiences such as degrees in STEM
disciplines; the nature of the degree (e.g., bachelor’s, master’s,
doctoral); post-doctoral experiences; mentoring relationships and
recommendations; previous time spent in the United States or
engaged with U.S. business operations; actual committed investment capital and/or credit extension; patent applied for and
received; licenses granted or received—regardless of patenting
activity; economic and humanitarian outcomes and effects of the
licenses; and experience with beginning a business(es), attracting
financing, putting together and working with a founding team,
and/or growing and scaling a business(es). A point system might
also consider the viability of a business plan as evidenced by
enforceable capital or credit commitments, employees hired,
and/or contracts with customers to receive the relevant goods or
services. Applicants might even be awarded points based on the
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amount that they or their sponsor are willing to pay the United
States government for the visa.
Among the advantages of a point system are the political confidence and appearances of impartiality inspired by using objective
selection criteria and data readily tied to the economy, labor markets, economic growth, and competitiveness objectives.87 Among
the disadvantages are an inability to adjust quickly to market
changes and business cycles as long as Congress retains authority for determining selection criteria and allocating values,88 but
this disadvantage could be minimized if Congress delegated
to an agency to determine the weightings in light of changing
conditions.
4.4. Auction Systems
Immigration visas are scarce resources worth a great deal of
money to those who obtain them. Indeed, these visas in a sense
are windfalls to the immigrants who are fortunate and patient
enough to win them over other applicants. As a matter of fairness,
it is not at all clear why the full value of this windfall should go
in the first instance to the immigrant; the society that enriches
him, even as he is enriching it, has a strong claim to part of that
value.
In this spirit, a number of economists—most notably Gary Becker,
Barry Chiswick, Richard Freeman, Gordon Hanson, and Julian
Simon—have proposed auctioning visas to the highest bidders
who satisfy other economic (e.g., minimum bids) and noneconomic (e.g., noncriminal conduct) criteria.89 Any such auction
should be designed to achieve certain fairness and credibility constraints,90 such as consistency, transparency, objectivity, and
being well- and clearly defined. These features are all too lacking
in the current system, which strongly favors those who happen to
have family members, friends, and a lawyer already in the country.91 A well-designed auction, then, might achieve at least as
much as the current system.
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It could allow sponsors, employers, family members, and even
humanitarian organizations to bid on behalf of individuals,92 or
individuals could bid for themselves on behalf of their own entrepreneurial venture.93 The government might even finance bids by
low-income but credit-worthy, high-skill applicants out of a fund
created from auction proceeds.94
Moreover, the bid amount need not be the only or decisive criterion in the awarding of visas. Depending on the weight society
wishes to place on other criteria, the bid could be one factor
among many with certain specified thresholds that must be met
as a condition for the visa’s validity.95
Such a system has several advantages. First, it would allow the
market to measure the value of the underlying visa and the
opportunities it presents to different applicants—an attractive
approach for a capitalist system. Second, the amount of each bid
would reveal that bidder’s self-assessed productivity potential in
the United States, an assessment backed by cash such that the
winners are likely to be the most productive additions to the U.S.
economy and society.96 This information, along with other,
noneconomic information, is socially valuable when it comes to
selecting what is inevitably a limited number of immigrants.97
Third, an auction would enable the government, and thus taxpayers, to recover the surplus—the difference between the costs of
running the system and the value that bidders place on the
visas—while shifting those costs to those who will benefit most
from the visas in the first instance. Finally, as mentioned above,
the government could use auction proceeds for social purposes.98
Critics may contend that an auction system would unfairly benefit those who can come up with the bid amount or who are connected with people who can finance it. Their rhetoric might
depict the scheme as “selling the Statute of Liberty.” This is a false
critique, however, as it also applies to the current system, which
greatly advantages those who have family members in the United
States, the contacts to find an employer sponsor, or the financial
resources to hire an expert lawyer.99 One way of meeting this
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objection—and a good idea in its own right—is to experiment
with auctions by using them, at first, only for a limited number of
visas rather than moving directly to an auction system for all of
them. An obvious place to start would be to eliminate the current
“diversity visa” category and allocate those 50,000 visas annually
through an auction.100
4.5. Start-Up Visa Act
Senators John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) introduced a bill to create an EB-6 category that grants two-year visas
to immigrants who meet certain capital-raising thresholds from
“qualified” venture capitalists or “super angels”.******* They can
qualify for permanent residency if they meet additional capitalraising or revenue-generating benchmarks and add at least five
full-time jobs for nonfamily members. The proposed Start-Up
Visa draws against the 10,000 visas allotted to the EB-5 investor
visa.†††††††
The Start-Up Visa could be useful, but it is unlikely to have a lasting, material effect or grow the economy or produce new jobs on
the scale of other strategies. For instance, less than 1 percent of
new businesses receive angel or venture capital investment at the
outset.101 Thus, the act assumes a reasonably mature business
ready to operate in the United States.102 Only about 16 percent of
the fastest-growing companies receive any venture capital funding at all.103 The bill’s proposed requirements also assume the
existence of a network that includes United States citizens who
are, or have access to, venture capitalists or super angels even
before the person arrives in the United States, which further
restricts the eligible applicant pool. This requirement also gives
the venture capitalist or super angel additional leverage over the
potential immigrant entrepreneur to demand more favorable
financial terms, ownership interest, and other concessions.

******* Start-Up Visa Act of 2010, S 3029 and HR 5193, 111th Cong.
††††††† Ibid.
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Finally, temporary visas limit entrepreneurial activity for at least
two reasons. First, the temporary status creates uncertainty for
possible capital sources. Investors and creditors willing to accept
normal market risks may be less inclined to tolerate enhanced
risks of deportation or nonrenewal if, for instance, the business
hires only four employees instead of five or generates only
$900,000 in revenue instead of $1 million. Such risks may cause
investors and creditors to charge a price premium or make other
risk-reducing demands, which will increase barriers to success
and thus jeopardize permanent status.
Second, as noted earlier, very few new ventures succeed. About
one-third of the 500,000 firms created each year will close within
the first two years and only about 50 percent will make it to year
five. Temporary status or conditions based on success may perversely induce people to sustain failed businesses rather than
moving on to the next venture. Consequently, visas designed or
intended to promote otherwise promising entrepreneurial activity should not unduly punish the prospects of failure beyond normal market conditions.
Therefore, while the Start-Up Visa legislation may provide some
opportunities and even be an improvement, other paths seem
more likely to maximize opportunities for HSIs to expand our
economy.
4.6. A Job Creators’ Visa
Another promising approach would create a provisional visa
based on jobs created rather than investments. Robert Litan proposes allowing H-1B or student visa holders an additional six to
twelve months to start at least one company and hire and retain
at least one nonfamily member.104 If they satisfy that threshold,
he proposes an additional three to five years within which to
employ and retain an average of five to ten nonfamily members
for at least an average of three years, after which they would
receive permanent residency status. Although this approach may
suffer from some of the disadvantages just discussed, it does not
unnecessarily tie the foreign-born entrepreneur to a single
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employer or even to the same employees. Nor does this approach
restrict the applicant to starting only one company or keeping
that company alive when the market otherwise suggests its
demise.
4.7. Improve Existing Programs
Current restrictions in the number of available visas and the time
required to process petitions, particularly for permanent residency status, harm the economy, damage American competitiveness,
and reduce potential job creation and innovation.105 At a minimum, the current allocations of H-1B and EB series visas should
be increased and lengthy processing times for approving permanent residency should be reduced.
4.7.1. Modify Allocations
In the years before the economic downturn, demand for H-1B and
EB series visas had exceeded supply.106 The resulting denials and
delays represent significant opportunity costs that increasing
caps (or eliminating certain of them) and provisional characteristics could remedy. Congress should consider increasing the allocation of HSI visas, including by returning H-1B visas to at least
the level of the early 2000s, tying visa allotments to changes in the
overall population or civilian workforce or to changes in the gross
domestic product, which has risen 64 percent in the last two
decades,107 or tying caps to the preceding year’s usage.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 108
At a minimum, Congress should remove the 7 percent cap on
immigrants from any one country receiving an EB series visa.109
This cap inhibits the ability to attract skills sets, networks, and
other capabilities intended to advance the U.S. economy.
Restrictions by country or region perversely deny the United
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle suggest that patent activity per capita would increase by six
percent for every one percent increase in immigrant college graduates in the United States, and
that such activity would increase by 12 percent for every 1 percent increase in foreign-born graduate degree recipients (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2009). Maskus found that for every 100 foreign
students who receive doctorates in science or engineering from a U.S. university, there are an additional sixty-two future patent applications (NFAP, 2010, citation omitted).
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States access to contributions and innovations that those cut off
by the cap would have made.110
To the extent there are concerns about increasing the number of
immigrants beyond current allocations, room could be found by
eliminating the so-called “diversity visa” program111 under
which 50,000 visas a year are available for applicants and their
families from certain low-admission states and regions. The program suffers, however, from very practical problems that undermine its usefulness, particularly when balanced against the value
of targeting HSIs and economic growth. Diversity visa holders
often lack technical education or usable skills, and they usually
lack any network or resources within the United States to help
them acclimate and adjust to their new home. As a result, they
and their families are less likely to contribute to economic growth.
Moreover, the program is ripe for abuse through the submission
of multiple applications under derivatives of the person’s name,
use of falsified documents, sales of successful applications to others in their country, and corrupt governments that may intercept
and redistribute visas or destroy them.112 Diversity visas are of
doubtful economic, social, political, and ethical value, and the
allocation could be better used to test some of the recommendations in this chapter.
Congress should experiment with a certain number of H-1B visas
that would not be tied specifically to any particular employer or
that the commitment be for one year. This change would not only
address criticisms about H-1B holders being cheap and exploited
workers and native-wage depressors, but also recognize that promotions, raises, and other indicia of upward mobility are now
more frequently available across firms rather than within
them.113
4.7.2. Accelerate Processing
The processing time for green cards and temporary skills-based
visas can take up to twenty years.114 The uncertainty, unfairness,
and inefficiency inherent in such long waits affect the would-be
immigrants, family members, employers, investors, creditors,
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and others, and surely inhibit innovative thinking and investment of human and financial capital in productive ways.115
Processing times can be reduced by hiring more people, organizing them more efficiently, and updating technology. Increasing
fees and/or revenue from the point system or auction programs
proposed above could help to defray the costs of a faster
system.116

5. CONCLUSION
A U.S. economy that needs innovation and economic growth is
ill-served by law, standards, and systems designed to further outdated goals and dubious policies. A blatant disconnect exists
between our current HSI system and the demands of economic
growth through innovation and entrepreneurship.
Yet, a vast number of HSIs is waiting to contribute to these goals.
In many ways, HSIs are low-hanging fruit. Why, then, have policymakers failed to reap these potential rewards? What is the
source of lethargy and tolerance for an unambiguously deficient
system? Policy regarding HSIs and corresponding benefits for
innovation, our economy, and human welfare should not be held
hostage to the contingencies of reforming other parts of our
immigration system.
Immigration, particularly by HSIs, has been both “engine and
fuel” for the U.S. economy by providing knowledge, technology,
and even capital. HSIs invigorate national and global commerce
and trade and in doing so contribute disproportionately to
American jobs, wealth, and human welfare. Current HSI policies
and standards do not adequately serve these essential goals.
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5:

How to Improve Five Important Areas
of Financial Regulation

Hal Scott∗

T

his chapter analyzes five important issues in financial regulation, most of which have been dealt with by the DoddFrank Act, and makes suggestions about the proper way to
resolve them. First, it examines systemic risk, the major reason for regulating the financial system. The focus is on what to do
about the three Cs of systemic risk: connectedness, contagion, and
correlation. Second, it argues for more expansive use of cost-benefit analysis, using the consequences of the failure to do so with
respect to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an example of
why a better approach is needed. Third, it discusses the importance of securitization to the housing markets and how
disclosure, alignment of incentives, and the role of the credit
rating agencies should be treated. Fourth, it discusses the threat
to the independence of the Federal Reserve System posed by
the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank. Finally, it examines the
negative impact securities class actions may be having on the
competitiveness and efficiency of U.S. capital markets.

∗ Hal S. Scott is the Nomura Professor of International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School
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THE THREE CS

OF

SYSTEMIC RISK

The major rationale for regulation of the financial system has
always been avoidance of systemic risk. Systemic risk comes in
three flavors, all of which were on display during the financial
crisis, the three Cs: connectedness, contagion, and correlation.
Connectedness, or interconnectedness as it is often called,
involves the problem that the failure of one institution (A) can
cause the failure of another institution (B) because B has an exposure to A that exceeds B’s capital. Contagion occurs when the failure of one institution causes the creditors of other institutions to
withdraw funding for fear that their institutions will be next—the
classic bank run. Correlation involves the same external event,
e.g. the bursting of the house price bubble, having an impact on a
wide set of institutions similarly exposed to that event. This section discusses the nature of each of these varieties of systemic risk
and then turns to what the recent Dodd-Frank bill has done to
contain or minimize them.

Connectedness
A chain reaction of bank failures traditionally focused on the payment system. Continental Illinois Bank, a Chicago bank, almost
failed in the mid-1980s. Continental served as a payments correspondent to many small banks (making and receiving payments
on their behalf). As a result, Continental held sizable uninsured
deposits of these banks; in many cases the amount of such
deposits substantially exceeded the capital of the depositor
banks. If Continental had failed, those banks would have failed as
well. Section 308 of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 gave the
Federal Reserve Board certain powers to deal with the general
problem of interbank credit. It permits the board to limit the credit extended by an insured depository institution to another
depository institution. This may be feasible with respect to placements (actual loans) by one bank to another since the amount of
credit extended is known in advance and fixed for a given term.
However, such exposures are much more difficult to control
when they arise from payment flows, as was the case with
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Continental. Every time Continental received a wire transfer for
the benefit of a customer of a small bank, the small bank had a
risk of Continental’s failure, and the small bank has no practical
way to control the size of wire transfers received by its customers.
The prospect of a chain reaction of small banks from the failure of
Continental resulted in its rescue by the FDIC.
An even more serious version of the payment system chain reaction problem was presented by the possible failure of a payments
clearinghouse in the United States, the Clearinghouse Interbank
Payment System (CHIPS). As of 2009, there were 48 CHIPS participants, the majority of which were foreign banks from nineteen
countries. CHIPS transfers in 2009 were about $1.4 trillion per
day, and the average transfer was about $4.3 million. Under
CHIPS rule 13, the failure of one bank to settle causes its positions
with other banks to be deleted and unwound, causing the potential failure of other banks with net debit positions with the other
banks. Before 2001, this was a very substantial problem—indeed
it was commonly understood that such a chain reaction of failures
would have to be forestalled by some form of public rescue. Large
net positions resulted from an end-of-day settlement system, the
exposures building up during the day. After 2001, CHIPS
changed its basic mode of operation, converting to a continuous
settlement system, leaving the end-of-day exposures quite modest in relation to the capital of participants. Payment system
issues were not a problem during the financial crisis.
In the financial crisis, we instead saw a new version of the chain
reaction problem, interconnectedness through derivatives. The
concern was that the default of an institution on its counterparty
obligations with respect to derivative contracts, particularly credit default swaps, could result in the failure of other institutions. It
is more difficult to estimate the size and consequences of derivative counterparty default than of interbank deposit default. The
chain may be longer, as the failure of one bank could lead to the
failure of a counterparty, which in turn could lead to the failure of
counterparties to the first counterparty and so on. Second,
the actual losses of counterparties depend on the value of their
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positions, and collateral they hold, but these values are hard to
estimate, particularly in an impaired market. Fear of such a chain
reaction was prevalent in the recent crisis but the extent to which
the fear was based on reality has yet to be determined. There were
many problems in unwinding Lehman’s large derivatives book
when it declared bankruptcy but its failure did not trigger the
failure of any of its derivative counterparties.
AIG’s own failure was certainly caused by its derivative positions—as a writer of credit default swaps (CDS) on collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) portfolios, its exposure increased as the
value of CDO portfolios decreased, triggering calls for increased
collateral, which it was eventually unable to meet. What is not
clear is whether any of AIG’s derivatives counterparties would
have failed if AIG had failed. There is substantial evidence that
Goldman Sachs, one of AIG’s largest counterparties, would not
have failed. It held cash collateral against AIG’s failure to honor
its CDS obligations, and covered possible shortfalls in the amount
of collateral through hedges, through the purchase of CDS contracts written on AIG itself, with collateral on these contracts as
well. A report by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) on the government’s investments in AIG indicated that Goldman Sachs, a major counterparty, would have been made whole in the event of an AIG default.1
Of course, other AIG counterparties, which included foreign
banks, may have had more unprotected exposures—the history
on this has yet to be fully written.

Contagion
A second form of systemic risk comes in the form of contagion.
This has traditionally manifested itself in the form of a bank run.
When Bank A fails, depositors in Bank B fearing that if A fails B
might fail as well, withdraw their funds from B, thus causing B to
fail even though B has sufficient capital. This can occur because
1 U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Factors
Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties (Washington, DC: November 17, 2009),
16–17.
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B’s assets are less liquid than the withdrawn deposits and what
assets can be sold must be sold quickly at fire-sale prices. There is
substantial academic debate about whether such bank runs represent rational, nearly simultaneous reassessments of bank risk by
banks’ short-term creditors,2 or indiscriminate withdrawals from
institutions regardless of their underlying financial strength.3
Either way, however, bank runs have plagued the banking systems of many countries for centuries.
Two principal antidotes involving public intervention have been
devised to deal with the problem: deposit insurance and the
lender of last resort power of a central bank. Deposit insurance
meant that depositors with deposits below deposit insurance limits have nothing to fear from the failure of their bank. So seeing
Bank A fail, the depositors of Bank B are much less likely to withdraw funds. The deposit insurance ceiling has been set to cover a
large portion of the deposits of individuals who might be prone
to making irrational judgments about the implications of the failure of Bank A for the failure of their own banks. The second antidote gave the central bank the power to loan to banks experiencing irrational runs, to be the lender of last resort to such banks.
Such central bank liquidity replaced the withdrawn deposits,
provided that the bank experiencing the run had adequate collateral (which meant sufficient capital) to pledge against the value of
the central bank loan.
Significant bank runs were not a feature of the financial crisis;
instead there were runs on nonbank financial institutions (which
some call the shadow banking system, though this term is quite
vague). The assisted acquisition of Bear Stearns, under which the
Federal Reserve loaned $29 billion to JP Morgan on a nonrecourse
2 For a discussion of this view, see, for example, Gary Gorton, “Banking Panics and Business Cycles,”
Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988): 751, http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/gbg24/Banking%20
Panics%20and%20Business%20Cycles.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Ted Temzelides, “Are Bank Runs Contagious?” Business Review, November/December
1997 (Philadelphia, PA: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/publications/business-review/1997/november-december/brnd97tt.pdf.
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basis, was triggered by the combination of a run on Bear and the
fear that the run could become contagious, triggering runs on
other investment banks. The run on Bear and other banks principally manifested itself through the refusal of short-term repo funders to renew their funding. There was no deposit insurance to
protect the exposure of these creditors, and at the time of the Bear
run the Fed had not yet created a liquidity facility to act as lender
of last resort for nonbanks (it created the Primary Dealer Facility
for this purpose shortly thereafter). There is a dispute over
whether Bear did have adequate collateral to back a Fed loan if
such a loan had been available. The Bear assisted acquisition
seemed to quiet the fear of contagion, at least for several months.
Runs did occur in the wake of the Lehman failure. First, other
investment banks experienced funding difficulties as their CDS
spreads dramatically widened after the Lehman failure. At that
point, however, the Primary Dealer Facility permitted the Fed to
supply funding to these banks, averting the consequences of a
run. While the Fed has claimed that such funding was adequately collateralized, there is concern that this may not have been the
case in some instances. Second, the Reserve Primary Fund, a
money market fund with significant holdings of Lehman commercial paper, failed to honor its obligations at par, thus “breaking the buck.” This triggered a run on other money market funds
that was only averted by a combination of the supply of Fed liquidity and FDIC guarantees (the equivalent of unlimited deposit
insurance). The Lehman case is actually a combination of the connectedness and contagion problem—the Reserve Primary Fund’s
failure to honor money market deposits at par was caused by its
overexposure on Lehman commercial paper—connectedness. But
its failure to honor its deposits at par caused runs on other funds
not connected to Lehman—contagion.

Correlation
A third form of systemic risk is correlation. An external event can
have a large impact on the financial system if important financial
institutions have taken similar risks and are therefore all impact-
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ed by the external event. This is the story of the housing bubble,
because various institutions had made loans or invested in securities whose values depended on residential real estate prices.
Real estate exposure was the primary cause of the failures or near
failures of several banks, perhaps most notably Washington
Mutual and Wachovia. Similar real estate exposures also contributed to the capital weakness of the nine banks that initially
received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Finally, high correlations between the riskiness of different
CDOs—whose values were also largely dependent on real estate
prices—also led to significant losses during the crisis in this
roughly $4.7 trillion market. Although many valuation models
used by banks to price CDOs had predicted relatively low correlations between the prices of different CDOs (due to diversification in their underlying mortgage-backed securities), the
unprecedented declines in house prices caused many of these
models to fail, with banks suffering large correlated losses across
their CDO portfolios as a result.4

DODD-FRANK MEASURES TO LIMIT SYSTEMIC RISK
In the broadest terms, the provisions of Dodd-Frank requiring
more capital for systemically important financial institutions are
aimed at minimizing systemic risk by making institutions less
leveraged and therefore less prone to insolvency.5 This makes
chain reactions less likely because counterparties are better able
to absorb losses. It also addresses correlation risk because with
higher capital buffers, all financial institutions should be better
able to absorb external shocks. These capital provisions are probably least effective in controlling contagion, however, since even
well-capitalized institutions with relatively illiquid assets compared to liabilities are unable to withstand runs. Dodd-Frank
4 See, e.g., Felix Salmon, “Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street,” Wired, February
23, 2009.
5 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 115(a)-(b) (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; ibid. §§ 171(a)-(b).
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does not determine how much capital will be required, or what
counts as capital, matters principally determined by the Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision for banks, with additional
requirements imposed by the Fed for systemically important nonbanks.6 The Basel Committee is also focusing on liquidity requirements, which are more relevant to contagion.7 Governmentdetermined risk-based capital requirements sound good but are
extremely difficult to devise given the ever-changing dimensions
of risk—more should be done to strengthen market discipline in
this area.
One major problem with the Dodd-Frank approach is the need
for the Financial Stability Oversight Council to determine what
qualifies as systemically important nonbanking financial institutions, which will be subject to heightened capital (and supervision).8 In the case of banking organizations, these requirements
apply to firms with $50 billion or more in assets.9 This determination is fraught with difficulty. The inquiry must be focused on
chain reactions or contagion since correlation risk by its very
nature affects an overly broad range of institutions to single out
some as systemically important. If institutions prudently limit
their exposures to each other (a matter further discussed below),
which “risk management 101” requires them to do anyway, then
no institution should cause or suffer from chain reactions; perhaps, then, the quality of risk management is the key. If the focus
is on contagion, and institutions comply with risk-based capital
and liquidity requirements, it is hard to see what else the FSOC
would be looking for. Further, there is a real danger that branding
of institutions as systemically important could create significant
moral hazard as creditors assume such institutions will be bailed
out if they get into trouble. And the designated institutions will
thereby enjoy a cheaper cost of capital, which is on net likely to
6 Ibid. § 171(b).
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector,
December 2009, 11, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf.
8 Dodd-Frank, § 115(a)(1).
9 Ibid. § 115(a).
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outweigh the increased cost of heightened capital and supervisory requirements. This creates a competitive disadvantage for
those institutions not anointed as systemically important.

Connectedness
Focusing specifically on the chain reaction problem, there are two
important promising provisions of Dodd-Frank. First, the legislation requires standardized and liquid over-the-counter derivatives contracts to be centrally cleared, thus mandating that these
contracts be subject to risk-reducing clearinghouse requirements,
such as margin requirements, and that any default of a clearing
member is collectivized through all clearinghouse members
absorbing the loss.10 Many important details of this requirement
will have to be determined by regulation, but given the key role
counterparty exposures on derivatives play in the chain reaction
problem, this is a welcome measure. As with CHIPS, however,
one will now have to deal with the risk of a clearinghouse collapse and the fact that important clearinghouses will almost certainly have to be bailed out. This makes regulation of systemically important clearinghouses crucial, which the legislation fortunately leaves in large measure to the Fed, rather than just to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, who are less qualified to deal with systemic
risk. Second, Dodd-Frank provides that the Fed require large
banks and systemically important nonbanks to limit their credit
exposure (broadly defined) to other institutions to no more than
25 percent of their capital stock and surplus, thus significantly
expanding current lending limits.11 These exposures will be difficult to determine given the problems of valuing derivative positions, noncash collateral, and hedging offsets, but the fundamental approach is quite sound.

10 Ibid. § 723(a).
11 Ibid. §§ 165(e)(2)-(3).
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Contagion
With respect to contagion, no specific new measures are formulated by Dodd-Frank although the new resolution procedures that
extend the current FDIC-type procedures to systemically important nonbanking firms create a framework under which new
approaches may be devised.12 Numerous possibilities can be
explored, ranging from bail-ins of creditors in a prepackaged
bankruptcy to priorities for short-term creditors, thus forestalling
the possibility of runs.13 However, there is one provision of
Dodd-Frank that makes future contagion more likely: the requirement that the Fed get the approval of the secretary of the treasury
before fashioning emergency liquidity facilities of the kind that it
devised in the crisis.14 This is discussed at more length under Fed
independence.

Correlation
With respect to correlation risk, the FSOC is supposed to monitor
macroeconomic developments to identify potential shocks that
could affect a wide number of institutions (such as asset bubbles)
and then make recommendations as to what to do about them.15
There is healthy debate among economists as to whether bubbles
can be identified, and certainly doubt as to whether the FSOC
would have sufficient confidence in their determination to curtail
them. The verdict on this approach is clearly out.

Regulatory Structure
A final point with respect to systemic risk under Dodd-Frank: the
failure to reform the regulatory structure by consolidating the
12 Ibid. §§ 202-06.
13 For a discussion of the bail-in proposal, see, for example, Wilson Ervin, “Are We Ready for the
Next Crisis?” (Credit Suisse, March 2010), 8-9. For a discussion of the proposal giving higher priority to short-term creditors, see Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, “Curbing Risk on Wall Street,”
National Affairs (Spring 2010), http://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/curbing-risk-onwall-street.
14 Dodd-Frank, § 202(a)(1)(A)(i).
15 Dodd-Frank, § 112(a)(1)(C).
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regulatory agencies will hinder any implementation of the plans
to detect and control systemic risk. The Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation recommended that the United States have
one regulator, along the lines of the United Kingdom’s Financial
Services Authority (FSA), the Fed, and possibly a separate consumer and investor protection agency.16 The Paulson blueprint
adopted a similar approach.17 Instead, several new agencies have
been created: the FSOC, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, and the National Office of Insurance. The only consolidation has been the minor merger of the Office of Thrift Supervision
into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.18 Our fragmented regulatory structure will pose increasing problems of
coordination, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, and problems falling through the cracks. The FSOC is not the solution; if
everyone is responsible no one is responsible. Compare the lessons learned by the United Kingdom from the crisis. Concerned
by the coordination of just two regulators, the FSA and the Bank
of England, the United Kingdom has effectively abolished the
FSA, converting it into a subsidiary of the Bank of England.19

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND SOX 404
Numerous commentators have noted the importance of using
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a critical disciplining tool in the
regulatory process,20 and Executive Order 12,86621 stipulates that
CBA be applied in the case of any “significant regulatory action”
16 See, e.g., Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan for
Regulatory Reform (Cambridge, MA: May 2009), 209 [hereinafter CCMR Plan for Regulatory
Reform]; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Recommendations for Reorganizing the U.S.
Financial Regulatory Structure (Cambridge, MA: January 14, 2009), 5 [hereinafter CCMR
Recommendations for Regulatory Structure).
17 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
(Washington, DC: Treasury Department, March 2008) [hereinafter Paulson Blueprint].
18 Dodd-Frank, §§ 312-13.
19 George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers
and Merchants of the City of London, June 16, 2010, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
press_12_10.htm.
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and submitted in a report to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the interagency coordinating body.22
Nevertheless, independent agencies have historically been
exempt from the provisions of Executive Order 12,866 and are not
officially obliged to provide CBA analyses of their regulatory rule
making to OIRA.23 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
which was designed to check the soundness of internal procedures for financial reporting, is arguably one of the most prominent examples of regulators’ failure to justify their actions in costbenefit terms. SOX 404 has widely come to signify an overly burdensome and expensive regime that may have set the compliance
bar too high to be an efficient and cost-effective method of fraud
prevention, particularly for smaller market players. By enacting
regulatory reform and subjecting independent agencies’ financial
regulations—including those implementing SOX 404—to more
comprehensive CBA and to OIRA review, financial agencies could
likely retain many of the intended protections of existing rules,
but do so within a more rational and efficient regulatory framework. This section discusses SOX 404 in cost-benefit terms as an
example of the broader problem of rationalizing independent
agency action.

SOX 404 Overview
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act24 was the culmination of swift (perhaps
too swift) Congressional reaction to the corporate governance
20 For a general background on the evolution of the use of cost-benefit analysis in the United
States, see Cass Sunstein, “Cost-Benefit Default Principles,” Michigan Law Review 99 (2001): 1651,
1660–63. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis in the SEC regulation context, see Edward
Sherwin, “The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual
Fund Reform Effort,” Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 12 (2006): 1.
21 Executive Order no. 12,866, 58 Federal Register 51735 (September 30, 1993).
22 Ibid. § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii).
23 Executive Order no. 12,291, 46 Federal Register 13193 (February 17, 1981); Executive Order no.
12,866, §3(b). It should be noted that Executive Order no. 12,866 does require each independent
agency to provide OIRA with a regulatory agenda detailing its legislative actions under preparation or review, as well as its significant legislative actions. Executive Order no. 12,866, §4(b), 4(c)(1).
The SEC’s submissions have not usually included a cost-benefit analysis, however. Sherwin,
“Lessons,” 12.
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and accounting scandals that contributed to the fall of industry
giants Enron and WorldCom, denting investor confidence in the
integrity of the U.S. securities markets. Section 404 of SOX
requires the management of public companies and their outside
auditors to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls over
financial reporting. The SEC has stated that Section 404 procedures are intended to help companies detect fraudulent reporting
early and deter financial fraud, thereby directly improving the
reliability of financial statements.25 Specifically, a company’s
management must state whether internal controls are effective
and note any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. An
external safeguard is provided by an independent auditor’s attestation of management’s assessment, pursuant to guidance issued
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
an independent board established under SOX to provide guidance for auditors of public companies.26

Costs and Benefits of SOX 404
It has been noted that the SEC does not have an official program
for CBA and the CBA that is conducted does not match the rigor
expected by Executive Order 12,866.27 Indeed, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in two decisions has chastised the
24 The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Public Law 107204, 107th Cong., 2d sess., U.S. Statutes at Large 116 (2002): 745.
25 Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238 (Aug. 14, 2003).
26 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report 117 (Cambridge, MA: November,
2006) [hereinafter CCMR Interim Report]. In July 2007, the PCAOB approved Auditing Standard 5
for public companies, which superseded earlier guidance (Auditing Standard 2) that had been provided by the PCAOB. Similarly, the SEC also issued guidance for management, to complement
PCAOB guidance. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange
Act Release Nos. 33-8810, 34-55929 (June 27, 2007). The PCAOB and SEC Guidance put in place a
“top down risk assessment” that seeks to base the compliance with SOX 404 on risk-based
criteria.
27 See generally Sherwin, “Lessons,” 17. Indeed, general lack of CBA analysis in the area of banking
and capital markets regulation has been broadly noted for some time. Robert W. Hahn, An Analysis
Of The First Government Report On The Benefits And Costs Of Regulation 10 (working paper no.
E-98-05, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, 1998), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=167048.
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SEC for failing to take CBA into account in its rule making. In
2005, for example, the D.C. Circuit struck down an SEC rule
requiring at least 75 percent of the directors on mutual fund
boards to be independent, and for there to be an independent
chairman.28 When the SEC attempted to pass the rule again, it
was once more invalidated by the D.C. Circuit court on the same
grounds.29 The SEC’s reluctance to espouse rigorous CBA in
promulgating rules with significant compliance costs and market
impact contrasts with the practice of international financial regulators, for whom CBA is a critical aspect of rule making. The
United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, for example, routinely uses CBA in the exercise of its regulatory functions.30
Nowhere is this lack of rigorous CBA analysis more apparent
than in the implementation of SOX 404, which has been widely
criticized as being overly costly.31 To illustrate, the SEC initially
estimated that SOX 404 compliance would cost the average company roughly $92,000;32 however, a 2006 Financial Executives
International report estimated that in the first year of SOX 404
reporting, an average company paid around $4.36 million to meet
its compliance requirements, including the vastly increased costs
created by the obligation to procure an auditor attestation
report.33 And though the average recurring SOX 404 cost has
come down somewhat in the wake of 2007 SEC reforms to SOX
404—the SEC estimates that mean recurring compliance costs
decreased from $2.87 million in 2006 to $2.33 million in 2008 for
Section 404(b) companies—first-year compliance costs have not
28 Chamber of Commerce v. Securities Exchange Commission, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
29 Chamber of Commerce v. Securities Exchange Commission, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
30 Financial Services Authority, Central Policy, Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis For Financial
Regulators: Version 1.1 (London: FSA, June 2000), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/foi/cba.pdf.
31 Stephen Bryan and Steven Lillian, “Characteristics of Firms with Material Weaknesses in Internal
Control: An Assessment of Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley” (working paper, March 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=682363.
32 House Committee on Financial Services, Sarbanes Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors and
Strengthening Markets: Hearing Before the House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Cong.,
2006, 37.
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declined significantly.34 In addition to direct reporting costs, it
has been estimated that public companies also face large indirect
costs incurred as a result of managerial attention being focused
on SOX compliance rather than on decisions regarding the business and investing activities of a firm.35
The expense burden has been felt more acutely by smaller companies. For example, it has been estimated that compliance costs
for firms with less than $700 million of market capitalization
averaged 0.46 percent of revenues, more than five times more on
a relative basis than firms with greater than $700 million in market capitalization (0.09 percent of revenues).36 Moreover, the 2007
regulatory SOX 404 reforms have not had a statistically significant effect on recurring compliance costs for companies with public float of $75 million or less.37 Indeed, since the enactment of
SOX 404, the SEC has granted a series of exemptions and extensions to smaller public companies, although in October 2009, the
SEC announced that even these smallest public companies must
begin to comply fully with SOX 404 for annual reports of fiscal
years ending after June 15, 2010, without further exceptions or
exemptions.38 However, Congress overrode this requirement by
including a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that exempts com33 Financial Executives International, FEI Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation,
March 2006. The FEI survey reports a single cost estimate for reporting member companies (ranging from less than $25 million in market capitalization to greater than $25 billion). It has been
reported that there was an average increase in audit fees of $2.3 million in 2003-2004. See Susan
W. Eldridge and Burch T. Kealey, “SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation Under Section 404,” June 13, 2005,
3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=743285.
34 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Economic Analysis, Study of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal Control over Financial Reporting Requirements
(Washington, DC: SEC, Sept. 2009), 4–5, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/
sox-404_study.pdf [hereinafter “SEC Study”].
35 Bryan and Lillian, “Characteristics of Firms,” 3.
36 Charles River Associates International, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs and Implementation
Issues: Survey Update, December 2005.
37 SEC Study, 4–5.
38 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Small Public Companies to Begin Providing Audited
Assessment of Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting in Nine Months,” news release, October
2, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-213.htm.
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panies with market capitalizations of less than $75 million from
having to comply with the SOX 404(b) provision that requires
independent auditor attestation as to the adequacy of management’s evaluation of internal controls.39 This legislative override
was fortunate, since small firms’ compliance burden under SOX
404 would have been likely to reduce the competitive appeal of
the U.S. capital markets as a viable arena for small firms raising
capital, and for small business investors that may be unwilling to
see the value of their investments disproportionately eroded
through higher regulatory costs. By requiring a study in the
Dodd-Frank Act of how to reduce compliance burdens for companies with market capitalizations between $75 million and $250
million, legislators also correctly recognized that many of the
same cost-benefit issues that apply to the smallest companies are
relevant for moderately larger firms as well.40
Despite these high costs, it remains empirically unclear whether
adherence to SOX 404 achieves its intended benefit: reduced incidence of fraud or opaque and aggressive accounting practices by
public companies. First, an empirical study suggested that average market reactions to announcements of accounting restatements since 2001 have decreased notably, suggesting that the
market views an increasing number of such restatements as
immaterial (and therefore, arguably not justified by the increased
costs of SOX 404).41 Second, the number of restatements revealing
misreporting appears relatively low. It has been noted that only
38 percent of restatements from July 2002 to September 2005 had
a market impact in excess of $5 million, and 12.6 percent of
restatements resulted in a negative market impact of greater than
10 percent of company value.42 Finally, even when there is actual
reporting of fraud, heightened internal controls appear not to be
39 Dodd-Frank, § 989G(a).
40 Dodd-Frank, § 989G(b).
41 Susan Scholz, “The Changing Nature and Consequences of Public Company Financial
Restatements 1997-2006” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 2008).
42 CCMR Interim Report, 130-31.
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the most effective way of detecting it. A 2008 study found that
46.2 percent of the initial detection of occupational frauds was
due to tips, compared to 23.3 percent by internal controls.43

Future Reform
As described, the implementation of the SOX 404 regime has generated considerable controversy because the approach of imposing broad compliance costs on U.S. listed companies may not be
justified by the benefits.
On the narrow topic of SOX 404, the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation has proposed that SOX 404 be implemented
with a stronger focus on materiality to govern which internal controls should be most stringently examined.44 While the 2007 guidance issued by the SEC and the PCAOB has gone far in underscoring the role of risk-based compliance, for example, to some
extent in its reshaping of the term “material weakness,”45 it has
not gone far enough. Nor has CBA generally improved at either
the SEC or PCAOB. The SEC’s new Office of Risk Assessment, as
led by Professor Henry Hu, may improve matters, but does the
SEC really have the culture or capacity to do serious risk-based,
e.g. cost-benefit based, regulation? Two broader potential reforms
may help address this problem.
First, the scope of Executive Order 12,866, with OIRA review,
should be extended to independent agencies. This type of review
would mandate more rigorous CBA from all independent agencies, and go a long way toward rationalizing the U.S. regulatory
process. For financial regulation specifically, this reform would
bring the SEC in line with its international counterparts like the
United Kingdom’s FSA and also complement the methodology
43 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and
Abuse, 2008, U.S. Department of the Treasury.
44 CCMR Interim Report, 131.
45 Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-8810, 34-55929 (June 27, 2007).
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behind risk-based oversight that imposes greater costs for greater
regulatory risks. While there could be a concern that control by
OIRA could threaten the independence of these agencies, it could
be argued that independence is undesirable if it leads to unjustified regulation.
Second, beyond applying CBA in the context of OIRA review, regulators should more explicitly consider a range of regulatory
options that could achieve a targeted benefit, and adopt the
approach that imposes the minimum regulatory cost for a given
benefit.46 Had the SEC applied this approach to the implementation of SOX 404, it might have realized that it could have achieved
the same level of fraud reduction through less-costly rules. This
approach of minimizing costs for a given benefit, coupled with
expanded OIRA review and mandatory CBA, would do much to
improve the current financial regulatory structure.

SECURITIZATION
Securitization is a financial innovation of the 1970s with great
economic value. Before the advent of the financial crisis, private
securitizations—as opposed to those affected by the governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs), Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae—
dominated the market. While there were clearly deficiencies in
the process—particularly the near-complete reliance on credit rating agency (CRA) ratings and inadequate disclosure—underwriting standards were set in response to the demands of private
investors rather than bureaucratic imperatives. It is important to
revitalize the private securitization market and to diminish the
role of the GSEs so that underwriting standards, and thus mortgage lending, are responsive to market forces. But there is a need
for added regulation of these markets to promote more transparency. Whether originators should be required to keep skin in
the game is unclear, however. When armed with more information in the future, investors, who have been burned badly in the
46 CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 27, 32.
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past, should be a more powerful force in disciplining bad securitized products and will rely much less on the analysis of credit
rating agencies.

Importance of Securitization
Securitization is the process of converting a pool of financial
assets into tradable obligations backed by identifiable cash flows.
Issuers like banks raise funds via securitization to improve their
capital and liquidity positions, and to transfer risk. Investors benefit from securitization because it gives them a wider choice of
high-quality investments. Further, the demand for securitized
products drives the supply of funds in the underlying markets,
thereby improving the allocation of capital. On average, U.S.
financial institutions securitized approximately 46 percent of the
total credit they originated from 2005-7.47 Because of the general
benefits of securitization, a poorly functioning securitization market could pose a significant risk to economic growth.

The Current State of the Securitization Market
The global financial crisis has devastated the private market for
securitized debt. Residential mortgage securitization volumes,
not backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, collapsed from $744
billion in 2005 to $8 billion during the first half of 2009.48
Throughout the financial collapse and afterwards, the federal
government essentially became the only securitizer of mortgage
loans; from 2006 to 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s share of
securitization grew from 39 percent to 72 percent of all domestic
mortgage originations, while mortgages insured by the FHA have
increased from 3 percent to 22 percent of total origination
volumes over the same period.49 Including the Federal Housing
Administration and the Department of Veteran Affairs, the
47 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Restoring Confidence in the
Securitization Markets, December 3, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/securitizationreport-exec-summary.shtml.
48 Jenny Anderson, “Debt-Market Paralysis Deepens Credit Drought,” New York Times, October 6,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/business/economy/07shadow.html?_r=2&ref=
business.
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federal government backed 94.6 percent of all mortgage origination activity in 2009, and 96.5 percent of all new home loans in the
first quarter of 2010.50 And in the aftermath of the crisis, the government has not only been involved on the origination side of the
securitization market; since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the Federal Reserve has purchased over $1 trillion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the GSEs.51
This MBS purchasing activity by the Federal Reserve during the
last two years is highly significant: the Fed’s purchases of MBS
comprise roughly half of its over $2 trillion balance sheet,52
and nearly 10 percent of the entire stock of outstanding U.S.
mortgage debt.53
Because Fannie and Freddie dominate the mortgage-underwriting market, private-sector standards for underwriting do not currently exist. Moreover, as a result of the crisis, the GSEs have
demanded that banks conform their loans to standards that often
may have little or nothing to do with the creditworthiness of the
borrower but are driven by excessive aversion toward risk—
bureaucrats do not want to be criticized for making bad loans. For
example, the full documentation requirement of the GSEs has
begun to exclude some high-quality self-employed borrowers
from the mortgage market, and the stricter appraisal requirements under the GSE Home Valuation Code of Conduct have significantly increased the difficulty of getting appraisals.54 This
general tightening of the availability of credit does not reflect consideration of the factors in the more nuanced market-based
49 Republican staff of the House Committee on the Budget, A Roadmap for America’s Future, 111th
Cong., 2d sess., January 2010, http://www.roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/Plan.
50 Nick Timiraos, “Fannie, Freddie Fix is Federal Hot Potato,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704167704575258503544541716.html?KEYWORDS=Fannie+Mae+Freddie+Mac.
51 “Exit, Pursued by a Bear,” Financial Times, May 31, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/4a67d7026cd1-11df-91c8-00144feab49a.html.
52 Ibid.
53 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding:
1990-2009 (Washington, DC: FHFA, 2009) http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15556/Enterprise
%20Share%20of%20Residential%20Mortgage%20Debt%20Outstanding%201990%20-%202009.xls.
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approach recommended by the American Securitization Forum,
which includes over 150 relevant predictors of loan performance,
including loan type, lien position, loan term and amortization
type, borrower information, property characteristics, and many
others.55
In addition to impeding the operation of markets, the GSEs have
been responsible for $226 billion of combined capital destruction
since the end of 2007 and have required $148 billion of government capital support.56 The GSEs have been backed by an initial
$200 billion per institution, but still potentially face even greater
losses than that.57 Indeed, these large and growing taxpayer losses from the activities of the GSEs already have eclipsed the most
recent estimates of roughly $66 billion of private sector losses
from the entire TARP program.58

CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATION OF THE
SECURITIZATION MARKET IN LIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
Among the criticisms of securitization markets are lack of disclosure requirements, poor incentive structures, and the failure of
the credit ratings process.

54 Jack M. Guttentag, “What Should Be Done With Fannie and Freddie?” The Mortgage Professor,
Yahoo! Finance, July 22 2010, http://finance.yahoo.com/expert/article/mortgage/257571.
55 For a complete list of these market based criteria, see American Securitization Forum, ASF RMBS
Disclosure and Reporting Packages 36-81 (July 2009), http://www.americansecuritization.com/
uploadedFiles/ASF_Project_RESTART_Final_Release_7_15_09.pdf.
56 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Conservator’s Report on the Enterprises’ Financial
Performance: Second Quarter 2010 (Washington, DC: FHFA, 2010), 9, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16591/ConservatorsRpt82610.pdf.
57 James R. Hagerty and Jessica Holzer, “U.S. Move to Cover Fannie, Freddie Losses Stirs
Controversy,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB126168307200704747.html.
58 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (Washington, DC:
CBO, Aug. 2010) 18, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11705/08-18-Update.pdf.
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Disclosure Requirements
A fundamental problem in the securitization process was the lack
of disclosure to the market of granular information about the
composition of the pools of assets in securitization deals.
Without such information, investors cannot properly value their
investments.
Past regulations, primarily SEC Regulation AB which allowed but
did not require dealers issuing mortgage-backed securities to provide granular loan-level data, have failed to provide investors
with sufficient disclosure on securitization deals. As the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation noted, numerous securitization-related data for investors have historically not been
made available to them, thus making accurate analysis of these
instruments far more difficult.59 The SEC’s proposed new
approach (released in April 2010) is commendable insofar as it
seeks to improve standardized loan-level disclosure in ABS offerings;60 it also appears to be consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act’s
similar new requirement for additional asset-level disclosures in
securitizations.61 This increased transparency should protect ABS
investors, and also enable market participants—not just ratings
agencies with preferred access to information—to more accurately evaluate securitization offerings.
Despite the progress made by the SEC in reforming Regulation
AB, however, regulatory reform of ABS disclosure processes has
been the subject of regulatory turf wars. Most notably, in early
2010, the FDIC has attempted to regulate the ABS disclosure
process through its role in determining bankruptcy remoteness.62
Although the Dodd-Frank Act commendably assigns promulgation of ABS disclosure processes to the SEC,63 there is nothing in
59 CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 147.
60 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange Act Release nos.
33-9117, 34-61858, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9117.pdf. Note that this proposed rule is along the lines suggested by the Committee. See, e.g., CCMR Plan for Regulatory
Reform, 151.
61 Dodd-Frank, § 942(b).
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the act to suggest that the FDIC cannot continue to use its bankruptcy remoteness authority to regulate ABS disclosure.
However, several factors suggest that regulating ABS disclosure
would be better left to the SEC. First, it is the SEC’s statutory
responsibility to set disclosure and transparency requirements for
primary and secondary issues, including of ABS.64 Additionally,
the SEC has substantially more experience than the FDIC in this
area and is better equipped to exercise continued oversight over
these disclosure requirements. While the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation, as well as the Paulson blueprint, called for
meaningful regulatory consolidation,65 given that this option was
not followed, leaving regulation of these disclosures to the SEC is
the most sensible option.

Incentives of Originators
Insufficient alignment of incentives between originators and
investors in securitized products may have played a role in the
recent credit crisis.66 More specifically, numerous commentators
have noted that the “originate-to-distribute” model in U.S. securitization markets caused mortgage lenders and securitization
originators to excessively focus on up-front fees collected from
direct lending or from structuring deals, without paying sufficient attention to the underlying quality of assets.67 Investors, in
62 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding
Treatment by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Conservator or Receiver of Financial
Assets Transferred by an Insured Depository Institution in Connection with a Securitization or
Participation After March 31, 2010, 4, http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/DEC152009no5.pdf.
63 Dodd-Frank, § 942(b).
64 Ibid.; Securities Act of 1933 § 7; Securities Act of 1934 § 13(a).
65 See e.g. CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 203. See also CCMR Recommendations for
Regulatory Structure; Paulson Blueprint; and Chris Dodd, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Summary: Restoring American Financial Stability – Discussion Draft 5,”
November 10, 2010 [hereinafter Dodd Discussion Draft] (discussing consolidating bank regulatory
power in a newly created Federal bank regulator).
66 CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 129.
67 European Central Bank, The Incentive Structure of the ‘Originate and Distribute’ Model
(Frankfurt: ECB, 2008), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/incentivestructureoriginatedistributemodel200812en.pdf.
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turn, were subsequently burned when asset quality deteriorated
and they had not obtained sufficient recourse against originators
to recoup their losses, particularly in the case of securitizations
backed by the riskiest mortgage products. Of course, if investors
had had more information and not left all evaluation of their
investments to the credit rating agencies, investor demands
might have disciplined the originators.
The most common proposal to remedy this possible misalignment of incentives in the securitization process has been to create
fixed retention thresholds for originators; the Dodd-Frank Act,
for example, sets this threshold at 5 percent of the overall issue,
subject to exceptions depending on the underwriting quality of
the underlying assets.68 While such proposals could potentially
help improve originator-investor incentive alignment, setting a
fixed percentage threshold for retention in all securitizations is an
overly inflexible approach given that different deals pose different levels of risk. Insofar as Dodd-Frank allows deviation from
the fixed 5 percent threshold contingent on underwriting quality,
it introduces a desirable degree of flexibility into the process.69 By
exploring other methods of incentive alignment like restrictions
on high-risk mortgage products from entering the securitization
market, and strengthening of representations, warranties, and
repurchase obligations by originators, regulators could introduce
further flexibility.70 To this end, Dodd-Frank has given the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau broad discretion to promulgate rules restricting high-risk products at the origination phase
(a useful power if reserved only for true outlier products),71 but it
does not strengthen originators’ representations and warranties
(though it does require that these representations and warranties
be more fully disclosed).72
68 Dodd-Frank, § 941(b).
69 Dodd-Frank, § 941(b); see also CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 142.
70 CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 141–42.
71 Dodd-Frank, § 1011(a).
72 Ibid. § 943.
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Credit Rating Agencies
While CRAs have been broadly criticized since the financial crisis
for their role in underestimating risks across a variety of rated
assets, arguably nowhere has this failure been as pronounced as
in their failure to rate securitized assets accurately. Since the third
quarter of 2007, CRAs have downgraded substantial percentages
of their ratings for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
and CDO securities, even for those securities with the highest
investment-grade ratings.73 The impact of these ratings failures
has been catastrophic because of the unprecedented scope of
structured credit issuance in the years leading up to the financial
crisis; from 2005 to 2007, CRAs facilitated the issuance of over
$6.5 trillion into global credit markets.74 Because of these failures,
and despite some recent efforts by the SEC to improve various
dimensions of the credit rating process,75 there have been numerous broader proposals in the wake of the crisis to improve regulation of CRAs.
There are three broad themes that should guide the regulation of
CRAs both domestically and internationally.76 First, policymakers should seek to develop globally consistent standards for
CRAs and enforce these standards at the highest governmental
level (not, for example, at the state level in the United States).
CRAs, like the investors they serve, operate globally, and regulating them at an international level would ease the burdens of compliance with new regulation, as well as the use of credit ratings
themselves. Likewise, placing enforcement powers with the highest level of governments worldwide would promote consistent
enforcement and avoid an inefficient and confusing patchwork
73 CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 155.
74 Ibid. at 154.
75 See U.S. Securities and Trade Commission, Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-57967 (Washington, DC: SEC, June 16, 2008)
(proposing new rules applicable to NRSROs, many of which were adopted in February 2009 substantially as proposed or as modified in response to comments).
76 Note that these three themes are largely distilled from the recommendations proposed in
CCMR Plan for Regulatory Reform, 171–72.
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approach to their regulation. The recent G20 agreement on several of these points represents progress in this direction,77 though
there is much more work to be done.
Second, governments should seek to separate themselves from
the ratings process to the greatest extent possible. Governments
should not interfere with how CRAs set ratings to ensure the
functioning of market processes in ratings determination; nor
should they seek to restructure the conflicts of interest in the
issuer-pays CRA business model by giving itself the power to
assign CRAs to issuers, as was proposed in the Franken
Amendment to the U.S. Senate financial reform bill. Although the
Franken Amendment was fortunately not adopted in the final
Dodd-Frank legislation, the Dodd-Frank bill does unfortunately
increase the scope for government interference in the credit ratings process by giving the new Office of Credit Ratings within the
SEC wide authority to promulgate rules related to rating methodology.78 Governments should also seek to reduce statutory and
regulatory reliance on CRA ratings. There is no reason why
reliance on privately determined CRA ratings should be hardwired into federal regulations, and the government should not
support a private oligopoly in the credit rating industry, particularly where reliance on such ratings has proved extremely harmful in the recent past. On this score, Dodd-Frank justifiably
requires that CRA-issued ratings be “purged” from statutes, with
the relevant agencies required to promulgate their own standards
for measuring creditworthiness.79
Finally, governments should seek to increase disclosure as to how
ratings are determined, particularly for complex structured credit products. Doing so will enhance investors’ ability to monitor
more accurately the meaning of changes in credit ratings. By the
same token, governments should not grant CRAs informational
advantages over other market participants, as in the U.S. govern77 G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System 6 (April 2, 2009).
78 Dodd-Frank, § 932(a)(8).
79 Dodd-Frank, § 939.
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ment exemption of CRAs from Regulation FD, which generally
prohibits material information from being selectively disclosed to
particular analysts. Governments should not support a private
oligopoly in this industry, particularly when investors with access
to the same information could perform independent evaluation
of the data relevant to credit performance. In the United States,
the Dodd-Frank Act delivers on both of these dimensions, by
increasing the amount of disclosure for rating methodologies80
and by eliminating the Regulation FD exemption for CRAs.81

FEDERAL RESERVE INDEPENDENCE
The independence of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) is crucial to the U.S. economy. Its independence has allowed it to take
necessary but unpopular measures to fight inflation and to be an
aggressive, but again unpopular, lender of last resort when necessary, as in the recent financial crisis. Central bank independence
is normally thought to involve independence from the administration or government, not independence from a legislative
body.82 Of course, in most Western democracies this distinction is
without a difference since the administration controls the parliament—indeed, the administration is formed from the parliament.
However, in the American democracy of checks and balances, the
administration and the Congress each pose their own threats to
Fed independence. Going forward, the threat from Congress may
become the more significant one.

Crisis Response 83
During the crisis, the Fed was an aggressive lender of last resort.
It first cut its borrowing rate, then its discount window penalty
rate to make it more acceptable for banks in trouble to borrow
80 Dodd-Frank, § 932(a)(8).
81 Dodd-Frank, § 939B.
82 For a general discussion of the issue of central bank independence, see generally Sylvester C.
Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan, “The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence” (Princeton
Special Papers in International Economics no. 19, 1996).
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without fear that borrowing would signal their weakness. It created several new liquidity facilities and extended access to the
discount window to primary dealers, including investment
banks. In response to the run on the money market funds, it made
loans to banks to buy unsecured and asset-backed commercial
paper, and to special-purpose vehicles to buy certain assets from
money market funds. It attempted to counter the severe dislocation in the securitization market by making loans to holders of
asset-backed securities and became a major purchaser of the
direct debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities of the
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks. In the process, the Fed balance sheet ballooned to over $2 trillion in 2009 compared with
$852 billion in 2006, at the same time reducing the fraction of
those assets in the form of U.S. Treasury securities (Treasuries) to
29 percent in June 2009 from 91 percent in 2006. Although traditional loans by a lender of last resort are sufficiently collateralized
to prevent moral hazard for borrowers and to reduce risk to the
central bank, it is increasingly clear that in many cases the collateral taken by the Fed was inadequate.84 Many of these liquidity
measures were taken with the prompting of Secretary of the
Treasury Hank Paulson, who knew he could not get the Congress
to appropriate funds for such programs85—this occurred only in
October 2008, when the Congress enacted TARP when the economy was on the brink of disaster because of the possible collapse
of major financial institutions despite the heroic measures taken
by the Fed.
These crisis measures not only increased the Fed’s risk, but the
resulting shortage of Treasuries also hindered the Fed’s ability to
83 Much of this section is based on, and some is taken verbatim from, Glenn Hubbard, Hal Scott,
and John Thornton, “The Fed’s Independence is at Risk,” Financial Times, August 21, 2009.
84 See, e.g., Caroline Salas et al., “Fed Made Taxpayers Unwitting Junk-Bond Buyers,” Bloomberg,
July 1, 2010. For a discussion of Bloomberg’s ongoing lawsuit to require the Fed to increase its disclosure of collateral for emergency loans during the crisis, see Josh Gerstein, “Bloomberg Notches
Win in Fed FOIA Fight,” Politico, August 23, 2010, http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0810/Bloomberg_notches_win_in_Fed_FOIA_fight.html.
85 Henry Paulson, On the Brink (New York: Business Plus, 2010), 240-41.
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conduct monetary policy. In order to counter the potential inflationary impact of its credit expansion (a concern during much of
the crisis), the Fed sought to sterilize its expansion of “crisis credits” by selling Treasuries. But since its supply of Treasuries had
dwindled through its purchases of other assets, the Fed requested that the Treasury Department sell special issues of Treasuries
under the Supplementary Financing Program—not to raise revenue for the U.S. Treasury but simply as a measure to sop up
excess liquidity. As of June 2009, the Supplementary Financing
Account of the Treasury Department was about $200 billion,
almost half the size of the Fed’s Treasury holdings.
Most of the Fed’s lending was done under the authority of
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which permitted the Fed
in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to lend to “any individual, partnership or corporation,” against notes that are “secured
to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank.” Many, including
former Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, questioned the
Fed’s authority to engage in much of the lending.86

Loss of Independence and Dodd-Frank
When the Congress took up legislative reform in the summer of
2009, Fed bashing, particularly from Republicans, was all the
rage. It was the Fed that had bailed out the evil financial institutions on Wall Street. While Chairman Frank of the House
Financial Services Committee held the line against curtailing Fed
power (apart from consumer protection authority), and even
expanded it with respect to systemic risk regulation, the Senate
was a different story. The first proposal by Chairman Dodd of the
Senate Banking Committee would have taken away much of the
Fed’s existing supervisory and regulatory power.87 As the year
progressed, however, Fed bashing declined and Chairman
Dodd’s subsequent proposals moved closer to those of the House.
86 See, e.g., John Brinsley and Anthony Massucci, “Volcker Says Fed’s Bear Loan Stretches Legal
Power,” Bloomberg, April 8, 2008.
87 See Dodd Discussion Draft (discussing stripping the Federal Reserve of most of its bank regulatory powers and vesting them in a newly created Federal bank regulator).
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So how does the Fed’s independence fare under Dodd-Frank?
First, the Fed’s role in controlling systemic risk is now largely
shaped by a new agency, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC), a ten-member group chaired by the secretary of
the treasury, composed of regulators plus one nonregulator
appointed by the president.88 The remit of the FSOC is quite
broad. The general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York suggested that the FSOC could even make monetary policy
recommendations to the Fed.89
The Fed has an increased role in supervision, retaining its role as
supervisor of all state banks and bank-holding companies, but
getting added power to supervise on a consolidated basis all
bank-holding companies with $50 billion or more of assets and
any nonbank financial institution (NBFI) that the FSOC believes
is systemically important.90 How many NBFIs will be so designated remains to be determined. The Fed has also been given
more power to regulate systemically important derivatives clearinghouses, which will play an increased role in general under
Dodd-Frank.91 The Fed in partnership with the FSOC is the systemic risk regulator. With more responsibility comes potential
blame if it fails to prevent future crises, thus making the Fed more
mindful of its political environment.
A major strength of the Fed has been its research capacity and
esprit de corps of influential and able economists. Until now, no
other agency has come close to matching these resources.
However, Dodd-Frank has created a potentially powerful competitor to Fed research in the form of a new Office of Financial
Research.92 With competing centers of knowledge, Fed policy recommendations may be more contested.
88 Dodd-Frank, §§ 111-12.
89 R. Christian Bruce, “Oversight Council Might Urge Rate Hikes, New York Fed Official Tells Bar
Organization,” BNA’s Banking Report, August 10, 2010.
90 Dodd-Frank, § 113 (for non-bank financial institutions), § 165 (for banks with over $50 billion in
assets).
91 Ibid. § 805.
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Fed monetary policy has been restricted by the narrowing of its
authority under Section 13(3). No longer can the Fed make a oneoff loan to a corporation as it did in the JP Morgan Chase acquisition of Bear Stearns or to the receivership it created in the case of
AIG. Further, new mandates for adequate collateral no longer
leave this issue to the sole discretion of the Fed. Under DoddFrank, Fed emergency lending procedures will be subject to new
rules requiring that collateral with a “lendable value” be assigned
to each facility, that this lendable value be “sufficient to protect
taxpayers from losses,” and that these procedures be terminated
in a timely and orderly fashion.93 Additionally, while such programs are in effect, the Fed must provide reports on the value of
the collateral posted for emergency lending programs to the relevant House and Senate committees every thirty days.94
Most significantly, Dodd-Frank requires Treasury Department
approval of Fed emergency lending facilities and submits these
procedures to more extensive congressional oversight.95 This
measure was suggested by the administration in its June 2009
financial reform proposal and was not resisted during the legislative process by the Fed, which at various periods was fighting
what it perceived were bigger battles over its supervisory jurisdiction. Some would point to the crisis and say this is not a problem. After all, it was Secretary Paulson who was encouraging the
Fed to create new facilities to stave off the collapse of the financial
markets. But that was then. Can we be assured that in a new crisis the secretary of the treasury will do the same, or in light of the
criticism (unfair in my mind) of these facilities in the recent crisis,
will a new secretary and his or her president want to shoulder
responsibility for bailing out Wall Street? Also, remember that
Paulson was running the financial show, not the White House.
This situation is unlikely to repeat itself. The need for prior
92 Ibid. § 152.
93 Ibid. § 1101(a)(6).
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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approval represents a major incursion on the Fed’s role as lender
of last resort. The Congress should have stopped with the requirement of more adequate collateral.
Finally, the Fed will be subject to more extensive and frequent
audits by the comptroller general.96 The specific purpose of these
audits is to monitor the Fed’s operational integrity, accounting
practices, and procedures for emergency lending activities.97
Although the new procedures represent a greater degree of transparency in Fed practices, they do not reach the extent of transparency proposed in Rep Ron Paul’s (R-Texas) “Audit the Fed”
bill, which proposed opening Fed Open Markets Committee
meetings to increased scrutiny. While the proposal passed the
House, it ultimately failed in the conference committee that produced Dodd-Frank.98 Even the more limited form of audit in
Dodd-Frank, however, makes it is possible that some degree of
heightened scrutiny may reduce the Fed’s willingness to make
politically unpopular but necessary policy decisions.

Conclusion
The Fed’s independence has been seriously eroded by the crisis.
With respect to monetary policy, its lender of last resort authority
has been significantly curtailed and its independent monetary
policy tools were compromised by its shortage of Treasuries. This
is not presently a problem as it seeks to buy Treasuries to fight
deflation but could be a problem if the focus turned to inflation
and its shortage of Treasuries made it dependent on Treasury
Department initiatives like Supplemental Financing. Further, the
FSOC, as bubble-burster-in-chief, may put pressure on the Fed to
burst bubbles, whereas before Dodd-Frank this was left entirely
to the Fed without a new agency to put pressure on it. Finally, the
Fed will be more rigorously audited and its enhanced role in
96 Ibid. § 1102(a).
97 Ibid.
98 Ron Paul, Audit the Federal Reserve, http://www.ronpaul.com/legislation/audit-the-federalreserve-hr-1207/.
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supervision may expose it to further political attacks. Most of the
Fed’s problems lie not with the Administration, but with the
Congress—a Congress that sees political profit in reining in Fed
independence.

SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
Securities class actions are a unique American invention that
demonstrates that not all inventions are a good thing. They negatively impact the competitiveness of the U.S. capital market
because they are often not in the interest of shareholders.99 Class
actions generally result in institutional shareholders suing themselves while giving lawyers over 25 percent of the settlement
amount. All shareholders pay for something they did not do and
could not control. Certain shareholders recover because they happen to have engaged in stock transactions during the class period; in other words, recoveries are essentially random. The only
justification for such class actions is deterrence, but it is hard to
see how shareholder liability will deter bad management, particularly since it is almost always the consequences of disclosing a
wrongdoing itself (e.g., the significant loss of firm value, reputational damage, and executive firings) rather than penalties
imposed in shareholder lawsuits that provide any relevant deterrence for management.100 Furthermore, the United States has a
massive federal and state enforcement of securities laws. Given
that these actions primarily affect shareholders, I would allow
shareholders to decide whether to keep them at all and, if so, in
what form.

Current Role of Securities Class Actions
Class actions present a very tangible liability risk for issuers
operating in the U.S. capital markets, with one recent study estimating that an average public company faces a nearly 10 percent
99 CCMR Interim Report, 71.
100 See Hal S. Scott, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation 17th ed. (Eagan,
MN: Foundation Press 2010), 71.
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probability of becoming subject to a securities class action in the
course of a five-year period.101 Moreover, the measure of liability
faced in such suits can be both unpredictable and extensive. In
2005, U.S. public companies paid out more than $3.5 billion to settle securities class action lawsuits, not including the $6.2 billion
settlement reached with WorldCom at the end of that year.102
Excluding the exceptional sums involved in the Enron and
WorldCom settlements, the average settlement in 2005 was $71.1
million—an increase of 156 percent over the $27.8 million average
settlement in 2004.103 The years 2005–7 saw eight of the decade’s
nine billion-dollar settlements. In 2008 and 2009, average figures
for class action settlements were less dramatic, but nevertheless
totaled an average of $28.4 million and $37.2 million for 2008 and
2009 respectively (with total settlement value of $2.75 billion for
ninety-seven total settlements in 2008 and $3.83 billion for 103
settlements in 2009).104
Predictably, issuers in the United States are paying vastly more
than their counterparts in other countries to insure against the liability risks from shareholder class actions. For example, figures
show that the cost of Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance in
the United States is 125 percent higher than it is in Europe,105
101 Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Are WorldCom and
Enron the New Standard? (White Plains, NY: National Economic Research Associates, 2005), 2.
102 PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory, 2005 Securities Litigation Study (2006), 18. A similar study
by the National Economic Research Association excludes data related to both WorldCom and
Enron, as well as any settlements reached by year-end 2005 but not yet finalized. Because this
approach omits from the 2005 calculations many large settlements, it suggests a much smaller
growth in the average settlement value between 2004 and 2005—approximately 28 percent.
Although the NERA study suggests that, underneath the megasettlements, there may be some stabilization occurring in average settlement values, it also shows the scope of the upward shift in
these values. According to NERA’s study, the average settlement value for the period 1996-2001
was $13.4 million. The average settlement value for the period 2002-5 was $22.7 million. Buckberg
et al., 6.
103 Ibid.
104 Ellen Ryan and Laura Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2009 Review and Analysis,
Cornerstone Research, 2009, 2.
105 Memorandum from Advisen and Association of Insurance and Risk Managers (AIRMIC),
received August 19, 2010.
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potentially setting high expense burdens for U.S. issuers compared to international competitors. This is likely one important
reason why U.S. public capital markets have been gradually losing their competitive advantage to other international financial
hubs and to private U.S. capital markets. By way of example, in
2009, foreign companies raised over twice as much equity in the
private U.S. markets as in the public markets ($7.3 billion private
vs. $3.1 billion public, or 70 percent private share of total global
IPOs in the United States) compared to a historical average of 64
percent private from 1996-2006.106 Further, the U.S. share of equity globally raised in public markets was 24.4 percent in 2009,
below the historic average of 32.2 percent for 1996-2006.
Notwithstanding the above, high-profile incidences of corporate
misfeasance, seen in the cases of Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, as
well as more recently in the securities swindles perpetrated by
Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford, underscore the importance of
a strong framework for the enforcement of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities regulation. Indeed, in the wake of the
financial crisis, regulators appear to be taking a tougher approach
to investor protection in the securities markets, even in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom that traditionally have relied
on a more principles-based, “light touch” approach to regulation.107 Although securities class actions and the associated large
settlements and damages awards might seem to provide effective
deterrence against wrongdoing, commentators and practitioners
alike have expressed considerable doubt about whether they do
so in practice.108 As briefly detailed below, class actions’ punitive
effects and the resulting allocations of wealth between actors in
106 Ibid.
107 Kate Burgess and Brooke Masters, “Insider Trading: a Bigger Bite,” Financial Times, May 12, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bbc0ee56-5dfa-11df-8153-00144feab49a.html.
108 John C. Coffee, “Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implementation” (working paper no. 293, Columbia Law and Economics, October 2006),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893833; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct.
1503, 1510 (2006) (arguing that securities litigation “presents danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975))).
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the securities market have been analyzed as largely inefficient,
undermining both the health and competitive pull of the U.S.
securities markets.

Governance and Cost Benefit in Class Actions
The basic legal regime for bringing securities class actions in the
United States is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA).109 The regime allows an attorney to bring a claim
against an issuer on behalf of an entire class of investors who purchased the securities issued and suffered a loss on their investments as a result of an issuer’s alleged misconduct. Accordingly,
a claim may be brought on behalf of an entire, indeterminate class
of plaintiffs, subject to the requirement that there be a “lead”
plaintiff, judged to be someone best representing the interests of
the class.110 Under Rule 23(b)(3), the basis for the vast majority of
securities class actions, the class certification extends to cover all
members of the investor class, unless one specifically “opts out”
from proceedings, either to pursue a claim independently, or to
drop out of the litigation altogether. There are a number of problems with this approach.
First, the alignment of interests between plaintiffs and their representative attorney is far from clear. The large number of plaintiffs involved, some of whom may never be aware of the suit111
and may only leave the class when they expressly opt out of it,
creates the risk of a principal-agent conflict of interest between
plaintiffs and the class attorney. Class members (with the possible
109 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Public Law 104-67, 104th Cong., 1st sess., U.S. Statutes
at Large 109 (2005): 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). One of the
stated purposes of the PSLRA was to provide greater discipline in bringing shareholder suits, with
a more stringent check on bringing suits, with changes in an issuer’s stock price, without further
investigation of culpability, being an insufficient basis on which to bring a claim. H.R. Rep. No. 104369, at 31 (1995).
110 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101(a).
111 In suits filed under Rule 23(b)(3), class members must receive “the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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exception of the lead plaintiff) will likely not have chosen the
attorney, and do not have access to effective coordination mechanisms for exerting control and direction over attorney conduct.
Nevertheless, they are bound by the final settlement or judgment.112 Commentators have therefore suggested that such class
actions are susceptible to a heightened risk of collusive conduct
between defendant issuers and plaintiff attorneys (agreeing to an
early settlement that spares the uncertainty of trial and generates
lucrative fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyer).113 Indeed, NERA found
the ratio of settlements to investor losses in 2002, 2003, and 2004
to be 2.7 percent, 2.9 percent, and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Moreover, plaintiffs often do not collect whatever settlement
amounts they are awarded; one recent study found that only 4060 percent of potentially eligible plaintiff shareholders collected
any proceeds at all after a settlement award is reached.114
Meanwhile, plaintiffs’ attorneys are customarily awarded
between 25 percent and 35 percent of any recovery (although this
percentage may be declining),115 indicating high agency and
transaction costs in such litigation.
Further, the process of bringing securities class actions has given
rise to a number of unsavory and abusive practices. Until the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, it was common for professional plaintiffs to own small pools of shares in large firms that enabled them
to bring class action suits, in return for kickbacks from attorney
firms.116 Similar abusive practices have continued since the
passage of the PSLRA, however, perhaps most notably as reflected in the indictment and conviction of several partners and lead
112 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., “Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation,” Columbia Law Review 100 (2000): 381.
113 Bruce L. Hay and David Rosenberg, “‘Sweetheart’ and ‘Blackmail’ Settlements in Class Actions:
Reality and Remedy,” Notre Dame Law Review 75 (2000): 1377, 1389.
114 Francis E. McGovern, Participation Rates in Private Securities Litigation Settlement
Distributions (May 6, 2010).
115 Buckberg et al., 6.
116 Russell Kamerman, “Securities Class Action Abuse: Protecting Small Plaintiffs’ Big Money,”
Cardozo Law Review 29 (2007): 853, 858–9.

149

RULES FOR GROWTH
plaintiffs of the firm Milberg Weiss on conspiracy charges related
to an alleged $250 million kickback scheme for lead plaintiffs in
shareholder class actions.117 Since the passage of the PSLRA,
attorneys have also engaged in so called pay-to-play practices
that involve attorney firms making large payments to the campaign funds of state officials in return for being appointed as
counsel for suits brought by state pension funds.118
Second, notwithstanding the large settlements involved and the
nuisance value of such claims, securities class actions have limited deterrence benefit. This is in part because individual directors
and officers are not usually personally liable for the amount of the
claims,119 leaving the punitive burden to fall on the shoulders of
shareholders, who do not have day-to-day control over the decisions of the directors and officers of an issuer. It is also due to the
fact that much of the deterrence against management misconduct
arises from the prospect of disclosure of such conduct itself, and
not from the resulting shareholder lawsuits, as discussed above.

Proposals for Reform
One potential solution to the efficiency and governance concerns
set out above would be to give shareholders the choice of amending their bylaws to prohibit class action suits in favor of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, or through some variation on current class action procedures.

117 U.S. Attorney, Central District of California, “Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Two Senior Partners
Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme Involving Named Plaintiffs in Class-Action Lawsuits,” news
release, May 18, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/milbergpress05182006.pdf; “New York Attorney Sentenced in Kickback Scheme,” New York Times,
November 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-kickbacks.5.9951917.html.
118 See, e.g., Mark Maremont, Tom McGinty, and Nathan Koppel, “Trial Lawyers Contribute,
Shareholder Lawsuits Follow,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703837004575013633550087098.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_RIGHTInDepthCarous
el.
119 Individuals may be liable where the business is insolvent and where there is insufficient D&O
insurance to cover the value of the claim, as happened in the case of WorldCom, for example,
where outside directors paid $25 million each to settle the claim.
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There are several potential drawbacks to subjecting more shareholder disputes to arbitration. First, shareholders would have to
approve this dispute resolution mechanism through a proxy vote
amending the bylaws of their corporation. Whether a present
group of shareholders should have the right to bind all existing
and future shareholders through such a vote may be debated,
although this is the effect of all bylaw amendments. Second, the
general counsel’s office of the SEC issued an opinion in 1990 that
the limited instances in which the Supreme Court has allowed
mandatory arbitration of claims under the securities laws, as
between brokers and their customers, should not be extended to
the context of issuer-shareholder disputes.120 While there is no
legal reason that the SEC general counsel may not revisit this
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence—
an interpretation that I regard as wrong—it is unclear whether the
SEC would do so. As a more general matter, arbitration usually
affords plaintiffs and defendants fewer procedural protections
than does litigation, and plaintiffs generally lose the opportunity
to appeal. And consumer advocates have made arguments
against arbitration proceedings in other contexts (such as brokerage and credit card disputes), arguing that it favors repeat industry players over consumers.121 Despite these potential problems
with arbitrating shareholder disputes, the benefits of reducing
burdensome shareholder class action litigation could be substantial, and at the very least, shareholders will be no worse off for
having the right to choose.
Another alternative would be for shareholders to determine
through their bylaws that shareholders be required to bring optin, rather than opt-out, class actions. Under Rule 23 of Civil
Procedure, class actions proceed on the basis of an inclusive
model, under which investors are automatically included unless
they expressly opt out of proceedings. As commentators have
noted, opting out is rare in securities actions,122 leaving a large
120 Ibid. at 111; Thomas L. Riesenberg, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: a Reply to Carl
Schneider, Insights 4 (1990): 2.
121 Kara Scannell, “SEC Explores Opening Door to Arbitration,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2007.
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class of investors who have little control over proceedings, or in
some cases, no knowledge of or interest in their conduct.
Basically, small shareholders do not care whether or not the litigation proceeds because they have so little to recover. But their
automatic inclusion makes the litigation viable for the plaintiff
attorneys.
The main advantage of allowing shareholders to opt into class
action suits is that only shareholders who affirmatively want a
class action suit would be part of one; investors who believed participating in a class action was not in their interest would not join
the class, or those who were indifferent also would not be included. Additionally, an opt-in approach allows only those participating in the class to be bound by the ruling, leaving the remainder
of the class with the possibility of pursuing a suit if they wish to
do so.
This approach may also be more palatable to courts than arbitration. Rather than requiring shareholders to waive their right to
bring class actions, switching to an opt-in regime just alters the
procedure under which they are conducted. Moreover, opt-out
regimes are used in other countries. For example, the United
Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain use a system of group litigation in
which potential claimants must affirmatively opt into a suit in
order to participate.123 In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act
in the United States also provides for an opt-in regime.124 A
switch to opt-in class actions is similar to other types of predispute agreements courts often enforce, such as waiving a jury trial
or specifying a choice of forum or choice of law. The case for an
opt-in regime is particularly strong when the shareholders affirmatively opt for such a system through the proxy vote procedure.
122 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, “The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues” (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 04-019, March 2004).
123 See Peter Mattil and Vanessa Desoutter, “Class Action in Europe: Comparative Law and EC Law
Considerations,” Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (2008).
124 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has offered ideas in five important areas of financial
regulation: control of systemic risk, the use of cost-benefit analysis, the revitalization of the private securitization market, the
preservation of Fed independence, and the use of securities class
actions. The first four subjects have been dealt with in the DoddFrank Act but often in a non-optimal fashion. Many of the shortcomings could be fixed through implementing regulation.
Securities class actions have been a troubling feature of our public equity markets for a long time and shareholders need, in their
own self-interest, to be more active in shaping their use.
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6:

How Financial Regulation Might Harness
the Power of Markets

Frank Partnoy∗

O

ne of the major themes of this volume is the importance of
sustained growth and dynamic efficiency, as opposed to
static efficiency. In the past, static efficiency analyses of
financial markets generally have led to one of two conclusions: (1) financial innovation is an unalloyed good, and financial
markets must be left unfettered, free from the regulatory intrusions of mandatory disclosure and securities litigation; or (2)
financial innovations are a source of deadweight loss and danger,
and financial markets must be tightly regulated to constrain
agency costs and control externalities.
As I understand it, one goal of “Rules for Growth” is to
reach beyond static analyses, to find more sophisticated and
helpful ways of thinking about the ongoing relationship between
legal rules and sustainable growth. In this respect, financial innovation presents particularly difficult challenges. Although much
∗ Frank Partnoy is the George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego
School of Law. I am grateful to the Kauffman Foundation for support and to participants in the
Third Annual Kauffman Summer Legal Institute on Rules for Growth for helpful comments and suggestions. I particularly want to thank Robert Litan, who has inspired and encouraged my work in
the financial regulatory area for more than a decade, and George Priest, whose efforts to keep my
intellectual follies in check began failing when I was his student, well before that.
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financial innovation (automated payment processing, online
transacting, and low-cost hedging with “plain vanilla” derivatives) is beneficial for growth, other innovation (undisclosed synthetic collateralized debt obligations, LIBOR-cubed swaps, and
bonds with payments based on the number of wins by a professional basketball team) is of more questionable benefit.
Financial innovation differs from other forms of innovation in
that it—like many of its products—tends to be derivative. The
over-the-counter derivative markets, at roughly $600 trillion in
notional amount, are by far the largest markets in the world,
financial or otherwise. Significant portions of that derivative
activity have led to a misallocation of capital, including most
prominently the use of super senior tranches of synthetic collateralized debt obligations to shift the risks associated with subprime
mortgages to and from financial institutions in ways that were
hidden from financial market participants. Standardized derivatives play a valuable role in an economy, but over-the-counter
derivatives are less useful and more dangerous.1
Moreover, the interplay between financial regulators and financial markets over time adds a layer of complexity to the analysis.
Markets constantly search for regulatory arbitrage, so that many
costly rules, even those with sensible static efficiency rationales,
can have short useful lives. In addition, regulators are either
inherently at a disadvantage, given the disparities in pay and
expertise between government and financial services, or are subject to the industry revolving door that creates strong incentives
to deliver economic rent instead of optimal policy. Given these
complexities and challenges, it can be nearly impossible to draw
conclusions about what kinds of rules best resolve the double
trust dilemma that arises when new ideas and capital are
combined.

1 See Robert E. Litan, “The Derivative Dealers’ Club and Derivatives Markets Reform: A Guide for

Policy Makers, Citizens and Other Interested Parties,” Brookings Working Paper (2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0407_derivatives_litan.aspx.
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The most salient examples arise from the recent financial crisis,
which has spurred reform efforts in numerous areas related to
financial markets, ranging from consumer protection to corporate
governance to derivatives. The proposed reforms in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act),2 which became law on July 21, 2010, are sprawling
and unrelated. Some are directed at problems related to the crisis.
Most are not.
Overall, the reforms are a hodgepodge, lacking a consistent intellectual theme. In this chapter, I argue in favor of one unifying
principle for financial regulation and reform, a core set of ideas to
use in sketching a road map for new financial rules for growth.
That basic principle is simple: Financial regulation should harness the power of markets.
Ironically, in recent decades, as financial markets have become
more liquid, financial regulators have relied less on markets for
regulatory purposes. This move away from market reliance has
limited innovation and economic growth. It has locked regulators
into relying on outdated and inaccurate balance sheets, on incompetent fraud investigators, and on undisciplined rent-seeking
gatekeepers.
From a theoretical perspective, this move away from markets is a
perversion of Ronald Coase’s argument that transactions could
take place either within markets or firms, depending on costs.3
From a practical perspective, it has led to misallocation of and
distortions in the cost of capital. Moreover, this regulatory move,
particularly as it relates to reliance on credit rating agencies, was
a core cause of recent financial crises. Whereas market forces
might naturally have performed a regulatory or quasi-regulatory
function, regulatory intervention has prevented these forces from
acting to discipline or deter deleterious private action.
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), H.R.

4173, 111th Cong., (2d. Sess. 2010).
3 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4 (1937): 386.
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In this chapter, I consider three examples of the shift away from
market-based regulation, in the areas of accounting, enforcement,
and regulatory reliance. First, a rules-based approach centered on
financial market gatekeepers, such as audit firms, has come to
dominate accounting and mandatory disclosure, particularly for
balance sheet reporting, resulting in disclosure that is not useful
for market actors. Second, government agencies have come to
dominate the investigation and prosecution of financial fraud, as
legislative and judicial changes have limited the market incentives of, and scope of efforts by, the plaintiffs’ bar and the private
attorney general enforcement role. Third, prudential regulation
has come to depend on regulated institutional measures of risk,
particularly those embodied in credit ratings, even when marketbased measures of risk are demonstrably more accurate and
reliable.
In each of these three areas, regulators could harness the power of
markets by changing rules to stir innovation and improve economic growth. First, regulators could require that companies create new “real” market value-based balance sheets to go alongside,
or replace, their “fictitious” ones; such financial statements would
force directors and officers to determine which assets and liabilities were reflected in equity prices, an exercise that would pressure them to allocate capital more efficiently. Such efforts would
move the focus of accounting away from regulatory intermediaries in the direction of reality-based market forces.
Second, regulators could revitalize reliance on private enforcement of legal claims. I suggest two possible ways to do this: by
incentivizing private litigants and by encouraging the creation of
“synthetic common law.” Incentivizing private financial fraud
enforcement would pressure corporate actors to internalize more
of the costs associated with fraudulent or manipulative activity.
Likewise, specifying common law menus of hypothetical results
to govern future disputes would increase certainty and reduce
costs in transacting complex financial contracts. In general, a shift
to privately enforced standards could leverage the Holmesian
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notion of law as a prediction of what a judge will do to govern the
conduct of market actors in a more efficient manner.
Third, regulators could implement rules that rely on market
measures of risk, instead of measures of risk generated by oligopolistic regulated institutions. Such changes would reduce the distortions that arise from “regulatory licenses,” the entitlements to
comply with regulation that have become the primary business of
gatekeepers such as credit rating agencies. Specifically, I argue
that market measures such as credit default swap spreads are
viable substitutes for credit ratings.

ACCOUNTING: REQUIRE REAL BALANCE SHEETS,TO GO
ALONG WITH FICTITIOUS ONES
The first proposal is that Congress should harness the power of
free, well-functioning markets by requiring that public corporations, particularly financial institutions, include all of their assets
and liabilities on their balance sheets.4 Transparency is one of the
central pillars of a well-functioning market, and it is central to
overcoming the double trust dilemma.
Congress recognized the importance of transparency in 1933 and
1934, when it implemented a two-pronged approach to shine sunlight on the markets with (1) a requirement that companies disclose material facts, and (2) an enforcement regime for companies
that do not make such disclosures. That approach was the backbone of economic growth for decades. Now that the markets have
once again swung far from transparency and balance sheets have
been opaque and fictitious, Congress should implement a similar
regime to require that (1) balance sheets are a clear picture of a
corporation’s financial health, and that (2) there are consequences
for companies that hide their debts.
4 This proposal is derived from a recent white paper I coauthored with Lynn Turner, former chief

accountant at the Securities and Exchange Commission, on off–balance sheet accounting. See
“Bring Transparency to Off–Balance Sheet Accounting,” Roosevelt Institute White Paper, March
2010, http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/policy-and-ideas/ideas-database/bring-transparencybalance-sheet-accounting.
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As in the 1920s, the balance sheets of major corporations recently
have failed to provide a clear picture of the financial health of
those entities. Banks in particular have become predisposed to
narrow the size of their balance sheets, because investors and regulators use the balance sheet as an anchor in their assessment of
risk. Banks use financial engineering to make it appear they are
better capitalized and less risky than they really are. Most people
and small businesses include all of their assets and liabilities on
their balance sheets. But large financial institutions and public
corporations do not.
This story began in the 1980s, when the derivatives market was
relatively small and off–balance sheet transactions were largely
unknown. The Financial Accounting Standards Board, the group
that publishes most accounting guidance, suggested that banks
should include swaps on their balance sheets.
The accountants’ argument was straightforward. Banks already
accounted for loans as assets, because the right to receive payments from a borrower had positive value. Banks already
accounted for deposits as liabilities, because the obligation to pay
depositors had negative value. A swap, the FASB argued, was no
different: it was simply an asset and a liability paired together,
like a house plus a mortgage, or a car plus a loan. (The asset part
of the swap was the money owed by the counterparty; the liability part of the swap was the money owed to the counterparty.)
The FASB’s premise was simple, common sense. When most people and businesses prepare financial statements, they list all of
their actual assets and liabilities. The reason is straightforward:
The government, creditors, and investors want to see the entire
picture. Individuals and small business owners cannot hide some
of their debts merely by relabeling them.
But banks foresaw that the burgeoning business of swaps would
inflate the size of their balance sheets if they were reported as
assets and liabilities. Banks wanted to profit from trading swaps,
but they did not want to include swaps in their financial statements. Instead, they argued to the FASB that swaps should be
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treated as off–balance sheet transactions. In 1985, the banks
formed a lobbying organization called the International Swap
Dealers Association. That group, now widely known as ISDA,
pressed the FASB to exempt swaps from the standard approach to
assets and liabilities. The banks argued that swaps were different,
because the payments were based on a reference amount that the
swap counterparties did not actually exchange. ISDA was a forceful advocate, and the banks persuaded the FASB to abandon its
argument.
ISDA and the banks have continued their lobbying efforts to keep
swaps and other derivatives off–balance sheet, as they argued
more generally for deregulation of these markets. As a result,
banks and corporations that trade swaps do not play by the same
rules as other individuals and businesses. Banks are permitted
to exclude their full exposure to swaps from their financial
statements, and instead report only the “fair value” changes in
those swaps over time. Such reporting is like an individual
reporting only the change in their debt balances, instead of the
debts themselves.
A similar analysis applies to off–balance sheet treatment of deals
that used “Special Purpose Entities,” or SPEs. An SPE is a corporation or partnership formed for the purpose of borrowing
money to buy financial assets. Historically, under accounting
rules adopted by the American Institute of CPAs, corporations
were required to consolidate any SPEs they used to finance assets.
During the 1970s, if a transaction was a financing, both the assets
being financed as well as the financing had to be reported on the
balance sheet. During the following two decades, the finance
industry lobbied for changes that would permit them to avoid
consolidating SPEs for many transactions. In general, the revised
approach required that a corporation include the assets and liabilities of another entity in its financial statements only if it had a
“controlling interest” in that entity. Importantly, the banks and
Wall Street quickly sidestepped these rules by engineering transactions in which the sponsor did not have legal control, but still
had economic control and would suffer losses from a decline in
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the assets’ value. The rationale was that if a bank did not have a
legally controlling interest in an SPE, the liabilities of the SPE
could remain off–balance sheet. The key question was: what
was “control?”
That vexing question led many companies, most notoriously
Enron, to create SPEs in which they held just a sliver of ownership, and therefore, they argued, did not have control. Enron’s
infamous Jedi and Raptor transactions were designed to take
advantage of the so-called “3 percent rule,” an accounting pronouncement that essentially permitted companies with less than
3 percent ownership of an SPE to keep the SPE’s assets and liabilities off–balance sheet.
Enron became the poster child of off–balance sheet liabilities, and
the FASB responded to public outrage about Enron’s hidden liabilities by adopting FIN 46 and later a watered-down version
called FIN 46(R), a new rule with a new acronym. FIN 46(R) recast
the guidance on SPEs by creating a new definition of “Variable
Interest Entity,” or VIE. The new guidance ostensibly was
designed to limit the kinds of accounting shenanigans that had
permitted Enron to hide so many liabilities. But FIN 46(R), like
the earlier rules, continued to focus on “control.” In simple terms,
if a bank did not have control of a VIE, it could keep that VIE’s
liabilities off–balance sheet.
In the aftermath of Enron, banks responded to this new guidance
cautiously at first. During the early 2000s, there was a lull in
off–balance sheet deals. But by 2004–5, banks were using new
forms of financial engineering to create VIEs that, like Enron’s
SPEs, remained off–balance sheet. The FASB was aware of these
problems, but decided not to rewrite FIN 46(R). By 2008, VIEs
were even more common than SPEs had been a decade earlier.
And the financial crisis did not reduce their use.
Congress should address the problems associated with the
accounting treatment of swaps and VIEs by adopting a general
requirement that companies record all of their gross liabilities in
their financial statements. This provision should include all liabil162
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ities for which a company will use its assets to pay or liquidate
those liabilities. It should include all liabilities that are, in substance, a financing of assets, regardless of legal form. Most crucially, Congress should require that balance sheets include assets
and liabilities associated with swaps and VIEs. Without such
transparency, regulators and investors who look at the reported
assets and liabilities of financial institutions are looking at a
mirage. It should not be a radical request to ask that financial
statements of banks reflect reality.
Lynn Turner and I previously have detailed how Citigroup’s
financial statements did not accurately describe that bank.
Instead, even during 2006–9, Citigroup’s balance sheet presented
a picture of a stable institution, with solid asset growth, relatively stable liabilities, and increasing net equity. That picture was
a fiction. A similar analysis holds for other major financial
institutions.
Accordingly, we have proposed the following language to require
that corporations, and particularly banks, account for off–balance
sheet liabilities:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, or a standard setter designated by and under the oversight of the Commission,
shall, within one year from the enactment of this bill, enact a
standard requiring that all reporting companies record all of
their assets and liabilities on their balance sheets. The recorded amount of assets and liabilities shall reflect a company’s
reasonable assessment of the most likely outcomes given currently available information. Companies shall record all
financings of assets for which the company has more than
minimal economic risks or rewards.
The motivation behind our proposal is simple. Abusive off–balance sheet accounting was a major cause of the financial crisis.
These abuses triggered a daisy chain of dysfunctional decision
making by removing transparency from investors, markets, and
regulators. Off–balance sheet accounting facilitated the spread of
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the bad loans, securitizations, and derivative transactions that
brought the financial system to the brink of collapse.
Banks argue that recording all liabilities will be too difficult, or
will introduce too much volatility. They also argue that some contingencies have such low probabilities that they should not
appear in financial statements. With respect to difficulties, banks
already are required to assess material liabilities; recording them
involves merely reporting a number they already have calculated
for internal purposes. With respect to volatility, it is true that balance sheet valuations would become more volatile, but that is
because they are more accurate. In any event, regulatory tools can
be based on lagged reported balance sheet information, to reduce
volatility, if such a reduction is warranted. Finally, low probability events are precisely those that should be included on balance
sheets. Imagine how bank boards would have assessed the risks
of their institutions if they had been required to record a probability-weighted estimate of the losses they would incur if housing
prices declined by 30 percent.
In sum, companies should include swaps on their balance sheets.
Companies should record all assets and liabilities of VIEs, in
amounts based on the most likely outcome given current information. Companies should report asset financings on the balance
sheet (not as “sales”). Congress should adopt a legislative standard requiring such disclosures (mere “guidance” from the
accounting industry is not enough). These changes would lead to
more meaningful financial statements, and therefore would better
support sustainable growth.

ENFORCEMENT: REVITALIZE RELIANCE
ACTORS

ON

PRIVATE

The second proposal is that policymakers should rely more on
private market-driven actors in enforcing legal rules. The two
specific areas of focus are securities litigation and arbitration of
financial contract disputes.
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First, during the past decade, both judges and legislators have
limited the scope of private litigation in the securities area. The
combination of the recent Supreme Court decisions in NAB
(restricting foreign-cubed claims), Dura Pharmaceuticals (restricting loss causation claims), and Stoneridge (restricting aiding-andabetting liability) have sliced the expected value of traditional
securities litigation by perhaps half or more. Many scholars have
supported these limitations, as part of the general policy move in
favor of tort reform.
My specific recommendation is to revitalize reliance on private
enforcement of antifraud standards by repealing these limitations
on such enforcement. This recommendation is general, though
three specific areas of focus would be the aforementioned
Supreme Court decisions.
One reason to strength private enforcement is that enforcement
by regulators has been less than optimal, for two reasons. First, it
has been misdirected. Second, it has been ineffectual. Regulators
have targeted only a relatively small number of cases, with limited success. Prosecutors have brought simple actions based on
facts that are not representative of the most deleterious conduct.
Examples include the prosecutions of Frank Quattrone, Martha
Stewart, Jeffrey Skilling, as well as the recent SEC complaint filed
against Goldman Sachs based on the Abacus 2007-AC1 synthetic
collateralized debt obligation. Prosecutions based on obstruction
of justice or false statements deter only obstruction and lying,
not financial fraud. Likewise, focusing on representations
peculiar to a particular CDO might affect those representations,
but it will not be relevant to the underlying problems associated
with CDOs.
Of course, private litigators have been criticized for similar reasons. But those criticisms have a different basis. One argument is
that recoveries are circular, and merely involve collecting from
one set of shareholders to pay other (or often the same) shareholders, with the net loss in social utility from the transfer made
to the attorneys and the costs associated with the litigation.

165

RULES FOR GROWTH
Others argue that private litigation serves a deterrent function,
though there is disagreement about whether the benefits of deterrence outweigh other costs.
Hal Scott has addressed these arguments in his chapter, and several commentators at the 2010 summer conference also criticized
the role of the plaintiffs’ bar as antigrowth. In response, I want to
focus the debate on the incentives of plaintiffs’ lawyers as contrasted to prosecutors, and the reasons why plaintiffs’ lawyers
might behave in the deleterious way critics suggest. Critics of the
plaintiffs’ bar, and even defense attorneys, do not claim that
plaintiffs’ lawyers are economically irrational in targeting specific conduct. To the contrary, plaintiffs’ law firms resemble hedge
funds more closely than regulators in their decision making.
Because of the contingent nature of their recovery model, they
react quickly and strongly to financial incentives. This reaction is
both positive and negative: If cases are attractive financially, they
will be pursued more aggressively; if they are not, they will not
be filed or will be abandoned as soon as it becomes apparent they
have negative expected value. Cases based on stock option backdating and structured finance were prominent examples: When it
became apparent that stock option backdating cases had positive
expected value, more than 100 were filed; yet the expected value
of complex structured finance suits is less clear, and those suits
are relatively uncommon.
A regulatory structure that controlled the incentives of the plaintiffs’ bar could more easily create incentives for those actors to file
(or not to file) appropriate cases. Yet regulators have largely abandoned this function. Judicial approval of settlements is mostly
perfunctory; indeed, judges recently have shown more skepticism of government litigation than private litigation (with the
Securities and Exchange Commission being the most notorious).
Regulators rarely partner with private litigants in U.S. courts
(Israel is a counterexample, where regulators and securities class
action lawyers can work together pursuant to statute). Private
and public litigation each can follow the other, but rarely work in
tandem.
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My point is not necessarily that regulatory policy should encourage or deter lawsuits. Instead, my point is that regulation should
harness the market incentives of the plaintiffs’ bar. Consider the
SEC’s lawsuit against Goldman Sachs based on the Abacus CDO.
In that instance, instead of picking a particular targeted CDO and
firm based on a dubious rationale, regulators could encourage or
assist private litigants. Instead of selectively disclosing particular
documents in public hearings, which generate political capital
but matter little to policy, Congress or the SEC could publicly disclose all of the documents relevant to a class of conduct and hold
a public forum for the plaintiffs’ bar to discuss and consider
causes of action.
Critics of the plaintiffs’ bar should consider whether it is really
the nature of the plaintiffs’ bar they are criticizing or, instead,
whether the problems arise from the institutional incentives created by the judicial system. If legal rules (particularly as implemented by judges approving settlements) established better
incentives, parties would not have reason to engage in the practices that most trouble critics. Proponents of markets should not
criticize market actors for responding to incentives. The solution
is not to attack the market actors; it is to realign the incentives.
The recent bias against private rights of action is ironic given the
growth of the regulatory state and the multiplication of legal
rules, particularly in the areas of banking and securities. As the
system has become more rules based, officers and directors
understandably have focused more on complying with rules than
on achieving the objectives of transparency and accuracy in financial statements. A market-based private enforcement regime
could help shift the thinking of officers and directors away from
simply complying with rules and instead in the direction of acting in a way they believe a judge would find acceptable at some
future date. Moving toward standards enforced ex post (and away
from rules specified ex ante) would help develop a culture of
ethics in financial statements. This is particularly important given
the failure of regulators to spot and remedy problems at major
financial institutions. Without a robust private enforcement
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regime, a rules-based culture of financial innovation will always
be one step ahead of the regulators.
The second enforcement topic is related to the first. The adjudication and enforcement of financial contract claims and disputes
have evolved away from market-based enforcement in a similar
way as legal rules in securities litigation. Complex financial disputes are rarely resolved through litigation, lawsuits involving
swaps and other derivatives are rare, and there is virtually no
case law for financial market participants to look to in resolving
claims arising from the financial crisis, particularly claims based
on individual negotiated derivative contracts. Substantive common law, which previously had provided guidance based on litigation decisions by private actors, has been disappearing.
Accordingly, a second proposal for revitalizing reliance on private actors in enforcement would be to encourage the selection of
“synthetic common law” in contracts. I have set forth and defended this proposal at length elsewhere,5 but I mention it briefly here
because it fits analytically with the argument in favor of increased
regulatory reliance on plaintiffs’ bar. (More general arguments
about the efficiency of markets for legal rules have been made
more forcefully and eloquently by George Priest and Gillian
Hadfield.)6
By “synthetic common law,” I am referring to the notion that private parties might opt to create and use a body of law that does
not actually exist. For example, suppose two parties negotiating a
contract are considering which body of law should govern any
future disputes. In the past, they have chosen New York law, as
have most parties in their area of practice, but a recent New York
case has been decided in a way the parties agree should not
5 See Frank Partnoy, “Synthetic Common Law,” University of Kansas Law Review 53 (2005): 281.
6 See, e.g., See George L. Priest, “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,”

Journal of Legal Studies 6 (1977): 65 (supporting efficiency conclusion with the argument that inefficient rules are more likely to be litigated, and then changed); Gillian K. Hadfield, “Bias in the
Evolution of Legal Rules,” Georgetown Law Journal 80 (1992): 583 (arguing efficiency conclusion
holds only on average and cases are not a random sample).
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govern their contractual relationship. California law includes a
few cases in subjects similar to the parties’ area of practice, with
reasoning and outcomes that they find acceptable, but those decisions are nearly a century old, and the parties worry that a judge
might decide a future dispute based on different principles.
Courts in a few other states have published decisions in related
areas, but nothing directly on point.
What should the parties do? My argument is that they should create, perhaps with regulatory encouragement (it is a public good
that likely would be underprovided), a synthetic common law
regime. Private synthetic law associations would be established,
consisting of experts in individual fields of law. Those associations would publish menus of cases. The cases would involve
simplified facts in particular areas of practice and would focus on
the issues that, in the judgment of the association (and of parties
who would choose that association), most likely would arise in
future disputes. The cases could include published state and federal cases, or examples based on such cases, or even stylized
Restatement-like versions of such cases with certain facts
changed or omitted. Numerous associations would compete for a
particular contract. Private parties might simply list, or check a
box for, cases they selected to govern disputes under the contract.
The association would then commit to resolve disputes based on
those cases. The association might describe, or even commit to, its
anticipated mode or process of reasoning in any future dispute.
The reputation of the association over time would be based on the
extent to which it was able to keep its commitments. The association could incorporate information gleaned from actual cases it
adjudicated into new synthetic common law for future parties to
choose. Associations would compete for business over time. As
with arbitration, courts would have limited review of association
judgments.
From the perspective of private parties, synthetic common law
would be no more complex ex ante than arbitration. Parties would
simply select an association to adjudicate their disputes, and then
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select from that association’s menu of cases a particular set of
cases to govern their contract. The association would adjudicate
any disputes based on the selected menu of cases, and the selected mode of legal reasoning, if applicable.
Note that synthetic common law is a hybrid of common law and
the alternatives to common law. It contains some of the public
aspects of common law and statutory law (e.g., limited judicial
review, real common law cases forming the basis for synthetic
cases included on a particular menu), as well as nongovernmental aspects of private law and private adjudication (e.g., synthetic
common law associations are private entities). Synthetic common
law also involves both ex ante and ex post specification of legal
rules: the governing legal rules (e.g., cases) are specified ex
ante, as they are in statutory and private law, whereas the results
in particular cases are decided ex post, as in common law or
private adjudication. Synthetic common law draws advantages
from each.
Synthetic common law has certain advantages over common law,
particularly in complex areas. Synthetic common law cases need
not evolve over time in order to reflect social practice. A filter limits synthetic cases, just as one limits common law cases, but it
does not depend on the potentially abnormal behavior of parties
other than the contracting parties. Real cases and controversies
are often based on disputes in which parties are behaving in an
economically irrational manner. Numerous real cases are litigated
because one or more parties misperceive the probability of recovery, the likelihood of victory, or both. Most importantly, the case
or controversy filter is incredibly costly. The synthetic common
law filter costs very little.
Synthetic common law likely would be fairer than common law,
because it would avoid judicial temptation to create new law. The
value of common law rules depends on their consistency (i.e.,
cases that are consistent with each other) and stability over time
(i.e., the “stickiness” of precedent). Synthetic common law,
because it is created all at once, is far more likely than common
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law to be consistent. Moreover, because synthetic common law
cases will not change, absent agreement of the parties, during the
life of the contract, they are guaranteed to be stable over time.
Synthetic common law by definition is replicable because the rules
selected by the parties cannot change during the life of the contract, regardless of the views of particular judges. Synthetic common law eliminates the possibility that prospective overrulings or
transformative rulings by judges will change the law relevant to
any dispute between the parties. Under synthetic common law,
private parties can avoid a bad case simply by not checking that
particular box.
The number of competing synthetic common law regimes is virtually unlimited. Competition among synthetic common law
associations would eliminate problems associated with the common law mode of legal reasoning. Successful associations would
develop reputations for deciding cases using a particular mode of
reasoning; they might even advertise a particular type of legal
reasoning methodology.
In difficult areas of commercial law, where some cases may seem
irreconcilable even after years of legal commentary, parties using
synthetic common law could reconcile such difficult cases simply
by deleting problematic sections. Hard cases may be useful for
law professors and students, but private parties likely will not
find the intellectual challenge of such precedents, as originally
written, to be worth their commercial while. If a particular passage in a case seems troubling or confusing, the parties could simply delete it. Whereas common law in the United States now performs poorly in generating a public record of legal rules, synthetic common law guarantees an adequate number of on-point
cases. If the parties do not believe the cases cover a specific point,
they can change or add a case.
Because synthetic common law is a public good, like common
law, it is subject to tragedy-of-the-commons limitations. Just as
government attempts to ameliorate this problem for common
law, it might do the same for synthetic common law, either by
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subsidizing its formation or providing a framework to give private parties assurance that their choices of synthetic common law
would not later be limited by changes in actual statutory or common law. Without such assurances, parties would be unwilling to
invest in a synthetic common law regime. Perhaps this is one reason why parties have not already adopted elements of synthetic
common law.
Looking to market actors—whether to enforce antifraud rules ex
post or to establish adjudicatory regimes ex ante—is a pro-growth
strategy. Two perhaps underappreciated areas in which regulators might look more to market actors in the dispute resolution
setting would be rules that better align the incentives of the plaintiffs’ bar and harness those incentives, and rules that encourage
the creation of synthetic common law.

REGULATORY RELIANCE: USE MARKET-BASED
MEASURES OF RISK
Finally, I want to propose that regulators harness the power of
markets by making financial regulation depend on market measures of risk. As with the other topics discussed in this chapter,
reliance on markets is a mechanism for bridging the gap between
ideas and capital, for encouraging the pro-growth allocation of
capital to its highest use.
One of the Dodd-Frank law’s most important provisions is a
requirement that regulators remove many references to credit ratings from their rules.7 Some regulatory judgments continue to
depend on credit ratings and credit rating agencies, but generally
regulators must remove references to the ratings of Nationally
Registered Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) and find
viable replacements. The law does not say what the replacements
should be.

7 Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Sec. 939(a-f).
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My argument is simple: regulators should use market measures
instead of ratings. Specifically, instead of relying on credit ratings
and credit rating agencies (or institutions generally), regulators
should rely on market measures of credit risk. In some areas, the
markets for credit defaults swaps, and CDS prices, are potentially viable substitutes. In other areas, credit spreads based on bond
prices—or “price talk” for not-yet-issued securities—might be
viable. As a general matter, the point is that regulators should
harness the power of financial markets, including prediction-like
markets, because market prices will better reflect relevant risks
than institutions such as credit rating agencies.8
CDS might not seem an obvious source of regulatory guidance. In
a typical CDS transaction, one counterparty (the “buyer of protection”) agrees to pay a periodic premium to the other counterparty (the “seller of protection”). In return, the seller of protection
agrees to compensate the buyer of protection in the event a reference entity specified in the CDS contract experiences a default or
similar “credit event.” For simple CDS, the reference entity might
be a corporation or government entity. For more complex CDS,
the reference entity might be a portfolio of structured finance
instruments. The various CDS terms usually are documented
through a standard form agreement created by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association.
One of the most important terms in a CDS agreement is the definition of “credit event,” the definition of which has become largely standardized. The most common credit event is the failure to
pay by the reference entity. Other credit events include bankruptcy or “restructuring,” which can vary depending on the parties’
preferences as to how much interest reduction or maturity extension they wish to specify in the CDS agreement.
8 I first proposed this market-based argument in 1999, and have revisited it several times since then.

“The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies,”
Washington University Law Quarterly 77 (1999): 619. The data in this section is derived from my
most recent research on alternatives to credit ratings, coauthored with Mark Flannery and Joel
Houston. See “Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 158 (2010): 2085.
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CDS “prices,” as measured in the market, represent the size of the
premium paid by the buyer of protection, and are generally
known as CDS “spreads.” CDS spreads change over time based
on supply and demand for particular CDS contracts. CDS spreads
are analogous to insurance premia, and reflect market participants’ assessment of the risk of a default or credit event associated with the underlying obligation.
In general, CDS are widely and deeply traded, and reflect market
information about the credit risk of underlying financial obligations; several studies have shown that CDS markets generally
reflect valuable information. Broad market participation suggests
that CDS prices should convey information about counterparties’
assessments of this risk. Notwithstanding the evidence that CDS
markets generally reflect valuation information, regulators and
market participants have resisted moving away from reliance on
NRSRO credit ratings toward reliance on CDS spreads.
In recent coauthored work with Mark Flannery and Joel Houston,
we presented evidence that credit default swaps based on financial institution obligations are potentially useful for regulatory
purposes, as well as by private investors. Overall, the data show
that changes in CDS spreads reflect information more promptly
than changes in credit ratings, even during periods of intense
market discord. CDS spreads increased during 2007 and 2008, as
information became available showing that the probability of
defaults by financial institutions was increasing. During this
same period, credit ratings nevertheless remained relatively
unchanged. We concluded from this data that CDS spreads are
superior to credit ratings in reflecting information because of
their market-based nature. In other words, markets (credit default
swaps) responded to new information, while institutions (credit
rating agencies) did not.
Specifically, during January 2006 through June 2007, CDS spreads
traded in a fairly narrow range. The average spreads for the BBB
group generally were between 40 and 50 basis points, while the
spreads for the AAA and AA groups were between 10 and 20
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basis points. Indeed, from early 2006 until early 2007, CDS
spreads actually declined somewhat, reflecting a period of calm.
Then, beginning in March 2007, CDS spreads increased and
became more volatile. The movements at this time were relatively small, particularly when compared to more recent volatility,
but they correspond to two important early events in the financial
crisis. First, various measures of subprime mortgage risk, including the ABX indices, had begun to increase in early 2007. The ABX
indices, also published by Markit, reflect CDS spreads for mortgage-backed securities themselves, as contrasted to the obligations of the financial institutions we are examining. Second, New
Century Financial, a prominent subprime mortgage broker, filed
for bankruptcy protection on April 2, 2007. Although market participants did not yet know how much various financial institutions were exposed to subprime mortgages, the increase in risk
was associated with an increase in both the level of CDS spreads
on financial institutions and the volatility of CDS spreads. This
increase was reflected in increased CDS spreads during March
and April 2007.
Nevertheless, despite this negative information, average CDS
spreads overall had increased only slightly by the end of June
2007. Average spreads for AAA and AA firms were just under 20
basis points and the spreads for the A and BBB firms were 25 and
47 basis points respectively. On an aggregated basis, the CDS
spreads for all financial firms did not signal a warning of the troubles ahead until March 2007 at the very earliest, and even that signal was a quiet one.
The reaction of CDS spreads during July 2007 through the end of
2008 was more dramatic. Negative information was disclosed
throughout the summer and fall of 2007, and CDS spreads
increased to reflect that information. By the beginning of 2008,
average spreads exceeded 100 basis points in each of the categories, and by June 2008 they exceeded 200 basis points. At the
end of 2008, the average CDS spreads for the AA, A, and BBB
firms were 340, 377, and 842 basis points, respectively.
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Overall, two conclusions emerge from the CDS spread data history. First, CDS spreads responded quickly to the events surrounding the financial crisis beginning in 2007. Second, credit ratings
became disconnected from market-based measures of information, such as CDS. Credit ratings remained largely unchanged
through these periods, even as disclosures about the increased
riskiness of rated financial institutions increased dramatically.
Credit ratings did not respond to available information about
financial institution credit risk, especially beginning in mid-2007.
One might argue that high credit ratings were justified throughout this period, notwithstanding the negative news, because they
reflected the high probability of government intervention and
rescue. This argument is convenient in hindsight, but has no support in the data. With respect to major financial institutions, credit rating agencies did not supply a government intervention
rationale during this time period, and, more importantly, the likelihood of government intervention was not constant across either
periods or firms.
To the extent credit ratings might seem preferable because of their
stability; there is a simple way to mediate any unwanted volatility in a market-based measure: use a rolling average. Rolling average CDS spreads based on thirty-day or ninety-day periods
would make manipulation of these markets difficult, if not
impossible, and would mute any short-term volatility, or avoid, at
least partially, the cyclicality associated with ratings. Regulation
can be anti-cyclical even if the market measures it is based on are
pro-cyclical. More fundamentally, stability is not attractive for
regulatory purposes if that stability masks underlying real
volatility in the markets. As is the case with the other areas discussed in this chapter, reality is better than fiction.

CONCLUSION
The recent financial crisis has made legislators and regulators
skeptical of markets, and policy proposals have reflected that
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skepticism. However, one lesson from the crisis is that markets
could have provided important regulatory tools, which might
have prevented or ameliorated the collapse. Regulators should
recognize these potential benefits, and should implement progrowth rules designed to harness the power of financial markets.
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7:

Tax Policy and Growth

Alan D. Viard∗

A

s discussed in Chapter 1, long-term economic growth is
heavily influenced by capital accumulation and technical
innovation. This chapter discusses the potential role of a
move from income to consumption taxation in promoting
capital accumulation and the potential role of research tax credit
reforms in promoting innovation.

BACKGROUND:THE LONG-RUN FISCAL IMBALANCE
Choices about tax policy structure, particularly major issues such
as the role of income and consumption taxes, cannot be properly
examined without first looking at the federal government’s
severe long-run fiscal imbalance. As is widely recognized, the
growth of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid is slated to
dramatically outstrip the growth of revenue over the upcoming
decades. The discussion below focuses on the alternative fiscal
scenario set forth in a 2010 report by the Congressional Budget
Office titled “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” which most analysts accept as a reasonable description of current policy.1
∗ Alan D. Viard is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
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Under this scenario, non-interest federal spending rises from 22.9
percent of GDP (itself unusually high, due to the recession, financial-sector bailout, and stimulus spending) in 2010 to 26.4 percent
of GDP in 2035. Social Security accounts for part of the increase,
rising from 4.8 to 6.2 percent of GDP. But its role is eclipsed by
that of medical spending. Medicare roughly doubles as a share of
the economy, from 3.6 to 7.0 percent of GDP. Medicaid and related spending also posts rapid growth, from 1.9 to 3.9 percent of
GDP, partly due to the March 2010 health care reform law. These
programs account for more than all of the growth in non-interest
spending, as other programs shrink from 12.5 to 9.3 percent
of GDP.
The Congressional Budget Office’s alternative fiscal scenario
assumes that federal revenue settles down at 19.3 percent of GDP,
its average value in recent decades. (Revenue is an unusually low
14.9 percent of GDP in 2010, reflecting the recession and the stimulus tax cuts.) The gap between non-interest spending and revenue gives rise to large deficits, with the resulting debt obligations triggering large interest outlays that further add to the
deficit. In 2035, publicly held debt is projected to be a staggering
185 percent of annual GDP, up from 63 percent in 2010. Interest on
the debt is forecast to be 8.7 percent of GDP, which combined with
the excess of non-interest spending over revenue, results in a
deficit of 15.9 percent of GDP. Of course, the situation only
becomes worse after 2035.
These projections are not intended to describe what will actually
happen, but rather what would happen if current policies were
maintained. The projections demonstrate that current policies are
unsustainable and must be modified. It will be necessary to
restrain the growth of Social Security and (especially) medical
spending relative to its current policy path, increase revenue relative to its recent share of GDP, or both.

1 Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 2010).

180

7:TAX POLICY AND GROWTH
Economic growth is likely to be stronger to the extent that the fiscal gap is addressed through spending restraint rather than tax
increases. Depending on the specific provisions, though, spending restraint can have distributional and other disadvantages. I
argued, in Viard 2009, that spending restraint should be a major
part of the response to the fiscal imbalance. But I also noted that
it is politically impossible to close the fiscal gap solely on the
spending side and that revenue will need to rise, as a share
of GDP.2
Because this chapter is devoted to tax rather than spending policy, I do not further address spending restraint. Instead, I consider
the ways in which the tax system can be reconfigured to minimize
any drag on economic growth, even as the overall tax burden
increases. I first discuss a possible shift to consumption taxation
and then consider more modest measures, related to the research
tax credit, that can be pursued within the current income tax
system.

POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES

OF

CONSUMPTION TAXATION

Many countries obtain some of their revenue from consumption
taxation, although most of them also raise some revenue from
income taxes. The widespread use of consumption taxation
reflects the recognition of its potential economic advantages over
income taxation.
The fundamental difference between income taxation and consumption taxation is that consumption taxation provides more
favorable treatment of capital accumulation. Unlike consumption
taxation, income taxation imposes a penalty on saving.
To illustrate this point, consider two individuals, Patient and
Impatient, each of whom earns $100 of wages today. Impatient
wishes to consume only today, while Patient wishes to consume
only at a future date. Savings can be invested by firms in
2 Alan D. Viard, “Four Long-Term Fiscal Realities,” Business Economics 44 (2009): 143–49.
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machines that yield a 100 percent rate of return between now and
the (potentially distant) future date. In a world with no taxes,
Impatient consumes $100 today. Patient lends the $100 to a firm,
which builds a machine that yields a $200 payoff in the future; the
firm then pays Patient back her $100 loan and $100 interest,
allowing her to consume $200 in the future.
What happens in a world with a 20 percent income tax? Impatient
pays $20 tax on his wages when they are earned and consumes
the remaining $80, which is 20 percent less than in the no-tax
world. Patient also pays a $20 wage tax and lends the remaining
$80 to the firm. On her $80 loan, she earns $80 interest and is
repaid $160 by the firm, reflecting the payoff on machines.
However, a $16 tax is imposed on the $80 interest. Patient is left
with $144, which is 28 percent less than in the no-tax world, compared to a mere 20 percent reduction in Impatient’s consumption.
Under the income tax, Patient faces a higher percentage tax burden solely because she consumes later.
Consumption taxation yields a more neutral outcome, at least if
the tax rate remains constant over time. Consider a consumption
tax imposed directly on individuals at a 25 percent rate, which
means that the tax is 20 percent of the combined amount devoted
to consumption and the tax. (For example, a taxpayer who consumes $100 pays $25 tax, which is 20 percent of the $125 total
spent on consumption and the tax.) After earning $100 of wages,
Impatient consumes $80 and pays $20 tax. Patient lends her entire
$100 to the firm; she owes no tax because she has not yet consumed. On her $100 loan, she earns $100 interest and accumulates
$200, reflecting the payoff on machines. She consumes $160 in the
future and pays $40 tax. Each worker’s consumption is reduced
by 20 percent, relative to a world with no taxes. Because both
workers face the same percentage tax burden, the consumption
tax does not penalize saving.
It is interesting to compare the consumption and income taxes to
a wage tax. Under a wage tax, Impatient would still pay $20 tax
up front. Patient would also pay $20 up front, save the remaining
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$80, and (because the wage tax does not apply to investment
income) ultimately consume $160. In this simple example, the
wage tax is equivalent to the consumption tax. More generally,
though, the consumption tax differs from the wage tax in two
important respects. First, if the machine had yielded above-normal returns, greater than the minimum return required to induce
Patient to finance the investment, the government would capture
20 percent of those extra returns under the 20 percent consumption tax, but not under a wage tax. Notice that taxing the extra
returns does not discourage investment, because they are a surplus above the minimum needed to induce investment. Second,
the introduction of a new consumption tax would raise additional revenue by taxing consumption financed from capital accumulated before the tax took effect, although transition relief might be
adopted to ease that burden.
In short, a consumption tax and a wage tax, unlike an income tax,
impose a zero marginal tax burden on new investment. But the
consumption tax, unlike the wage tax, collects some revenue from
investment because it taxes above-normal returns from new
investment and (subject to transition rules) taxes payoffs from
investments made before the tax took effect.
Despite common assertions to the contrary, consumption and
income taxes are fundamentally similar, apart from their treatment of capital accumulation. Both tax systems penalize work relative to leisure. Consumption taxation has no advantage over
income taxation in taxing drug dealing and other illegal transactions, nor is it generically less susceptible to evasion. There is also
no competitiveness advantage from the manner in which consumption taxation treats imports and exports.
Some simulation studies have found that a full switch to consumption taxation would significantly expand the U.S. economy
in the long run, by increasing capital accumulation. Auerbach
(1996) estimated long-run output gains of 2.7 to 9.7 percent from
various proposals to replace the income tax with a consumption
tax.3 The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in
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2005 estimated a long-run increase in output of up to 6.0 percent
from replacing the income tax with a progressive consumption
tax.4 In 2001, David Altig, et al., estimated long-run output gains
ranging from 1.9 percent to 9.4 percent for various consumption
tax proposals.5 The long-run output gain is associated with an initial reduction in living standards, however, as households reduce
their consumption and increase their saving. These simulations
are not universally accepted as an accurate description of economic behavior because they assume, rather than prove, that
households make saving decisions in an optimizing manner. But
the studies suggest potential gains from replacing the income tax
with a consumption tax.
By considering the replacement of the current income tax system
with consumption taxation, the studies may understate the relevant stakes involved in completely switching to consumption taxation. As the tax system expands to become a larger share of GDP
in upcoming years in response to the fiscal imbalance, the gains
from fully replacing income taxation with consumption taxation
will increase.
The gains would be diminished, however, if only part of the
income tax was replaced. As discussed below, partial replacement
is politically more likely and more in accord with international
experience. Because the most common way to incorporate consumption taxation into a tax system is to adopt a value added tax
(VAT) alongside an income tax, I first consider that possibility.

3 Alan J. Auerbach, “Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency and Growth,” in Economic Effects of
Fundamental Tax Reform, ed. Henry J. Aaron and William G. Gale (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1996), 29–73.
4 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/index.html.
5 David Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A. Smetters, and Jan Walliser, “Simulating
Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 574–95.
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ADOPTION

OF A VAT ALONGSIDE THE INCOME TAX

The VAT is best understood as a modification of a retail sales tax.
While a sales tax is collected only on the final sale to a consumer,
a VAT is imposed and collected at each stage in the production of
goods and services. This collection structure helps prevent the tax
from being evaded at the retail level, an important consideration
at high tax rates. Each firm is taxed on its sales, whether to consumers or to other firms, but effectively deducts its purchases
from other firms. The most common implementation method
employs invoices to show the tax paid on purchases and charged
on sales, which creates a paper trail that aids enforcement. Like
the retail sales tax, the VAT is a real-based tax that applies only to
the sale of goods and services, with no tax on, or deductions for,
financial transactions such as loans and stock purchases.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the VAT to the sales tax in
an economy with two firms and two individuals. Firm A produces a machine that it sells for $100 to Firm B and pays $70 of
wages to Jones, its employee. Firm B buys the machine for $100,
pays $40 wages to its employee Smith, and produces $150 of consumer goods. Jones buys $90 of the consumer goods and Smith
buys the remaining $60.

Fig. 1. Example relationship of the VAT to the sales tax in a two-firm, two-individual economy.
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Under a retail sales tax, tax would be collected from Firm B on the
$150 of consumer goods that it sold. Under a VAT, tax is collected
from Firm A on the sale of the $100 machine and from Firm B on
its $50 value added ($150 sales to consumers minus $100 machine
purchase). Because the sale of the machine washes out, the VAT is
equivalent to the sales tax.
The adoption of a VAT (or a sales tax) is likely to lead to a onetime increase in the consumer price level. Consider a worker who
produces 100 apples. With no taxes, the worker is paid a wage
equal to the consumer price of 100 apples; if apples sell for $1, the
worker is paid a $100 wage. Now, suppose that a 10 percent VAT
is adopted. If the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies keep the
tax-inclusive consumer price of apples unchanged at $1, then the
firm clears only 90 cents for each apple sold, with the other 10
cents paid in VAT. Because the 100 apples produced by the worker are worth only $90 to the firm, the market-clearing wage falls
to $90. Because apples still cost $1, including tax, the worker’s
real disposable income is 90 apples.
The problem is that it may be difficult to reduce nominal wages.
If the worker’s wage remained rigid at $100 rather than falling to
the new market-clearing level of $90, firms would pay 100 apples
to workers while also paying 11 apples (10 percent of the total of
111 apples) to the government. Firms would lay off workers until
the marginal product of workers rose to 111 apples. To avert these
job losses, the Federal Reserve would be likely to “accommodate”
the VAT, allowing the tax-inclusive price of apples to rise to $1.11,
so that real wages could fall without a reduction in nominal
wages.
It is important to realize that the individual income tax does not
cause a similar increase in the price level and that replacement of
the income tax would therefore not mitigate the price increase
resulting from the introduction of the VAT. With a 10 percent individual income tax, the 100 apples are still worth $100 to the firm
and the worker receives the same $100 wage as in the no-tax
world. Of course, the worker pays $10 of the $100 as income tax,
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so that disposable income is $90, which is enough to buy only 90
apples. Although the individual income tax reduces the worker’s
real after-tax wage from 100 to 90 apples, it does not reduce the
real wage paid by the firm to the worker. Rigidity of the nominal
wage paid by the firm to the worker therefore poses no problem
and no price increase is required. The difference is that the
income tax is collected from the worker out of the wage payment
received from the firm, rather than being collected from the firm.
If a VAT is adopted, it would be important for the Federal
Reserve, Congress, and the President to reach an early and public
agreement on the extent to which the Federal Reserve would
accommodate the VAT. If the tax was accommodated, steps
would need to be taken to minimize the economic disruption
from the one-time price level increase; if the tax was not accommodated, steps would need to be taken to reduce wage rigidity
and facilitate the necessary nominal wage decline.
It is virtually certain that a VAT (or a sales tax) will not be adopted as a full replacement for the income tax. As a proportional tax
on consumption, a VAT would be burdensome to the poor.
Although the problem could be addressed to some extent by providing rebates, a complete replacement of the income tax by a
VAT would still shift the tax burden downward in the income distribution. The VAT is therefore better suited as a partial replacement of the income tax. This conclusion is consistent with the
international experience, as most countries that impose a VAT
also have an income tax. A number of public figures have recently suggested consideration of a VAT (generally without making
an outright endorsement), but always in the context of retaining
the income tax.
The adoption of a VAT would raise a number of other issues. One
concern is that the VAT would be relatively invisible to consumers, making it a money machine that would ease any pressure
for spending restraint. The visibility of the tax could be enhanced,
however, by listing it separately on customer receipts, as is done
in Canada. On a broader level, though, the presence of both the
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income tax and the VAT could still make spending increases easier than they would be with either revenue source alone. Other
issues concern the tax treatment of financial institutions and state
and local governments. Because these issues have been extensively discussed elsewhere, I do not examine them here.
A partial-replacement VAT offers one way to reap economic gains
from moving toward consumption taxation. Larger gains may be
possible, though, from complete replacement of the income tax
system with a consumption tax. As the above discussion suggests, the full-replacement consumption tax would need to be
more progressive than the VAT. Such consumption taxes exist, but
they are much less familiar than the VAT and pose their own
potential challenges. I now explore those options.

COMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF INCOME TAX WITH
PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX
The leading options for progressive consumption taxation are the
Bradford X tax and the personal expenditures tax (PET). The two
taxes attain progressivity in quite different ways and have different strengths and weaknesses.

Mechanics of X Tax and PET
The X tax is a modification of the “flat” tax, which is in turn a
modification of the VAT. Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka (1983)
proposed a two-tier VAT that they called the flat tax.6 Firms compute value added, as they would under a VAT, but deduct their
wage payments to obtain a remainder called “business cash
flow.” Workers are then taxed on their wages. The total tax base
is the same as under a VAT (or a sales tax). Because the VAT is a
consumption tax and the flat tax is simply a two-part VAT, the flat
tax is also a consumption tax. Like the VAT, the flat tax is a realbased tax.

6 Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax (New York: McGraw Hill, 1983).

188

7:TAX POLICY AND GROWTH
Figure 1 (page 185), applies the flat tax in the simple economy.
Firm A is taxed on $30 cash flow ($100 value added minus $70
wage payment) and Firm B is taxed on $10 cash flow ($50 value
added minus $40 wage payment). Smith and Jones are taxed on
the wages they receive.
The purpose of taxing wages and business cash flow separately is
to promote progressivity. Firms are taxed at a single flat rate—say,
25 percent—on business cash flow, while workers are taxed at
that same rate on wages above a substantial exemption amount.
Workers with earnings below the exemption amount pay zero
tax, those with incomes moderately above the exemption amount
pay a small fraction of their wages in tax, and those with very
high earnings pay close to 25 percent. That pattern ensures some
degree of progressivity across workers. Meanwhile, consumption
financed from business cash flow is taxed at the full 25 percent
with no exemption, because business cash flow, which is attributable to above-normal returns and capital in place when the
reform is introduced, is likely to accrue to relatively affluent
households.
Due to its administrative similarity to the current income tax system, the flat tax is often mistakenly thought to be a type of income
tax. For further confirmation that the flat tax is a consumption tax,
introduce a 20 percent flat tax into the previous example of
Impatient and Patient, both of whom are assumed to be above the
exemption level.
Impatient pays $20 tax on his wages and consumes his remaining
$80. Patient pays $20 tax on her wages and lends the remaining
$80 to the firm. So far, the flat tax looks like an income tax,
because Patient has been taxed on her wages without having consumed anything. The picture changes, though, when we walk
through the remaining steps. The firm uses the $80 loan to buy a
$100 machine; under the flat tax, a $100 machine costs only $80,
because the firm immediately deducts the $100 of wages paid to
build the machine and thereby reaps a $20 tax savings. In the
future, the machine yields a $200 payoff, on which the firm pays
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$40 tax. With the remaining $160, the firm pays Patient her $80
principal plus $80 in interest. Patient then consumes the entire
$160, because interest is tax-exempt under a flat tax.
Because Patient’s consumption under the flat tax matches the
$160 attained under a direct consumption tax and differs from the
$144 attained under an income tax, the flat tax is, from an economic perspective, a consumption tax rather than an income tax.
Two features of the flat tax together make it a consumption tax.
First, firms immediately expense, rather than depreciate, investment outlays, so the firm is not required to capitalize and depreciate the wage costs of building the machine, as it would have to
do under an income tax. Second, households pay tax only on
wages, not on capital income.
The flat tax’s exemption amount for workers may not provide
sufficiently progressivity. Bradford (1986) therefore proposed that
the tax be modified to feature a full set of graduated marginal tax
rates.7 Under Bradford’s proposal, which he called an X tax,
workers with earnings below the exemption amount pay no tax
(and may receive refundable tax credits), the highest earners face
a marginal tax rate equal to the firms’ tax rate, and workers with
intermediate wages face intermediate marginal tax rates.
The personal expenditures tax (PET), which is sometimes called a
consumed-income tax, takes a different approach. Each household files an annual tax return on which it reports wage income,
deducts all saving (deposits into savings accounts, asset purchases, amounts lent to others, and payments made on outstanding
debts), and adds all dissaving (withdrawals from savings
accounts, gross proceeds of asset sales, amounts borrowed from
others, and payments received on outstanding loans). The resulting measure equals the household’s consumption, which is taxed
at graduated marginal tax rates based on the level of consumption. No tax is imposed at the firm level. The PET is a real-plus7 David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 8182.
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financial tax because it taxes households on inflows from financial transactions and allows them to deduct the corresponding
outflows. Figure 1 (page 185), shows that the PET imposes tax on
each individual, based on his or her consumer spending.

Evaluation of X Tax and PET
Aside from their progressivity, both the X tax and the PET have
other advantages over the VAT. Both taxes are more visible than
the VAT because households must file annual tax returns. Also,
both taxes avoid the one-time increase in the price level because,
like the current individual income tax, they collect wage taxes
from workers rather than from firms. Of course, the X tax and the
PET differ along many dimensions. Many of the differences arise
from how the two taxes treat financial transactions. To understand these differences, it is useful to review the relationship of
real production and financial transactions.
Firms and workers engage in real production by using labor and
capital to produce goods and services, generating wages for
workers and capital income for firms. Financial transactions then
take place. In one set of financial transactions, firms allocate the
income and cash flow generated by production to households.
Firms obtain funds from households by issuing stock and bonds,
pay funds to households in the form of interest and dividends,
and retain funds on behalf of stockholders. These transactions do
not change the total cash flow or income generated by the firms’
real production. A second set of financial transactions, such as
borrowing and lending, occur between households. These transactions also result in zero aggregate net cash flow and income in
a closed economy; for example, when a lending household
receives interest income, the borrowing household incurs negative interest income (interest expense).
A real-based tax system tracks only the production activity of
firms and workers while a real-plus-financial tax system also
tracks the financial transactions. Because a real-based system
does not track capital income or business cash flow to their final
recipients, it can tax those items only at a flat rate at the firm level.
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To employ graduated rates based on a household’s annual
income or consumption, a real-plus-financial approach that tracks
all flows to the final household recipients is necessary. Of course,
tracking financial flows adds complexity.
At one extreme, the real-based nature of the VAT eliminates the
need for household returns, but forces all consumption to be
taxed at a single flat rate. At the other extreme, the real-plusfinancial nature of the PET permits graduated tax rates tied
directly to annual consumer spending, but requires households to
file annual tax returns reporting a wide array of financial transactions. (The current tax system takes a similar approach to the taxation of income.) The X tax follows an intermediate strategy,
adopting the real-based approach of the VAT, but taxing wages at
the household rather than the firm level. The X tax achieves
much, but not all, of the simplicity of the VAT, because only
wages are reported on household returns; for most households,
the necessary information can be obtained from the W-2. The X
tax also achieves much, but not all, of the progressivity of the PET,
by taxing wages at graduated rates tied to annual wage income
and imposing a high flat tax rate on business cash flow, which
largely accrues to the well-off. To be sure, this progressivity is not
as finely calibrated as that achieved by the PET, in which graduated rates are tied directly to annual consumer spending. On balance, the X tax offers an attractive combination of simplicity and
progressivity.
The neutrality of consumption taxation with respect to the timing
of consumption requires that the tax rate on consumption be constant over time. That gives the X tax a potential advantage over
the PET. Under the PET’s system of graduated tax rates, a household’s movement between brackets across tax years could interfere with neutrality. Under the X tax, the tax rate that affects the
timing of consumption is the flat tax rate on business cash flow.
Of course, both taxes are vulnerable to tax rate changes arising
from legislation. Also, the X tax applies graduated tax rates to
wages, creating nonneutrality with respect to the timing of work.
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On the other hand, welfare and social insurance programs would
be easier to administer under the PET than under the X tax. The
PET features household tax returns that provide detailed data on
the household’s well-being while the X tax features household tax
returns that provide data only on the household’s wages. Under
the X tax, agencies administering transfer payments would need
to gather information about potential recipients’ non-wage
incomes.
Aside from economics, the viability of a tax can also depend upon
its “optics” (its appearance to the general public). The X tax and
the PET each face challenges in this regard.
The optical challenge facing the X tax is that it is not readily
understood to be a consumption tax and that it looks very odd if
it is mistakenly viewed as an income tax. The problem is that the
X tax lacks a visible tax on households consuming out of capital
income. Of course, no consumption tax system imposes a marginal tax on capital income from new saving; that is done only by
income tax systems. But consumption taxes do impose taxes on
above-normal returns and preexisting capital, and it is politically
appealing to make those taxes as visible as possible. Under the
PET, households report capital income and deduct new saving on
their tax returns, visibly taxing households that consume out of
capital income. In contrast, the X tax imposes its tax on abovenormal returns and preexisting capital less visibly, through the
firm-level cash flow tax, while imposing a highly visible household-level tax on wages.
On the other hand, the PET faces two optical challenges. First, it
appears to excuse business from “paying” taxes. This concern is
economically nonsensical because firms cannot ultimately pay
tax. Nevertheless, repealing the corporate income tax with no
replacement firm-level tax may be a political drawback. Second,
the PET, unlike the current income tax, taxes households on
amounts that are borrowed. To be sure, the borrower deducts all
subsequent payments on the loan, both principal and interest,
which cancels out the initial tax in present discounted value,
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assuming that the household remains in the same tax bracket.
Furthermore, the X tax and the VAT also tax consumption by borrowers, albeit less visibly at the firm level. Even so, the PET’s
treatment of borrowing may be perceived as unfamiliar or unfair.
The X tax has several potential drawbacks relative to the PET. The
PET encounters no difficulties with international trade rules
because it does not directly tax trade flows. The X tax encounters
problems, however, because it taxes trade flows, but does so in a
manner that deviates from the VAT framework around which the
international trade rules were written. Another potential drawback of the X tax is its distinction between wages, which are taxed
at graduated rates, and business cash flow, which is taxed at a
high flat rate. Because many sole proprietors and partners provide both labor and capital to firms, there is no simple way to
classify their payments from the firms. In contrast, the PET does
not distinguish between wages and business cash flow, which are
reported together and summed on household tax returns.
Negative tax liabilities also pose a challenge for the X tax. Under
the PET, households are taxed on consumption, which must be
positive, and there is no tax on firms. Under the X tax, firms are
taxed on business cash flow, sales minus purchases minus wages,
which can easily be negative for a given firm in a given year. The
neutrality of the X tax depends on firms being able to immediately expense their investment purchases, which requires that firms
with negative cash flow receive immediate tax savings based on
their negative tax liability (or some other treatment that is equally good in present value). If, as is likely, Congress is unwilling to
provide such generous treatment, then the neutrality of the X tax
is impaired. A final problem concerns the tax treatment of financial institutions, whose activities often involve real production
that is labeled as financial transactions. Because the X tax is real
based, it may fail to properly tax these transactions. The PET
avoids this difficulty because it is a real-plus-financial tax.
Given the X tax’s attractive combination of simplicity and progressivity, it is likely to be the best approach, if the aforemen-
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tioned challenges can be satisfactorily addressed. Robert Carroll
and I are writing a book discussing ways to address the challenges facing the X tax.
The income tax can be completely replaced by a progressive consumption tax, but doing so will require the use of a relatively
unfamiliar tax, either the Bradford X tax or the PET. Neither of
these taxes has attracted much political support. In 1995, the
Nunn-Domenici Unlimited Savings Allowance plan, which featured a PET, drew some attention, but it never gained traction in
Congress and tax policy analysts concluded that the plan’s specification of the PET was unworkable. One of the two tax plans recommended by the tax reform panel in 2005 featured an X tax, but
retained a 15 percent flat-rate tax on capital income, thereby stopping short of a full movement to consumption taxation. The panel
considered, but did not definitively recommend, an alternative
plan that would have replaced the income tax system completely
with an X tax. In any case, none of the panel’s plans attracted
political support. If the income tax system is to be replaced with
a progressive consumption tax, public support for this approach
must be built.

IMPROVING THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT
Moving toward consumption taxation could help promote innovation as well as capital accumulation. A number of other tax
policies may affect the spread of innovation through the establishment of new firms, including the treatment of start-up expenditures and net operating losses. Due to space constraints, I do
not discuss these issues, focusing instead on the research tax credit, which has the most direct effect on innovation.
Some types of research may generate spillover or external benefits that are not captured by the firm doing the research. Bronwyn
Hall (1996) concludes that there is “overwhelming evidence that
some positive externalities exist for some types of R&D,”
but notes the difficulty of measuring the external benefits and
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determining which types of R&D generate them.8 In the presence
of positive externalities, efficiency calls for more generous treatment than even the zero marginal tax that consumption taxation
provides for new investment, as there should be a subsidy to
reflect the external benefit. Hall discusses whether the subsidy
should take the form of direct government sponsorship of
research or tax incentives for private research or a combination
of both. In keeping with the focus of this chapter, I discuss tax
incentives.
Although some observers have questioned whether research is
sensitive to tax incentives, a number of empirical studies indicate
that taxes have some effect. In her study of Compustat data Hall
(1993) found particularly strong effects of the research tax credit.9
Subsequent studies have also found an impact from tax incentives, although generally smaller than the effects estimated by
Hall. Prominent examples include the study of state research tax
credits by Wilson (2009)10 and the cross-country study by Bloom,
Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002).11 The studies typically find that
the responsiveness of research spending to incentives is significantly greater in the long run than in the short run.
As discussed below, the research tax credit expired on December
31, 2009, but is likely to be retroactively reinstated and extended.
As further explained below, firms may claim either a 20 percent
credit on qualified research spending in excess of a base amount
linked to their 1984–88 research spending or a 14 percent credit on
spending in excess of a base amount linked to more recent spending. I discuss three possible reforms of the credit.
8 Bronwyn H. Hall, “The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,” in Technology,
R&D, and the Economy, ed. Bruce L.R. Smith and Claude E. Barfield (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, 1996), 160.
9 ____. “R&D Tax policy During the Eighties: Success or Failure?” Tax Policy and the Economy 7, ed.
James M. Poterba (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 1–35.
10 Daniel J. Wilson, “Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate Effects of
R&D Tax Credits,” Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (2009): 431–36.
11 Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith, and John Van Reenen, “Do R&D Tax Credits Work? Evidence From a
Panel of Countries, 1979–1997,” Journal of Public Economics 85 (2002): 1–31.
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Make the Credit Permanent
The research tax credit was enacted on August 13, 1981, effective
retroactively to July 1, 1981, with an expiration date of December
31, 1985. A sequence of repeated expirations and extensions has
followed, with most of the extensions being for only one or two
years. As shown in table 1, the credit has faced fourteen scheduled expirations. In four instances, all of them early in the credit’s
history, Congress extended the credit before its scheduled expiration. In the other ten instances, Congress failed to act before expiration. In nine of the ten cases, Congress retroactively reinstated
the credit to the date of its expiration, but waited between 66 and
408 days (237 days, on average) to do so. In one other instance,
after the June 30, 1995, expiration, Congress waited until August
20, 1996, a lag of 417 days, to act and then reinstated the credit
only back though July 1, 1996. As a result, no credit was provided for research spending in the second half of 1995 and the first
half of 1996. The credit will face its fifteenth scheduled expiration
on December 31, 2011.
Many observers have noted that the uncertainty surrounding the
credit’s temporary nature makes it difficult for firms to rely on the
credit. In view of the 1996 experience, firms cannot be absolutely
certain, in any given instance, that the credit will be retroactively
reinstated back to its expiration. Consideration should therefore
be given to permanent extension of the credit. Throughout the
credit’s history, presidential budget proposals have consistently
recommended that it be made permanent. President Obama reiterated his support for permanence in the economic plan he
announced on September 8, 2010.
Permanence faces significant political obstacles. Members of the
tax-writing committees are able to use each extension of the credit (and other temporary tax provisions) as a way to obtain additional campaign contributions. Also, the February 2010 PAYGO
budget law would require the ten-year revenue loss from permanent extension to be offset with tax increases or entitlement
spending cuts, unless the requirement was waived by a three-
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fifths vote in the Senate. But there is a favorable precedent; the
low-income housing tax credit was enacted on a temporary basis
in 1986 and extended several times before being made permanent
in 1993.
Yin (2009) argues that making tax incentives permanent hampers
congressional oversight and impedes fiscal responsibility as
budgetary offsets are not adopted for each year’s extension.12
These points would seem to be outweighed, however, by the
advantages of a permanent credit. If full permanence is not
desired, a middle ground would be to extend the credit for five to
ten years.

Move to a Flat Credit
One other feature of the credit has led to instability and inefficiency. From the outset, the credit has been structured as an incremental incentive, with firms receiving credit only on their research
spending above a base amount. The incremental structure is
intended to provide a stronger incentive for research spending
per dollar of revenue loss, or “more bang for the buck,” but has
led to some harmful consequences.
Consider a firm that would spend $100 on research in the absence
of a credit, but would increase its spending to $110 in response to
a 20 percent flat credit. Presumably, each of the additional ten dollars of research has an expected payoff to the firm greater than
eighty cents (making it worthwhile in the presence of the credit),
but less than one dollar (making it unviable without the credit).
The flat 20 percent credit has a $22 revenue loss.
But suppose that the firm is instead given a 20 percent credit on
its spending in excess of an $80 base amount. (For the moment,
ignore the process by which this base amount is set.) According to
stylized economic theory, the firm still spends $110 on research,
because it has the same 20 percent marginal incentive. Yet this
12 George Yin, “Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint,” New
York University Law Review 84 (2009): 174–257.
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incremental credit has a revenue loss of only $6, because only the
last $30 of research spending receives the credit. The incremental
credit gets the same bang for fewer bucks.
The success of this strategy depends, however, on three conditions holding. As discussed below, designing a credit that satisfies
these three conditions is a formidable challenge.
First, the base value must be equal to, or less than, what the firm
would have spent on research with a flat credit. If this firm is
assigned a $120 base amount, for example, there is no incentive
for additional research, because the firm’s credit remains fixed at
zero unless and until it reaches the base amount. In short, if the
base amount is higher than what the firm would spend with a flat
credit, there is no bang, although there also are no bucks.
Second, the base amount should not be too far below what the
firm would spend under a flat credit, because a small base
amount does little to limit the revenue loss. In combination, these
two requirements mean that each firm’s base amount should be
set as close as possible to, but not above, what the firm would
spend under a flat credit.
Third, each firm’s base amount must be set in a way that does not
have undesirable incentive effects. If a firm’s base amount is
linked to its other economic activity, for example, then the incremental credit effectively taxes that activity. The advantage of
stronger research incentives per dollar of revenue loss may be offset by the disincentives for the other activities. Or, if the base
amount is linked to past research spending, that linkage can itself
undermine research incentives.
This last issue arose under the approach that Congress initially
adopted on August 13, 1981. Firms received a 20 percent credit for
research spending in excess of their average spending over the
previous three years (a three-year rolling base). One problem was
that a firm could easily spend somewhat less than its previous
three-year average in a given year, meaning that it would receive
no marginal incentive from the credit. More important, the credit
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offered little net incentive, even for firms that exceeded their base
amounts each year. Under the rolling-base credit design, spending $100 more today provided a $20 initial credit. But in each of
the next three years, the extra spending raised the base amount by
$33.33, lowering the credit by $6.67. The $20 of initial tax savings
was fully paid back over three years, albeit at a zero nominal
interest rate; with a 5 percent market nominal interest rate, the
$100 of research yielded only $1.85 of present-value tax savings.
The rolling-base approach dramatically reduced the bucks, but
also greatly reduced the bang.
In response to these problems, Congress switched to a fixed-base
approach on December 19, 1989. Effective January 1, 1990, each
firm’s base amount was set equal to its average annual research
spending in the fixed base period of 1984 through 1988, with certain adjustments discussed below. If a firm remained above its
base amount, the credit provided a full 20 percent incentive,
because there was no future payback. At first glance, the fixedbase design seemed to offer the desired increase in bang for the
buck.
The fixed-base design imposed a large retroactive tax on 1984–88
research spending. With the benefit of hindsight, firms would
have been well advised to sharply reduce research spending in
those five years; each extra $100 spent per year increased the fixed
base amount by $100, and lowered the credit by $20, in each year
from 1990 onward, ignoring the special rules discussed below. If
firms had foreseen Congress’s action, there would have been no
net gain in bang for the buck, because the increased incentive for
research in 1990 and thereafter would have been offset by a massive disincentive for research in 1984–88.
Of course, firms did not foresee Congress’s action. Congress
obtained more bang for the buck by unexpectedly taxing something firms had already done. Such a “capital levy” is a way to
raise revenue (in this case, to limit the credit’s revenue loss)
without disincentives, provided that taxpayers do not expect
something similar to be done again. The fairness of punishing
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firms for their 1984–88 research in this way can be questioned.
And it is unclear why a Congress that did this once would not do
it again.
Even setting those issues aside, the fixed-base approach poses
problems. Congress has responded to these problems in ways
that diminish the bang of the credit, with many firms receiving
less than a 20 percent marginal research incentive or facing disincentives in other areas. Seeking to set each firm’s base amount as
close as possible to, but no larger than, what it would otherwise
spend on research, Congress made two adjustments to the base
amount.
First, it provided that a firm’s base amount in each year was its
1984–88 average research spending, adjusted by the subsequent
proportional change in the firm’s gross receipts. The idea was that
a firm’s desired level of research spending would change over
time in proportion to its gross receipts, although a close link
between receipts and research seems implausible. In any case,
making the base amount proportional to gross receipts effectively placed a tax on gross receipts, similar to a turnover tax, which
has its own disincentive effects.
Second, Congress provided that no firm could claim the credit on
more than half of its research spending. In other words, a firm
could not use a base amount smaller than one-half of its research
spending. When this constraint binds, the firm effectively faces a
10 percent flat credit and its marginal research incentive is 10 percent rather than 20 percent.
As 1984–88 receded further into the past, the fixed base amount
became more problematic. Some firms complained that their
research spending in that period had been unusually high, for
various reasons, and that they could never exceed their base
amounts. On August 20, 1996, Congress responded to these concerns by giving firms an alternative to the fixed-base credit,
allowing firms to choose an Alternative Incremental Research
Credit (AIRC), effective July 1, 1996. Congress expanded the
AIRC on December 17, 1999, effective July 1, 1999, and again on
201

RULES FOR GROWTH
December 20, 2006, effective January 1, 2007. This alternative
credit was essentially a flat credit, with no link to past research
spending. However, the credit rates were only about 3 to 5 percent, providing relatively small research incentives.
On December 20, 2006, Congress adopted a third option, the
Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC), effective January 1, 2007. On
October 3, 2008, Congress expanded the ASC and, in an abrupt
change of course, repealed the recently expanded AIRC, effective
January 1, 2009.
The design of the ASC resembles the rolling-base design used in
1981 through 1989, but is less flawed. Each firm’s base amount is
half of its average research spending over the three preceding
years, making it less likely that firms will fall short of their base
amounts. The credit rate was initially 12 percent, but was
increased to 14 percent by the 2008 legislation. An extra $100 of
research yields $14 of initial tax savings, while raising the base
amount by $16.67, and reducing the credit by $2.33, in each of the
following three years. In effect, half of the $14 is repaid over three
years at a zero nominal interest rate. With a 5 percent market
nominal interest rate, the present value of the net tax savings
is $7.65.
Congress also has adopted special start-up rules that prescribe
fixed base amounts for firms established after the 1984–88 base
period. (Like older firms, new firms are allowed to use the ASC,
and were allowed to use the AIRC before its repeal, in place of the
fixed-base credit.) These start-up rules are ill designed because
they link firms’ permanent base amounts to their research spending in the sixth through tenth years of their existence. Newly
established firms that increase their research spending during
those years are penalized in much the same way as older firms
that increased their 1984–88 research spending, with the conspicuous difference that the penalties are foreseeable for newly established firms.
In its current form, the credit provides uneven marginal incentives for research. The fixed-base credit provides a 20 percent
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incentive to some firms and a 10 percent incentive to other firms
(those with base amounts fixed at half of current spending) while
the ASC provides a 7.65 percent incentive and the start-up rules
provide new firms with different incentives (or disincentives) in
various years. Before it was repealed, the AIRC provided incentives of 3 to 5 percent. Other incentive rates can arise if firms
move between the fixed-base credit and the ASC across different
years.
The incremental credit has added other complexity. Rules have
been adopted to allocate base amounts during mergers and spinoffs. Congress also has tinkered with the definition of gross
receipts in an effort to make it a better scaling variable for the
fixed base amount. Also, research spending must be defined consistently between the current tax year and the base period; for
firms using the fixed-base credit, if the definition of qualified
research is changed, the firm must recalculate its base amount by
reclassifying its 1984–88 research spending in accordance with the
modified definition.
In view of these difficulties, moving to a flat credit should be considered. Holding revenue loss fixed, a flat credit will provide a
somewhat smaller research incentive, in the aggregate. But, the
incentive will be uniform across firms, presumably producing
a more efficient allocation of research spending. The complexity and instability of the current credit will be removed. The
implicit turnover tax embedded in the fixed-base credit will be
eliminated.
As 1984–88 continues to recede into the past, the problems of the
incremental credit can only become severe. One ominous possibility is that Congress may replace 1984–88 with a new “fixed”
base period. Any anticipation of such a development would create severe research disincentives of the kind that were avoided in
1984–88 only because the adoption of the fixed-base credit was
not anticipated.
The quest for more “bang for the buck” has generally not led
Congress to adopt an incremental design for other tax incentives.
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For example, Congress has not limited taxpayers to deducting
only the excess of charitable contributions over a base amount
linked to past giving. Because there are no obvious features of
research spending that make it more suited to the incremental
approach than charitable giving or other tax-preferred activities,
it may be time to bring the research tax credit into line with other
tax incentives.
If a full movement to a flat credit is not desired, more modest
steps could be taken. For example, a flat credit could be adopted
for new firms. Another possibility is to expand the ASC, luring
firms away from the much more deeply flawed fixed-base credit.
President Obama’s September 8, 2010, economic plan adopts just
this approach, raising the ASC credit rate from 14 to 17 percent.
With a 5 percent nominal interest rate, the research incentive is
9.28 percent for a typical firm. In the fact sheet justifying the proposal, the White House criticized the fixed-base credit formula as
“complex” and “outdated.” Nevertheless, President Obama did
not propose abolishing the fixed-base credit.

Refine the Definition of Qualified Research
The final issue concerns the definition of research that receives
the credit. As noted above, the goal of the credit is to subsidize
research with spillover benefits not captured by the firm doing
the research.
Congress has required that the research be “undertaken for the
purpose of discovering information (i) which is technological in
nature, and (ii) the application of which is intended to be useful
in the development of a new or improved business component of
the taxpayer, and (iii) substantially all of the activities of which
constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose
… [related] to (i) a new or improved business function, (ii) performance, or (iii) reliability or quality.” Congress also has disqualified research related to style, taste, cosmetic, or seasonal design
factors; research in the social sciences, arts, and humanities;
research performed after commercial production of the business
component has begun; research that adapts a component to a
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particular customer’s requirements; research that duplicates an
existing component; and certain surveys and studies. Congress
also has imposed restrictions on the availability of the credit for
the development of internal-use software. Applying these rules
has proven to be a difficult task.
While Congress required that the research be undertaken for the
purpose of “discovering information,” it did not specify whether
the information must be new to society or only to the firm. On
December 2, 1998, the IRS proposed regulations requiring that
research be “undertaken to obtain knowledge that exceeds,
expands, or refines the common knowledge of skilled professionals in a particular field of science or engineering.” The IRS
emphasized that Congress intended the credit to encourage
research that increased the innovative qualities and efficiency of
the U.S. economy. The IRS finalized the regulations, with only
modest changes, on January 3, 2001, effective for research performed on or after that date.
The final regulations drew intense criticism as providing an
unduly restrictive definition of research and imposing unduly
burdensome documentation requirements. The regulations
required that a firm document early in its research, or before it
began, the questions the research sought to answer and the information that was sought. Also, any firm that wished to invoke a
rebuttable presumption that its research satisfied the new definition was required to document that it had conducted an investigation early in the research, or before it began, confirming that the
result sought by the research was not part of common knowledge.
Eberle (2001) noted the concerns expressed about the research
definition and the documentation requirement.13
The January 3, 2001, regulations proved to be short-lived, particularly because a new President took office seventeen days later. In
the March 5, 2001, Internal Revenue Bulletin, the IRS announced
13 James Eberle, “Analysis of the Final Research Tax Credit Regulations,” Tax Notes 90 (2001); 153340.
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that the regulations would be reconsidered and that firms would
be allowed to rely on the pre-2001 regulations until the changes
were finalized. On December 26, 2001, the IRS published proposed regulations that dropped the requirement that research
seek to obtain information that expands, exceeds, or refines commonly held knowledge. On January 2, 2004, the IRS finalized the
proposed regulations with little change. These regulations define
creditable research as follows:
Research is undertaken for the purpose of discovering
information if it is intended to eliminate uncertainty
concerning the development or improvement of a business component. Uncertainty exists if the information
available to the taxpayer does not establish the capacity or
method for developing or improving the business component, or the appropriate design of the component …
[creditability] does not require the taxpayer be seeking
to obtain information that exceeds, expands, or refines
the common knowledge of skilled professionals.
(emphasis added)
There has been little further consideration of the issue since 2004.
Although research that adapts existing technology to business
use may have some external benefits, the strongest benefits are
likely to arise from research that discovers new information not
previously known to society. It may be desirable, therefore, to
narrow the definition of qualified research along the lines set
forth in the January 2001 regulations.
If a narrower definition is adopted, onerous documentation
requirements should be avoided and care should be taken not
to exclude socially beneficial activities. The complexity and
disruption of moving to a new definition would also have to be
considered.
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CONCLUSION
Tax policy can have significant effects on capital accumulation
and innovation, the two key forces driving long-run economic
growth. A move to consumption taxation could help promote
capital accumulation. Some gains would arise if the income tax
system could be partially replaced by a VAT, but larger gains
could be achieved by replacing the entire income tax system with
a progressive consumption tax, such as the Bradford X tax or a
personal expenditures tax. Each of these taxes poses certain complications. On a smaller scale, the research tax credit could be
modified to make it a more effective tool in promoting innovation.

Table 1: Scheduled Expirations of
Research Tax Credit
Scheduled
Expiration
Dec. 31, 1985
Dec. 31, 1988
Dec. 31, 1989
Dec. 31, 1990
Dec. 31, 1991
June 30, 1992
June 30, 1995
May 31, 1997
June 30, 1998
June 30, 1999
June 30, 2004
Dec. 31, 2005
Dec. 31, 2007
Dec. 31, 2009

Date
Extended

Days
Late

Extension
(months)

Oct. 22, 1986
Nov. 10, 1988
Dec. 19, 1989
Nov. 5, 1990
Dec. 11, 1991
Aug. 10, 1993
Aug. 20, 1996
Aug. 5, 1997
Oct. 21, 1998
Dec. 17, 1999
Oct. 4, 2004
Dec. 20, 2006
Oct. 3, 2008
Dec. 17, 2010

295
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
408
417
66
113
170
96
354
277
351

36
12
12
12
6
36
11*
13
12
60
18
24
24
24

*From July 1, 1996.
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8:

Advancing Antitrust Law to Promote
Innovation and Economic Growth

George L. Priest∗

T

he effective implementation of antitrust law is central to the
promotion of innovation and to the achievement of economic growth. Antitrust law defines the guidelines of a competitive private market that, in all economies, is the principal
source of innovation and economic growth.
Put conversely, in the absence of a competitive private economy,
innovation and economic growth are greatly retarded. State(political-) controlled economies can generate innovation and
economic growth over some range. But the experience of the past
century shows that the range is limited, as evidenced, among
endless examples, in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and
the experience of China and India, where economic growth was
retarded before and has been greatly expanded after the introduction of (some level of) private market operations.
Chiefly for political reasons, the principles of antitrust law in the
United States have not generally been allowed to define the range
of state-controlled versus private- (market-) controlled enterprise
∗ George L. Priest is the Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauffman
Distinguished Research Scholar in Law, Economics and Entrepreneurship, Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Peter Schuck and to participants at the Third Kauffman Summer Legal Institute for comments on an earlier draft.
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that would maximize economic growth (see the Parker v. Brown
line of cases restricting the application of antitrust law from areas
under state political control1). From the standpoint of economic
growth, this is a source of regret and an important subject worthy
of further study. Nevertheless, putting aside, for the moment, the
extent of state control of enterprise, an effective antitrust law will
maximize economic growth within the private sector.
The relationship between antitrust law and innovation is somewhat more complicated. There is an interesting theoretical issue
as to whether monopolies or cartels will invest as much in innovation as firms in competitive industries. There is a long popular
tradition that believes that monopolies retard or, at the least, possess reduced interests in innovation because they are sheltered
from competition. This idea is as old as the Case of Monopolies
(1603),2 and is reflected more modernly in Hicks’ famous aphorism that the greatest monopoly return is a quiet life.
There are good economic reasons to question this belief. (See the
Arrow-Demsetz debate on this issue.) If monopolists seek to maximize profits (which is typically the point of securing a monopoly), they will benefit from expanding demand—monopoly profits become greater—and thus will invest in innovation. Further,
the antitrust laws are importantly amended by copyright and
patent statutes whose principal idea is to hold out the prospect of
monopoly in order to encourage innovation.
The debate over this issue, however, as is typical of much of modern antitrust analysis, largely ignores and, thus, obscures the
dynamic character of innovation. The relationship between
antitrust law and the copyright and patent regimes in encouraging innovation will be addressed later in this chapter. With
1 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991).
2 “The 2d incident to a monopoly is, that after the monopoly [is] granted, the commodity is not
so good and merchantable as it was before: for the patentee having the sole trade, regards only
his private benefit, and not the common wealth.” Trin. 44 Eliz., 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260
(King’s Bench 1603).
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respect to the more typical objects of antitrust law—cartels and
mergers to monopoly—the economic effects and the effects on
innovation and economic growth are clear; neither need be debated. Monopolies and cartels have chiefly redistributive goals and
effects: They take money from buyers and pocket it to sellers. The
redistribution of wealth is generally antagonistic to the creation of
wealth through innovation.3
As will be explained, much of the development of antitrust law in
the United States—from the 1940s through the mid-1970s—
focused on supposed redistributive effects of industrial practices
and directed law and policy to reverse that redistribution in ways
that most likely inhibited economic growth. That definition of
antitrust law could not be defended and has been overturned in
succeeding years. This is an admirable achievement and has contributed to economic growth.
Nevertheless, modern antitrust law, however liberated from rules
inhibiting economic growth, still falls short of the broader affirmative effects that antitrust law might achieve. This paper will
attempt to describe how antitrust law might be advanced more
dynamically to promote innovation and economic growth.
Part I describes briefly the development of antitrust law in the
United States from enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890
through, roughly, 1975 and explains how that development inhibited innovation and economic growth. Part I also outlines the
change in antitrust law that began after 1975 and continues today,
and explains how that change has (partially) enhanced economic
growth. Part II describes how antitrust law might be redirected
for the future to advance innovation and economic growth more
successfully.

3 An exception, as mentioned, is the grant of monopoly rights to patentees.
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PART I:THE DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES

OF

ANTITRUST LAW

IN THE

Antitrust Law, 1890–1975
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, prohibiting “every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” (Section 1)
and monopolization (Section 2). For the first two decades of
Sherman Act enforcement, the act was directed against unions
and against companies that had merged to monopoly or formed
cartels, often in the form of trusts, holding shares (and thus controlling the operations) of formerly competing companies.
Antitrust jurisprudence at the Supreme Court paid no attention to
questions of industrial organization. The principal legal issue was
whether the act should be read literally: as a prohibition of
“every” contract that could be construed to have restrained trade,
or whether there was some mediating principle that limited the
application of the act. In 1912, in the Standard Oil decision,4 the
Supreme Court decided that the Sherman Act must be interpreted by the “Rule of Reason”: an invented legal proposition that
means that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited,
in contrast to “reasonable” restraints of trade, the most common
example of which is a partnership of two individuals, obviously
possessing no market power.
Although there were many interesting prosecutions and debates
following the Standard Oil decision, the next principal change in
antitrust doctrine occurred during the Second New Deal in 1940,
in which a Roosevelt-dominated Supreme Court expanded the
reach of the antitrust laws by announcing the “per se” prohibition
of price fixing—an absolute prohibition—in the important
Socony-Vacuum Oil case.5 No economist or student of public policy can support price fixing among competitors. There was not
then, nor has there been since, any substantial critique of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case. The conception, however, of
4 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911).
5 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).
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a per se prohibition of a particular industrial practice (i.e., that the
practice was prohibited regardless of the analysis of economic
effect, in direct contrast to a determination of whether a claimed
restraint was “reasonable”) was new and had an important
impact on future Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence.
Over succeeding years, until the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court,
confident upon the acceptance of the Socony-Vacuum Oil
approach, and largely hostile to nontypical business arrangements, progressively expanded the number of practices subject to
per se antitrust prohibitions. Per se prohibitions were announced
against all forms of price control starting, as indicated, with the
per se prohibition of horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), but
extended to include resale price maintenance (reinterpreting the
1918 Dr. Miles opinion) and maximum price limitations (Albrecht);
vertical territorial restrictions (Schwinn); tying arrangements
(Northern Pacific); group boycotts (Fashion Originators’ Guild); and
predatory pricing (Utah Pie); among others.6 The Supreme Court
also sanctioned what by any modern eye would be regarded as
extreme limitations on mergers. In the 1966 Von’s Grocery case,7
the Supreme Court approved the prohibition of a merger of noncompeting retail grocery companies in Los Angeles, each possessing less than 4 percent of the retail grocery market. This opinion
signaled that the Court would sustain any challenge that the
Justice Department brought against a proposed merger, leading
the department in 1968 to promulgate draconian Merger
Guidelines that outlined its policy toward merger challenges, stifling future merger activity.
Although I know of no studies exactly making this point, there is
every reason to believe that this definition of antitrust law imped6 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19 L.Ed.2d 998 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967); United States v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct., 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312
U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 87 S.Ct.
1326, 18 L.Ed.2d 406 (1967).
7 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 86 S.Ct. 1478, 16 L.Ed.2d 555 (1966).
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ed economic growth by the prohibitions it imposed on industrial
enterprise. Certainly, the spirit of the law was hostile to economic growth. That spirit was basically redistributionist: halting the
effort of successful firms to advance their operations; preventing
potentially wealth-enhancing mergers; indeed, overtly redistributionist in protecting small business from large, especially in the
context of retail dealers (the dealer liberty theory: Klors,8 Brown
Shoe).9 The antigrowth effects were particularly pronounced with
respect to vertical practices—tying arrangements; territorial allocations; vertical price restraints; vertical integration generally—
based upon economically indefensible theories of market
foreclosure.

Antitrust Law 1976–2010
In the middle of the 1970s, the Supreme Court began a dramatic
change in its approach to interpretation of the Sherman Act. In
succeeding years, the Court essentially adopted (though not perfectly) the analysis of antitrust law that Aaron Director had
defined at the University of Chicago in the 1940s and 1950s. The
progressive adoption of this approach (though with some fits and
starts) continues today.
I have separately attributed as the principal catalyst of this
change the appointment of John Paul Stevens to the Court in
1976. Though this fact has only been discovered recently, Stevens
had taught the antitrust course at the University of Chicago Law
School with Director, an opportunity he has described as “the
most important intellectual experience of [his] life.”10 Whether or
not it was Stevens who changed the Court’s view on antitrust law
is unimportant to this paper. Relevant to the subject of economic
growth is that the Supreme Court, beginning in 1977, substantially changed its interpretation of the Sherman Act to largely
8 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959).
9 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962).
10 For a fuller discussion of Stevens’s relationship with Director, see Priest, Modern Antitrust Law:
The Triumph of Aaron Director, forthcoming 2011.
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remove the impediments to economic growth that had been introduced in the preceding forty years.
• In an important case decided in 1977, Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,11 the
Court vastly restricted the ability of competitors to file antitrust
suits seeking redress from harms caused by market-expanding
activities. The conceptual origins of the case are not fully understood, but its impact is significant because it reduced substantially the redistributive aims of antitrust law by curtailing
antitrust suits brought by inferior against superior competitors.
• Over succeeding years, the Court progressively reduced the
previously adopted per se prohibitions of various industrial
practices. The effect of these many cases is to charge courts to
investigate the economic impact of alleged offenses under the
Rule of Reason, allowing firms the opportunity to explain
how the practices under attack might enhance economic
productivity.
• The change in antitrust law allowed firms to engage in practices
with other firms in order to enhance output that had previously been prohibited. An example is the Court’s adoption of a
more nuanced understanding of what are categorized as group
boycotts (Northwest Wholesale Stationers).12
• The Court’s change in view—Director’s direct legacy—led to a
different understanding and treatment of vertical arrangements, including tying arrangements (Fortner II, Jefferson Parish
Hospital), and predatory pricing (Matsushita, Brooke Group),
among other vertical practices.13

11 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S. Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
12 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Company, 472 U.S. 284, 105
S.Ct. 2613, 86 L.Ed.2d 202 (1985).
13 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 97 S.Ct. 861, 51 L.Ed.2d 80
(1977); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125
L.Ed.2d 168 (1993).
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• Though not initiated by the Court, yet entirely consistent with
the Court’s new approach, under another acolyte of Director,
William Baxter, as chief of the antitrust division, the Justice
Department’s Merger Guidelines were amended in 1982 to
define markets more dynamically, by including potential future
production into product and market definitions, and vastly
expanding the definition of markets, thus reducing the apparent effect of any potential merger in terms of market power.
These multiple changes in antitrust law following 1977 had the
effect of removing the obstacles to economic growth characteristic of the earlier era. The changes substantially contributed to
economic growth.
Still, with the exception of the revised Merger Guidelines, modern antitrust law contributes to economic growth only, as
explained in Chapter 1, in a static manner: smoothing the path of
industrial enterprise by eliminating obstacles to growth. Modern
antitrust law, like modern private law, even if sensitive to economic considerations, applies the economic understanding statically, not dynamically. Antitrust law facilitates economic growth
for existing enterprises, but it does not directly encourage growth
for new enterprise.
The next section outlines ways that modern antitrust law might
be defined to more dynamically promote economic growth.

PART II: ADVANCING ANTITRUST LAW TO MORE
ROBUSTLY PROMOTE INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
The transformation of antitrust law since the mid-1970s was successful in reducing the impediments to economic growth imbedded in the earlier antitrust regime. Nevertheless, the transformation has been inadequate in many ways. As discussed, modern
antitrust law has (at best) adopted a static conception of law and
economic growth, the principal objective of which is to enhance
current production. This conception is not unimportant, but it
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fails to adopt a dynamic conception of law and economic growth:
creating a legal structure that promotes and encourages new
innovation and future economic growth. This section discusses
the possibilities of advancing antitrust law to enhance economic
growth into the future.
There are several ways in which modern antitrust law could more
fully recognize the opportunities of innovation to achieve the
potential of enhancing economic growth:
• First, all antitrust authorities should acknowledge and build
into their policy decisions the fact that, in our modern fluid
economy, antitrust law is a very crude mechanism for controlling industrial practices. Serious antitrust prosecutions extend
over many years, often over a decade. Given rapid changes in
competitive markets, antitrust law should be viewed as serving, at best, as a last resort mechanism for affecting changes in
industrial practices. The recognition of the limitations of slowmoving antitrust law in comparison to dynamic market competition also should inform courts facing antitrust suits brought
by less successful against more successful competitors. Those
suits should be presumptively disfavored.
• Toward the same point, modern antitrust law has ignored the
significant effects of increased global competition. Antitrust law
in the United States remains domestic law. The interpretation of
the law has failed to consider the extraordinary modern effects
of actual and potential global competition.
– The existence of increased global competition should result in
a diminution of antitrust prosecution, not an increase.
Markets should be defined to include the prospect of global,
not simply internal U.S., competition.
– The United States should be aggressive, not passive, in
opposing the application of the antitrust laws of other countries—most centrally, the European Union (EU)—that have
different and economically less-informed antitrust regimes.
Allowing the EU to block the GE-Honeywell merger is a
prime example in which both the U.S. Justice Department
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and the EU competition authority concluded that the merger
would dramatically reduce costs and improve product quality. This conclusion led the Justice Department to approve the
merger, but the EU to prohibit it under its standard of prohibiting increased market dominance.
– Recognizing the force of increased global competition, the
United States should expand the antitrust laws to prohibit
protectionism and industry subsidies wherever they appear.
Protectionism waxes and wanes at the federal level, where
even seeming pro-market administrations embrace protectionist policies for political reasons. A broader definition of
the scope of antitrust policy might harness such policies.
• This point is also relevant with respect to state-level regulation.
As described earlier, under the Parker v. Brown line of cases,
state protection of industry (favorable taxation or direct subsidization) is immunized from antitrust scrutiny. From the standpoint of economic growth, policies of this nature are hugely
harmful. This is especially true in the context of increased global competition. State competition against other states for new
companies through reduced taxes or subsidies—dynamic competition—is entirely appropriate. State subsidization of
entrenched local production, however—deriving from political
influence—should be prohibited. Parker v. Brown could be easily overruled on Commerce Clause authority. As explained in
the Hadfield chapter in this volume, state “regulation” of the
professions—in effect, immunization from regulation—is particularly harmful.
• Although the Aaron Director/Chicago School view of antitrust
law has been extended over much of the field, it has not been
seriously applied to the intersection of antitrust law and patent
and copyright law. This is a great regret, since patent and copyright law remain mired in the understanding of vertical
arrangements typical of the 1950s and 1960s. Another Director
acolyte, Ward Bowman, wrote an important book on this subject,14 though his basic point was simply that patent exploitation ought to be maximized. There is important study to be
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done analyzing how patent and copyright law should be
reformed in order to advance dynamic innovation.
• Modern antitrust law has not successfully been applied to network industries that are perhaps the greatest source of innovation and economic growth in our modern society. I have
remarked on this failing elsewhere.15 Over the past decade, a
considerable literature on the economics of network industries
has developed. Much of this writing has focused on the most
novel of network topics, such as first-mover effects, tipping,
lock-in, and the like. These subjects are of substantial conceptual interest, but they are essentially esoteric and do not address
the practical understanding of how networks are organized and
how they operate. To date, the literature on network industries
in both economics and law has failed to develop practical
grounds for understanding what legal interventions will serve
to enhance network benefits for consumers.
Because in simple terms a network industry is one in which, over
some large and relevant range, the benefit of the industry’s product or service to consumers increases as the network expands, the
most basic antitrust question is this: What network configuration
or operational characteristics best expand these benefits to consumers? This question resembles, but is not exactly equivalent to,
an inquiry about achieving appropriate economies of scale.
Nevertheless, there are many examples of network competition in
industries possible because the benefits of expanding networks
diminish over some range or because of heterogeneous demand
supporting competing networks.
These issues are important for modern antitrust law because of
the increasing role of network industries in our expanded and
increasingly connected society. Practices that may appear anti14 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973).
15 Priest, “Flawed Efforts to Apply Modern Antitrust Law to Network Industries” in High Stakes
Antitrust, ed. Robert Hahn (Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
2003).
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competitive when adopted in the context of multifirm industries
or even anticompetitive when adopted by a monopolist may take
on an entirely different cast where the objective is to expand consumer benefits by expanding networks.
Again, the most direct standard for evaluating network-related
practices for purposes of enhancing economic growth is whether
a questioned practice enhances or diminishes network benefits to
consumers.
To date, none of our courts, and surely not the Justice
Department, has adequately considered how antitrust law must
be redefined in the context of networks. In the important Microsoft
case,16 the Washington, DC Circuit Court of Appeals (in a ruling
that effectively possesses Supreme Court significance), wisely
overruled the more harmful features of the lower court’s rulings
against Microsoft, but without establishing new principles for
addressing network industry practices more generally.
Network-related practices surely will be the subject of an increasing number of antitrust lawsuits, in particular greater claims of
monopolization where one competitor succeeds in creating network benefits over others. In our increasingly connected economy, the adoption by standard-setting organizations of protocols
that advance interconnection are inevitable. One or more firms
that have developed a dominant protocol will gain; those rejected
will lose. Because the antitrust treatment of this issue at the
Supreme Court is not developed—the most “recent” Supreme
Court precedent is Radiant Burners,17 a case whose resolution preceded the development of the economic understanding of network effects—there will be substantial litigation over the standard-setting process, as we have already witnessed. To date, these
issues have been addressed in Courts of Appeals’ decisions—
some quite sensitive to the network effects issues18—but many
16 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
17 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 365, 5 L.Ed.2d 358
(1961).
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different variations of the question are likely to be raised until the
Supreme Court addresses carefully the standardization question.
Finally, although treated glancingly in the Microsoft decision, the
issue of how to employ the antitrust laws to encourage platform
competition needs substantial development. The conditions
under which platform technologies can exist as competitors versus domination by a single platform are not well worked out in
economics, not to mention in antitrust law. Much further work is
necessary to understand these conditions.

CONCLUSION
The antitrust laws can provide an important contribution to economic growth. Cartels among competing companies or monopolies acquired by artificial means (such as the merger of competitors in U.S. Steel),19 inhibit economic growth. The purpose of the
antitrust laws is to prohibit these forms of economic organization
to enhance growth.
During the early years of antitrust enforcement in the United
States (the first eighty-five years), the application of the antitrust
laws partially achieved these ends, though surely not entirely, as
the Supreme Court raised obstacles to economic enterprise
through general hostility to business and through efforts to
achieve redistributional ends. Since the mid-1970s, however,
many of these impediments to industry have been removed.
Nevertheless, the modern interpretation of the antitrust laws
remains dominated by a static, not a dynamic, conception of economic growth. For the future there are many ways in which the
antitrust laws can be reinterpreted to dynamically enhance economic growth, in particular through a recognition of the limits of
the effects of prolonged antitrust prosecutions in the context of a
18 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008).
19 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293. 64 L.Ed. 343 (1920).
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dynamic economy; through an explicit redirection of policy given
the increased significance of global competition; through the
elimination of growth-retarding subsidies and protections at the
federal and state levels; through a reanalysis of the intersection of
antitrust law and patent/copyright law; and through an
enhanced understanding of the operation of network industries.
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Contract, Uncertainty, and Innovation

Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott∗

C

ontract today increasingly links entrepreneurial innovations
to the efforts and finance necessary to transform ideas into
value. In this chapter, we describe the match between a form
of contract that “braids”1 formal and informal contractual
elements in novel ways and the process by which innovation is
pursued.
It is hardly surprising that these innovative forms of contract
have emerged first in markets, and that the common law, and the
theory of contract, then play catch-up. Between the time contracting practice adapts to the demands of innovation and the time
contract doctrine adapts to the demands of practice, law acts as a
∗ Ronald J. Gilson is the Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University;
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University; European Corporate
Governance Institute. Charles F. Sabel is the Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law, Columbia
University. Robert E. Scott is the Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for
Contract and Economic Organization, Columbia University.
1 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott, “Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine,” Columbia Law Review 110 (forthcoming
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535574. We draw here on this article, as well as on Ronald J.
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott, “Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration
and Interfirm Collaboration,” Columbia Law Review 109 (2009): 431. We are grateful to the
Kauffman Foundation for research support.
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friction on the innovation process rather than a lubricant to it.
Our goal here is to reduce that lag by providing a theory that can
guide courts in developing case law that addresses current forms
of innovation. Put differently, we seek to provide courts the logic
necessary to order the experience that Holmes, as a pragmatist,
thought so central to the life of the common law.2
This chapter provides an overview of our ongoing work. The
starting point is the Knightian distinction between risk and
uncertainty.3 In our view, traditional contracting techniques and
traditional contract law address problems of risk. Braiding, or
contracting for innovation, addresses conditions of uncertainty.
We illustrate the relevance of this distinction by describing the
shift in the organizational location of innovation4—in particular a
fundamental shift from vertical integration to contract as the
organizing mechanism for cutting-edge innovation. We then
describe the braiding of formal and informal contracting that has
developed to organize collaboration across organizational boundaries where the desired outcome can, at best, be anticipated only
very approximately. Next, we reexamine the interaction between
formal and informal contracting to understand why braiding was
not envisaged as a theoretical possibility before it became a
salient reality, and to make theoretical sense of braiding now that
it has. Finally, we look to recent case law to argue that the domain
of braiding now includes contexts where uncertainty is not generated by technological development, and we examine the failure
of courts to recognize the difference between and consequences of

2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 3. When Holmes wrote that “The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience,” he was not referring to passive process. Rather, the
pattern was one in which experience driven litigation gave rise to logic—the predicative value of
the court’s decision. This notion that law follows from, rather than developing internally independent of, experience reflected Holmes’s strongly held view, driven by his battlefield experience
in the Civil War, that logic isolated from experience was ideology, from which came the carnage
of the war. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Flamingo, 2001), 3–4, 61.
3 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), 197–232.
4 See Ronald J. Gilson, “Locating Innovation: Technology, Organizational Structure and Financial
Contracting,” Columbia Law Review 109 (2009): 885.
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low-powered and high-powered enforcement in addressing
braided contracts.
In particular, our analysis gives courts concrete guidance in the
area of preliminary agreements, where courts for the first time are
undertaking to enforce formal agreements—whether in the context of a preliminary agreement, letter of intent, or corporate
acquisition agreement—that establish a process by which the parties will determine whether an innovation is possible, but do not
obligate the parties to go forward with the substance of the innovation.5 In contrast to the unpredictability currently associated
with judicial accounts of how these agreements will be enforced,
our development of a theory of braided contracts gives the court
clear guidance: enforce the process established by the formal element of the contract through low-powered reliance damages, but
never enforce, through high-powered (expectation) damages, the
informal substantive element of the braid. This rule prevents the
formal element of the braided contract from “crowding out” the
informal element, and thereby preventing the innovative activity
from going forward at all.

INNOVATION, UNCERTAINTY, AND INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION
Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty is central to
understanding the role of contract in the innovative process. Risk
exists when future states of the world can be estimated probabilistically. Given such estimates, a contract, through a series of “if
X, then Y” clauses, can more or less specify what will occur in
each realized state. Alternatively, markets can be used to hedge
against particular realizations, such as the future prices of commodities, or interest or currency exchange rates.
Under uncertainty, in contrast, future states of the world cannot
be expressed probabilistically. Ex ante, we cannot usefully specify
5 For discussion, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, “Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements,” Harvard Law Review 120 (2007).
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the desired outcome(s), or assign an option providing protection
to one or another party ex post. In our analysis, innovation is
inherently uncertain: an innovation is defined in the same process
that ultimately leads to its achievement. From this perspective,
the term “linear innovation,” sometimes used to describe the next
step in a predictable sequence,6 is an oxymoron.
The increasing importance of innovation in this sense can be seen
in the tendency to vertical disintegration of industry. Conventional
industrial organization theory predicts that when parties in the
supply chain must make transaction-specific investments, the risk
of opportunism will drive them away from contracts and toward
vertical integration.7 This pressure toward sole ownership will be
especially powerful in innovative industries where rapid technological change produces high levels of uncertainty in supply relationships. Contemporary contract theory concurs. In the presence
of uncertainty, it offers no general solution to the problem of assuring both efficient levels of transaction-specific investment ex ante
and adjustment to an efficient outcome ex post after uncertainty is
resolved. So from this perspective too, firms should dominate markets as a means to organize supply relationships.
For much of the twentieth century, the organization of large
industry tracked this account. The dominant firms in industries
such as steel, automobiles, electric machinery, and food processing—both in the United States and worldwide—used the technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution8 to achieve dramatic economies of scale through the mass production of standard
goods with single-purpose or dedicated machinery. The most
6 Masahiko Aoki, “Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,” Journal of Economic
Literature 28 (1990): 1, and Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism,” in Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage,
ed. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50-54, distinguish
between forms of national capitalism that support linear innovation (for example, Germany and
Japan) and those that support non-linear innovation (for example, the United States).
7 Much of this transactions cost literature is an extension of the work of Oliver Williamson. See
e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985);
and Oliver E. Williamson, Markets And Hierarchies: Analysis And Antitrust Implications (New York:
The Free Press, 1975).
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conspicuous organizational feature of firms in these industries
was vertical integration.
More recently, however, contemporary practice is moving away
from this solution. Companies recognize that the escalating rate
of change and resulting uncertainty means that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field necessary
for an innovative product. Accordingly, companies are increasingly electing to acquire by contract inputs that in the past they
had made themselves. Instead of vertical integration, we observe
vertical disintegration of firms, the expansion of collaborative
research and development across firm boundaries, and at the
intersection of these, the rise of platform production (where the
“operating system” and the “applications” it integrates are codeveloped by independent producers). In diverse industries ranging from contract manufacturing to pharmaceutical collaborations, these changes are accompanied by an increase in interfirm
relations with both parties expecting to innovate jointly.
In previous work,9 we explored three exemplars of this pattern
that ranged from contracts that imposed a formal governance
structure but no formally enforceable substantive obligations,10
to collaborative research agreements that look to the development of a continuing stream of products,11 to similar agreements
limited to developing a particular product and a consequent end
game.12 None of the familiar mechanisms for coping with the
problem of contractual incompleteness adequately respond to the
challenge posed by structuring transactions in the face of continuous uncertainty. But these exemplars demonstrate that transactional lawyers in a number of industries apparently began

8 Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities For Prosperity
(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
9 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, “Contracting for Innovation.”
10 For an example, see the Deere-Standyne agreement, ibid.
11 For an example, see the Apple-SCI agreement, ibid.
12 For an example, see the Warner-Lambert–Ligand agreement, ibid.
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responding to their clients’ need to structure new relationships in
light of the constraints imposed by uncertainty.
We term the novel result “contracting for innovation.” In the next
section we describe the components of this form of contracting
and provide a theoretical account of why the contractual innovations that work in practice also work in theory.

CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION
Taking innovation as we have defined it, the contracting problem
is to craft a structure that (a) induces efficient, transaction-specific investment by both parties, (b) establishes a framework for iterative collaboration and adjustment of the parties’ obligations
under conditions of continuing uncertainty—circumstances when
the resolution of one element of uncertainty merely gives rise to
another, and (c) limits the risk of opportunism that could undermine the incentive to make relation-specific investments in the
first place.
The common challenges facing parties contracting for innovation
across organizational boundaries give rise to solutions with common elements. In each case, a process of collaboration substitutes
functionally for ex ante specification of the desired product—the
process defines the specification, not the other way around. In
each case, the parties make relation-specific investments in learning about their collaborators’ capabilities that raise the costs of
switching to new partners, and so restrain either party from taking advantage of their mutual dependency.
Review of actual efforts of contracting for innovation informs our
understanding of how braiding is used to achieve these outcomes, by relying on formal contracting to establish processes
that make behavior observable enough to support informal contracting over the substance of the (uncertain) collaboration.13
Braiding uses formal contracts to create governance processes that
13 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, “Contracting for Innovation,” 476–89.
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support iterative joint effort through low-powered enforcement
techniques that specify only the commitment to collaborate,
without controlling the course or the outcome of the collaboration. This formal governance arrangement has two closely linked
components.
The first is a commitment to an ongoing mutual exchange of
information designed to determine if a project is feasible, and if
so, how best to implement the parties’ joint objectives. The second
component is a procedure for resolving disputes arising from the
first. Its key feature—the “contract referee mechanism”14—is a
requirement that the collaborators reach unanimous (or nearunanimous) agreement on crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved (or not) by unanimous agreement at higher
levels of management from each firm. Together these two mechanisms render observable, and forestall misunderstandings about,
the character traits and substantive capabilities that support the
informal contracting upon which the parties rely as, working
under uncertainty, they encounter unanticipated problems that
can only be solved jointly. At the same time, the parties’ increasing knowledge of their counterparty’s capacities and problemsolving type, a direct result of the processes specified in the formal contract, creates switching costs—the costs to each party of
replacing its counterparty with another—that constrain subsequent opportunistic behavior.
The formal element of a braided contract is thus sharply and distinctively limited in what it aims to accomplish. It functions to
allow both parties to learn about each other’s skills and capabilities for collaborative innovation and to develop jointly the routines necessary to working together. The formal contract does not,
however, commit either party to develop, supply, or purchase any
product. That commitment emerges from the informal contract,
where the barrier to ex post opportunism results not from formal
enforcement of obligations created by explicit contract, but from

14 Ibid., 479–81.
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increased switching costs generated by the collaboration process
itself.15

BRAIDING AND THE THREAT

OF

CROWDING OUT

The conceptual difficulty at this point in the analysis is with our
premise—that formal and informal contracting in fact can be
combined. The academic literature has long recognized the two
components making up a braided contract: one strand that is formal and legally enforceable and one strand that is informal and
subject only to self-enforcement. However, the literature largely
has either ignored the possibility of combining formal and informal contracting, or largely treated the two techniques as mutually inconsistent substitutes. Contemporary contract theory typically assumes that formal and informal methods are separate
responses to the problem of motivating relation-specific investments in a collective enterprise. If the threat of opportunism can
be addressed explicitly either by specifying state contingent outcomes or by assigning decision rights among the parties, then we
observe formal contracting; if not, we observe either self-enforcing informal contracts supported relationally or, when these cannot protect specific investment, vertical integration.16 Work in
experimental economics does in contrast address the possibility
of formal–informal interaction, but focuses mainly on circum15 Only where the subject of the braided contract is a discrete project do we see formal contracting over the output of the process. In the discrete project setting, switching costs discourage
opportunism during the collaborative period, but the parties have to fear opportunistic renegotiation once the cooperative stage of the project is completed and switching costs no longer provide protection. The only issue then remaining is division of the gains from prior cooperation. As
a result, an explicit constraint on opportunism must be employed; but at this stage, the uncertainty having been resolved, the contract theory solution of allocating rights to decision making
is feasible.
16 See e.g., Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 691, 697–700; Oliver Hart
and John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economics 98
(1990): 1119, 1151; Oliver Williamson, Assessing Contract, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
1 (1985): 177; Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, Journal of Political Economy 89 615; L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Agreements, Journal of Business 53 (1980): 27.
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stances when the introduction of formal contracting degrades the
effectiveness of, or “crowds out,” informal contracting.
What is broadly lacking in both literatures is a theory of when
and why the parties can make use of both techniques. In this section, we provide a first step toward developing a theory of the
complementary interaction of formal and informal contracting
that allows braiding.

THE LIMITS

OF

FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTING

Formal Enforcement: The Verifiability Problem
The capacity to compel disclosure of private information is the
defining feature of formal enforcement. When a formal contract
breaks down due to the opacity of the interactions or the guile of
one or more of the parties, courts (or arbitrators17) function by
assessing responsibility. To do this, courts must have better information than was available to the parties. But a judge, unlike, say,
a basketball referee, cannot directly observe complex interactions
on the field of play and then declare fouls. A legal referee must
obtain information indirectly, from the very parties who dispute
the facts of their “play.” This requires that the court have the
power to impose sanctions in order to force the disputants to provide essential information known only to them. The court then
can verify outcomes through information each party may lack
individually. Without a judicial sanction both for nonproduction
and for misleading production favorable to a party’s own position, a party would be motivated to conceal evidence known only
to it: the court then would lack the ability to secure information
even as good as the parties themselves possess. Breach by a party
would not be verifiable.
Verification, however, is costly. As a result, formal enforcement
can break down, particularly where the optimal actions for each
17 Arbitration remains a formal enforcement strategy. While arbitration displaces some of the legal
rules associated with litigation, it still requires the intervention of the state to enforce the arbitration award.
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party depend on the future state that materializes, but the future
is uncertain. In that circumstance, it is prohibitively costly or
impossible to specify most future states, let alone the appropriate
action that is to be taken if they occur. Under these conditions,
parties relying on formal enforcement are confronted with two
choices: the Scylla of “hard” terms (precise rules) and the
Charybdis of “soft” terms (vague standards). Rule-based contracts will require renegotiation after the uncertainty is resolved,
because their ex ante allocation of rights will frequently turn out
to be wrong ex post. This will allow the party favored by fate to
renegotiate from strength, and thus undermine incentives to
invest. Similarly, the costs of verifying standards-based contracts
and the corresponding risk of the court choosing the wrong
proxy—the designation of what range of observable outcomes
should dictate whether unobservable behavior would be “reasonable”—are high. To be sure, parties writing more complex contracts can ameliorate this problem by using combinations of standards and rules; but as uncertainty increases—precisely the circumstances of innovation—the performance of both standards
and rules deteriorate.18

Informal Enforcement: The Observability Problem
Where formal enforcement depends on court verification, informal enforcement depends entirely on private behavior—one
party’s ability to observe directly the other’s actions, and the
capacity to sanction misbehavior when observed. For example,
parties to an agreement often can observe whether one of them
has exercised “best efforts” and can punish a slacker, even though
it would be quite costly to convince a court to impose an equivalent punishment. The private, nonstate sanctions that comprise
informal enforcement are generally thought to take three forms,
which are mutually supportive at low-to-intermediate levels of
uncertainty, increasing the actors’ capacity to enforce contracts
where behavior is directly observable to them, but outcomes are
18 Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, “Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,” Yale Law
Journal 115 (2006): 814.
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hard to verify. However, as we will see, informal enforcement also
breaks down at high levels of uncertainty, making it no substitute
for formal enforcement when the actors are in significant ways
ignorant of the future they intend to create. Put differently, collaborative innovation confronts the barrier that both familiar contracting strategies break down in just the circumstance that
defines the environment of innovation.
A first type of informal enforcement is the threat that one party to
an informal contract will respond to its counterparty’s breach by
reducing or terminating future dealings. This tit-for-tat strategy
imposes losses on the defector that, in prospect, create disincentives to breach in the first place.19
A second type of informal enforcement is normative, supported
either by the morality or tastes of the contracting parties rather
than their calculations of individual gain. Much experimental evidence shows that approximately half of the test subjects do not
behave opportunistically even when it is in their economic interest to do so and they are not under threat of punishment or retaliation.20 Similarly, experimental evidence also indicates a widespread, but not universal, taste for reciprocity—an inclination to
reward cooperators and punish opportunists even when the subjects derive no direct and particular benefits from doing so.21 Like
character, a preference for reciprocity provides one explanation
for how (and why) this informal sanctioning works. Absent a
taste for reciprocity, it may be irrational for individuals to absorb
the costs of shaming, boycotting, and ostracizing.

19 Even where the particular parties do not expect to deal with each other in the future, the titfor-tat enforcement structure will still work if one party will trade with others in the future—that
is, if trade will be multilateral rather than bilateral—so long as the repeat play party’s reputation,
the collective experience of parties who have previously dealt with a person or firm, becomes
known to future counterparties. The action of future counterparties then serves to discipline the
misbehaving party.
20 For a review of the literature, see Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, “Theories of Fairness and
Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications” (working paper no. 75, University of Zurich,
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 2001), 2–3.
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A third type of informal enforcement is normative or dispositional informal sanctions, which can operate at the level of social
groups rather than among individuals. In compact and homogenous communities, for instance, the community as a whole can
sanction the breach of one member’s obligation to another by
ostracizing the malefactor, cutting off not just business ties but all
the benefits of belonging to the group.
The different supports for informal contracting generally complement each other, at least as the uncertainty—and with it the complexity—of transactions remains at low-to-moderate levels. But
informal enforcement depends on clear observation of counterparty’s actions: the simpler a party’s action, the easier it is for the
counterparty to observe and characterize. Thus increasing complexity interferes with all three types of informal enforcement.
The probability of a mistake in playing tit-for-tat increases with
the difficulty of assessing the counterparty’s actions. And by the
same token, the capacity to assess whether one’s counterparty has
a taste for reciprocity, or is of a character to forgo opportunism, or
is observing community norms, also degrades in a complex environment: the match between a party’s actual behavior and the
character of that party becomes more difficult to assess.
In a mistake-prone or “noisy” tit-for-tat environment, misreading
a counterparty’s actions as opportunistic first leads to retaliation,
which in turn leads to responsive retaliation and a cycle of opportunistic behavior that continues until another mistake resets the
21 The experimental evidence on individuals’ propensity to reciprocate yields two key findings.
First, many people respond cooperatively to generous acts and, conversely, punish noncooperative behavior. Second, the observed preference for reciprocity is heterogeneous. Some people
exhibit reciprocal behavior and others are selfish. Taking all the experiments together, the fraction
of reciprocally fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60 percent, as does the fraction of subjects who
are selfish. For discussion, see e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device:
Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica 65 (1997): 833, 850 (finding roughly half of subjects punishing shirkers, and roughly half rewarding nonshirkers); Ernst Fehr and Simon Gatcher, “Fairness and
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 159, 162
(“Many studies have carried out detailed analyses of individual decisions and found that the fraction of subjects exhibiting reciprocal choices is between forty and sixty-six percent.”). For applications of this experimental evidence to contract theory, see Robert E. Scott, “A Theory of SelfEnforcing Indefinite Agreements,” Columbia Law Review 103 (2003): 1641, 1661–75.
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cooperative equilibrium. In such a setting, tit-for-tat is no longer
the most effective strategy because it risks triggering a retaliatory
cycle. The dominant strategy is more forgiving: it allows some
percentage of the other party’s defections to go unpunished.22
This is where the complementarity of the supports for informal
contracting becomes relevant. A significant probability that a
counterparty has a taste for reciprocity, or is of a character
that dictates forgoing opportunism, makes it less threatening
to be more forgiving of an apparent defection. An independent
reason to trust the counterparty results in a corresponding
higher probability that the apparent defection was really a
misunderstanding.
Moreover, just as the normative modes of informal enforcement
can support tit-for-tat calculations of the value of ongoing relations when counterparty’s actual behavior becomes less observable, so too can the existence of ongoing relations increase the
effectiveness of normative enforcement. The presence of an ongoing relationship that allows for retaliation in the event of counterparty opportunism makes it less risky for a party to act on the
probability that the counterparty values reciprocity or forgoes
opportunism. In this sense, the existence of the continuing relationship allows the parties to learn about each other’s tastes and
character. Thus we see a virtuous cycle, in which each of the
mechanisms that support informal contracting reinforces the others by making the conduct of the counterparties more observable—less subject to mistaken assessment—to each other. Indeed,
given the mutually supportive relation among the types of informal enforcement, we can think of them (at least at low-to-moderate levels of uncertainty) as aspects of a single informal enforcement mechanism, one rooted in ongoing relations among parties
supported by a (normative) disposition to reciprocity.
22 The literature is well developed and uncontroversial: Generous tit-for-tat strategies outperform
simple tit-for-tat strategies in noisy environments. See e.g., M. Nowack and K. Sigmund, “Tit for Tat
in Heterogeneous Populations,” Nature 364 (1992): 56–58; H.C.J. Godfray, “The Evolution of
Forgiveness,” Nature 255 (1992): 206; J. Bendor, R.M. Kramer, and S. Stout, “When in Doubt …:
Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1991): 691; Robert
Axelrod and D. Dion, “The Further Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 242 (1988): 1385.
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The experimental evidence suggests, moreover, that informal
enforcement, when it is effective, is both cheaper and better than
formal enforcement. Informal enforcement is cheaper because a
party only incurs the costs of observing the other’s behavior,
while formal enforcement requires the parties to expend additional resources (attorney’s fees, court costs, etc.) in verifying that
behavior to a court. Moreover, when informal enforcement
works, it is also better. It permits parties to make credible promises regarding observable (and perhaps only observable with repetition) but nonverifiable measures of performance, thus allowing
parties to avoid the risk of opportunism arising from formal
enforcement of a precise rule or the moral hazard associated with
the ex post application of a broad standard. These advantages
explain why, in commercial contracting, parties often rely
on informal enforcement even when formal sanctions are
available.23
These mechanisms of informal enforcement, however, are subject
to inherent limitations. Informal contracting, even that supported
by taste and character, works best with repeat play in the narrowest sense: the same actors doing the same things with each other
again and again makes conduct more observable, an indispensable element of informal contracting. The more actors undertake
novel things with strangers—precisely the conditions of collaborative innovation in the face of uncertainty—the greater their
chances either of mischaracterizing each other’s acts and intentions, or lacking the ability to characterize what the others are
doing at all. When changing sequences of novel performances
among unfamiliar actors dissipate the transparency necessary for
informal contracting, a switch to forgiving strategies no longer
interrupts the vicious cycles of mistake, retaliation, and counterresponse, as can occur at lower levels of uncertainty. Instead,
retaliations escalate and destroy the relation.
23 This insight was first explored in Stewart Macaulay’s classic account of how commercial contractual relationships rely on informal enforcement even when the parties previously have entered
into to a formal, legally enforceable contract. Stewart Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 55.
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In sum, formal contracting has an advantage where performance
is verifiable ex post but not necessarily observable ex ante.
Informal contracting has an advantage where performance is
observable but costly to verify. But both can break down in the
highly uncertain environments that are the domain of innovation.
Can contract planners address such circumstances by combining
the two strategies in a fashion that is more effective than either
standing alone?

COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES? EXPLAINING THE
RIVALRY BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL
ENFORCEMENT
The preceding discussion suggests that contracting parties
should be motivated to capture the benefits of both formal and
informal enforcement, by relying on formal enforcement to solve
complex problems with noisy interactions and on informal mechanisms to enforce contingencies that are difficult to verify but
clear enough to be observable. A mixed strategy is feasible if formal and informal enforcement mechanisms can be complements,
but not if they are substitutes in that recourse to formal contracting “crowds out” the operation of informal contracting. Here the
existing theory and evidence offer limited guidance. Predicting
when the crowding out effect dominates requires an understanding of the mechanism through which formal enforcement
degrades the operation of informal contracting.
Consistent with our analysis that informal contracting depends
on the observability of a counterparty’s actions, we argue that
crowding out occurs when the presence of a formal contract and
the potential for high-powered legal sanctions degrade the information about the nature of the counterparties and the nature of
their interactions.24 In other words, we see crowding out when
formal contracting makes the parties’ actions and performance
less observable. This occurs because of the effects of two interrelated factors: (a) formal enforcement changes the way a party perceives the observed behavior of the counterparty and (b) formal
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enforcement reduces the number of observations of the very
behavior that signals an intention to cooperate.
First, there is evidence that the parties’ behavior will change
depending on whether they believe they are engaged in normbased or arm’s-length arrangements.25 The most familiar example is the experiment of using formal sanctions to cause parents
to be timely in picking up their children from nursery school. In
an effort to improve punctuality, a fine was imposed to encourage
compliance. But rather than increasing compliance, imposing a
fine caused late pickups to increase. The formal fine “crowded
out” the reputation-based norm by changing the parents’ perception of each others’ obligation from a commitment to the community to a price for additional day care.26

24 The distinction between high-powered legal sanctions that drive out informal enforcement and
low-powered sanctions that, we argue below, do not result in crowding out is critical to our theory of how braiding works. High-powered enforcement consists of the imposition of standard
breach of contract remedies for a failure to perform specified contractual obligations. High-powered enforcement, then, is tied to outcome variables and provides incentives that induce parties
to take specified substantive actions designed to maximize expected surplus.
25 We acknowledge that our argument could be cast entirely in terms of the conditions under
which a more forgiving form of the self-interested strategy of tit-for-tat displaces a less forgiving
one, without reference to the conditions under which intrinsic or moral motives are crowded out
by extrinsic, gain-oriented ones. For two reasons, we choose instead to combine the two forms of
argument, and, as in the preceding discussion, even to underscore their complementarity. First, we
are convinced by the experimental evidence that intrinsic motivation—particularly a propensity to
reciprocity—is a fact of (some) human behavior. To be sure, we are a long way from understanding
the operation and implications of such intrinsic motivation; but it seems odd to transcribe what
we do know of it into a rational-choice vocabulary that denies, or least questions, its existence.
Second, to acknowledge the existence of intrinsic motivation is hardly to abandon the postulate
of rational action in economic exchanges of the kind under consideration here. Rational actors are
perfectly capable of making rational—calculating—decisions about when, and in relation to
whom, to rely on intrinsic motivation. Indeed, a central claim in our braiding argument is that
under uncertainty it is rational for actors to design institutions that allow them to develop a counterparty’s propensity to reciprocity, along with her capacities. For an earlier effort to reconcile
rational-choice and intrinsic approaches to trust, see Charles Sabel, “Studied Trust: Building New
Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy,” in Explorations in Economic Sociology, ed. Richard
Swedberg (New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 1993), 104–44. For a review of the persistent tension between rational choice and intrinsic perspectives, see Christos J. Paraskevopoulos,
Social Capital,” Comparative Politics (July 2010): 475–494. We are grateful to Yochai Benkler for
reminding us of just how far we are from a full understanding of intrinsic motivation and its relation to institutional rather than individual behavior.
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Similar results are reported in more commercial settings.27
Studies indicate that when offered a contract whose performance
is based only on trust, a substantial number of individuals will
both pay higher prices and extend higher levels of effort than narrow self-interest would dictate. But when offered the same choices plus the possibility of having a third party impose a monetary
sanction if the promisor fails to perform, the average price offered
and the average effort given declines significantly. The introduction of the formal enforcement option causes shirking to increase
and trust vanishes almost completely.28 In effect, the introduction
of a formal sanction that governs all of the parties’ actions under
the contract results in a “cognitive shift that crowds out normbased social behavior and increases the likelihood of income maximizing behavior.”29
Moreover, when the introduction of formal penalties changes the
parties’ perception of their interaction, that change also may
change the signal indicating the taste or character of the party
who proposed the formal penalty. A party’s willingness to
expend resources to create a threat of significant damages for failure to perform the formal contract may indicate that the party is
less likely to be a reciprocator. Once a counterparty’s character
becomes less observable and (correctly or not) the party is identified as potentially opportunistic, only fully formal contacts will
be chosen.

26 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine is a Price,” Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 1. An extensive literature in social psychology also considers the crowding out of intrinsic motivations. See
Edward L. Deci, R. Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, “A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivations,” Psychological Bulletin 125
(1999): 627.
27 See e.g., Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey, and Steffen Huck, “More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust and Crowding,” American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 131.
28 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, “Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?”
(working paper no. 34, University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, April
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313028. A similar result is reported by Daniel Houser,
Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, “When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions,
Intentions and Non-Cooperation,” Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008): 509.
29 Houser et al., “When Punishment Fails.”
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Second, “high-powered” formal enforcement contributes to
crowding out by suppressing information that supports reciprocity. For example, one party’s request for an adjustment of contractual duties subsequently may be found to justify the other party’s
declaring an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, thereby
exposing the requesting party to substantial damages. A single
misstep can transform a surplus-generating cooperative enterprise into a zero-sum game.30 This threat, in turn, deters actions—
such as requests for mid-course adjustment of the contract—that
invite a counterparty to reciprocate proportionally and informally and that can confirm a party’s tastes or character. In short,
high-powered penalties dramatically raise the stakes associated
with observability-based informal contracting, leaving the parties
to rely on verifiable formal rules.

BRAIDING

IN THE

COURTS: PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS

Ideally, courts would respond to the need for the parties to initially address a project’s feasibility by enforcing the chosen methods
of mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements
themselves. Low-powered sanctions designed to encourage compliance with the information exchange regime (and the informal
relations it supports) would be imposed while avoiding highpowered sanctions that crowd out informality, and destroy the
braid, would be avoided. And indeed, this is what we are beginning to see: courts in leading cases are sanctioning overtly selfish
abuse of information-exchange regimes. But because the sanction
relates only to the commitment to collaborate, damages are limited in principle to the reliance costs incurred in the collaboration
30 In addition to the notion that only one party can breach and that material breach results in
compensatory damages as well as loss of accrued contract rights, rules governing insecurity and
anticipatory breach permit one party to threaten these consequences whenever the other discloses anticipated difficulties in performance. In addition, the mitigation doctrine only operates once
a party forfeits all rights by breaching. Until there is a breach, the counterparty can ignore requests
for adjustments that might reduce the consequences of nonperformance. The threat of the ultimate sanction thus deters parties from voluntarily revealing the information needed for the counterparty to adjust informally. Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, “The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,” Virginia Law Review 69 (1983): 967, 1011–1018.
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rather than lost profits from not going forward with the project.
In this way, the collaboration commitment can achieve its
intended purpose of generating information and trust precisely;
low-powered formal enforcement does not drive out informal
enforcement.31
As might be anticipated in an emergent area of law, the decisions
of courts called on to enforce braided contracts are not uniformly
consistent with the enforcement theory we have developed here.
Some decisions invite the award of damages for parties who participate faithfully in the information exchange regime but then
decide that it is not profitable for them to pursue the joint project.
Other decisions contemplate (or at least invite the possibility of)
the award of full expectation damages—that is, high-powered
enforcement—for breach of the information-exchange obligation.
In both instances, courts fail to appreciate the importance of limiting formal enforcement to low-powered sanctions focused on
willful violations of the collaboration agreement itself and thereby create the kind of incentives that undo braiding by inducing
strategic crowding out of informal enforcement.
In this section, we review judicial decisions that address the contract doctrine applicable to contracting for innovation. Although
pertinent cases have arisen in the context of contractual and
antitrust disputes over joint development of technology,32 we
extend the reach of our analysis by focusing on the area of preliminary agreements or letters of intent, as they are termed in the
context of corporate acquisitions. In these settings as well, parties
realize that the feasibility of many projects can only be established by joint investment in the production of information necessary to make that very determination, and consequently distinguish agreement on the process of disciplined coevaluation from
final agreement on the actual project.

31 See Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, Braiding.
32 See Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, Braiding.
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We see cases in these domains in which courts get it right by
applying low-powered enforcement to commitments to collaboratively determine the feasibility of a potential project, and
declining to enforce at all claims that a party wrongfully refused
to actually pursue the project. But we also see cases where the
court gets it wrong by holding out the possibility either of imposing damages on parties who participate faithfully in the information exchange regime but then decide not to pursue the joint project, or the award of full expectation damages for breach of the
information exchange obligation. The divergent approaches to
formal enforcement reveal that the courts lack a sound theoretical
construct that informs their treatment of braided contracts.
We show here that a better understanding of theory can help
courts to frame the proper contract doctrine, and thereby facilitate innovation.

Braiding in Preliminary Agreements
Assume two commercial parties agree to collaborate in investigating the prospects for what they hope to be a profitable commercial project.33 The parties agree on the nature of the initial
investment that each is to make to evaluate the project, but the
terms of the ultimate project cannot be determined without that
initial investment. Consequently, the parties agree to proceed
with their initial investments and also agree to negotiate the
remaining terms of the contract once they can observe the fruits
of their efforts. These two parties have reached what the law now
recognizes as a “preliminary agreement.” Only by each party
investing and sharing the information that their investment
reveals can they determine collaboratively whether their project
can succeed. The increased knowledge about the project revealed
by the initial investments will then permit the parties to determine whether to finalize the deal with a fully enforceable contract
and on what terms.

33 The discussion in this section draws on Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, “Precontractual
Liability and Preliminary Agreements,” Harvard Law Review 120 (2007): 661.
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The legal question is to what extent a preliminary agreement that
looks to the future exchange of private information is formally
enforceable. The question is important because the parties meet
as strangers with no necessary prospect of an ongoing relationship (and so with no basis for trust). Thus the risk of opportunism
is significant. This is particularly the case where the parties
undertake to make preliminary investments concurrently and
then to share the information that the investments yield. Suppose
one party then elects instead to wait and see what comes of her
counterparty’s investment—in effect reneging on the mutual
commitment to collaborate. Delaying a promised investment
under these conditions offers several strategic advantages. First,
the passage of time and her partner’s investment is likely to
reveal whether the project will be profitable. If so, the opportunistic party—having yet to make any investment in the project—can
exploit the counterparty in a negotiation over the terms of the
ultimate contract. Second, if the project proves unsuccessful,
delay permits the opportunistic party to avoid what otherwise
would have been sunk costs. Those savings will likely be larger
than any offsetting losses from delay if the project instead proves
profitable.
Historically, such preliminary agreements were unenforceable
under the indefiniteness doctrine of the common law of contracts.
Recently, however, courts have affected a major shift in doctrine
by relaxing the common law rule under which parties are either
fully bound or not bound at all. Instead, a new enforcement rule
is emerging to govern cases where the parties contemplate further negotiations.34 This new rule responds to the increasing
importance to successful collaborations of the search for new
partners in an uncertain environment. The new rule starts with
the presumption that preliminary agreements typically do not
create fully binding contracts.35 This presumption rests on the
traditional common law view that courts should not hold parties
to contracts unless the parties intended to make them. The shift
comes from courts now recognizing that welfare gains can result
from attaching some level of formal enforcement to agreements to
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collaborate that were intended to bind despite the need for further negotiation. The new default rule thus enforces “a mutual
commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to
reach final agreement.”36 Neither party, however, has a right to
demand performance of the contemplated transaction. If the parties cannot ultimately agree on a final contract, they may abandon
the deal. Both parties thus enter into an option on the ultimate
deal, which is exercisable after the parties learn the information
produced through the preliminary investments and whose price
is the cost of the preliminary investment.
This new rule governing preliminary agreements to collaborate—
creating a legal duty to bargain in good faith but not requiring the
parties to agree—is an appropriate first step in solving the parties’ contracting problem. As we argued above, it is helpful to
attach some formal support to agreements that depend on initial
learning to achieve innovation, particularly when the imposition
of low-powered enforcement stimulates the mechanisms that
build trust. The contemporary judicial approach to preliminary
agreements of this sort appropriately opens the door to judicial
support of mutual learning in contracts for innovation.
Nevertheless, the courts’ experience so far provides little normative guidance concerning the breadth of the enforceable obligation, or the consequences of its breach. This is an important short34 The rule originated with the opinion of Judge Pierre Leval in Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 481, 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). Judge Leval identified
two separate types of “preliminary agreements.” He labeled as “Type I” those cases where the parties have agreed on all material terms but have also agreed to memorialize their agreement in a
more formal document. Disputes arise primarily because parties have failed to express clearly
their intention as to when their arrangement would be legally enforceable. Here the question is
solely one of timing—when have the parties manifested an intention to be legally bound? In contrast, “Type II” agreements concern binding preliminary commitments, the preliminary agreements
we analyze here. In this latter case, the parties agree on certain terms but leave possibly important terms open to further negotiation. This requires courts to determine whether such an agreement had been made, what the duty to bargain in good faith entails, and which remedy should be
awarded for breach of that duty. This framework has been followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts and seven federal circuits. See Schwarz and Scott, “Precontractual
Liability,” 76–80.
35 See R.G. Group Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
36 TIAA v. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. 498.
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coming when, as we have seen, the breadth of judicial enforcement is critical to whether crowding out is the unintended consequence of formal enforcement.
Our analysis of the function of the braiding mechanism suggests
that the parties to this agreement should be legally required to
comply with their initial commitments to pursue promised preliminary investments (typically investments in information) that
are necessary to reveal whether or not the proposed project is feasible. But formal enforcement should play no role in determining
whether or not the project should go forward and on what terms.
After all, rational parties will pursue efficient projects and abandon inefficient projects. The parties already have strong incentives to negotiate faithfully over the conditions for achieving success. Rather, the challenge is to discourage parties from defecting
early in the relationship before a robust pattern of cooperation
has developed. The threat of a legal sanction, therefore, should
only be designed to give the parties sufficient opportunity to
develop patterns of cooperation supported by switching costs.
Then, how well does the new legal framework governing preliminary agreements support the braiding mechanism? In our analysis, the complementary braiding of formal and informal enforcement will be successful if and only if the following condition is
satisfied: The courts only deploy low-powered incentives; that is,
courts only sanction cheating on the parties’ mutual commitment
to iterative collaboration but do not attempt to regulate the course
or the outcome of the collaboration. Put differently, if the preliminary agreement is breached, the court should require a party to
repay the price the counterparty paid for the option—the amount
spent on the preliminary investment. It should not require even a
breaching party to exercise the option, whether by completing the
transaction or by imposing expectation damages. An examination
of litigated preliminary agreements suggests that courts are
divided in their understanding of the breadth of their role.37
We illustrate the lack of clarity in two manifestations of the
37 For an analysis of the litigated cases, see Schwartz and Scott, “Precontractual Liability,” 691–702.
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preliminary agreement issue. The first is its application in a
general commercial setting. The second is its application in a specialized form of preliminary agreement—a letter of intent in a
corporate acquisition.

The Commercial Setting
Consider first In re Matterhorn Group, Inc.38 There, Swatch wanted
to sell more watches in the United States by expanding its franchise operations. Matterhorn and Swatch agreed to collaborate on
pursuing the possibility of a long-term relationship: the parties
signed a letter of intent granting Matterhorn the exclusive franchise for thirty possible sites. Under the agreement, Matterhorn
undertook to invest in finding appropriate locations for retailing
Swatch watches from among the list of possible locations. Swatch
undertook to process diligently the applications for franchises at
potentially profitable locations as Matterhorn filed them, and
then to seek financing and approval of franchises at chosen locations from its parent firm. Thus, in our framework, the parties
agreed to collaborate by making concurrent investments in pursuit of an entrepreneurial innovation: Swatch would incur opportunity costs (by granting exclusive rights to Matterhorn) and
invest the human capital needed to evaluate Matterhorn’s applications and to become familiar with the American business climate; Matterhorn would invest the search and information costs
necessary to identifying profitable locations. The project contemplated an iterative exchange of information focused on finding
profitable retail sites for selling Swatch watches in shopping
malls, but precisely which locations, if any, would be mutually
profitable could not be determined without the initial investments by both parties.
In this case, the parties had no prior history, they did not share
membership in a homogeneous community, and they could not
depend on the discipline of repeated exchange to constrain
opportunism. As a consequence, informal sanctions were weak at
38 2002 WL 31528396 (Bk. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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the outset of the relationship and the parties were each at risk of
exploitation. And, indeed, Swatch engaged in just the strategic
behavior that our framework predicts: it delayed processing several applications and failed to secure the necessary approvals.39
The court found Swatch to be in breach of a preliminary agreement to bargain in good faith and awarded Matterhorn reliance
damages based on its investment expenditures in investigating
the locations in question. Importantly, however, the court denied
Matterhorn’s claim for expectation damages based on lost profits,
holding that “there is no guarantee that it would have opened a
store in [that location].”40 Thus the court compensated
Matterhorn for the price it paid for the option, but did not protect
it from Swatch’s decision not to exercise it.
The result in Matterhorn is consistent with the hypothesis that narrowly defined duties of good faith will complement a regime that
depends primarily on informal enforcement. A properly configured braiding mechanism, such as the one that appears to have
been adopted by the court in Matterhorn, likely will not crowd out
the informal mechanisms that build trust but rather will offer a
low-powered complement during the early stages of collaboration, thereby giving reciprocity and trust the opportunity to
evolve.

Preliminary Agreements in Corporate Acquisitions: Letters of
Intent and the Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
The pattern of preliminary agreements that contemplate concurrent preliminary investments can also be seen in the context of
39 The court held: The rejection of the Vail application violated the Letter of Intent. The Letter of
Intent granted Matterhorn the exclusive right to negotiate a lease in Vail despite Vail’s geographical distance from Matterhorn’s base of operation in the Northeast. Furthermore, it required Swatch
to review the Vail application in good faith, and in a manner consistent with the criteria discussed
above.... [Swatch] unilaterally rescinded the exclusivity that the Letter of Intent had granted, and
Swatch’s [decision] to reject the Vail application was improper. In addition, Matterhorn sent the
Vail letter of intent in late April 1996.... Swatch took four months to complete its processing of the
application.... Accordingly, Swatch breached the Letter of Intent by rejecting the Vail application
for improper reasons. Ibid., 16–17.
40 Ibid.
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corporate acquisitions. We turn now to several cases that illustrate this pattern. They also illustrate the adverse consequences
when courts fail to understand the interaction of formal and
informal enforcement.

Tan v. Allwaste, Inc.
Tan v. Allwaste, Inc., involved a claim by shareholders of Geotrack
that Allwaste had breached an obligation to negotiate in good
faith Geotrak’s acquisition. Discussions between Allwaste and
Geotrack had led to the parties executing a letter of intent that
stated Allwaste’s intention to make the acquisition subject to satisfactory due diligence. The letter of intent also stated that it
“does not constitute a binding agreement among the parties” and
further stated that, according to the court, “the parties do not
have a deal until a formal agreement was executed.” However,
the letter did contain some binding obligations. It bound the parties to pursue a deal in good faith and contained a “no-shop”
clause by which Geotrack promised not to shop Allwaste’s stock
offer to other potential buyers. During the due diligence investigation, Allwaste discovered that Geotrack had not remitted payroll and withholding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service for
some time. Allwaste withdrew from further negotiations and was
unwilling to buy Geotrack even after it offered to lower the price.
This preliminary acquisition agreement can be fairly characterized as an innovative effort to secure the synergies that might
arise from combining the Allwaste and Geotrack businesses,
whose assessment and ultimate success depends on both parties
making preliminary investments in the proposed project concurrently. Here the buyer invests in information (due diligence) to
determine the actual condition of Geotrack’s business and to
develop the information necessary to assess the potential for synergy and the difficulty in actually achieving it. In turn, this investment is protected by a no-shop clause: the seller cannot use the
fact of Allwaste’s interest to induce other buyers to enter a competing bid and thereby devalue Allwaste’s investment in information. Thus Geotrack makes an opportunity cost investment
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and incurs the potential costs of running the business without
change and subject to its competitors’ actions while Allwaste
undertakes its investigation.41 Concurrent investment and the
passage of time together will show whether a profitable project
exists, at which time the parties would be free to write a contract
to complete the acquisition if the underlying innovation was
feasible.
In this case, the court correctly held that the letter agreement was
a preliminary agreement obligating Allwaste to negotiate further
in good faith with Geotrack: in our terms, this was a low-powered
formal obligation that supported the concurrent investment that
was necessary to get the parties to the point where they could
assess whether synergy gains could be captured and then decide
whether to complete a transaction. However, the court went a
step further by also concluding that there was sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude that although the target had
failed to disclose that it had not paid its payroll and withholding
taxes for some time, Allwaste had declined to go forward with the
deal for reasons that were unrelated to Geotrack’s actions, omissions, or financial status.42 On this basis, the court concluded that
the case would go to a jury to determine whether Allwaste had
breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith because it may
have declined to go forward with the transactions for reasons
unrelated to the target’s misbehavior.43

41 Sellers in these acquisition agreements may also invest in the synergies that result from integration. See Gilson and Schwartz, “Understanding MACs,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
33 (2005): 330.
42 In particular, plaintiffs noted the acquisition of Geotrack was to be debt free, so Geotrack’s tax
liability should not have affected Allwaste’s analysis of the deal. Plaintiffs also provided evidence
that Allwaste simply decided not to conduct any more acquisitions. 1997 WL 337207 at 4. However,
Allwaste might well have concluded that a counterparty that lied about its liabilities may have
been lying about other matters, such as the condition of its assets or the nondebt aspects of its
financial condition that a debt-free acquisition would not protect against.
43 The court appears to have concluded that if Allwaste declined to go forward with the acquisition because it “simply decided not to conduct any more acquisitions” (ibid. at 4), a jury could conclude that it breached its preliminary agreement. In other words, the court construed the obligation as prohibiting a change in one party’s strategy.

249

RULES FOR GROWTH
Under these circumstances, exposing Allwaste to the threat of a
jury finding a bad faith failure to negotiate transforms the preliminary agreement from a low-powered formal enforcement tool
that supports the diligence process necessary to assessing the
potential for innovation, to a high-powered sanction that exposes
Allwaste to large damages from not making the acquisition.44
There was no allegation that Allwaste had not made its preliminary investment in assessing the potential of the acquisition; it
had paid the price for its option. Rather, Geotrack alleged that
Allwaste had merely concluded that the acquisition was no
longer advantageous, which the court concluded would be a
breach. So expansive an interpretation of the good faith obligation and the expansion of the role of formal enforcement goes
much further than the low-powered enforcement associated with
a braiding strategy, which contemplates only that each party is
held to making the preliminary investments necessary to assess
the acquisition, but neither is obligated to close the transaction.
More concretely, a braiding strategy does not envision that a letter of intent shifts the risk of changes in general economic conditions or the potential buyer’s circumstances or strategy to the
buyer. Such an expansion of formal enforcement is precisely the
shift in the relative importance of formal and informal enforcement that is associated with crowding out the development of
informal patterns of cooperation necessary to exploit the potential for innovation in the first place. The court in Tan v. Allwaste
unwisely departed from the kind of low-powered enforcement
necessary to support effective braiding, and thereby restricted the
range of contractual techniques available to parties seeking to
innovate.

VS & A Communications and Venture Associates
The potentially dysfunctional reasoning and result in Tan v.
Allwaste is not simply an example of a single judge getting it
wrong. The absence of a theoretically sound principle to guide
44 The court did not limit potential damages to Geotrack’s reliance costs, thus leaving open the
possibility that Allwaste could be held to benefit of the bargain damages.
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judicial enforcement of a letter of intent can be seen by comparing the efforts of two distinguished jurists confronting this problem—then-Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen, and then-Chief
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Both reach the right result in the end, but
Chancellor Allen inflicted on the defendant a costly trial that he
later acknowledged was unnecessary,45 and Judge Posner, albeit
in dicta, held out the possibility that the damages for breach of an
obligation to negotiate in good faith contained in a letter of intent
might extend to expectation damages.46
In VS & A Communications, Chancellor Allen considered the claim
that an obligation to negotiate in good faith, contained in a letter
of intent concerning an acquisition, in effect required the seller to
close the transaction on terms that the buyer alleges the seller
could not in good faith have rejected.47 While the facts that give
the buyer’s position at least surface plausibility are complicated,
Chancellor Allen’s framing of the issue is not:
In my opinion [the letter of intent] does create an
implied obligation to keep the Stations off the market
and not to offer to sell or negotiate with others concerning the sale. In addition, [the buyer] was obligated to
continue to assist the negotiation process in specific
ways: to afford information, for example. These obligations are real and they would have value to one negotiating to buy the Stations. But the obligation … does not
go so far as to constitute a concession from the seller of
its right as a property owner to change its mind … prior
to the time it agrees to bind itself legally to a sale. . . .
Markets change. Negotiating a complex transaction is
always subject to the risk that a material change in a relevant market will suddenly make a proposed deal
45 VS&A Communications Partners, L.P. v. Palmer Broadcasting Limited Partnership, 1992 WL 339377
(Del.Ch. 1992).
46 Venture Associates Corporation v. Zenith Data Systems Corporation, 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
47 The case is unusual in that typically it is the buyer who elects not to go forward.

251

RULES FOR GROWTH
uneconomic from one side of the transaction or the
other. That risk inevitably exists until a party is legally
bound.48
Thus Chancellor Allen reaches a conclusion that is consistent with
low-powered formal enforcement of a braiding strategy and the
avoidance of a crowding out. However, it is important to keep in
mind that Chancellor Allen was writing a post-trial opinion. As
he said, “It may be that, taking the view of this case that I now do,
it would have been permissible to grant summary judgment of
dismissal to defendants. That course would have saved the substantial effort and expense entailed in the trial that has now been
completed.”49
The risk of trial, especially trial to a jury as opposed to the bench
trial found in the Delaware Chancery Court, becomes especially
significant if the potential damage remedy extends not just to
reliance damages (the amount of one party’s preliminary investment), but also to benefit of the bargain damages (the profits the
party would have earned had the acquisition actually been completed). And here is where Judge Posner’s opinion in Venture
Associates Corporation50 becomes relevant.
Judge Posner correctly concludes, as did Chancellor Allen, that an
obligation to negotiate in good faith contained in a letter of intent
does not constrain a party from changing its view of the desirability of an acquisition in light of a change in conditions:
Since [the seller] had not agreed on the sale price, it
remained free to demand a higher price in order to
reflect the market value of the company at the time of
the actual sale. … [The seller] was free to demand as
high a price as it thought the market would bear, provided that it was not trying to scuttle the deal … If the
48 1992 WL 339377 at 8.
49 Ibid. at 2.
50 Venture Associates Corporation, 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
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market value … rose … say to $25 million, [the seller]
would not be acting in bad faith to demand that amount
from [the buyer] even if it knew that [the buyer] would
not go that high. [The seller] would be acting in bad
faith only if its purpose in charging more than [the
buyer] would pay was to induce [the buyer] to back out
of the deal.51
Consistent with proper judicial enforcement of a braiding strategy, a party is not committed to exercising the option to close the
transaction.
However, the risk of trial becomes a serious threat to crowd out
informal contracting, even if the charge to the jury is correct, if the
potential damages are calculated in terms of a breach of an obligation to pursue the ultimate deal. And here Judge Posner
expresses the view that the threat is real: “[D]amages for breach
of an agreement to negotiate may be, although they are unlikely
to be, the same as the damages for breach of the final contract that
the parties would have signed had it not been for the defendant’s
bad faith.”52 The difficulty with Judge Posner’s invitation to
courts to award expectation damages is that it blurs the separation between the formal portion of the braided contract and the
informal portion, thereby increasing the risk of crowding out.
The conclusion in Tan v. Allwaste that a party who has made the
contemplated preliminary investment cannot simply decline to
close the transaction, together with Chancellor Allen’s subjecting
such a party to trial and Judge Posner’s holding out the possibility that the party might be subject to expectation damages
premised on a breach of the final contract, illustrates the importance of a theory to explain the underlying commercial behavior
and prescribe the appropriate facilitative role for courts. No
51 Venture Associates Corporation, 96 F. 3d at 279–80. Judge Posner does not address the broader
point made by Chancellor Allen that the changed conditions that have affected the price would
allow the seller in good faith simply to decline to complete the transaction.
52 Ibid. at 278.
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matter how sharp the intuitions of experienced judges, courts
unguided by a theoretical framework are prone to err. Thus in
both cases, the court failed to embrace fully the notion that an
enforceable preliminary agreement only requires a party to pay
the option price by undertaking a promised investment in acquiring and sharing information. Framing the obligation in this way
should permit a party to properly obtain a summary judgment
even though it walks away from the transaction for reasons wholly unrelated to the actions of the counterparty. And even if the
promised investment is not made, the defendant’s liability is
properly limited to the investment cost and not to the expectancy
that might result from a concluded deal.

HOW COURTS CAN KNOW BRAIDING WHEN
THEY SEE IT
An important theme emerges from the preceding discussion of
some of the evolving case law governing braided contracts. It is
clear that the duty to negotiate in good faith in preliminary agreements and letters of intent provides a useful doctrinal placeholder permitting courts to imply a governance structure to support
agreements that rely principally on iterative investments in information. However, the new obligation to negotiate in good faith is
unmoored because the cases do not indicate what the parties are
supposed to bargain over, or when the refusal to agree constitutes
bad faith, or just what should be the remedy for bad faith. Under
contemporary legal doctrine, for example, the question of when
preliminary agreements should be enforced requires a multifactor
analysis that invokes the language of the agreement, the existence
and number of open terms, the extent of any reliance investments, and the customary practice regarding formalities. The
court, in addition, is required to consider the context of the negotiations resulting in the preliminary agreement.53 Such a laundry
list of relevant factors leaves the decision process largely obscure.
That is particularly the case when, as is typical, courts fail to
53 See TIAA, 670 F. Supp. at 500–02.
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attach weights to the factors or specify the relationship among
them.54 In the absence of a theory, the courts are left to interpret
criteria for imposing liability that are unconnected to the operative facts that might justify formal enforcement.
Our theory of how courts can best support the braiding of formal
and informal contracting provides a coherent way to think about
the domain and limits of the obligation to negotiate in good faith:
courts best respond to the proliferation of preliminary agreements induced by innovation under uncertainty by imposing
low-powered sanctions designed to encourage compliance with
the information-exchange regime while avoiding high-powered
sanctions that crowd out informal enforcement and destroy the
braid. In short, the duty to negotiate in good faith means that parties should be held to their commitment to make initial investments in collaboration and nothing else.55 Thereafter, each party
faces a choice whether or not to proceed to a fully enforceable,
formal obligation. The key to understanding the nature of lowpowered sanctions, therefore, is to recognize that an obligation to
collaborate is not an obligation to bargain. Whenever a court
holds, to the contrary, that the dissenting party has an obligation
to bargain in good faith, it follows that there must be a state of the
world in which failing to reach agreement is a breach. It is precisely that trap that led the court in Tan v. Allwaste and Judge Posner
in Venture Associates to err.

54 Schwartz and Scott, “Precontractual Liability,” 675–6.
55 Our principal concern has been the question of what it means to formally enforce these preliminary obligations. But, as noted above, the criteria for determining when parties have reached
such an agreement are also needlessly vague. See ibid. Since parties are always free to indicate
their desire to be completely free from formal enforcement, courts should hold all commercial
parties to an obligation to invest as promised whenever they agree to invest collaboratively in a
letter of intent or other similar form of transaction.
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Torts, Innovation, and Growth

Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein∗

O

ur torts system aims at minimizing the total cost of accidents and accident avoidance.1 To this end, it sets up rules
that try to reduce the sum of the following social costs:

1) Primary costs that aggregate the cost of accidents and accident-avoidance expenses;2
2) Secondary costs that represent the distributional effects of the
primary-cost bearing upon those who bear those costs under
applicable legal rules;3 and

∗ Gideon Parchomovsky is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
specializes in intellectual property, property law, and cyber law. Alex Stein is a Professor of Law at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Formerly a Professor of Law at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Professor Stein has been widely published in the United States
and abroad on evidence, torts, procedure, and criminal law. His writings combine law with moral
philosophy and economic theories.
1 See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1970), 225-26, 250-59.
2 Ibid., 26-27.
3 Ibid., 27-28.
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3) Tertiary costs that encompass the costs of adjudicating disputes over the allocation of primary and secondary costs.4
The conventional economic understanding of the torts system
focuses on how to minimize the erosion of society’s welfare that
results from accidents and from the application of the rules allocating the primary, secondary, and tertiary costs. This welfare erosion aggregates the harm from the accidents that could not be
prevented, the resources expended on accident prevention, the
detraction from the wealth of the individuals forced to pay for the
damages they caused, the suffering of the accident victims who
still remain uncompensated, and the expenditures on adjudication and other law-enforcement mechanisms.
This understanding of the torts system pays no attention to the
system’s collateral benefits and costs. As Jennifer Arlen has
recently demonstrated, our torts system does not merely reduce
negative externalities.5 Rather, it forces out standardization of
care as well as production of collective goods, network externalities, and economies of scale in the form of improved precautions
against harm.6 As for the system’s collateral costs, we have
recently shown that the existing tort liability rules are unintentionally, but systematically, biased against innovation.7 This bias
is an unintended consequence of the custom criterion by which
courts adjudicate medical malpractice, defective-product allegations, and negligence claims in general. This criterion animates
the evidentiary requirements that courts use in determining negligence and product defects, and it also sets the substantive
benchmark for determining doctors’ malpractice.8 As we show
below, the custom criterion taxes innovators and subsidizes repli4 Ibid., 28.
5 See Jennifer Arlen, “Contracting Over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice,”
University of Pennsylvania. Law Review 159 (2011): 957.
6 Ibid.
7 Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, “Torts and Innovation,” Michigan Law Review 107 (2008):
285.
8 See Part I.
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cators of conventional technologies; and by doing so, it chills
innovation and distorts its path. This distortion, again, is unintended, but its economic consequence—the chilling effect on
innovation—is significant. Lawmakers therefore should fix this
problem, and in what follows, we make a number of proposals on
how to do so.
The chilling effect on innovation is engendered not only by the
custom rules as such, but rather by all governmentally determined liability criteria that apply in the area of torts. By allowing
courts and administrative agencies (such as the Food and Drug
Administration) to set up safety standards for torts, the legal system makes liability depend on whether the technologies that
cause damage (both by themselves and in combination with other
factors) align with the conventional knowledge that state agents
have approved. Alignment with this knowledge insulates individuals and firms from liability in torts, regardless of damages
they cause. On the other hand, failure to align with the prevalent
conventions and customs makes the firm and the individual
liable for damages resulting from that failure.
These rules deviate from the straightforward “result criterion”
that rejects custom-driven proxies and calls for a direct assessment of the technologies’ risks and benefits. Under this criterion,
the technology’s compliance or failure to comply with custom
should play no role in determining its users’ liability for tort damages. That is, defendants who comply with custom should receive
no preferential treatment from the torts system. Each defendant’s
liability should be determined by the extent of the damage it actually caused, not by his compliance with custom or a governmentally imposed safety standard.
The torts system’s deviation from the result criterion can hardly
be justified by the saving of adjudicative expenses that the custom rules (and other decision-making proxies) bring about. Tort
adjudication can be cost-effective without imposing a socially
unnecessary tax upon innovators and without giving an anomalous subsidy to the replicators of conventional technologies.
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To achieve this socially beneficial effect, the torts system can do a
number of things. First, it can abolish the custom benchmark.
This abolition will do away with the decisional shortcut that
courts and agencies presently use. Courts and agencies will consequently have to carry out a risk-benefit analysis on a case-bycase (or category-by-category) basis, which will increase the overall cost of their decision-making processes. We believe that this
increase will be offset by the value of innovations that the proposed reform will unlock,9 but not everyone will share this
belief.10 We therefore have made another proposal: a proposal to
set up special tribunals (with rotating experts) that will speed up
the process of evaluating the safety of innovative technologies.11
Under this system, a new technology that received the seal of
approval from the relevant tribunal will be deemed to be as safe
as a parallel customary technology. The special tribunals will
accelerate the recognition of new technologies as satisfying (or
not satisfying) the requisite criterion for tort liability. This proposal is not immune from skeptical challenge either. Arguably,
streamlining the recognition of a new technology’s safety is not
necessarily a good thing because experience—the ultimate judge
of whether the technology is safe enough—can only be acquired
over time. The law’s recognition of a technology’s safety—so goes
the argument—should therefore be synchronized with the formation of custom that was purposefully designed to be slow rather
than fast.
We believe that this challenge isn’t serious: if the tribunal adjudicating an innovation’s safety does not have enough information
for making a dependable decision, it will—presumably—say so.
Some innovations’ safety can be tested fairly fast. Their recognition as safe consequently should not depend on whether they
became customary. More fundamentally, custom formation is not
9 Ibid.
10 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, “Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence,” Columbia Law
Review 109 (2009): 1784, 1813-15.
11 Parchomovsky and Stein, “Torts and Innovation.”
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a purely epistemic process—one that involves knowledge-based
persuasion, deliberation, and decision. Customs are also consequences of the incumbent power, and incumbents on the technologies’ (and other) markets have a strong incentive to block
newcomers instead of competing with them on equal terms.
Contrary to what the law presently does, the incumbents’ standards therefore should not be used as benchmarks for imposing
liability in torts.
This paper explores yet another innovation-promoting reform:
requiring tort plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the innovative technology allegedly responsible for
the damage in question is inferior to the customary technology as
far as safety is concerned; and, moreover, that the defendant’s
adoption of the customary technology would have averted the
damage. This change in the law of evidence would create the
desired equalization between conventional and customary technologies. Correspondingly, it would level the tort-liability playground for innovators and replicators.
We unfold this proposal in three parts. Part I will specify the antiinnovation effects of the custom rules. Part II will state the disadvantages of the widespread recourse to agencies’ determinations
of safety as a benchmark for identifying “negligence” and product “defects.” Part III will set forth our evidentiary proposal. A
short conclusion follows.

PART 1. THE CUSTOM RULES
Three main doctrines that make up tort law—general negligence,
product liability, and medical malpractice—are founded upon
custom.12
Begin with negligence. In assessing a defendant’s conduct, courts
generally presume that a defendant who failed to comply
with safety-related customs prevalent in her industry acted
12 This part is based on Parchomovsky and Stein, “Torts and Innovation.”

261

RULES FOR GROWTH
negligently. The defendant consequently needs to rebut this presumption, which may in many cases be very difficult to do.
Likewise, in product liability, courts turn to custom in determining whether the defendant’s product design was defective.
Deviation from industry customs, therefore, runs a greater risk of
a ruling that the product is unsafe. Finally, in the area of medical
malpractice, courts hold doctors to the “customary care” standard. Failure on the part of a physician to comply with this standard exposes her to a high prospect of liability. Custom thus constitutes the benchmark against which defendants’ conduct is
evaluated.
In the product liability area, custom plays a crucial role as well.13
Under the prevalent regime, a manufacturer’s conformity with
the relevant industrial custom is admissible as evidence, tending
to prove that its product was safe and not defectively designed.14
Conversely, a manufacturer’s failure to conform to custom is evidence of—once again, inconclusively—the presence of a defect in
its product.15 These factors go into determination of design
defects under both “risk-utility”16 and “consumer expectation”17
criteria. Under those criteria, a product classifies as defective
when it falls far below a reasonable consumer’s expectation or
creates a risk of harm that exceeds its benefits.
The effect of those custom rules is substantial. A product that conforms to the customary design will normally classify as more beneficial than risky and as satisfying a reasonable consumer’s
expectation. The product consequently will be held safe and nondefective, despite the damage that consumers may have suffered
from using it. Conversely, a product that fails to align with the
13 See David G. Owen, “Proof of Product Defect,” Kentucky Law Journal 93 (2004-5): 1, 5-10 (documenting massive use of industry customs as a benchmark for determining design defects in product liability actions).
14 Ibid., 8.
15 Ibid., 7.
16 See David G. Owen, Products Liability Law (Eagan, MN: West Publishing, 1995), § 5.7, at 303-4.
17 Ibid. § 5.6, 295.
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customary design will almost certainly fail both “risk-utility” and
“consumer expectation” tests.18 This failure will identify the
product as unsafe and defective.19
The law of medical malpractice provides that a doctor must treat
her patients with customary medical care.20 This rule differs from
the general negligence and product-liability rules in one important respect. Under the medical malpractice rule, a doctor’s compliance with the relevant custom, practice or “school of thought”
does not merely evidence the delivery of adequate care. Such
compliance is adequate care as a matter of substantive law.21 By
proving her compliance with the relevant customary norm, the
doctor therefore does more than simply increase her chances of
winning the case; she guarantees herself this result.22
The law of torts relies on customs not only directly, by associating
custom with precautions against harm that a reasonable person
ought to take, but also indirectly, through evidentiary rules and
presumptions that bolster the centrality of custom to adjudicative
determinations of fault.23 Chief among those is the res ipsa loquitur
presumption that creates a strong evidential association between
safety and conventional precautions against harm. Under this
presumption, an unusual occurrence featuring an infliction of
harm by an instrumentality over which the defendant exercised
exclusive control prompts an inference that the defendant was
18 Ibid. §§ 5.6, 5.7, 295, 306-7.
19 Ibid.
20 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (Stamford, CT: Gale Cengage, 2000), § 242, 633.
21 Ibid.; Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992) (articulating the “school of thought” rule as a
complete defense against medical malpractice allegations). Courts, however, sometimes scrutinize
doctors’ customs that determine the level of risk of injury or death to which a doctor may and
may not expose her patient: see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
22 See Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 242, at 633.
23 Courts’ decisions about negligence routinely rely on proxies and evidentiary devices that
include custom, the res ipsa rule and accepted expert opinion. See, e.g., Twyman v. Twyman, 855
S.W.2d 619, 633 (Texas 1993) (observing that “The issue of negligence is seldom decided without
guidance from some external source: custom, relevant statutes and regulations, evidentiary doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur, or expert testimony on alternatives.”).
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negligent.24 Taking conventional precautions against harm
removes the occurrence from the “unusual” category.25 Failure to
take conventional precautions, in contrast, indicates negligence
on the part of the defendant not only when she takes no precautions whatsoever, but also when she elects to employ a novel—
i.e., “unusual”—technology.26 When res ipsa applies, the case
goes to trial automatically and the plaintiff is entitled to a jury
decision as to whether the defendant acted negligently even
when she cannot point to any specific negligent act. The ensuing
prospect of losing the case puts the defendant under a serious
pressure to settle.
Another rule inimical to innovation is the Frye doctrine27 that
controls the admissibility of expert evidence in many state jurisdictions.28 Under Frye, expert testimony that falls outside of scientific or technological consensus is inadmissible as evidence and
cannot be presented to fact finders. This evidential incapacitation
works against innovators and in favor of users and producers of
conventional technologies. The Daubert doctrine29—an alternative to Frye, used by federal and a number of state courts—has a
similar effect. Daubert’s multifactor screening of expert testimony30 includes four criteria that might keep the company’s expert
away from court. One of those criteria is the expert’s alignment
with the conventional technological wisdom.31 This criterion is
24 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 5th edition (Eagan, MN: West Publishing,
1984), § 39, 244-48 (explaining that the res ipsa rule applies predominantly to unusual events).
25 See, e.g., Aderhold v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 811, 812-14 (Ga. App. 2007) (denying
res ipsa to a shopper struck by a box that fell from a shelf at Lowe’s among other things because
“the manner in which the boxes were stacked…did not appear to be unusual or dangerous”).
26 See, e.g., Hailey v. Otis Elevator Co., 636 A.2d 426, 428 (D.C. 1994) (“Given the power of res ipsa
loquitur to satisfy without further proof the element of negligence and the consequent caution
with which it should be applied, we think that where the plaintiff relies upon “common knowledge” to invoke the doctrine, the fact that such events do not “ordinarily” occur “without negligence” must be based upon a widespread consensus of a common understanding.” (emphasis
added)).
27 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923) (conditioning the admissibility of expert
evidence upon “standing and scientific recognition” of its underlying methodology).
28 See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, “The Daubert Trilogy in the States,” Jurimetrics
Journal 44 (2004): 351 (most states follow Frye in one form or another).
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discretionary, rather than mandatory (as it was under Frye), but
failure to satisfy it increases the testimony’s chances of being
excluded. Another criterion is a peer-reviewed publication of the
expert’s methodology.32 This criterion is particularly hostile to
technological innovations that are kept secret—away from imitators’ eyes—for business reasons. Apart from that, peer review is
often a wall erected by old-timers, and innovators will find this
wall difficult to penetrate.33 A similar timing problem arises in
connection with two additional criteria set by Daubert: replicability of the new methodology34 and ascertainment of its error
rate.35 For these criteria to be met, the new technology usually
needs to undergo a long series of tests that will determine its
dependability.
All these rules subsidize producers and users of conventional
technologies while taxing innovators. This effect may well be
unintended, but it is both prevalent and detrimental to society in
that it slows down innovation and growth.

29 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Daubert substituted the Frye
standard by a multifactor balancing test requires the trial judge to make sure that the methodology underlying the expert’s testimony is falsifiable by experiments that other experts can run; to
consider whether this methodology underwent peer review and was published in the academic or
professional literature after undergoing examination for possible flaws; to take into account the
error rate, actual or potential, that accompanies the expert’s testimony and methodology; to see
whether this methodology attains acceptance in the relevant scientific or professional community; to examine the expert’s inferences from methodology to conclusions for the presence of analytical gaps; and finally, to look into the testimony’s capacity to mislead or prejudice the jury. For
informative discussion of this test, see Kenneth S. Broun, ed., McCormick on Evidence 6th edition
1 (Eagan, MN: West Publishing, 2006), § 203, at 831-33..
30 Daubert, 509 U.S., 591-95.
31 Ibid., 594.
32 Ibid., 593-94.
33 See David F. Horrobin, “The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of
Innovation,” JAMA 263 (1990): 1438 (arguing that peer review generally favors conventional wisdom
and tends to suppress innovation).
34 Daubert, 509 U.S., 592-93.
35 Ibid. at 594.
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Innovation entails three distinct activities: coming up with a
viable idea for a new invention, research and development
(R&D), and commercialization or marketing the invention to the
public. Naturally, innovators critically depend on the reaction of
the market to their innovation; the market success of new technologies determines the innovators’ reward. Failure in the marketplace implies that investments in R&D (and the innovator’s
opportunity costs) will not be recuperated. As we will show, however, the market’s reaction to innovations is a function not only of
the innovations’ quality but also of the innovator’s expected liability in torts. When an innovator cannot reduce this liability by
improving the quality of her innovation, the effect of the law of
torts on the incentive to innovate is perverse. This effect, of
course, does not stop all innovators dead in their tracks. Many
remarkable innovations are produced under the current regime.
Yet, the heightened risk of liability puts a drag on innovation and
diverts its path.
In addition to exerting this chilling effect on innovation, the custom rules skew the direction of technological progress. The
heightened risk of tort liability induces innovators to limit their
R&D endeavors to the conventional technological frameworks.
Instead of focusing upon genuine technological breakthroughs,
innovators will strive to produce incremental improvements of
customary and conventional technologies. The custom rules
effectively tell firms: “If you want to minimize your prospect of
paying for damages that your activities may cause, go conventional, align yourself with the custom, and never stand out.”

PART II. BUREAUCRATIZATION

OF

SAFETY STANDARDS

Federal agencies—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and others—
issue rules and regulations with regard to the safety of food,
drugs, medical devices, motor vehicles, and other consumer
products.36 These rules and regulations are subsequently used as
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shields and swords in tort litigation. Violation of those rules and
regulations constitutes negligence in virtually every single case.37
A consumer product that fails to comply with those rules and regulations is considered defective.38 By the same token, compliance
with those rules is generally identified with adequate care.39
Moreover, those rules and regulations often establish a preemption system that prevents the imposition of tort liability upon
firms under applicable state law.40 In some cases, tort actions are
blocked completely.41 In other cases, tort actions can be filed, but
state courts cannot make decisions that conflict with the federal
safety standard.42
The rule that imposes tort liability for failure to comply with a
federal safety standard makes perfect sense. A firm violates a
safety standard that a federal agency had devised to fend off the
risk of damage. The firm’s action causes damage that the federal
standard aimed to prevent. If compliance with the standard was
cheaper than the expected damage, the firm acted suboptimally
and should pay for the damage it caused. This payment obligation will induce firms to prefer cheaper precautions to a costly
damage. Absent such obligation, firms will externalize risks of
damage even when they avoid this externalization at a relatively
low cost. On the other hand, if compliance with the federal standard costs more than the expected damage, then the firm should
go ahead and externalize the risk. Under this scenario, the firm
will be paying for the damages it will cause but it will be making
36 See Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine M. Sharkey, “Backdoor Federalization,” UCLA Law Review
53 (2006): 1353; Catherine M. Sharkey, “Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,”
George Washington Law Review 76 (2008): 449; Catherine M. Sharkey, “Federalism Accountability:
‘Agency-Forcing’ Measures,” Duke Law Journal 58 (2009): 2125.
37 See Issacharoff and Sharkey, ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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a greater saving on precautions. Because firms are always best
positioned to determine the economically best course of action
with regard to their products, federal regulation in this area reinforces Calabresi’s “cheapest cost avoider” criterion for liability in
torts, while taking advantage of standardization and other
economies of scale. From an efficiency perspective, therefore, a
federal agency only needs to set up precautions that generally
cost less than the expected damage.
The compliance rule, on the other hand, makes no economic
sense. To induce firms to comply with federal safety standards,
the lawmaker only needs to impose tort liability upon those who
fail to comply. Since the “stick” achieves the desired result, why
give firms a “carrot” as well? This “carrot” produces a serious
anomaly. Under the compliance rule, a firm complying with the
requisite safety standard can cause as much damage to consumers as it pleases and go scot-free. This rule creates an incentive for firms not to innovate in the products’ safety area. Instead
of trying to improve the safety of its products, a firm will virtually always be better off complying with the federal checklist.
For both good and bad reasons, this checklist will often mirror the
prevalent custom. As a practical matter, an agency would normally find it hard to require firms to adopt nonstandard technology.
Any such requirement would be risky to make and costly to
enforce. The requirement would also face resistance from firms
that use conventional technology and are not interested in investing in innovation. Basing the requisite safety requirements on
existing customs thus saves the agency’s time and effort.
Moreover, old-timer firms that dominate the market would exert
pressures to convince the agency to stick to the old standards that
those firms follow. Some of those pressures (such as lobbying)
would be legitimate. Others (e.g., bribes) would not. In either scenario, the agency’s adoption of the prevalent customs will be perceived as a totally appropriate form of regulatory conservativism.
The agency—or, more accurately, those who run it—thus have
every reason to align regulation with the prevalent customs and
protocols.
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This regulatory strategy would subsidize replicators of conventional technologies, who would receive complete immunity
against liability for damages they cause. This immunity would
perversely discourage innovation in the product safety area.
Instead of trying to improve their products’ safety, firms would
prefer to stay in the safe harbor of the agency-approved customary safety measures. This preference would likely be the prevalent mode across many firms. As such, it would further entrench
the custom-based compliance rule.
To illustrate the perverse effect of this rule, consider the following
scenario.43 Innovator N develops a new technology for maintaining electric hoists. The new technology is as safe as, but more
cost-effective than, the dominant technology on the market.
Absent liability for accidents, N can provide the new maintenance service at $80 per hoist.
N is not the only provider on the market for hoist-maintenance
services, however. Its competitor is O, who provides a similar
service using the old and conventional technology. Absent liability for accidents, O can provide the maintenance service at a price
of $100 per hoist.
Under a no-liability assumption, over time N will drive O out of
the market and the new technology will replace the old. This, of
course, is the socially efficient outcome.
The compliance rule, however, changes the analysis dramatically.
Assume that the agency regulating construction equipment safety issued a custom-based safety standard similar to the one used
by O. This regulation might forestall N’s innovation completely,
as the agency may decide to enjoin N from providing services not
aligning with the customary protocol. At the very least, the custom-based regulation will make N responsible for any damage
caused by its new technology, should N go ahead and use it. O, in
contrast, will be completely exempted from liability in torts under
the compliance rule. The old and the new technology are equally
43 This example is adapted from Parchomovsky and Stein, “Torts and Innovation.”
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prone to accidents. But the compliance rule subsidizes O and
taxes N, who may consequently decide to abandon its new development. This consequence is plainly anomalous.

PART III. USING EVIDENCE LAW TO LEVEL THE TORT
LIABILITY PLAYGROUND FOR INNOVATORS AND
REPLICATORS
The lawmaker can use evidence law to equalize the conditions
under which innovators compete with replicators of conventional technologies in the domain of torts. To achieve this effect, the
lawmaker can require tort plaintiffs to prove that innovative technologies are inferior to customary ones in terms of their safety.
Specifically, in order to succeed in a suit for negligence, a defective product, or medical malpractice, a plaintiff will need to establish two additional elements. First, any such plaintiff would have
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that if a conventional technology or a customary procedure were implemented by
the defendant, her injury would have been avoided. Second, the
plaintiff would also have to establish that overall, across the relevant range of all possible accidents, the innovative technology is
less safe than the customary alternative. Only upon making both
showings will the plaintiff be allowed to recover damages for her
injury.
The proposed evidentiary mechanism will eliminate much of the
disincentive to adopt innovative technologies. Although this proposal puts the burden of comparing conventional and innovative
technologies on the plaintiff, it is reasonable to expect that defendants, too, will conduct similar comparisons on their own accord.
Not investigating ex ante would expose businesses to the risk of
losing a particular case in court, as well as the broader risk of
being stuck with a substandard precaution. Businesses that failed
to make the optimal decision would therefore face a Hobson’s
choice between paying multiple future plaintiffs and replacing
the inferior technology. Both options are costly.
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We are cognizant of the fact that our proposal raises a fairness
concern. It is possible to argue that it is unfair to impose additional evidentiary requirements upon plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs
with meager financial means. This concern may be partially
addressed by allowing successful plaintiffs to recover the full cost
of litigating the case or, alternatively, the cost of making the additional showings.

CONCLUSION
America’s torts system should become more welcoming of innovations. To achieve this effect, the system can eliminate courts’
reliance on custom in making liability determinations.
Alternatively, it can set up a rule instructing courts to give innovations whose safety was verified by independent industry
experts the same deference they give custom. This paper proposes another plausible reform: the legal system can impose a special
proof burden on the plaintiffs who challenge the safety of an
innovative technology and blame their damage on the defendant’s preference of this technology over the conventional one.
Each of those reforms eliminates the anomalous tax that innovators presently pay and do away with the anomalous subsidy that
replicators of conventional technologies presently receive. None
of those solutions is cost free.44 However, the costs of those solutions are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of unhindered
innovation.

44 Parchomovsky and Stein, “Torts and Innovation.”
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11:

The Effects of Modern Tort Law on
Innovation and Economic Growth

George L. Priest∗

T

his paper addresses how the expansion of tort liability in
the United States since the mid-1960s has affected innovation and, as an inevitable consequence (as explained in
Chapter 1), economic growth. The paper will attempt to
explain how this expansion has operated as a tax—and not an
inconsiderable tax—without commensurate benefit to consumers. The effect of expanded tort liability has been to suppress
innovation and reduce U.S. economic growth.1
Part I presents a brief history of underlying conceptions of tort
law and of the development of those conceptions following the
mid-1960s, which describes the modern era. Part II discusses the
economic effects of the expansion of modern tort liability. Part III
briefly addresses the ideas of Parchomovsky and Stein, who
argue in this volume that harm-causing practices qualifying as
customary, or that comply with regulatory standards, should not
∗ George L. Priest is the Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauffman
Distinguished Research Scholar in Law, Economics and Entrepreneurship, Yale Law School.
1 There are many other undesirable effects of the tort law tax—such as its regressive distributional effect—that are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of this issue, see Priest, “The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,” Yale Law Journal 96 (1987): 1521.
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be treated in tort law advantageously relative to novel practices.
This section explains that their argument, though attractive as an
ideal, addresses only a minor feature of modern tort law. More
seriously, their focus misestimates the effects of modern law
described in Part II. As a consequence, their analysis of the custom defense and of the effect of presumptions regarding federal
regulatory standards confuses the effects of modern law on innovation and economic growth.

PART I. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HISTORICAL
CONCEPTIONS OF TORT LAW AND THEIR CHANGES
OVER TIME
For the first centuries of the common law, private law—tort law,
contract, and property law—was viewed as serving chiefly a
redistributive end.2 According to this conception, private law
and the system of private law damages operate to compel redistribution in a defined set of circumstances: Where a first party
has imposed a loss on a second party through an alleged tort or
property violation or through breach of contract, the first party is
compelled to compensate the second party to the extent of the
second party’s loss as long as the alleged violation meets the
legal standard for recovery. In tort, the legal standard was the
“fault” of the injurer or “negligence” where the injurer had failed
to act with “due care;” in contract, the standard was breach of the
express promise of one of the parties. The damages payment
imposed by law serves a compensatory—i.e., redistributive—
purpose. From this light, compensation, as reflected in the dominant legal remedy of compensatory damages, seeks no more
than to restore the victim to its pre-loss position.
Though of ancient vintage, this view of the role of private law
has been supported in recent times by philosophical theories of
corrective justice that attempt to justify this form of redistribu2 To be fair, the distinction between the production of new resources versus the redistribution of
existing resources has not been generally discussed in the analysis of law.
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tion. These theories do not ignore the effects of legal decisions
and rules on future behavior, but the role of private law viewed
as a system of corrective justice, at best, is to prevent the need for
future redistributive decisions; more typically, simply to restore
the injured party (as much as can be done through money damages) to its pre-injury position, thus reinstating, except for the
injury, the earlier status quo.
The corrective justice conception of private law ignores the effect
of law on economic growth. As it has been defined, corrective
justice is a deontological, in contrast to an instrumental,
approach to law. In essence, the role of the law is to square off on
equal terms what in essence (shifting to instrumental terms) is a
zero-sum game of life’s interactions or worse, a negative-sum
game, in the sense that—especially in the context of torts—any
gain to the injurer from engaging in a risk-generating activity is
typically substantially less than the loss to the victim.
The modern—quasi-economic and purely instrumental—
approach to the role of tort law was initiated in the 1940s, but
became widely embraced in the 1960s, and expanded thereafter.3
Supported somewhat by academic literature, the first iteration of
what would become the modern view was the concurring opinion of Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court in
the now-famous case, Escola v. Coca-Cola.4 The case was simple:
A waitress in a restaurant was cut when a Coca-Cola bottle
exploded. The court’s majority opinion resolved the case on res
ipsa loquitur grounds, a doctrine that presumes negligence from
the facts of the case alone.5 Justice Traynor, however, in a concurring opinion, argued that the manufacturer should be held
absolutely liable for the injury, without regard to a showing of
fault or negligence or even of a presumption of negligence
through the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. He justified the position
3 For a more detailed discussion of this history, see Priest, “The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 14
(1985): 461.
4 Escola v. Coca-Cola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
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giving two reasons, both of which have something of an economic cast. First, the manufacturer is in a superior position to reduce
the risk of injury:
Even if there is no negligence, public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market. It is evident
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot.6
Second, even if the accident cannot effectively be prevented, the
manufacturer can provide a form of insurance, passed on to the
product’s consumers in the product price:
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business.7
These two quasi-economic goals—reducing the incidence of loss
(improving safety) and, for losses that cannot be prevented, providing insurance through tort law damages—constitute the cornerstone of modern tort law. These goals were adopted as central
to products liability law during the mid-1960s with the general
adoption of the doctrine of strict products liability, first by the
5 The case appears so simple to the modern eye that one wonders why the jury verdict in favor
of the waitress was appealed to the California Supreme Court. In historical context, the case raised
an interesting issue regarding the res ipsa doctrine since the manufacturer had delivered the bottle to the restaurant some substantial time (thirty-six hours) prior to the accident. At the time, a
defense to a res ipsa claim was that the manufacturer had relinquished control of the product and
thus should not be responsible for any subsequent event, which was attributed to the user or consumer. Conceptually, strict liability excuses consumers from most efforts to prevent accidents.
6 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440. Note the presumption in Traynor’s explanation that only manufacturers,
and not consumers, can take measures that have the effect of reducing accidents from product
use. That presumption is characteristic of the modern regime, though there is no empirical foundation for it.
7 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–441.
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California Supreme Court;8 then in the American Law Institute’s
Second Restatement of Torts;9 and ultimately, by courts or legislatures in all of the states.10 The goals have been extended to other
areas of tort law, beyond products, over the succeeding years.
The goals of employing the law to reduce the frequency of accidents and to provide insurance do not directly address economic growth. As quasi-economic goals, they are not entirely unrelated to growth. The resources of a society will be greater if the
number of injuries that can be cost-effectively prevented is
reduced. As explained in Chapter 1, this represents a static, not a
dynamic, conception of efficiency.
Providing accident insurance in the price of a product or service
as compelled by law is more problematic. As a general proposition, a society wants to maximize the cost-effective provision of
insurance for losses that cannot be prevented. The existence of
insurance allows citizens to engage in a wider range of productive, though risk-causing, activities and, thus, will spur innovation and economic growth, a subject worthy of further study. As
Justice Traynor formulated the idea as indicated in the quotation
above, however—and as most modern courts have viewed the
matter—providing accident insurance through liability judgments serves chiefly a redistributional welfare goal. As explained
in Part II, the actual effect of using private law to provide insurance is to reduce net welfare and hamper economic growth.
More recently, these goals of employing the law to improve safety and provide insurance have been subsumed in the more general economic concept of “internalizing” the costs of injury to the
injury-causing entity. The concept of internalizing costs is more
centrally economic. The idea is to affect the productive decisions
of all entities in the society by compelling them—through private
8 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (Traynor, C.J.).
9 Restatement (Second) of Torts, §402(A) (1964).
10 For a fuller discussion of these events, see Priest, “The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law.”
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law—to take accident costs into account in each of their productive decisions. Thus, the law serves to perfect the pricing system
by requiring risk-generating entities to include in decision making the price of accidents that result from their production. At a
very general level, the concept is plausible. The concept becomes
difficult when the issue of causation is carefully addressed. As
Ronald Coase showed many years ago, in the context of an interaction between a person injured and the entity whose production
was involved in the injury, unless it is clear that one of the parties could have cost-effectively prevented the accident at a cost
less than the other, one cannot from an economic standpoint confidently attribute causation of the accident to either single
party.11
The internalizing costs concept is especially unhelpful with
respect to the allocation of the burden of insuring losses that cannot be cost-effectively prevented. Again, the Traynor and modern law formulation is entirely redistributive and welfare oriented. It does not derive from a careful study of the most effective
means of providing insurance.
Nevertheless, the goal of internalizing costs in order to create
incentives to reduce the accident rate and to provide accident
insurance commands private law today. This goal has provided
the justification for courts to expand substantive tort liability
standards and to restrict legal defenses in a broad range of areas,
from occupational safety to job-site discrimination. The goal—in
particular, the internalizing costs concept—also has provided the
basis for the expansion of recovery of noneconomic damages,
such as pain and suffering and loss of the value of life on the
argument that, if costs are to be internalized, damages should
equal the full costs of the accident, measured as completely
as possible.
Together, these concepts have led to a vast expansion of tort liability over the past fifty years. Whether measured in terms of
11Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960): 1.
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actual private law judgments or, more fully, judgments plus settlements, or more fully yet, judgments plus settlements plus
attorneys’ costs and fees, the amount of money transferred
through the legal system has increased by many multiples and
perhaps exponentially since the mid-1960s.12 The next part discusses the economic effects of this development and, in particular, its effect on economic growth.

PART II. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF TORT LIABILITY

OF THE

EXPANSION

What have been the effects of the extraordinary expansion of tort
liability since the mid-1960s? Measuring the effects of tort law is
particularly difficult since no adequate statistics exist recording
either the benefits of tort judgments and settlements or their
costs at any particular point or over time.
There exists, however, less systematic evidence from which inferences can be drawn as to the effects of the expansion of tort liability. As examples, at various points in time when the continuous increase in liability judgments has appeared to spike, various
products and services have been withdrawn from the market. In
the mid-1980s, for example, many pharmaceutical products were
withdrawn; day care centers closed; many doctors shifted from
obstetric and specialized surgery practices to less litigationprone practices; and manufacturers of private aircraft went out
of business, all allegedly attributable to the increase in liability
judgments.13 There were similar withdrawals of service—especially of medical services such as obstetrics—during periods of
the 1990s and early 2000s.

12 For some mid-term evidence of this trend, see Priest, “Products Liability Law and the Accident
Rate,” in Liability: Perspectives and Policy, ed. Robert E. Litan and Clifford Winston (New
York: Brookings Institution Press, 1988); Priest, “How to Control Liability Costs,” Fortune, April 24,
1989, 323.
13 For a discussion of this period, see Priest, “The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law.”
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One of the ambitions of the expansion of tort liability is to create
incentives for the withdrawal of products or services that are
excessively dangerous, in the sense that their costs of production,
including resulting injury costs, exceed the benefits from use of
the product. In some cases, the law may have that effect. It is difficult to believe, however, that medical services such as obstetrics
or specialized surgery are too dangerous to provide in any form.
Moreover, there is evidence that, where legislatures have adopted measures limiting the expansion of liability, previously
withdrawn products and services have been restored, such
as general aviation manufacture after the enactment of federal
tort reform.
Why would products that are not inherently excessively dangerous be withdrawn from markets with the expansion of tort liability? The quasi-economic goals of increasing safety and providing
insurance themselves provide no obvious answer. It is well
established as an economic proposition that enhanced liability
will lead manufacturers and service providers to make investments in increasing safety, up to the point at which the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of further investments are equated.14
Additional liability will not increase investments in precaution
beyond the point of maximum cost-effectiveness; it will only
shift the burden of insuring losses that cannot be prevented from
the victim to the injurer.
If the insurance provided through the tort system levied on manufacturers were superior to the insurance that could be obtained
by potential victims—which Justice Traynor presumed—then the
expansion of liability would increase the availability of risky
products by reducing total product costs (manufacturing costs
plus insurance). If the insurance provided through the tort system were the equivalent of private victim insurance, there would
be no general effect on production. In contrast, where insurance
provided by the injurer through tort law is more costly than the
14 E.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 54–80.
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insurance that could be obtained by potential victims, and the
difference in insurance costs exceeds the net benefit of the product to consumers, products and services that are not excessively
dangerous will be withdrawn from markets on account of the
expansion of liability because consumers are not willing to pay
the increased insurance costs.
There are strong reasons to believe that tort law insurance is substantially more costly than private insurance available to consumers. Damages as measured by tort law differ dramatically
from accident insurance benefits typically purchased directly by
consumers or indirectly, when provided by their employers.
Third-party tort law insurance provides full recovery of medical
expenses and lost income; private first-party insurance never
provides full recovery, but is uniformly attended by deductibles
and forms of coinsurance. Tort law insurance, in addition, provides full recovery of pain and suffering loss; in contrast, there is
no private first-party market for pain and suffering insurance
because pain and suffering is largely unmeasurable (making it
uninsurable) and does not implicate financial well-being, the
equalization of which over time is the economic function of
insurance.15 Moreover, private first-party insurance is structured
in order to constrain loss in ways impossible for third-party tort
insurance.16 Finally, the costs of providing third-party tort law
insurance—including attorneys’ costs and fees in the judgment
and settlement process—are vastly greater than the administrative costs of providing and delivering first-party accident
insurance.
These systematic differences between the magnitude and structure of third-party tort law insurance and first-party insurance
explain why the expansion of tort liability is not universally beneficial to consumers or other potential victims. Products and
services that are not excessively dangerous will be withdrawn
15 For a further discussion of these points, see Priest, “The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law.”
16 See Priest, “How Insurance Reduces Risk,” mimeo. (1996).
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from markets where the differential insurance costs are greater
than the net benefits of the product or service to the dominant set
of users.
This analysis also suggests the broader effect of the expansion of
tort liability on innovation and economic growth. The withdrawal of products and services that are not excessively dangerous
from the market on account of expanded liability reduces economic welfare. Such withdrawals, of course, only can occur
when the affected product or service already has been introduced. The harm from expanded liability, however, is greater.
The prospect of having to include expected liability costs in the
product or service price will affect the introduction of new products and services. Products and services never introduced
because of a judgment that expected liability costs would make
them unmarketable constitute losses to innovation and economic growth that can never be observed. For these potential innovations, tort law insurance serves as a deadweight loss like a redistributive tax, impairing economic growth.
The next part addresses the analysis of custom as a defense by
Parchomovsky and Stein and the effects on economic growth of
their proposal to subject customary and agency-approved practices to the liability standards imposed on novel practices.

PART III. PARCHOMOVSKY AND STEIN ON CUSTOM
AS A DEFENSE AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
Parchomovsky and Stein, in Chapter 10 in this volume, criticize
the legal doctrine providing that, in certain circumstances, a
product or service that is held to comply with customary standards of a field or with government regulations can invoke that
compliance as a defense to a liability claim.17 Their criticism, in
brief, is that compliance with custom or federal regulations as a
defense unfairly advantages old (customary) products and serv17 Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, Torts, Innovation, and Growth, this volume, chapter 10.
See also, Parchomovsky and Stein, “Torts and Innovation,” Michigan Law Review 107 (2008): 285.
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ices in comparison to new products and services and, thus,
retards innovation. In order to offset the advantage, they propose
(1) abrogating the defenses; (2) the creation of special committees
of industry experts to advise courts on the safety of innovative
technologies; and (3) that tort plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the inferiority of innovative products or services. For reasons
presented below, I believe that their analysis is seriously misdirected and that their proposals would do little to repair the harm
to innovation and economic growth from the expansion of liability over the past five decades, described above.
First, I believe that Parchomovsky and Stein exaggerate the
importance of the custom as a defense doctrine. It is well-known
that the strong trend of modern tort law is to restrict all tort law
defenses, including the custom defense. The doctrine is strictly
limited in the Third Restatement of Torts,18 and many analogous
rules, such as the state-of-the-art defense in products liability
law, have been generally repudiated by courts. Parchomovsky
and Stein do not estimate the number or percentage of tort
cases effectively invoking the doctrine, but it is unlikely to be
substantial.
Second, Parchomovsky and Stein overestimate the current significance of federal agency approval—such as approval by the Food
and Drug Administration or the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration—of safety-related features of products. They
argue that agency approval “insulates” complying products
from liability. In fact, except for those few areas in which courts
have ruled that federal regulation preempts state tort law, agency
approval may be introduced as evidence, but is never controlling
and, in much modern litigation, is often counterproductive
where plaintiff attorneys use the introduction of the evidence
to enable their demonstration of various forms of regulatory
misconduct.

18 For a thorough discussion, see Kenneth S. Abraham, “Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and
Negligence,” Columbia Law Review 109 (2009): 1784.
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Third, and more generally, the Parchomovsky-Stein analysis of
custom as a defense does not carefully define what practices the
doctrine will find as complying with custom and how those
practices differ from practices regarded as noncustomary,19
which may or may not mean more innovative. Finding a product
or service liable because it failed to comply with custom—which
Parchomovsky and Stein claim “taxes” innovation—may not
relate at all to innovative products and services, but to outdated
ones. Parchomovsky and Stein do not put forward a theory or
explanation of how the accumulation of knowledge leads to the
generation of a “custom.” Their analysis treats “custom” as if it
meant “status quo.” But compliance with the status quo is not a
defense in tort law. Without a careful definition of what types of
practices are held to constitute “custom” and which do not, the
operative effect of the doctrine is largely hypothetical.
Fourth, the attempt to put on equal footing for liability purposes
the consideration of older versus newer practices is probably
unrealistic. By definition, there will always be greater information available concerning older versus newer products or services. As a consequence, any fact finder will have greater confidence
with respect to the old than to the new. To the opposite effect,
though equally suggestive of the restricted relevance of the doctrine, if one of the characteristics of a novel product or service is
enhanced safety, the custom defense will never be successful,
and should not be.
Fifth, Parchomovsky and Stein give no careful consideration to
the issue of institutional competence to evaluate safety-related
technologies. They propose to equally subject customary and
novel technologies to liability, presumably by lay jury decision
making, though they propose to convene independent industry
experts to advise courts on safety. They do not explain why these
industry expert committees are superior to or even different
from expert trial testimony, also presented to juries. Nor do they
19 Ken Abraham is somewhat better on this point, though still not precise. See, ibid., 1788 (defining custom as “a widespread and, for some courts, nearly universal practice”).
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justify the superiority of industry-expert committees to federal
regulators, compliance with whose safety-related standards they
criticize. Their proposal to require tort plaintiffs to prove the
inferiority of a novel design is a burden that tort plaintiffs
already bear.
Finally, and most seriously, Parchomovsky and Stein ignore the
deleterious effects of modern tort law. Their proposal to equalize
old and new by rejecting the custom defense, as well as all presumptions deriving from compliance with governmental regulations, neglects entirely the harm to innovation and economic
growth resulting from the expansion of liability since the mid1960s, with its mandated substitution of third-party tort law
insurance for first-party insurance. Given that harm, available
defenses, including compliance with custom or federal regulations (the importance of which, again, they overstate) are
advances. Economic growth and innovation would benefit if
these defenses were strengthened, even if that left innovative
practices subjected to higher standards of safety. By eliminating
these defenses, the Parchomovsky and Stein proposals would
further expand modern tort liability. Parchomovsky and Stein do
not discuss the insurance implications of their proposal, though
the implications are significant. Their proposals, regrettably,
would further dampen innovation and economic growth.

CONCLUSION
There are strong reasons to believe that the expansion of tort liability since the mid-1960s has hampered innovation and economic growth. There is little doubt that the effect of the expansion has
been to shift an insurance burden to manufacturers and service
providers. There is no doubt that the provision of third-party tort
law insurance is substantially more costly in many dimensions
than the provision of first-party accident insurance. This shift in
the insurance burden provides no benefit to consumers; to the
contrary, it causes harm. The prospect of paying damages on
account of the expansion of liability impairs innovation and eco285
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nomic growth because the increased insurance burden acts as a
deadweight tax on innovation. Innovation and economic growth
could be enhanced if tort liability were shorn of its insurance features and liability attached only where a party failed to make a
cost-effective investment in prevention of the loss. Proposals,
such as those of Parchomovsky and Stein of expanded liability,
fail to consider these insurance effects and thus, if adopted,
would further impair innovation and growth.
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Land Use Regulation, Innovation,
and Growth

Nicole Garnett∗

W

e live in an era when the dominant land use regulation
question about growth is not how to promote it, but
rather how to curtail it. Concerns about global warming, sustainability, environmental stewardship, suburban sprawl, and urban disinvestment take center stage in discussions of land use and environmental-law policies. For example, in
2007, California Attorney General Jerry Brown sued San
Bernardino, California, for failing to adopt a comprehensive plan
that adequately addressed global warming by limiting new
growth. The suit, which settled out of court, is but one example of
growth-phobia.1 Each year, communities across the country enact
hundreds, if not thousands, of regulatory restrictions on
growth—ranging from anti-“big box” retail ballot initiatives to
total moratoria on new development. Motivations for these
efforts range from elite snobbery about dominant American
∗ Nicole Garnett is a Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School. Her teaching
and research focus is on property, land use, urban development, local government law, and
education.
1 Margot Roosevelt, “State Reaches Settlement on Gas Emissions: San Bernardino County Officials
Agree to Measure How Much the Region Contributes to Global Warming and Sets Goals to Cut
Pollution.” L.A. Times, August 22, 2007, B1.
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consumption preferences—as Robert Brueggman has observed,
the very word “sprawl … has always conveyed a not-so-subtle
accusation against the way that other people choose to live their
lives”2—to genuine concern about environmental degradation
and urban disinvestment. Sprawl has come to be seen as a modern plague on our culture. In some circles, the spread of the foreclosure crisis to suburban communities was welcomed with a
kind of voyeuristic glee, with opinion leaders penning doomsday
articles declaring that the collapse of the housing bubble, combined with the decline in fossil fuels and global warming crisis,
portend “The End of Suburbia.”3
Suburban growth is, to be sure, not costless. Global warming and
environmental degradation are serious concerns—although suburban growth is but one cause of both. And urban disinvestment
and concentrated urban poverty are serious problems—although
the causal link between current urban woes and current suburbanites’ housing choices is attenuated at best. Moreover, geographic growth—that is, an expansion of the urban footprint—should
not necessarily be equated with economic growth. There is no reason to believe that dense land use patterns are inconsistent with
economic growth and innovation. On the contrary, it is conceivable that urban density might, in fact, promote both by concentrating their necessary inputs—human and economic capital—in
relative proximity to one another. In the United States, however,
for better or worse, it is extremely difficult to disentangle economic growth and innovation from the explosion in suburban
growth that began during the last decades of the nineteenth century. For better or worse, we are a suburban nation, where economic growth has long been linked with urban expansion. By the
1960s, more Americans lived in suburbs than in central cities; the
employment balance shifted to the suburbs by the 1980s. By 1990,
a solid majority of all Americans were suburbanites.
2 Robert Brueggman, Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
3 Christopher B. Leinberger, “The Next Slum? The Subprime Crisis is Just the Tip of the Iceberg.
Fundamental Changes in American Life may Turn Today’s McMansions into Tomorrow’s
Tenements,” The Atlantic, March 2008.
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The importance of suburban growth to economic growth is suggested by a number of factors. The first is the dramatic decline in
the traditional radial commuting patterns—that is, commutes
between suburban homes and urban jobs—a reality that plagues
proponents of public transportation. Today, the number of
Americans who “reverse commute” (between city homes and
suburban jobs) or “cross commute” (between two suburbs) outnumber traditional suburb-to-center-city commuters by a two-toone margin. The second factor is that, while some major cities
continue to act as important centers of finance and information—
hence, commuters to city jobs tend to have higher wages than
suburban employees, suburban locales (for example, Silicon
Valley; Redmond, Washington; and Route 128 in Massachusetts)
have become the most important incubators of innovation. In
fact, during the recent economic downturn, the majority of new
high technology jobs have been located in southern states (Texas,
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia), characterized by suburban land use densities.4 The third factor is that suburban growth
also has long acted as an important economic and social safety
valve. That is, suburban expansion has enabled and responded to
upward mobility and fueled the housing filtering process, by
which a wealthier individual moving to a larger house sets off a
“chain of successive housing moves” that increases the availability of quality housing for poor and moderate-income individuals—and opens up the suburbs, with their economic and educational opportunities, to them as well.
Many academics and policy leaders endorse three, intersecting,
legal reforms to address the “problem” of growth—(1) comprehensive growth restrictions, (2) new regional government institutions, and, (3) most recently, “new urbanist”-inspired regulatory
alternatives to traditional zoning practices. Versions of these
reforms have been enacted in a number of states—perhaps most
comprehensively in Oregon, where all three have become firmly
entrenched. Comprehensive, statewide growth management
4 Jeffry Bartash, “High Tech Sector Seen ‘Weathering’ Downturn,” Market Watch, March 31, 2009,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/high-tech-sector-seen-weathering-downturn.
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regimes also are in place in Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, New
Jersey, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
Additionally, regional government institutions now control some
aspects of growth in a number of metropolitan areas, either
through regional government institutions, as in the Portland,
Oregon and the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota regions, or
through city-county consolidations, as in Indianapolis, Louisville,
Miami, and Kansas City, Kansas. Many cities are also experimenting with form-based land use regulation, especially, although not
exclusively, for redevelopment and urban “infill” efforts. Pressure
to implement versions of all three of these reforms remains
intense in many states where they have not yet been adopted.
Where enacted, each has its intended effect—to slow the pace,
and alter the landscape, of suburban growth. And each raises the
same concerns about the consequences of these intended effects—
an increase in housing prices, a reduction in the efficiencies generated by interjurisdictional competition for development, and
transitional fairness concerns raised by curtailing growth at a
time when minorities have begun to account for the bulk of suburban population gains.
The regulatory reforms outlined in the previous paragraph also
may negatively affect economic growth and innovation for at
least three reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, the centralization of control over land use regulation—either through
comprehensive growth management or regionalization—limits
interjurisdictional competition within metropolitan areas and
may prevent local governments from responding flexibly and
invitingly to the development of new pockets of innovation.
Second, growth restrictions impose additional costs on entrepreneurs seeking to start new businesses, a particular problem in
light of evidence that startups, which all agree are the engine of
economic growth, are particularly sensitive to regulatory costs,
including the costs of land use regulations. Third, by limiting
interjurisdictional mobility within metropolitan areas, growth
restrictions may restrict access to high-quality elementary and
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secondary schools, and thus the educational opportunities necessary for economic success, especially among the less fortunate.
This chapter will focus on three major alternatives to the standard
antigrowth toolkit that address legitimate concerns about urban
expansion without stifling economic growth and innovation.
Each of these reforms can be implemented through wise regulatory reform (and, in some cases, the rejection of unwise ones):
Price growth, don’t prohibit it. Although growth restrictions come in
many forms, most adhere to a traditional “command-and-control” model of regulation. These regulations are justified as a
means of “rationalizing” growth, but, in practice, they tend to
increase housing prices, exacerbate the exclusionary effects of
existing land use regulations, and promote sprawl. They also may
impede the spontaneous development of agglomeration
economies by preventing local governments from promoting
(and responding to) the development of pockets of innovation. In
contrast, properly calibrated exactions can enable efficient growth
by pricing growth, thereby forcing developers and consumers to
internalize the costs of new development.
Promote interjurisdictional competition, don’t stifle it. There are many
policies and proposals designed to mute interjurisdictional competition within U.S. metropolitan areas—by, inter alia, transferring local government authority over land use regulation to new
regional government institutions or mandating fiscal sharing
between local jurisdictions. “Regional government” proponents
argue that these policies will promote growth by increasing the
overall health of metropolitan regions. The difficulty is that, as
Charles Tiebout influentially predicted, interjurisdictional competition generates many benefits by subjecting local governments
to some approximation of market competition. Importantly, interjurisdictional competition may spur regulatory innovations that
themselves promote growth and innovation. Regional government proponents have failed to demonstrate that the benefits of
centralized control will outweigh the efficiencies lost by reduced
intrajurisdictional competition.
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Develop alternatives to traditional zoning regulations. Zoning, the
standard template for development in the United States, negatively impacts growth and innovation by, inter alia, preventing the
development of rational work-life arrangements; prohibiting the
mixed land use environments that promote the social connections
needed to generate economic and social innovation and collaboration; and enabling the exclusion of less-affluent residents from
wealthier suburban jurisdictions. While numerous proposals for
zoning innovation are worthy of serious consideration, care must
be exercised when implementing new forms of land use regulation. There is a risk that the predominate alternative to use-based
zoning today—“form-based” aesthetic codes promoted by “new
urbanist” architects and planners—might backfire and unnecessarily stifle growth and innovation by dramatically driving up
development costs. This chapter explores an alternative to new
urbanist codes—a system of regulatory prices that could address
the limitations of zoning without unnecessarily escalating development costs.

PRICE GROWTH, DON’T PROHIBIT IT
As discussed above, state and local governments rely on a variety
of regulatory devices to control suburban growth. Examples
include:
• “Urban growth boundaries,” which seek to channel new development into built-up areas and exclude it from undeveloped
ones
• Development moratoria
• Restrictions on the rate of new development (often called
“phased growth” requirements)
• “Adequacy of public facilities” or “concurrency” regulations
that link new development to a guarantee of sufficient infrastructure and public services
• Minimum lot and square-footage requirements
• Restrictions on chain or “big box” retail outlets
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Additionally, regulators, by design or effect, restrict the pace and
scale of growth through innumerable other requirements imbedded in the land use regulation process. These include the subdivision approval process, environmental permitting requirements,
“inclusionary zoning” and “housing linkage” set-asides for
affordable housing, a host of exactions, historical preservation
and other aesthetic controls, “development agreements,” and
“community benefit agreements.”

Growth Management: The Problems
Proponents argue that growth restrictions are needed to prevent
urban disinvestment and environmental harm, and to rationalize
suburban growth. Suburban growth, to be sure, is not costless,
but neither are the tools that are commonly implemented to control it. A full explication of the debate over growth restrictions is
the subject of a voluminous literature and far beyond the scope of
this discussion, which instead focuses on three negative consequences of standard growth management policy. The first is the
risk that growth management will, perversely, exacerbate the
problem of suburban sprawl. The second is the likelihood that
growth management will limit the supply of affordable housing
and restrict access to suburbs (and their public amenities, including high-quality public schools) to those of limited means. The
third is the possibility that growth management will impede the
natural development of agglomeration economies, and the network effects that flow from them, by seeking to force economic
activity into existing urban centers and by increasing the costs of
entrepreneurship. The latter two risks are particularly problematic to those concerned about promoting economic growth, since
both education and agglomeration economies are critical, albeit
for different reasons, to future growth and innovation.
1) Growth Restrictions and Suburban Sprawl
Most growth management efforts are implemented at the local
government level. Many are the result of “ballot box” zoning initiatives motivated by resident frustration over the pace of growth
in their community. And these public expressions of official oppo293
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sition to growth are dwarfed by the thousands of actions taken by
local officials each year to slow growth—such as intentional
delays in the subdivision approval and permitting processes—
which are essentially invisible to the public’s eye. There is little
question that local growth controls are effective at doing the work
that they are designed to do—that is, limit growth within a local
jurisdiction.5 There also is, however, significant evidence that
local growth controls may, in fact, encourage suburban sprawl.
To understand why, it is necessary to view local governments as
in competition, as Charles Tiebout influentially predicted, for residents (or Tiebout’s “consumer voters”).6 Land use regulations
provide an important means of competing because they enable
local governments to design built environments that appeal to
would-be residents. Logically, local governments located on the
suburban fringe initially will welcome growth and invite it by
enacting relatively lax land use regulations. Over time, however,
as suburbs develop and political pressure for growth limits
increase, local governments begin to restrict growth. But excluding growth from one jurisdiction naturally generates pressure to
accommodate it elsewhere—and exurban, underdeveloped jurisdictions are naturally more likely to be inviting. Thus suburban
governments within a metropolitan area may become locked in a
pattern of exclusion and invitation, with more sprawl its natural
consequence. As William Fischel has observed, growth controls
“probably cause metropolitan areas to be too spread out…[L]ocal
ordinances cause developers to go to other communities. The
most likely alternative sites are in exurban and rural communities, where the political climate, at least initially, is more favorable
to development.”7 The available empirical evidence tends to sup5 Some economists question whether adequacy of public facilities requirements may actually
enable, rather than restrict, new growth. The same can be said of exactions policies that essentially “lowball” the price of new development.
6 Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economics 64
(1956): 416.
7 William A. Fischel, Do Growth Controls Matter? (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
1990).
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port Fischel’s hypothesis. For example, one well-known study of
the San Francisco Bay region found development was disproportionately concentrated in municipalities without growth restrictions, leading the author to conclude that growth controls exacerbated sprawl in the Bay Area.8 Anecdotal visual evidence of this
phenomenon can be found by viewing Boulder, Colorado on
Google Earth. Boulder, which has implemented extremely restrictive growth controls, including an urban growth boundary and
severe rate of growth restrictions, appears surrounded by an
undeveloped greenbelt. Suburban development in outlying jurisdictions, however, is easily visible beyond the city’s boundary
and outside of the reach of city regulators.
2) Growth Management, Affordable Housing, and Economic Mobility
Moreover, while demographic change and economic growth are
not synonymous, they are related because geographic mobility is
a primary way that Americans of limited means secure access to
the tools they need to contribute to our economy and, ideally, to
become engines of economic growth and innovation. Therefore, it
is important to acknowledge that growth limits enacted at the
local level are often little more than exclusionary zoning in disguise—that is, a way that wealthier jurisdictions exclude poorer
residents. Many common local growth management tools—for
example, large-lot zoning—are essentially indistinguishable from
exclusionary zoning devices. Moreover, growth restrictions drive
up the price of existing houses, thus making them less affordable
to those of modest means. As Robert Ellickson has observed,
“Antigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries:
those who already own residential structures in the municipality
doing the excluding.”9 All exclusionary land use policies, including those packaged as “growth management,” tend to deprive
poorer residents of access to the economic opportunities and,
8 Q Shen, “Spatial Impacts of Locally Enacted Growth Controls: The San Francisco Bay Region in
the 1980s,” Environment & Planning B: Planning and Design 23 (1996): 61.
9 Robert C. Ellickson, “Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,” Yale Law
Journal 86 (1977): 385.
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importantly, high-quality public schools found in wealthier locations. They therefore have serious consequences for the overall
rate of economic growth and innovation, because without access
to these economic and educational opportunities many poorer
Americans simply will not enter the mainstream economy at all,
let alone generate growth.
In part to prevent local parochialism and mute its negative effects,
most academics favor comprehensive growth management enacted and enforced at the state or regional, rather than local, level. A
favorite model is Oregon’s statewide growth model, which
requires the establishment of “urban growth boundaries” for
each metropolitan area in the state and channels all new development to the areas inside these boundaries. In contrast to the
Boulder example described above, Portland’s urban growth
boundary is administered by an elected regional government
institution known as “Metro.” Growth management proponents
argue that by wresting control of growth policy from local governments, comprehensive growth management actually will curb
exclusionary zoning and prevent tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios from replaying themselves throughout our metropolitan
regions.
Unfortunately, statewide or regional growth management
regimes likely exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the price effects
of growth controls. Economists generally agree that suburbanization has helped generate a stable supply of affordable housing in
the United States. Not only are the kinds of homes that Americans
prefer (that is, single-family detached homes) more affordable in
far-flung suburbs, but suburbs increasingly feature a wider variety of housing choices—including townhomes and multifamily
apartments. Moreover, new suburban growth promotes the housing filtering process, by which a wealthier individual moving to
a larger house sets off a “chain of successive housing moves” that
increases the availability of quality housing for poor and moderate-income individuals. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that
comprehensive growth management will be more effective than
local controls in increasing overall regional housing prices, by
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dramatically reducing the supply of property available for housing. And while some proponents argue that properly structured
growth management policy need not necessarily increase housing prices, their assertion that the law of supply and demand may
be suspended in the growth-management context depends upon
the implementation of a host of other regulatory devices (such as
“inclusionary zoning” laws requiring developers to sell or lease
some new units at “affordable”/below-market prices). Publicchoice realities, however, suggest that there is a significant risk
that policymakers may lack the political will to implement affordability promotion tools on a large enough scale to counter the
regressive effects of growth management.
Moreover, even if a regional development strategy succeeded in
holding constant the overall cost of housing, most affordable
housing will likely continue to be found in center cities and older
suburbs. Regional growth-management strategies aim to channel
new development into built-up areas. Yet suburbs still represent
the urban poor’s hope for a better life, as suburbs have throughout the modern industrial age. The reality is that suburbs offer the
good schools, economic opportunities, and environmental amenities that wealthy urban dwellers can afford to purchase and poorer ones cannot—and that social science evidence continues to
demonstrate are key to harnessing the intellectual and economic
potential of the disadvantaged. Finally, there is something slightly unseemly about dramatically curtailing suburban growth at a
time when racial minorities are responsible for most new suburban population gains. It is difficult to avoid concluding that
changing the rules of the development game at this time is tantamount to pulling the suburban ladder out from under those who
previously were excluded from suburban life by economic circumstance, exclusionary zoning, and intentional discrimination.
3) Growth Management and Agglomeration Economies
Growth management proponents argue that the law should channel new development “where it belongs”—that is, into built-up
areas, preferably the urban core. There is certainly no a priori
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reason to believe that urban density and innovation are inconsistent. As the literature on “agglomeration economies” suggest,
economic and social connections tend to fuel innovation—and
density might be expected to promote the economic and social
connections. That said, economic history suggests that economic
growth and innovation sometimes flourish in unexpected
places—including, especially in the United States, in the suburbs.
And, while the reasons for the geographic locations of centers of
innovation—such as Silicon Valley, or Austin, Texas, or Boston’s
Route 128—remain somewhat opaque, legal rules are not irrelevant to the emergence of agglomeration economies.10 Moreover,
there is little question that economic growth is highly correlated
with an abundance of small entrepreneurial firms or that innovators thrive when they work in proximity to one another. Growth
management may impede the network effects necessary for the
next wave of innovation by limiting local governments’ ability to
flexibly and invitingly respond as these concentrations began to
emerge. This might occur if regulators miscalculated in their
assumptions about where development “belonged” or if the innovators simply rejected the lifestyle and working conditions
required by a growth management policy. Moreover, as Edward
Glaeser’s work suggests, entrepreneurs—who are the engines of
economic growth—are sensitive to start-up costs, including the
costs imposed by new land use regulations.11

Pricing Growth: An (Imperfect) Alternative
Many of these concerns would be addressed if lawmakers, in
place of regulatory restrictions on new development, instead
priced growth through a rational exactions policy. Exactions—
that is, concessions demanded as a condition of regulatory
10 Ronald J. Gilson, “The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128,
and Covenants Not To Compete,” New York University Law Review 74 (1999): 575.
11 Edward L. Glaeser, et al., “Clusters of Entrepreneurship” (working paper 15377, National Bureau of
Economic Research, September 2009), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/
files/Clusters.pdf; Edward L. Glaeser, et al., “Urban Economics and Entrepreneurship” (working
paper 15536, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2009), http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Urban%20Economics.pdf.
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approval for new development—are a ubiquitous feature of the
land use regulation landscape. Exactions are nothing new. The
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, adopted in many states in
the 1920s, authorizes local governments to require developers to
construct streets, water mains, and sewers in new developments.
Many local governments have, since that time, required developers to construct and dedicate facilities to the community. Over
time, communities began to expand their demand for such dedications beyond basic infrastructure such as sewers, streets, and
sidewalks.12
While the nature and extent of local government exactions is not
well understood, it is clear that current practices depart dramatically from earlier antecedents. Importantly, a majority of cities
now impose monetary exactions, or “impact fees,” in lieu of—or
in addition to—traditional in-kind exactions. A 2004 U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development report characterized “the increasingly widespread adoption of impact fees” as
a “dramatic change in the regulatory environment” and asserted
that “communities are asking developers to bear a larger share of
the front end burden of supplying new infrastructure and added
services as a means of paying for continued growth.”13 Moreover,
cities increasingly are expanding the types of development subject to impact fees to include nonresidential land uses and even
renovations of existing properties. Exactions and impact fees are
also being used to fund a much wider range of services and facilities. As recently as 1985, the vast majority of impact fees funded
water lines, sewers, and roads. More recent studies suggest that
increasing numbers of local governments rely on impact fees for
other public services, including schools, low-income housing, fire
and emergency services, traffic mitigation, public transportation,
and open space. A growing minority of communities rely upon

12 Alan Altschuler and Jose Gómez-Ibanez, Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land
Use Exactions (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993).
13 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Why Not in Our Community?
Removing Barriers to Affordable Housing,” 2004.
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exactions for the provision of affordable housing as well, through
“linkage” and “inclusionary zoning” requirements.14
Exactions are theoretically preferable to command-and-control
restrictions on development because, ideally, they price growth
rather than prohibiting it. A properly structured exactions policy
ought to enable efficient—and curb inefficient—growth. Impact
fees, in particular, have generally been championed as a way to
internalize the full cost of new development. As Vicki Been
observes, “by requiring the developer and its customers to mitigate the negative effects a development may have on a neighborhood…impact fees may encourage efficiency by making the
developer and its customers internalize the full cost of harms that
the development causes.”15 This view is generally shared across
the political spectrum. For example, in the conservative Heritage
Foundation’s Guide to Smart Growth, Samuel Staley asserts that,
“[p]roperty owners and developers should bear the full cost of
property development.”16
Indeed, the idea that developers and their customers should
shoulder the cost of new development is rarely challenged,
although both judges and economists have questioned the ability
of government to accurately calibrate those costs. Objections to
exactions generally focus on policy design questions about the
level and extent of exactions. There is a significant concern that
local governments may dramatically overcharge developers—
that is, that impact fees do not simply force newcomers to internalize the cost of new developments, but rather act as a plan of
14 Linkage programs require developers, especially commercial developers in central cities, to
agree to “offset” the anticipated costs of the proposed development. Inclusionary zoning programs impose similar requirements on residential developers. Usually, inclusionary zoning rules
require developers to set aside a certain percentage of new residential units for “moderate
income” residents and to sell or lease these units to the targeted residents at “affordable” (i.e.,
below market) prices.
15 Vicki Been, “Impact Fees and Housing Affordability,” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development
and Research 8 (2005): 139.
16 Samuel R. Staley, “Reforming the Zoning Laws,” in A Guide to Smart Growth: Shattering Myths,
Providing Solutions, ed. Jane S. Shaw and Ronald D. Utt (Washington, DC: The Heritage
Foundation, 2000).
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extortion by cash-strapped local governments desperate for a
new source of funds. This is a particular concern today, in light of
the fiscal crises facing many cities, which are desperate for new
revenues and eager to find a way around state-law debt and tax
limits. Staley, for example, asserts that “fees are often abused and
become a source of general revenue for local governments.”17 His
concerns are echoed in a recent report by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, which warns that many
impact fees are “disproportionate to the actual development
costs” and unreasonably drive up the cost of housing as a result.18
If development is overpriced, exactions may have the same
growth-restrictive effects as explicit growth controls, with the
same consequences. There is some limited evidence that localities
intentionally use exactions policy to limit growth, although most
local jurisdictions reporting that they use exactions policies in this
way also report that other growth restrictions are both in place
and more effective. Vicki Been’s comprehensive survey of impactfee practices, conducted in 2004, found that impact fees did
increase housing prices, although she also found that the price
effects of impact fees varied dramatically by jurisdiction. Finally,
it is worth noting that policies that seek to force new owners to
internalize the cost of their mobility also raise transitional fairness
concerns. If impact fees are excessive, and the overcharge is used
as a supplementary revenue source, then existing homeowners in
established suburbs will have succeeded in extracting rents from
new homeowners in fringe suburbs. And even perfectly calibrated fees may signal to suburban newcomers that they are being
required to “pay twice”—first to fund their own improvements
directly and again through tax revenues for services provided to
older homes. These transitional fairness problems have both a
generational and a racial component, since older, white
Americans are more likely to own their homes.
17 Staley, “Reforming the Zoning Laws”; William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home
Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land Use Policies (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
18 HUD, “Why Not in Our Community?”
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These concerns make careful regulatory design of exactions policy an imperative, but they do not negate the case for pricing,
rather than restricting, growth for at least three reasons. First,
impact fees may in fact enable economic growth that would not
otherwise occur, especially where land use regulators would otherwise impose moratoria or other restrictions on development.
Impact fees, for this reason, are most attractive if they come to
supplant, rather than supplement, growth controls. In jurisdictions imposing multiple forms of growth restrictions (as many
do), impact fees may actually impede, rather than enable, economic growth. Second, competition for growth among local governments (discussed in more detail below) provides a check on
exactions because jurisdictions that overprice growth will “lose”
the competition for economic growth. This competitive effect
will, however, be muted or negated if municipalities primarily
use exactions as subterfuge growth restrictions or if a regional
government, rather than multiple local governments, was
charged with calibrating fee levels. Third, in contrast to other regulatory arenas, the U.S. Constitution places outer limits on exactions policy, since the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause to require rough parity between
the exaction demanded and the development effect that the local
government seeks to mitigate.19

PROMOTE INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION,
DON’T STIFLE IT
Calls for new “regional” governments, vested with authority to
regulate development (among other things), are closely linked
with the demand for comprehensive growth restrictions.
Regional government proponents object to the current structure
of local government law, which vests local government authority
in multiple, overlapping governmental institutions. They argue
that this system—known as “metropolitan fragmentation” in the
19 The question of whether this “rough proportionality” rule, adopted in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994), applies to monetary exactions remains open.
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local government literature—makes little sense in an era characterized by political, economic, and social membership within
metropolitan regions, rather than individual municipalities.
Metropolitan fragmentation emerged in the early twentieth century, as state legislatures began to enact general municipal incorporation laws that enabled suburban locales to protect themselves from annexation by their urban neighbors.20 Zoning laws,
which emerged during the same time period, may have, as
William Fischel has argued, accelerated the pace of metropolitan
fragmentation by enabling suburbs to legally exclude industrial
land uses that required the infrastructure previously offered by
large cities as an incentive to accept annexation.21 Since most state
laws now immunize incorporated municipalities from annexation—a legal norm that also emerged during the early twentieth
century—many large cities find themselves “landlocked” (surrounded by multiple incorporated suburbs and lacking any room
for geographic expansion). Metropolitan fragmentation also is
characterized by the proliferation of multiple special purpose
local governments—water districts, school districts, sewer districts, parks districts, transportation authorities, etc.—which also
began to emerge in large numbers in the early twentieth century.
The result is that local authority over important government
functions within our metropolitan areas is distributed among
hundreds of local governments with overlapping boundaries. For
example, a single school district might serve residents of several
municipalities.
Regional government proponents argue that metropolitan fragmentation is both inefficient and unjust. The system is inefficient
because within American metropolitan regions, local governments—with close to absolute autonomy over development and,
in some states, education and taxation policy—compete for residents. This competition results in suburban sprawl and exclu20 In the nineteenth century, municipal incorporation generally required an act of the state
legislatures.
21 Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis.
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sionary zoning, and the overinvestment in infrastructure
improvements. The system is unjust, in this view, because metropolitan fragmentation also results in a stark maldistribution of fiscal resources among the local governments within a metropolitan
area. Since all municipalities are viewed as coequal in the eyes of
state law, wealthier local jurisdictions are able to effectively turn
their backs on their poorer neighbors; and since all municipalities
are vested with land use authority, they are also able to exclude
poorer newcomers by using land use regulations to set what are
essentially high entrance fees.22 By doing so, the wealthier jurisdiction is able to maintain a high level of services at a relatively
low tax rate. But the exclusion deprives poorer residents of access
to the amenities that it uses to attract wealthier ones—good
schools, low crime rates, employment opportunities, etc.—thereby, for the reasons discussed above, dramatically curtailing the
possibility that the excluded will become engines of economic
growth and innovation.
There are many policies and proposals designed to mute the
interjurisdictional competition within U.S. metropolitan areas, by
either limiting local control over land use regulation or mandating fiscal sharing between local jurisdictions. Regional government proponents argue that these policies will not only minimize
the unjust interjurisdictional disparities but will also rationalize
infrastructure policy and, ultimately, promote economic growth
by increasing the overall health of metropolitan regions.
Comprehensive regional government reforms, which have been
implemented in only a few U.S. metropolitan regions, take various forms. For example, in Minnesota, state law mandates fiscal
sharing among municipalities within the Twin Cities metropolitan area and also vests a regional entity, the Metropolitan Council
of the Twin Cities, or Met Council, with the authority over the
infrastructure needed for new development. Portland’s Metro
controls the size and location of the urban growth boundary and
22 A municipality may “price out” unwanted residents by, for example, enacting zoning laws that
do not accommodate multifamily housing or that impose minimum lot/square-footage requirements on single-family homes.
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operates a public transportation system. Thus far, calls for new,
general-purpose regional governments, vested with the full
panoply of local powers, have not come to fruition, although citycounty consolidations in a number of states represent a step in
that direction.
The difficulty with regional government proposals and reforms
is, as Charles Tiebout influentially predicted, that interjurisdictional competition among the multiple local governments within
our metropolitan areas subjects local governments to some
approximation of market competition. Tiebout argued that local
governments within a metropolitan region compete for “consumer voters” by structuring the package of local services, public
goods, and taxation policy that will appeal to desired residents.
And the available evidence strongly suggests that—even when
Tiebout’s assumptions (including, importantly, perfect information and costless mobility) are relaxed—Tiebout was right. That
is, interjurisdictional competition works. For example, a number
of scholars have found that the public school students’ scores on
standardized tests improve as the number of school districts
within a metropolitan region increases. Other scholars have
demonstrated that competition among local governments
reduces local taxes. And while many social commentators
bemoan the relative monotony of the suburban landscape, local
governments clearly use their land use policies to design communities that appeal to new residents—with the growing diversity of
land use patterns in suburbs suggesting that inter-jurisdictional
competition may also spur regulatory innovation.
Interjurisdictional competition also clearly spurs local governments to offer regulatory and tax concessions in an effort to generate economic growth, although some economists argue that
interjurisdictional competition for economic development is
essentially an irrational, zero-sum game.
Metropolitan fragmentation, however, is also the primary generator of the metropolitan inequalities bemoaned by proponents of
regional governments. Wealthier suburbs, and the residents who
can afford membership in them, generally fare better than center
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cities and some inner-ring suburbs (think Detroit compared with
Gross Pointe, Michigan). Regional government proponents claim
that the reforms they propose can address these inequalities without stifling “good” economic growth and innovation. In fact,
pointing to evidence linking overall metropolitan economic
health to the economic well-being of center cities, they argue that
rationalizing the distribution of resources and the location of new
development in our metropolitan regions will actually promote
economic growth and innovation. The difficulty is that centralizing local government power in a metropolitan region will mute
intergovernmental competition—that is, after all, the point of
regional government reforms. And while some economies of
scale may result from centralizing local government power, there
is little evidence that these benefits will exceed the efficiencies
generated by the competition that metropolitan fragmentation
enables.
Moreover, there is evidence that center cities, in particular, are
getting better at competing with their suburban neighbors, and
that the competition itself may spur innovation and growth.
Recent decades have witnessed an unexpected urban resurgence.
While the reasons for that resurgence are complex and somewhat
opaque, Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb plausibly argue,
city fortunes may have improved in part by rising incomes, educational attainment, and an increased affinity among intellectual
elites for city life, especially for the social interactions and consumer amenities enabled by dense, mixed-use urban environments.23 If so, a plausible case can be made that by capitalizing on
the amenities available to them (especially density and older,
mixed-use urban neighborhoods), the traditional “losers” in the
interjurisdictional competition game may be able to attract the
residents who are most likely to promote innovation and
growth—the group that Richard Florida has influentially termed
the “creative class.”24 And they do not necessarily need the help
23 Edward L. Glaeser and Joshua D. Gottlieb, “Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City,” Urban
Studies 43 (2006): 1275.
24 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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of coercive land use policies or a radical restructuring of local
government authority to do so.

DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES TO USE-BASED ZONING
Regulatory reforms offering alternatives to traditional use-based
zoning may prove to be one way to enable more effective competition among local jurisdictions—and to promote innovation and
economic growth. Zoning, the standard template for development
in the United States,25 negatively impacts growth and innovation
by preventing the development of rational work-life arrangements and prohibiting the mixed land use environments that may
promote economic and social innovation and collaboration.
Zoning is also a primary contributor to suburban sprawl (because
it mandates relatively low-density “suburban” land use patterns)
and to metropolitan inequality (because it enables the exclusion of
less-affluent residents from wealthier suburban jurisdictions).
Zoning has been subject to criticism since it emerged nearly a century ago. Zoning reforms, however, have long foundered—in
part because local governments are jealously protective of the
authority provided to them by zoning laws and in part because
homeowners view zoning as a form of property-value insurance.
Although numerous proposals for regulatory innovation are worthy of serious consideration, a full explication of these proposals
is beyond the scope of this discussion, which instead focuses on
two zoning alternatives—Lee Anne Fennell’s proposal to replace
command-and-control land use restrictions with self-assessed
regulatory prices and the new-urbanist promoted “transect zoning,” which recommends that zoning controls be swapped for
aesthetic “form-based” regulations of building design.

Entitlements Subject to Self-Made Options
The standard justification offered for zoning, from the time of its
inception, has been that it prevents harmful land use spillovers.
25 Every major city in the United States except Houston, Texas has a zoning law in place.
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To be sure, zoning does serve this purpose, along with other, lessbenign purposes (including, for example, class segregation).
Since local governments (and private developers) can rarely calibrate the level of regulation to residents’ true preferences, however, zoning prohibitions frequently impose excessive prevention
costs. That is, the costs imposed by the regulations to prevent possible, future harms tend to exceed the benefits of actual harm prevention. But because property owners—especially, homeowners—are extremely risk averse, they accept (even demand) high
prevention costs as a means of shielding their investment. In a
recent book, Lee Anne Fennell proposes that in lieu of the standard prohibitory land use regulations, local governments or private developers could give property owners the right to buy or
sell certain land use entitlements at prices set by the entitlement
holders themselves.26 That is, rather than prohibiting outright
activities that might generate harmful spillovers, regulators could
price the right to engage in, and to be free from, the potentially
harm-producing activities. Fennell calls her proposed regulatory
innovation “entitlements subject to self-made options,” or
“ESSMOs.” Options provide the legal right, but not the obligation, to buy (a “call option”) or sell (a “put option”) a given commodity at a preset price. Traditional liability rules are, in a sense,
“call options.” That is, they give an actor the right, but not the
obligation, to purchase an entitlement at a price set by a third
party. Fennell’s ESSMO system would rely on options by entitling
owners to purchase the right to engage in a land use activity, or to
enjoin neighbors from the same, and would be “self-made”
because it would use self-valuation devices to price land use entitlements. Since the options employed to regulate land uses would
be self-priced, the ESSMO proposal addresses the central difficulty of previous proposals to price land use entitlements—namely
the risk of undercompensation presented by third-party valuation of entitlements.

26 Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home: Property Values Beyond Property Lines (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
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Fennell makes a strong case that self-priced options could better
calibrate land use controls to residents’ true preferences than zoning rules. But she arguably undersells the transformative power of
this intriguing proposal by assuming that it primarily addresses
intralocal regulatory spillovers and discounting the possibility
that it might address regional inequalities as well. As discussed
above, most proponents of regional government and growth control proceed on the assumption that poorer jurisdictions simply
cannot compete with wealthier jurisdictions for the “right” kind of
residents. But the relative status of poorer jurisdictions and their
less-advantaged residents also would be improved if poorer jurisdictions could compete successfully with wealthier jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, existing land use regulations frequently impose
“suburban” land use patterns on city neighborhoods, arguably
hamstringing urban officials’ ability to capitalize on this advantage. Yet even city officials who recognize this as a problem—and
many do not—find it difficult to use land use policy to promote
density and vitality because urban residents often are only marginally less averse to spillover risk than the suburban homeowners. Fennell’s ESSMO proposal, however, might well enable cities
to achieve greater land use diversity while addressing property
owners’ risk aversion and thereby gain an edge vis-à-vis suburbs
in the competition for residents with a taste for urban life. And by
reducing homeowner anxieties, it also might serve to open up
wealthier suburbs to less-advantaged residents. Moreover, jurisdictions experimenting with regulatory pricing might be well
positioned to attract innovators—who, for example, wish to work
from home, or closer to home than zoning laws permit—thereby
promoting new geographic pockets of innovation.
Consider a hypothetical illustration of the proposal:
Innovationville, a medium-sized Midwestern city, wishes to
attract more start-up firms. In order to make Innovationville
attractive to entrepreneurs, local elected officials need to streamline the process by which businesses can “repurpose” older
homes along certain busier streets (zoning variance procedures
tend to give neighbors a near veto over such conversions) and
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eliminate zoning rules that dramatically restrict the scope of
home businesses (by, for example, prohibiting them from
employing anyone who does not reside in the home).
Innovationville leaders, however, know that homeowner anxieties about business-related spillovers pose a significant impediment to implementing these reforms. Fennell’s insight is that
Innovationville leaders could assuage homeowner anxieties—
and minimize political opposition to needed reform—by monetizing the property-value/spillover protection provided by zoning laws’ regulatory prohibitions. For example, instead of giving
homeowners in “residential” zones an absolute entitlement to
live in a business-free environment, Innovationville might permit
a homeowner who wishes to start a home-based business the
right to purchase her neighbors’ “no businesses allowed” entitlements from them. Using various value-eliciting devices that
Fennell explores in detail, Innovationville might even allow
homeowners to set the price at which their entitlements would be
waived. Over time, this regulatory innovation might give
Innovationville an edge on attracting entrepreneurs over neighboring municipalities—leading to more technological innovation
and ultimately more economic growth.
To be sure, Fennell’s proposal raises a number of complex institutional design questions that are beyond the scope of this volume.
For example, ESSMOs cannot govern every aspect of community
life. Not only would the administrative costs of identifying and
then pricing the entitlements to be protected likely overwhelm
any regulatory systems, but normative considerations may weigh
against pricing some entitlements. Even after the universe of
ESSMO protection is determined, however, numerous questions
remain—from the difficulty of eliciting truthful valuation information and avoiding strategic behavior to the need to enable regulatory evolution as individual and community preferences
inevitably change. In the end, a second-best solution may be for
local jurisdictions, through the subdivision approval process, to
waive zoning restrictions if developers agree to impose covenants
substituting options for standard regulatory prohibitions.
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“Form-Based” or “Transect” Zoning
Currently, the dominant alternative to use-based zoning is a system of aesthetic controls promoted by new urbanist proponents
of mixed-use urban neighborhoods. New urbanists argue that
cities should regulate property based upon building form, not
building type. Their regulatory alternative to zoning proceeds
upon the assumption that development naturally progresses
from urban (most intense) to rural (least intense). New urbanists
call this progression the “transect” and urge cities to replace use
zoning with the regulation of building form appropriate to the
various “transect zones” along the progression. Theoretically, the
concept is relatively simple: buildings appropriate for the city
center should go in the city center (regardless of what they are
used for); suburban buildings should look suburban. New urbanists promise that their system of regulation promotes careful
planning that balances the need for city busyness with the concern about land use spillovers.
The new urbanists have made valuable contributions to thinking
about urban development in recent decades. Nearly a century of
single-use zoning has shaped our cities and suburbs—and our
views about cities and suburbs—and new urbanists mount a serious challenge to these longstanding practices and assumptions.
Indeed, even those who remain unconvinced by the new urbanists’ grandiose claims that more “urban” community design will
make us better, more complete people, cannot help but be moved
by their nostalgia for the “old neighborhood” and their case, qua
Jane Jacobs, for urban life. Unfortunately, as the saying goes, the
devil is in the details. And the new urbanists’ alternative to zoning is detailed indeed. The movement is dominated by architects,
and new urbanist coding consequently relies heavily on detailed
architectural design standards. Moreover, political resistance to
scrapping traditional zoning usually guarantees that these
standards tend to supplement, rather than supplant, traditional
zoning tools when they are adopted. New urbanists have specific ideas about how buildings should look: ugly, unwelcoming
buildings, in their view, can be just as detrimental to community
311

RULES FOR GROWTH
life as is sterile, single-use planning. For example, the regulatory
code for the Park East redevelopment district in Milwaukee—a
project initiated by the city’s former mayor, John Norquist, who is
now president of the Congress for the New Urbanism—includes
hundreds of pages of architectural renderings and photographs
of “appropriate” building types. The project has stalled, in part
because developers have balked at the complexity and cost of the
regulations.
New urbanist coding promises to make some city projects—
including infill efforts and mixed-income public housing developments—look very nice. It also may help attract some wealthy
elites who prefer an urban aesthetic but remain concerned about
the disorder and background noise associated with city life. Still,
complying with these design standards may prove daunting and
expensive, especially for those without financial means or formal
education, and it may ultimately impede growth by increasing
dramatically the cost of development.

CONCLUSION
Land use rules seek to direct the pace and scale of economic
growth—and, in so doing, to discern between “good” growth that
should be enabled and “bad” growth that should be curtailed. In
recent decades, the prevailing system of land use regulation—
characterized by command and control regulations, implemented
by multiple local jurisdictions in competition with one another
for residents and business—has come under considerable fire.
Proponents of growth management, regional government, and,
most recently, the new urbanism claim that most of the growth
enabled by local regulations is bad—and propose a new model of
comprehensive controls to guarantee that new development will
be better. Proponents of these proposals raise questions worthy of
serious consideration—but other legal rules can address the questions without raising the same risk of stifling economic growth
and innovation.
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Growth-Oriented Law for the
Networked Information Economy:
Emphasizing Freedom to Operate
Over Power to Appropriate

Yochai Benkler∗

F

rom the “rough consensus and running code” approach of
the Internet Engineering Task Force, through the World
Wide Web’s ascendance, to Skype’s voice over Internet
approach or YouTube, the rate of change, the complexity of
interactions, and the practical, technical feasibility of rapid, informal, low-cost experimentation have driven growth and innovation on the Internet on an evolutionary model rather than an engineering model. Variation, selection, adaptation, and survival/
replication through user adoption, rather than planning and high
investment, have repeatedly offered the more robust approach in
this new complex and chaotic environment. Rapid, low-cost
experimentation and adaptation on a mass scale, underwritten by
the ease of cheap, fast implementation and prototyping, and
cheap widespread failure punctuated by a steady flow of unpredictable successes, have been more important to innovation and
growth in the networked economy than models of innovation
∗ Yochai Benkler is the Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies,
Harvard Law School; Faculty co-Director, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard
University. I am grateful to the detailed and thoughtful comments of the participants in the
Kauffman Summer Legal Institute, and in particular to Robert Litan for detailed comments and
thoughts.

313

RULES FOR GROWTH
based on higher-cost, more managed innovation aimed at planning for predictable, well-understood returns. Judges and legislators who want to increase growth over time by increasing technological innovation in this unusual space should therefore orient
their efforts towards minimizing institutional barriers to experimentation and implementation. This is a very different emphasis
than the baseline set of assumptions that has driven much of
copyright and patent doctrine and legislation, which focused on
assuring existing investors the ability to secure payments for the
products of their investment. While this slower moving, higher
investment focused approach may have been appropriate to
slower moving fields with intrinsic high-capital requirements,
like small molecule pharmaceuticals, jet airplanes, or Hollywood
blockbusters, it leads to precisely the wrong results in the new
technological context that typifies the networked information
environment.
Freedom to operate is more important than power to appropriate.
Appropriation of the benefits of one’s investment is critical ex
post, and there is no question that at root, its anticipation drives
investment in commercialized applications, services, and cultural
goods. But in a globally connected, networked world, the level of
uncertainty and the rapid changes in modes of appropriation of
the benefits of innovation are so great that agility and continuous
updating for responses to actual practices and technical, social, or
behavioral opportunities is more important than the ability to
plan clearly for a release schedule and a well-specified model in
advance, and then execute reliably in a predictable environment.
The benefits of crisply defined and enforced appropriation models are outweighed by the fact that in order to secure that appropriability, the law has set up a set of rules that, in protecting yesterday’s actors, limits to too great an extent the freedom of new
innovators to operate today. In two studies from 2007 and 2010,
the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA)
claimed that the “fair use industries,” industries that depend on
and benefit from limitations to copyright, rather than its extension,
account for $4.7 trillion, with a value added of $2.7 trillion, or
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about one-sixth of U.S. GDP, employing about 17.5 million
employees with a per-employee productivity that was over 25
percent higher than economy-wide average productivity.1
The CCIA studies, which like all studies produced by lobbies
need to be taken with more than a grain of salt, are the mirror
image of the much longer practice by the copyright industries
themselves, which have often published studies touting their
own contribution to the economy. They reflect a relatively new
recognition in industries that depend on freedom to operate that
the regulatory policies that broadly fall under the umbrella of
“intellectual property” essentially regulate how they do business
in order to secure the business model of other industries, whose
business model is optimized to take advantage of these forms of
government-granted exclusivity: mostly Hollywood and the
recording industry for copyright, and the pharmaceutical industry and the patent bar for patents. This conflict of lobbying studies underscores a simple fact about intellectual property laws:
while their total effect on innovation may be questionable, they
unquestionably support some business models—those that rely
on invoking these particular grants—at the expense of other businesses, which appropriate the benefits of their investments in
research and innovation on other models—be they supply side
improvements like know-how acquisition, demand side improvements like first-mover advantages and network effects, or noncommercial models, which play a larger role in innovation
economies than in other, grain-and-steel based systems.2 The
most extensive effort to quantify the trade-offs found that the
costs of patent litigation faced by public companies outweighed
the benefits from patent-related revenues by a factor or three or
four during the innovation boom of the late 1990s.3
1 Computer & Communications Industry Association, Fair Use in the U.S. Economy: Economic
Contribution of Industries Relying on Fair Use (Washington, DC: CCIA, 2007), http://www.
ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000085/FairUseStudy-Sep12.pdf ; CCIA,
Fair Use in the U.S. Economy (Washington, DC: CCIA 2010), http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/
files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/fair-use-study-final.pdf.
2 Yochai Benkler, “Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production,”
International Review of Law and Economics 22 (2002): 81.
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Another way of putting it is that for innovation, flow is more
important than stock, but the owners of existing stocks of knowledge can afford to influence more votes in legislatures and hire
more lawyers to make arguments in court. This means that we
should expect the institutional interests of the owners of stocks of
existing materials—the owners of copyrights in existing works,
and the owners of patents in industries where single innovations
yield high returns for sustained periods—to be more powerfully
and explicitly defended in our institutions than the interests of
future innovators, who may make connections between existing
pieces of knowledge in ways that are harder to quantify now, and
therefore harder to convert into paid advocacy. This feature of the
political economy of both legislative and judicial development of
the law systematically biases our institutions in favor of stocks to
the detriment of flows. As a result the current baseline of law is
tilted in favor of past industries, and against present industries.
Any growth-oriented lawmaking body—courts, legislators, or
administrative agencies—needs to compensate for this systematic bias in the information flow to it by adopting a thoroughgoing
and systematic skepticism toward claims of the necessity of
increasing protection over existing information, knowledge, culture, and platforms at the expense of new uses and users who are
making creative or productive use of the existing body of human
knowledge and creative expression.
Courts and legislatures should consistently try to limit the extent
to which existing players who own elements of systems that new
players are building on use law to extract value from the new
players by:
• Emphasizing exemptions and narrow construction that create
freedom to operate, such as narrow construction of copyright to
exclude claims about linking or crawling, or expanding the definition of what use counts as de minimis in copyright. All are
ways of creating zones of freedom to operate.
3 James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, “Do patents perform like property?” Academy of
Management Perspectives 22 (2008): 3, 8–20.
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• Emphasizing freedom to operate and revenue sharing over
forcing ex ante negotiation or creating deterrence. In the classic
terms of liability versus property rules, this emphasizes liability systems, but a certain limited liability type: more on
the model of disgorging a share of the profits than the torts or
contracts model.
• Capping risks of liability, tying it to revenue from the new use,
and providing an anchor for negotiations in the shadow not of
exclusion or massive crippling damages, but of upside sharing
among successful operations that choose a revenue-generating
or profit-making model. Charges imposed as liability for access
to existing information, standards, or elements, should be minimized. Courts should adopt ex post upside-sharing rules as
quasi-liability rules, rather than either (a) ex ante property rules,
which create risks of hold ups and high transactions costs, or
(b) liability rules that are not tied to revenue or profit of the
innovator, such as strict damages based on high statutory levels or hypothetical lost sales or similar mechanisms that courts
in the past have used when driven by a property-protection
model that conceived of follow-on innovation without permission as a species of theft or injustice.
Change and complexity emphasize an evolutionary model of innovation.
The critical characteristic of innovation and growth on the
Internet has been its unpredictability. It has resulted from rapid,
repeated innovation, at very low cost, over an open network, with
massive rates of failure surrounding rare but regularly occurring
success. This form of distributed, scrappy innovation outstripping well-ordered, planned innovation has typified the Internet,
both commercial and noncommercial, both “deep” innovation in
the network and “user facing.” The World Wide Web is the classic example. When Lotus released Notes 1.0 in 1989, and had a
team of developers working on it, and certainly by 1995 when
IBM bought it, one would not have predicted that the actual
architecture for document sharing and collaboration would come
out of a scrappy, informal system, one of dozens then being
developed by young computer scientists and users to solve the
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same set of problems. And yet, it was Tim Berners-Lee’s World
Wide Web, not IBM’s Lotus Notes, that won the day. It was then
Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina at University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign who created Mosaic, the first graphical user
interface to the Web, and who founded Netscape. It was Brian
Behlendorf, from the same academic research group, whose Web
server, Apache, won out against both Netscape’s own Web server
and Microsoft’s server. Behlendorf’s was open source software,
developed by a distributed group, and has been adopted and
employed by between 50 and 65 percent of the Web server market for over fifteen years, including many of its e-commerce
giants like Amazon. The same was true of Jimmy Wales’s
Wikipedia over Microsoft’s Encarta. Instant messaging came from
the periphery—ICQ was created by four kids in their twenties
from Israel. The first generation successes—Amazon and eBay,
Yahoo and Google—all follow the path of small, peripheral experimenters trying something out, implementing at incredibly low
costs, surrounded by dozens of others in the same space, trying
their own experiments. Second-generation successes—from voice
over IP like Skype, which itself was built on the architecture
developed by its founders for KaZaa, the peer-to-peer music filesharing system, to video like YouTube, to social networking like
Facebook and Twitter—all have followed a similar trajectory.
Almost none of the major innovations that underlie how the
Internet is used have followed the path of efficient, orderly,
investment in R&D by established industry players. Instead, they
have been the result of entrepreneurial experimentation, both
commercial and noncommercial, by edge players, outsiders who
emerged from a field of thousands of similar experimenters who
failed. Innovation on the Internet has been a lightning-speed evolutionary process, with diversity and variation, selective pressure, and local or global successes replicating and establishing
themselves through continuous learning, experimentation, and
adaptation. For those aspects of IT industries, like semiconductor
design, where patents have been common, evidence suggests that
the patent portfolios are amassed more for protection from strike
suits by competitors or non-innovators than because they are
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themselves necessary to sustain innovation in markets that offer
many other models of appropriation—first-mover advantages,
know-how learning effects, etc.4
Three major reasons account for the importance of the edge-driven, rapid-evolution model of innovation.
First, the physical capital necessary to develop, prototype, pilot,
implement, revise, and redeploy in real time is widely available at
low cost. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the
core physical capital goods, in the core economic activities, of the
most advanced economies are widely distributed in large
portions of the population. That leaves the primary cost
associated with trying something the cost of human labor and
human capital.
Second, the kinds of innovations that can be implemented in software, text, images, etc., do not generally require massive teams
working for years before something usable can begin to run
(although refinement over time is a different matter). The labor
and human capital cost for initial experimentation, therefore, is
also relatively low (again, by comparison to pharmaceuticals or
jet airplanes, which formed the model cases of innovation in the
physical industrial age).
Third, the innovations are incremental and can be deployed over
a standards-based, open system. As a technical matter, no one’s
permission need be sought to implement and experiment. In
many cases, depending on the particular application, no lawyers
need be hired, no contracts signed. The technical and institutional system in which these innovations occurred provided nearly
absolute freedom to operate, with high uncertainty about models
of appropriation should the innovation succeed. Needless to say,
this freedom to operate meant that a lot of nonsense happened, as
well as harmful activity. But the nonsense came and went cheaply, without imposing too great a cost on most people around it.
4 B. H. Hall and R. H. Ziedonis, “The patent paradox revisited: An empirical study of patenting in
the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979–95,” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2001): 101–128.
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Failure was cheap and rapid. And the harm was, broadly speaking, less than the typical threats associated with living in a big,
thriving city. Metaphorical hyperbole notwithstanding, the risks
online are still, by and large, not as severe as the risks in the physical world. And “piracy” online still stands for potential, often
hypothetical, lost sales, not for sunken ships, maimed sailors, and
enslaved passengers. The first two reasons, then, had to do with
low capital barriers to innovation. The third had to do with low
institutional barriers.
As a result of these characteristics, innovation in the networked
environment is characterized by rapid change, complexity,
imperfection, and constant learning and experimentation. It is
typified by:
• Change and complexity, rather than predictability and “well
behaved” change
• Innovation and growth, rather than efficiency and optimization
• “Scruffy,” adaptive learning systems with late-binding design
that do better than tightly-coupled, slower-moving, optimized
systems
• Open systems, which emphasize freedom to operate on standardized interfaces among different actors and components,
that do better than closed systems that emphasize control and
well-ordered development and interaction among components
and actors
In such an environment, the critical challenge for law, lawmakers,
and judges is to resist the temptation to impose order on this
chaotic realm. Accepting that it is precisely the chaotic, complex,
open nature of this system that has been so important to innovation and growth in the past two decades is extremely difficult for
law as a cultural concept, and for lawyers and judges as people
who are trained to think in terms of order, and to see their roles
as constructing systems that increase predictability and order.
That basic impulse is not entirely mistaken, but can easily lead to
the introduction of counterproductive barriers to experimentation, innovation, and growth in the context of the networked
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information economy. It requires self-discipline for a judge to
accept that sometimes not protecting claims that are framed as
“rights” is a way to assure innovation and growth, because as
lawyers we are trained to think that clear, strong rights enable
markets, rather than create barriers. In this context, however,
where the rights are intellectual property-type rights, or rights to
control standards or other necessary facilities, the claims of right
are often more of a hindrance to entrepreneurship than a help.
Assume that any given attempted innovation has a chance of
1:1,000 to succeed. Assume further that there is a threshold level
of cost of innovation and experimentation that can be borne by a
large number of potential innovators as part of their baseline existence. This can mean many different things. It might mean a couple of college roommates working at night, or a few twenty-somethings who decide to work, using some of their parents’ or relatives’ money, or day jobs, to cross-subsidize experiments that they
are doing because they hope to be the next big entrepreneur or at
least gain experience and a reputation. Or it might mean that it is
a way for an existing big company to occupy some of its slack, or
generate motivation and enthusiasm among its knowledge workers, working “off the clock” or using specially designated free
“play” time. There are many strategies, by many different actors
in society, able to sustain highly uncertain activities that are in
some measure rewarding in their own right, and in some measure able to deliver very high returns at a vanishingly small probability. Above a given threshold, however, experimentation
becomes something that requires a real source of financing—an
investment from a venture capital firm, a loan from a bank, etc.
That cost represents a “threshold,” in the sense that it represents
a dramatic drop-off in the number of actors and the diversity of
the models they can use to sustain their innovative exploration.
Say there is some number—$100,000 per year, or 2,000 engineering or artistic hours, or 100 billable hours by a lawyer—above
which the range of actors able to persist is drastically reduced to
those who can raise money in sufficient quantities: that is, those
who can make a well-defined case for appropriation of the

321

RULES FOR GROWTH
returns to investment to an investor who has alternative options
in a more well-behaved market. If the increase in cost reflected a
corresponding increase in likelihood of success, then in principle
the level of innovation could be maintained. But as long as the
number of experiments and experimenters declines more rapidly
than the probability of success increases, we will get fewer successful innovations. Imagine that under cost condition one, below
the threshold, we have 10,000 experiments with a 1:1,000 probability of success, and so ten are likely to succeed. On the other
hand, imagine that above the threshold, we have only 500 experimenters, and let’s imagine that their probability of success is ten
times greater, not 1:1,000, but 1:100. In this case, we can expect
five successful innovations. While these numbers are, of course,
hypothetical, they illustrate the basic intuition: as long as the
amount of experimentation that occurs above a threshold cost has
decreased by more than the probability of any given experiment’s
success on average has increased for the new types of more carefully selected experiments, the level of innovation at a societal
level has decreased.
The critical facts about a given ecosystem’s rate of innovation,
then, become: (a) the value of the threshold; (b) the rate at which
experiments drop after the threshold is reached; (c) the success
rate of all organizations/individuals capable of functioning at
costs below the threshold rates; and (d) the success rate of the
subset of organizations capable of continuing to experiment, at
the number of feasible experiments, above the threshold rate.
There are no current measurements of this trade-off. What we
have is the practical experience of the past twenty years in online
innovation. Even the most innovative companies, like Google,
find themselves buying innovations from outside sources, even
where they tried to innovate in the same space internally. Google
had its employees working on a video platform and created
Google Video, but ended up buying YouTube as the more successful innovation in the same field. The fact that the experimenter
was Google turned out not to predict who among the dozens or
hundreds of experimenters working on online user-generated
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video platforms would end up winning. The point is that if there
is a baseline level of innovative experimentation that can go on in
a society as long as its costs are below a given threshold, and if
there is an insufficiently tight correlation between being a present
successful company with a stock of knowledge and being the
entrepreneur and innovator who creates tomorrow’s successful
innovation, then keeping the cost of experimentation below that
threshold becomes the critically important target. That state of the
world indeed seems to describe the shape of experimentation and
innovation online better than the alternative model, which
depends on a more predictable rate of success, from larger investments made by a more predictable set of actors in a more wellbehaved innovation system.
The implication of accepting this model of evolutionary innovation in the online environment is quite substantial. It means that
assuring the costs of experimentation remain below the threshold
that allows large numbers of low-cost, low-expected-return
(given the discounted probability of success) experimenters is
more important than emphasizing the predictability of appropriating the return should it happen, where doing so would raise the
cost level in the first place. In the context of intellectual property,
this means that the potential negative effects on follow-on innovation, always known to exist in any IP system, have a particularly acute effect in this more chaotic innovation system. Whatever
the beneficial effects on the investment incentives of the platform
or IP owner, they are likely to be swamped, in a dynamic,
evolutionary analysis, by the decline in experimentation by
everyone else.
Practical proposals to promote experimentation. Accepting a growthoriented framework, particularly accepting that innovation and
experimentation are characterized by a nonlinear, threshold effect
whereby, once costs increase above a given threshold, the amount
of experimentation lost swamps the amount of investment
secured by the increased investments of the smaller set of players
able to play above the threshold cost, has stark implications for
copyright law and its neighboring rights online, like business
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methods patents. Here, I will describe and outline what these
reforms would look like, although without working out the specific doctrinal moves for each or the detailed analysis of how each
would directly affect innovation. They are all intended to present
pathways for reform, and specific targets of reform, for a judge
and a legislature concerned with innovation in this new, chaotic,
and complex networked innovation system.
Narrow construction of scope and applicability of control points based
on copyright or patents.
• Read the idea or fact/expression dichotomy broadly.
• Use preemption to limit application of licensing agreements
that attempt to limit reverse engineering and similar efforts to
promote interoperability.
• Expand de minimis freedom to operate.
• Revise Grokster back to Sony.
• Continue to expand the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) exceptions through the Librarian of Congress.
Innovation and creative experimentation always represent a tension between the freedom to operate of today’s innovators, and
the ability of yesterday’s innovators or owners of existing information resources to make money from last year’s investments.
This is not unique to the Internet, and is driven by two factors.
First, one of the raw materials for tomorrow’s innovation or creative expression is yesterday’s universe of knowledge. This is
particularly so in a networked information environment, where
the raw materials, the transportation hubs, the machines, are
largely made up of yesterday’s knowledge base. Second, information, knowledge, and culture are strictly public goods in the economic sense. Once produced, even in the most well-behaved and
simple model, their marginal cost is zero. That is, to the extent
that they are available only for a positive price above their cost of
distribution, they will be underutilized by future innovators.
These two understandings have been at the core of the economic
understanding of innovation and IP at least since Nobel Laureate
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economist Kenneth Arrow’s pathbreaking work on the rate and
direction of innovation almost fifty years ago. That tension is the
underlying economic rationale, under the traditional approach,
of various limitations of copyrights and patents, from the
limited terms required by the Constitution, to the more-or-less
high requirements of novelty and nonobviousness in patent,
and through to the various exceptions and carve outs in copyright law.
This tension is heightened in the distributed, complex networked
environment. Because major innovations come from peripheral
players, both commercial and noncommercial, preserving the
power of yesterday’s innovator to appropriate does not provide
revenue streams for tomorrow’s innovations to the same extent
that was true in the past. Because the cost of experimentation and
innovation is so low, the expectation of appropriation need not be
as great, and the “incentives” problem is solved by the tippy
nature of networked markets—first-mover advantages are substantial, network effects lock in successful leads, and large numbers of users tend to provide sufficient levels of revenue to attract
investment and effort in search of the next big thing even in an
open, fluid environment. Much of the legal system’s emphasis in
the past twenty years on control and its exercise has been driven
by law suits and policy drives by non-innovative industries—like
the recording industry, Hollywood, and some of the older-line
software companies—in an effort to leverage older investments to
capture future rents at the expense of today’s innovators.
Copyright law provides various doctrines with which to create
substantial freedom to operate for next-generation innovators.
One classic example that has been enormously important was the
more-or-less categorical acceptance by courts of the position that
copying a computer program for purposes of reverse engineering
did not violate copyright, mostly by protecting it under the fair
use doctrine. The case of reverse engineering is a classic instance
of efforts to leverage earlier innovation to constrain later innovation: it is the classic image of freedom to operate trumping power
to appropriate. Beginning in 1988,5 and then throughout the
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1990s, circuit courts throughout the country largely protected the
privilege of software developers to act in ways that formally violate copyright, say, by making an unauthorized copy or derivative work, as long as this was done as part of the process of
reverse engineering: that is, figuring out how the software works
so as to make use of its functionality, usually in order to create
software that interoperates with the software that is being
reversed engineered.6
This widely adopted rule was, in turn, quite widely accepted
within the industry, but came under pressure after the passage of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and the introduction of an increasing number of End User Licensing Agreements
(EULAs) that prohibited reverse engineering. The DMCA’s core
provision constrained circumventing technological protection
measures. The “anti-circumvention” provisions responded to a
concern by copyright owners. They hoped to maintain, and
indeed refine, their control over digitized information goods by
wrapping them with encryption, so that they could avoid unauthorized copying but also enforce much more subtle techniques
of price discrimination—for example, by making sure that a digital music file sold in the United States for $15 could not then be
resold in Europe, where it is available for EUR 15; or to sell onetime viewings, or three-time viewings, etc., at different pricing.
The fear to which the anti-circumvention provisions responded
was that other software developers would be able to build
devices that would get around—circumvent—the encryption.
The DMCA made both the act of circumventing a copy-protection
design, and the act of making or distributing the tools to do so,
civil and potentially criminal offenses. Within a short period,
these provisions began to be used by companies to prevent competitors from entering their markets. Typical of these cases was
the Lexmark case. One printer company, Lexmark International,
5 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
6 For a review of the cases and problems associated with its extension to software patents see
Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley, “Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry,” California
Law Review 89 (2001): 1.

326

13: GROWTH-ORIENTED LAW FOR THE NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY
tried to use the DMCA to prevent competitors from making toner
cartridges that could work with its own printers. It did so by
including a microchip and piece of software with the cartridges,
without which a competing cartridge would not be run by the
printer. Another company, Static Control Components, created a
compatible, unauthorized microchip that could be installed in the
cartridges by other companies, which, in turn, could compete in
the market for replacement toner for Lexmark printers. To do so,
Static Control had to both make use of a Lexmark’s Toner
Loading Program, in ways that included copying it, and circumvent the protection measure provided by the chip.7
The Sixth Circuit decision provides a model for what a court concerned with freedom to operate to support growth should do. The
first was to define the boundaries of copyrightability narrowly.
Rather than relying on fair use, which involves substantial litigation risk, the court analyzed the program copied for its character
as functional, within the classic idea/expression and merger
framework. That is, copyright law specifically excludes from its
coverage the idea embodied in an expression from coverage; anyone is free to express the same idea in different words. What is
interesting about the way the Sixth Circuit applied this basic principle of copyright law to this case is that it created a broad categorical freedom to operate for access controls of the kind at stake,
instead of subjecting each future effort to achieve interoperability
to the vagaries of fair use. Note that fair use is a four-factor doctrine, is relatively uncertain, and presents a relatively high litigation risk for defendants. Second, the court construed the DMCA’s
provision narrowly to avoid the facts of the case, and emphasized
the importance of the core function of Static Control’s program—
enabling interoperability. Together, these two components anchor
an important part of the broader approach: assuring that where a
later innovator uses the functions, ideas, or facts embedded in a
copyrighted work, even when doing so technically requires using
the work itself, that act is not itself infringing.
7 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
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By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Blizzard v. BnetD took the opposite route. There, Blizzard, a major computer games company,
used a code to limit play of its online, multiplayer game to players who used servers that it owns and controls. BnetD was an
open source project that permitted the owners of copies of
Blizzard games to direct their instances of the program to play on
different servers not owned by Blizzard. (The servers are essentially databases that store all of the data about past “behaviors” of
the players, and continuously update the data on who has manipulated his or her software in the past in ways that move a character, build a feature, etc. These games are essentially vast relational databases that the users manipulate through the interface of the
richly rendered game environment.) Blizzard argued that
enabling its players to use their games over other systems’ servers
violated the terms of its end user license agreement (EULA),
which, among other things, prohibited reverse engineering.
While the court agreed that reverse engineering was “necessary”
in order for the BnetD software to be developed, it nonetheless
sided with Blizzard, holding that enforcing a prohibition on
doing something that was privileged under federal copyright law
was not preempted by that law. To so hold, the court would have
to assume that the freedom of software developers to reverse
engineer under federal copyright law was not itself a core component of federal policy, and it did so explicitly rejecting the applicability of the reverse engineering cases, going back to Vault,
which did in fact hold that federal law preempted terms of service or a EULA that prohibited reverse engineering. The court in
Blizzard effectively made a choice: assuring that Blizzard was able
to control use of its game software by having a secure, controlled
playing environment was more important than assuring that new
innovators and entrants had the freedom to operate they needed
to create new systems that interoperated with the existing systems. It is a preference for defending stocks over enabling flows.
While not a doctrinally implausible decision, it put the thumbs on
the scale on the wrong side from the perspective of driving innovation and growth. This becomes even clearer in the case of
Blizzard, because the game is a multiplayer online persistent
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environment—that is, it is a database service company, which
sells access to a continuously updated database (which records
and reports the “location” and “actions” of the game characters).
As such, from the perspective of assuring appropriability, it is not
at all clear that multiplayer online game makers like Blizzard
require any more intellectual property protection than do other
database producers: which is to say, none at all.
The point of the discussion here is not necessarily or specifically
to criticize the Blizzard decision and support extension of Lexmark.
It is to emphasize that courts and judges concerned with growth
and focused on innovation in a complex, rapidly changing environment should model their analysis on the Lexmark case, and
avoid the pitfall of imagining that what they are seeing is a pathway to piracy on the model of Blizzard. The particulars will
change from one case to the next. In one, courts might be asked to
treat crawling of images and reproduction of thumbnails by an
image search engine as violations of the underlying copyright in
the image;8 in another, courts might be asked to hold that crawling the contents of news sites to develop an aggregate sense of
what news is currently important violates a newly reinvigorated
“hot news” doctrine on the model of International News Service vs.
Associated Press (a mostly abandoned approach in which the
Supreme Court created a property-like right in the factual contents of news reports; this allowed news media to sue competitors
who copied the factual content of the news, which cannot be protected by copyright, for the period during which the news had
commercial value).9 The fundamental idea that a growth and
innovation perspective underscores is that all of these types of
cases include the same core structure, and should be treated as
cases of constraints on freedom to operate in the face of pressure
from yesterday’s innovators and creators to slow innovation and
growth down so as to stabilize their ability to appropriate the
fruit of their own past investments. While it will not always be
practical for a court to refuse to provide such a remedy, the basic
8 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
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stance we propose here is one of skepticism and minimalism,
rather than of creative judicial extension of rights that might be
recommended by a more static, efficiency- or security-centric
analysis.
Specifically, Lexmark and the reverse engineering cases (prior to
Blizzard) stand for the benefits of using two major doctrinal levers
more powerfully in defense of freedom to operate for follow-on
innovators and creators.
• Idea/fact versus expression doctrine. In particular, Lexmark used
the fact that the copying was used to achieve interoperability to
anchor its holding that however initially “creative” the
Lexmark code was, once it is used to protect access, then using
it and its unique features becomes a fact about interoperability.
That is to say, the function merges with the expression based on
the fact that using what might otherwise have been protected
elements becomes necessary to interoperate with the earlier
work.
• Preemption of licenses that constrain follow-on uses. Courts should
treat elements of copyright law that preserve freedom to operate for follow-on uses as preempting the field, and preempt
licenses that constrain follow-on uses beyond what a growthsensitive, flow-protecting interpretation of copyright or patent
would support.
A similar transformation can occur by a broad reading of the de
minimis doctrine. Copyright law recognizes that minimal uses do
not rise to the level of copyright violation. Yet courts have been
highly circumspect in their use of the de minimis doctrine. In
Bridgeport Music,10 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that a threenote riff sampled and transformed was sufficient to invoke copyright, subject only to the fair use doctrine. But the fair use doctrine is uncertain and an invitation to litigate. Far more effective
9 246 U.S. 215 (1918). The idea of reviving this largely defunct doctrine was presented by news
organizations in the context of Federal Trade Commission workshops on the future of journalism.
E.g., Current Copyright Issues in Journalism panel, FTC Workshop, “How Will Journalism Survive the
Internet Age?” Washington, DC, March 9, 2010.
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would be to create safe harbors for creative reuse of existing
materials. The critical frame of mind appropriate for such a determination is as follows: is this the kind of violation or revenue
stream without which the original investment would not have
been made? In the case of music and sampling, the basic question
is whether there is any song recorded and distributed where, at
the margin, the investment in creating, recording, and distributing the music would not have been made but for the expectation
of sampling royalties. As long as the kind of use would not have
made the marginal difference to incentive—that is, as long as
there is a clear market absent royalties from this particular creative downstream use—then imposing liability creates a downstream blockage without obvious marginal contribution to investment in creative work.
Reinstitute the Sony Doctrine by reversing Grokster. The fear of rampant online music piracy led the Supreme Court to a split decision that unnecessarily increased the litigation risk for innovators
and entrepreneurs that develop platforms for user creation, storage, and communication of cultural expression, thereby dampening and increasing the costs of entrepreneurship.11 When Sony’s
Betamax technology was challenged in court, the Supreme Court
ultimately held that even a relatively modest amount of substantial noninfringing use was sufficient to provide an innovator with
a safe harbor against contributory liability for copyright infringements committed by users who use its product or platform (in
that case, a video cassette recorder).12 When the doctrine was
revisited by the Supreme Court in the Grokster case,13 the Court
was faced with three options. First, advocated by the movie and
music industry, was a doctrine that would have required innovators to show, with extensive evidence of actual usage patterns,
that the uses that users made of the technology after it was
deployed were largely legal. The risk posed by this standard
would have been, of course, that innovators of relatively flexible
platforms cannot in advance know what the uses will be, or how
10 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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usage and adoption patterns would develop. Any platform capable of infringing uses alongside its noninfringing uses would represent enormous investment risk, particularly in light of massive
damage awards discussed below. The second option was to keep
the innovation-supporting Sony doctrine in place. This had the
benefit of over two decades of practice, during which creativity
by the copyright industries continued undiminished, and innovation in the electronics industries was widespread. The third
option, which the Court chose, was to permit a more fact-based
inquiry not into patterns of use after the fact, but into intentions
of the platform provider at the time of the creation of the innovation—whether there is evidence that supporting piracy was
intended as the major application. While not as restrictive as the
position advocated by the copyright industries, this position certainly created new litigation risks for platform innovators,
because the kind of fact-based inquiry required by the court
makes these kinds of cases less susceptible to summary dismissal
and therefore more likely to kill an entrepreneurial company if
brought, irrespective of what the ultimate merits of the case
might be were the innovator to have the wherewithal to litigate to
11 Note that I use the terms “risk” and “uncertainty,” and sometimes, as in the case of the innovation environment that drives experimentation, it has a positive valence; and in others, like litigation risk, a negative one. From a purely financial, options basis, “risk” is desirable. When we consider different sources of risk, however, we can see that some of them drive toward better applications or uses being established—these are risks associated with whether a technology will or
will not work; with whether consumers will or will not adopt a technology—because the risk is
associated with whether or not a desideratum of the platform will, or will not, turn out to be as
valuable and adopted as its designers intend. To overcome such a risk, the person deploying the
platform can aim to make whatever it is they are deploying more of what it is intended to be—
useful, attractive, etc. Litigation risk, by contrast, has to do with the fact that uncertain doctrines
like fair use, or the new Grokster doctrine, expose parties to risks of payment that are not correlated with how good or early or useful their application or service is. They also are not a reflection of how harmful their activity is to an earlier actor; or how useful that earlier actor is. Efforts
to mitigate such risks cannot therefore be directed ex ante at avoiding harm to valuable incumbents, or improving one’s service; they involve simply added insurance costs, in effect, against a
risk that it not correlated to any desirable dimension of the innovation or development itself.
Hence, while from the financial investment perspective one bet is as good as another, from the
perspective of risks that drive to desirable investments (those that increase the probability of success, or decrease harm to valuable incumbent activities), the two kinds of risks are not parallel.
12 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
13 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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conclusion. Given that there is no evidence that the original Sony
doctrine was insufficient, either a legislative or judicial revisiting
would help to lower the risk and cost of innovation in a broad
range of online applications.
Continue to expand exemptions through the Librarian of Congress. The
DMCA included a specific process through which the Librarian of
Congress can identify classes of behavior that require circumvention of digital protection devices, but are privileged under copyright and therefore require an exemption from liability. In the first
two or three reviews, the Librarian of Congress began to issue a
very small set of exemptions. Most recently, the Librarian extended an exemption to iPhone “jailbreaking”: the practice of overcoming the iPhone’s internal security that allows Apple to control
which applications run on the phone, so as to make those applications compatible with the iPhone platform. This is an enormously important decision, because it opens up for innovation a
platform that, at least potentially, could come to replace the laptop as the primary mobile Internet device through the same kind
of chaotic innovation model that typified the Internet. The
Librarian also extended the exemption to circumvention of video
protection measures if the use that is made of the video is noncommercial creative transformation—that is, mashup. Given that
user-generated video is an important pathway for consumer
product innovation, again, this likely is a mid-level intervention
to increase freedom to operate at the expense of some reduction
in power to appropriate.14
Create a new kind of injunctive relief in copyright cases that would tie
damage-like payments to actual revenue of entrepreneurs that use existing copyrighted materials without permission. Injunctions and damages present important risks, particularly to early stage commercial, and noncommercial, efforts. The risk to innovation and
entrepreneurship is not so much that a successfully commercialized platform will be required to pay a reasonable share of its
14 Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201 Rulemaking, July 23, 2010,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/Librarian-of-Congress-1201-Statement.html.
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profits and revenues to an enabling underlying innovation or creative cultural input. While clearly excessive damages or poorly
thought-out injunctions can gum the works up even at those later
stages of commercialization, the higher risk is that early stage
experimentation will be stifled by potential liability irrespective
of successful commercial establishment for (a) early stage commercially oriented experimentation and innovation and (b) noncommercial innovation and experimentation, which, as noted
earlier in this chapter, have made unusually large contributions to
innovation in the networked environment because of their particular pattern of distributed physical capital investment and relatively low cost of implementing innovation.
Both injunctions and damages that are not tied to actual revenues
of the infringer can cause significant dampening of innovation
that depends on use of existing knowledge, platforms, or cultural inputs. Because of the nonrivalry of information—that is, its
nature as a public good—even a perfectly functioning set of property rights enforced by injunction would lead to underutilization
of existing information inputs. Moreover, there are significant
imperfections involved in identifying whose existing IP rights
would potentially be implicated by a given new application or
business model and in transacting over these rights, and there are
many opportunities for strategic behavior and holdout where one
party holds an exclusive right over inputs that are essential to the
functioning of a dependent product. Particularly in an innovation
environment where low-cost, high-risk innovation is the modus
operandi, leaving the clearance of right to an injunction-enforced
property-type system imposes relatively high costs and relatively
high degrees of constraint on the freedom of innovators to operate in the networked economy.
A partial solution to this dampening effect is the one presented in
eBay v. MercExchange.15 There, the Supreme Court refused to follow the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s practice of
assuming that injunction was the normal remedy in patent cases,
but rather decided that the issuance of an injunction even in
patent cases was subject to the standard equitable analysis,
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requiring irreparable injury, inadequacy of damages, balance of
hardships, and public interests. Lower court cases since then have
indeed applied this standard and denied injunctions in a substantial minority of cases. The cost of this approach is increased
uncertainty for the rights holders. The benefit is that this
increased uncertainty decreases the expected value of the suits,
and therefore likely decreases the number of suits, in particular
suits against impecunious defendants, who are precisely the
kinds of defendants that are most likely to be driven out of business by suits and that form the set of experimental entrepreneurs
of particular concern to the networked innovation system. Within
the traditional injunction model, levers like balance of hardships
and public interest can be particularly productive in creating an
early stage freedom to operate for early innovators and noncommercial players to generate the distributed innovations that have
played an important role in the online environment.
Judicial discretion in granting injunctions provides the doctrinal
pathway through which to implement some of the insights of the
benefits of using liability-like regimes in these areas of extensive
small- to mid-scale innovations with high mutual dependencies
that are so typical of the online environment. The idea behind the
long-standing drive of scholars like Jerome Reichman and others
has been that a legal regime that emphasizes flows over stocks,
assuring access and sorting out revenue sharing later, is particularly conducive in an innovation system that depends so heavily
on radically distributed innovation, with high dependencies
between incremental improvements made by disparate organizations and individuals. Here, the failures of a property system are
strongest, and the benefits of a mechanism for settlement arrangements after it becomes known which innovations got commercialized, and their dependencies, emphasizes a “do first, distribute later” approach.
But a liability regime itself can create as much, if not more, of a
drag on innovation and investment than a property/injunction
15 eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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regime, if the expected damages are unmoored from the actual
potential business models to which they apply. A classic example
of this threat is the holding in UMG v. MP3.com.16 There,
MP3.com introduced a music distribution service that was much
more manageable and plausibly legal than the peer-to-peer filesharing services that emerged with its demise. Nonetheless, the
company was not owned by the record labels, and was sued for
providing a service that allowed users to listen to music anywhere, as long as they had once proven that they owned a copy
of the music by inserting a CD of it into their computer while
logged into the service. As a technical, practical matter, to offer
the service MP3.com made copies of the music, and violated the
copyrights of the record labels. As a practical business matter,
MP3.com was an innovative firm that was able to create a market
that could have provided a much more manageable online marketplace for recording companies than the chaos of the decade
that followed. But the recording industry was not ready to give
up the level of control it had enjoyed in the off-line world. In the
suit, MP3.com was held liable for statutory damages of $25,000
per CD, which could have totaled over $160 million. The company settled for $53 million with UMG and another $110 million
with the other firms. As a result, the company became too financially weak to operate, was initially bought out at a tiny fraction
of its value in IPO by one of the recording labels, Vivendi
Universal, and then broken up and sold in pieces.
The statutory damages created a set of crushing liabilities entirely divorced from either real damages caused to the labels or actual revenues captured by the innovative firm. The in terrorem force
of such damages is hard to overstate. They exist irrespective of
any showing of a single displaced sale. They exist and are available against any infringer. And where an injunction can shut off a
pathway or line of business, the damages pose an immediate
threat of wiping out investors in bankruptcy.

16 UMG Recordings, Inc. vs. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp. 2d 349 (2000).
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What, then, is the solution? How do judges or legislators preserve
the freedom to operate for innovators who depend on existing
materials, without subjecting them to excessive strategic holdouts
through injunctions and without creating unacceptable risks of
very high damages that are independent of their revenues? One
possible answer is to use the equitable powers that are implicit in
the injunction remedy, expanding the approach introduced in
eBay v. MercExchange. The driving idea is to give innovative models a space to explore and experiment, while preserving a framework to force payment should a given experiment succeed and
become a significant source of revenue. A court could issue an
injunction, subject to purchase by the infringer at a rate equivalent to an industry-standard royalty for the works used. An entrepreneur facing a decision whether to experiment with a platform
or service that uses existing information, knowledge, or culture
with possible proprietary claims will face neither the prospect of
holdup nor the prospect of bankruptcy, but rather the prospect of
paying a standardized royalty should the experiment succeed.
That entrepreneur would still prefer to acquire a license so as to
minimize uncertainty. But the bargaining posture is very different
when the rights holder cannot stop the entrepreneur from operating, and cannot expect to win more than an industry-standard
royalty, than when the rights holder can put the entrepreneur out
of business through either injunction or overwhelming damages.
This proposal is far from trivial to implement. It has the virtue of
creating extensive freedom to operate in experimentation with
online business models, technical platforms, and services around
existing cultural materials. It would represent a dramatic departure from the trend of the past twenty years, which has systematically emphasized the power of rights holders to appropriate the
value of their existing cultural goods, rather than the freedom of
entrepreneurs to innovate. An imperfect version of this approach
could be implemented by judges by applying the discretion left to
them in awarding damages and fashioning injunctions under the
copyright act, although the constraints of statutory damages
still leave rights holders the power to elect imposition of, at a
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minimum, a $750 per-violation damage award. Still, a systematic
judicial practice of imposing only the bare minimum in statutory
damages, to be credited against the value of the royalty from
actual revenues, should limit the effects of the threat of damages.
Of course, a more complete and refined reform could be adopted
by Congress, although the political economy strongly favors protecting currently known rights holders at the expense of future
and currently unknown innovators and entrepreneurs.
Eliminate business methods patents. Quite possibly the most misguided application of patent doctrine was its extension to business methods. It was a laughable idea that entrepreneurs need a
government-granted twenty-year monopoly over a particular
way they developed to serve customers or calculate payments
among holders of syndicated credit notes, and that the returns in
the market from such innovations is insufficient to support them.
And it was laughable from the moment the Federal Circuit first
decided to extend patent protection to business methods (in particular, an automated system for pooling the funds of mutual
funds).17 Business methods patents have been subject to extensive criticism since they were first introduced. Partly, this is
because the very idea is so patently unnecessary. Partly, it is
because the quality of patents granted has been so low. (As this
manuscript was being prepared, Amazon was granted a patent
on social networking, on a patent application filed four years
after Facebook had been launched, whose abstract reads like a
joke about how a patent attorney would describe Facebook’s
affordances; note too that Facebook itself was a latecomer, following Six Apart, Friendster, and later MySpace.)18
It took slightly over a decade for the Federal Circuit to begin to
reverse course, and in its en banc hearing of In re Bilski, that court,
without formally reversing State Street Bank, limited it extensively by tying the availability of patenting to the implementation of
a business method under the historical “machine or transforma17 State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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tion” test. As a practical matter, this would largely contain the use
of business methods patents, without overturning their availability in principle. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirmed
the result (the patent holder lost), but reversed the exclusive use
of the “machine or transformation” test as too narrow and outdated a basis for patentability.19 Four concurring justices would have
categorically excluded business methods patents from patentability.20 Justice Kennedy did not exclude the possibility that the
Federal Circuit would find other, less textually cramped
approaches to limiting patentability in ways consistent with
enhancing innovation. Indeed, his opinion was very explicit in
embracing the idea that it is precisely the widely distributed,
open innovation ecology of the Internet that creates the new challenges for patent law:
It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not
commenting on the patentability of any particular
invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should
or should not receive patent protection. This Age puts
the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. With
ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking
patent protections for their inventions, the patent law
faces a great challenge in striking the balance between
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over

18 Brian D. Robertson et al., Amazon Technologies, Inc., US Patent 7,739,139, social networking system, filed May 27, 2008, and issued June 15, 2010. The abstract reads: “A networked computer system provides various services for assisting users in locating, and establishing contact relationships
with, other users. For example, in one embodiment, users can identify other users based on their
affiliations with particular schools or other organizations. The system also provides a mechanism
for a user to selectively establish contact relationships or connections with other users, and to
grant permissions for such other users to view personal information of the user. The system may
also include features for enabling users to identify contacts of their respective contacts. In addition, the system may automatically notify users of personal information updates made by their
respective contacts.”
19 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. (June 28, 2010).
20 Slip op at 33.
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procedures that others would discover by independent,
creative application of general principles. Nothing in
this opinion should be read to take a position on where
that balance ought to be struck.
For now, business methods patents are still available. The pathway that the Federal Circuit pointed to, that four justices would
have adopted already, and that the majority certainly left open, is
for their elimination.
Other policy areas involve trade-offs between control and freedom to
operate. The basic problem identified here—a trade-off between
law and policy positions that aim to stabilize and order an otherwise-chaotic system at the expense of raising the cost of innovation and entrepreneurship on the Internet—is repeated in other
contexts as well. These other areas are too complex to be covered
in detail in this short chapter. They raise distinct issues from those
of IP, and there is no intention of resolving them here.
Nevertheless, it is important to identify the fact that each of these
areas, in addition to other aspects of the problems they present,
also represent the problem of trading off control and the opportunities it provides for appropriation by the owners of a valuable
resource, and freedom to operate for innovators who require
access to and use of those resources to experiment, pilot, deploy,
and innovate. The debate over net neutrality has a similar shape:
opponents claim that carriers need the power to control flows
over their networks in order to provide incentives for infrastructure investment, while proponents argue that freedom to operate
over a set of open standards that treat all bits equally provides
greater flexibility for innovation and avoids transactional barriers
for entrepreneurs and innovators developing new applications
online. Privacy concerns also have a similar shape. Here, the tension is not between security for large investment and freedom to
experiment, but between security of individual context and the
same freedom to experiment. Because the tension is between an
economic, growth-oriented interest and a noneconomic interest,
the trade-off is harder to settle along a common dimension.
Nonetheless, it is important to understand that (a) the tension has
340

13: GROWTH-ORIENTED LAW FOR THE NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY
the same impact on innovation and entrepreneurship, and (b)
that solutions to concerns over privacy that depend on widely
adopted technical standards, that then permit widespread innovation without imposing higher costs, have the benefit of serving
the noneconomic interests implicated by privacy and the growth
interests concerned with widespread freedom to operate for innovation. Internet security is another interest that, like privacy, is
somewhat distinct from investment security. As Jonathan Zittrain
has described in detail, precisely the wide-open characteristics of
the Internet, what he called its generativity, are also the characteristics that made deployment of experiments so trivial.
Approaches based on trusted systems that will refuse to run programs not authorized by a given party—say, Microsoft through
the operating system, or Apple through its App Store—certainly
offer greater control and security against viruses and malware,
but only at the expense of creating a drag on experimentation and
innovation. The Internet, in this regard, is like a city: a big, open
space, where many diverse characters come and meet for their
mutual benefit, but also a space that invites crime and abuse. The
trick for modern cities has always been to manage the tension
between openness and innovativeness, on the one hand, and insecurity on the other. That same tension underlies contemporary
efforts to assure online security.

CONCLUSION
Growth depends on innovation. In the networked information
economy, innovation and entrepreneurship seem to have depended more on freedom to operate in an environment that allows
mass-scale experimentation by diverse and distributed innovators than on well-ordered investment by predictable innovators.
This importance of edge innovation seems to be driven by the
complexity of the network and its global reach, by the rapid rate
of change, by the low capital cost barriers to experimentation, and
by the technical and institutional openness of the Internet as a
network for invention, rapid prototyping and experimentation,
very rapid global adoption for successful stories, and more-or341
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less graceful, low-cost exit for the vast number of failures. The
Internet therefore seems to have characteristics that mark it as the
kind of system where very large amounts of low-cost experimentation are feasible and productive of growth, and that the potential constriction in the number and diversity of experiments
caused by efforts to impose more orderly innovation systems,
with higher costs, is likely to result in less, rather than more, innovation. The policy implications of this observation are many and
diverse, but they share a common theme and a common focus.
They argue that in a wide range of policy choices, judges, legislators, and regulators focus on preserving freedom to operate, even
where doing so comes at the expense of power to appropriate.
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Digital Firm Formation

Oliver R. Goodenough∗

INTRODUCTION AND ACTION STEPS

F

irm formation is a critical element in promoting and sustaining economic growth. Startups help drive economies forward. Increasing the ease of creating startups, and the universe of players with whom a startup can be formed, will
necessarily contribute to economic progress. Digital communication is increasing the scope and ease of many forms of human
interaction. We are using the Internet, cell phones, and such
blended devices as the iPad to keep track of friends, date, make
restaurant reservations, pursue education and commerce, and file
our taxes. The boost in efficiency and reach resulting from the
digitization of these activities is significant–sometimes even
revolutionary.
The digital revolution is affecting law as well, and digital firm formation is now a possibility. As creating and operating a firm
∗ Oliver R. Goodenough, a fellow at The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law
School, a Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School, and an Adjuct Professor at Thayer School
of Engineering at Dartmouth College, is an expert in the law of business, including corporations,
entertainment law, intellectual property, securities law, and trademarks.
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through a medium like the web becomes easier, more completely
integrated, and more widely available, it too will create a significant boost in the possibilities for establishing start-up companies.
We can accelerate this process and capture the benefits sooner by
pushing forward on a series of action steps, working to:
• Recognize the potential for digitization to bring speed and efficiency to many realms of law and their application to human
needs, with a particular focus on the law of company formation
and operation;
• Pass legislation and reform regulations so as to authorize the
formation and operation of digital companies and to recognize
the character and treatment of algorithmic ownership interests;
• Develop platforms that integrate software, communication systems, and law so as to allow users to capture the potential created by these legal changes; and
• Educate entrepreneurs and their legal advisors in law about
these changes and about how to use them to create reliable legal
structures for business with greater efficiency, reduced friction,
and increased client autonomy.
As we face a period of predicted slow economic growth following
the sharp downturn of 2008-9, cultivating institutions that better
support innovation and entrepreneurship is a priority for the
United States and the world.
In laying out the case for digital firm formation, this chapter will
first explore the importance of legal institutions for economic
activity and the potential impact of digitization on the creation of
such institutions. It will then describe more fully the four action
steps set out above, reporting on progress to date and suggesting
implementation strategies that will help to accelerate the acceptance and application of digital firms. Finally, it will return to a
wider assessment of the benefits that will flow from digital company laws, benefits that go well beyond the immediate goals of
reducing costs and boosting efficiency.
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This chapter focuses largely on legal developments in the United
States. This choice reflects limitations of scope and authorial
expertise, and not any inherent lack of interest in laws and events
outside the United States. That said, the digital corporation and
LLC amendments passed in Vermont still stand out as leading
steps in this field, and U.S. law is illustrative of the general points
to be made. Any gains that might come from an extended comparative treatment would be limited for the purposes of the arguments set out here.

BACKGROUND 1: FIRM FORMATION MATTERS
GROWTH

FOR

Why is firm formation particularly important for sustained
growth? Economic progress can be usefully differentiated
between “catch-up” growth and innovation-led growth. Catchup growth involves the adoption of existing models of technology, production, and distribution by less developed countries. As
contemporary examples like China and India demonstrate, it is
an important part of the story for increasing prosperity and wellbeing around the globe. But it is also essentially a finite part of
that story. When everyone catches up, this kind of development
levels off and stagnation can set in.
Innovation-led growth, by contrast, keeps expanding the frontier
of the possibilities of prosperity. Innovation can come in new,
more competent technological processes or in better institutions
for organizing and financing economic activity. This type of
growth is the hope of the current leaders in the world economy,
such as the United States, who set the standards to which catchup economies aspire, and in future years it will be the source of
solutions to such challenges as sustaining and growing prosperity in a resource-constrained world.
Catch-up growth is essentially imitative. It does not need the
spark of new discovery, just a good eye for what is working for
somebody else and the willingness to move from locally estab-
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lished practice and adopt the observed improvements. These
attributes can often be accommodated by existing firms, and so
catch-up growth is less dependent on new firm formation.
Innovative growth, on the other hand, is inherently a matter of
finding new approaches to put new ideas to work. Existing firms
can be a source of innovation, but the full vision of creative
destruction in a growing economy requires a constant stream of
new enterprises pushing the boundaries outward. The ease with
which new startups can be established within an economy has a
direct impact on its potential for growth.
Baumol et al. recognize this, putting firm formation among the
first elements on their list of necessary factors for an innovative
system: “[I]n the successful entrepreneurial economy, it must be
relatively easy to form a business, without expensive and timeconsuming bureaucratic red tape.”1 Summing up the problem
succinctly, they declare, “If entrepreneurship is about starting and
growing a commercial enterprise... then it must be easy and inexpensive to do.”2 The unspoken villain of the red-tape nightmare
is the legal system. While firms can be—and often are—founded
on handshakes, most advanced economies offer legally supported forms of expectation and commitment through which a more
formal, explicit, and enforceable arrangement can be made. The
availability of these private legal institutions is important for
growth. The trick, of course, is to make the barriers to establishment low in terms of complication, time, and expense—goals the
digital world can often help to accomplish.

BACKGROUND 2: LEGAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER
FIRMS

FOR

The importance of legal institutions in economic growth is widely recognized. As Jones and Romer remark: “There is very broad
1 William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the
Economics of Growth and Prosperity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
2 Ibid.
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agreement that differences in institutions must be the fundamental source of the wide differences in growth rates observed for
countries at low levels of income and for the low income and TFP
[total factor productivity] levels themselves.”3
Similarly, when Baumol et al. (2007) describe the preconditions
for a successful entrepreneurial economy, something they characterize as “a well oiled economic growth machine,” they spell out
four necessary elements, all of which involve institutions. The
first two—firm formation and the law of contract and property—
are private law spaces within which participants get to fashion
their own collaborative structures. The second two—government
policies and regulations—are public institutional domains.4
Clearly, legal institutions matter for growth, and private legal
institutions—and business organization laws in particular—can
matter as much as the society-wide institutions of macroeconomic policy. How does meeting this need help innovation?
In the public imagination, new inventions are often the product of
a lonely, innovative genius, toiling away in isolation. If the inventor is successful, and the critical light-bulb moment occurs, then
the idea generator magically morphs into an expert manager of
the processes of commercialization. While this is sometimes the
case, the myth of the lone inventor/entrepreneur is more often
just that—a myth. Innovations are seldom solitary achievements,
and particularly not in these times of technological complexity,
when mashing together a diversity of skills and knowledge is
often the source of new knowledge. In The Rational Optimist: How
Prosperity Evolves, Matt Ridley argues that innovation occurs
when “ideas have sex,” a process that is likely to require more
than one mind as the source of those ideas.5

3 Charles I. Jones and Paul M. Romer, “The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Population, and
Human Capital,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, no. 1 (2010): 224-45.
4 Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism.
5 Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves (New York: Harper Collins, 2010).
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Collaboration is even more important for taking an idea into production and bringing it to market. Here again, the skill sets
involved are likely to be only partially represented in any one
person, and collaboration will increase the chances of success.
Furthermore, skills alone are frequently not enough—capital is
generally a requirement, and a requirement that must often be
sought from sources beyond the coalition of idea and management providers so far assembled. As it labors to bring ideas to
practice, entrepreneurship often creates a team, bringing together
capital, technical expertise, management acumen, and expertise
in dealing with legal and governmental requirements. Whether it
is two people or ten, the team will generally only commit the
required resources of time, talent and money against a reasonably
reliable expectation of a share in the hoped-for gains that the
innovative activity can produce.
The challenge of capturing and sharing the gains that arise from
productive cooperation and collaboration is a general one, with
application well beyond the context of human economic activity.
The potential problems come in several variants, ranging from
active deceit, defection, and predation to less aggressive but
equally destructive free-riding. In their classic biological treatment, The Major Transitions in Evolution, John Maynard Smith and
Eors Szathmary argue that solutions to just such problems of benefit capture and sharing underlie several of the significant
changes of efficiency and scale that punctuate the path from primordial chemistry of early life to the complex biology and social
structures of modern humanity.6 Entrepreneurial collaboration
can be viewed as a powerful next step in this story of transitions.
Game theory provides insights into many of these challenges (e.g.
Gintis 2000).7 The subdiscipline of mechanism design has as its
project the creation of institutional mechanisms that match sacrifice and reward with enough reliability to enable collaboration to
6 John Maynard Smith, and Eors Szathmary, The Major Transitions in Evolution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
7 Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolving (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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occur, particularly in the sphere of information disclosure (e.g.
Parkes 2001; Goodenough 2008).8 At the level of real-world application, we might call the process of redenominating the entrepreneurial game-form so as to provide good expectations for the
players “institutional design.” The rule of law enables many of
the best solutions to the challenges of institutional design.
Law—particularly property law—starts by providing a bulwark
against the expropriation of the benefit by those outside the team.
Whether sneak thieves, protection artists, imitative competitors,
or the law giver itself, there are many players who will happily
take slices of the gains away from the team. Physical and intellectual property regimes can protect against these external predators, and property rights are widely recognized as an important
predicate to growth (e.g. de Soto 2000; Baumol et al. 2007).9 But
what about the team itself? How are its players given assurance
of future participation and reward among themselves as the
entrepreneurial enterprise goes forward? Contracts play an
important role, particularly if the contribution is limited in scope
and the reward is relatively well defined.
When the contributions to the team and the expectations of
reward are more open-ended, however, then the relationship is
not easy to define in a one-off contract. The incompleteness of the
contract with respect to specific outcomes can be managed by
conceptualizing the arrangement as joint ownership of the project
with other major, ongoing contributors, a more loosely defined
arrangement through which the contingent flows of success and
failure can be accounted and allocated. In the U.S. context,
such approaches are structured through the law of business
organizations. This area of law takes pieces from property,
8 David C. Parkes, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational
Efficiency. (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2001), accessed November 15, 2010,
http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/diss.html; Oliver R. Goodenough, “Values, Mechanism
Design, and Fairness,” in Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy, ed. Paul J. Zak
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 228-255.
9 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism.
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contract, fiduciary duties, even government, and while there have
been determined efforts by some to restate it all in one or another of these categories, it is also worth thinking of the law of the
firm as a separate category.
Part of the genius of business organization law, as it has evolved
in most developed economies, is the way it provides solutions to
a whole range of the dilemmas faced in a free-market, entrepreneurial economy. One set of much-studied attributes cluster
around the relations of the firm, its assets, and its members to the
outside world, and in particular around questions of legal personhood, limited liability, asset sequestration, and entity shielding (e.g., Hansmann et al. 2006).10 Another cluster looks at the
relations among firm participants, and in particular questions of
governance in larger firms with widespread public participation
(e.g., Anabtawi and Stout 2008).11 A third cluster focuses on the
increasing “contractualization” of business entity forms, in which
there is a move from standardized legal requirements in governance rules to a world of permissive default settings with a wide
range of acceptable variation established by contract among the
participants (e.g. Hansmann et al. 2005; Hansmann and
Kraakman 2010; but see Hansmann 2006).12 Each of these identifies important issues, which affect firm governance and growth at
various points over the life cycle of the business.
At the point of formation, establishing rights and duties among
the team becomes particularly salient. We need to create reliable
structures within which the collaborations of innovation and
10 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” Harvard
Law Review 119, no. 5 (2006): 1333-1403.
11 Iman Anabtawi and Lynn A. Stout, “Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders,” Stanford Law
Review 60, no. 5 (2008): 1255-1308.
12 Henry Hansmann, “The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective.” University of Illinois
Law Review, 2005, no. 1 (2005): 5-14; Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “The
Contractualization of Organizational Law,” in Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am
24. August 2010 Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, edited by Stefan Grundmann et al.
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 747–764; Hansmann, “Corporation and Contract,” American Law and
Economics Review 8, no. 1 (2006): 1-19.

350

14: DIGITAL FIRM FORMATION
entrepreneurship can take place, structures that will motivate not
just correct treatment but enthusiastic striving toward the common goal. In designing such structures, biology suggests that outcome interdependency plays an important role. Early in the
development of terrestrial life, the loosely tied grouping of mutually beneficial catalytic chemistry called the “hypercycle”
changed to a powerhouse of cooperative interaction and evolution called the “cell” once it was wrapped in a membrane. The
membrane boundary contained the benefits of the interaction of
the constituent parts and linked their outcome, for good or ill, in
a mutual fate.13 Tying people, and their outcomes, together in
the legal structure of a firm has this same potential for driving
productive collaboration.
By facilitating a made-for-the-purpose team to create new ideas
and bring them to market, it is no surprise that the ability to form
a legally grounded business organization is a key factor in promoting innovative growth. The development of successful,
growth-oriented capitalism is at least partly a story of the development of better private business institutions within which firms
can be structured. In the United States, we often take a welldeveloped business organization law for granted. But its significance was better recognized when the developments were new.
In 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler, then president of Columbia
University, gave a frequently quoted description of the importance of business organization law for growth:
I weigh my words when I say that in my judgment the
limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times…. Even steam and electricity
are far less important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.14
13 Smith and Szathmary, The Major Transitions in Evolution.
14 Nicholas Murray Butler, “Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, November 16, 1911.” Quoted in William Meade Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations 1, s. 21 (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1917), 43.
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The history of business organization law has been marked by several steps that have made formation easier and the resulting entity better tailored to the needs of entrepreneurial startups. In the
nineteenth century, for instance, general incorporation laws,
which require a simple filing to create a company, replaced the
expensive and time-consuming requirement of a specific legislative act for the grant of a corporate charter. More recently, close
corporation statutes, better partnership laws, and the development of the LLC (limited liability company) and the LLP (limited
liability partnership) have extended the contractualization
approach, mentioned above, so that by the late twentieth century
the design of relations between participants in a firm was nearly
wide open, at least as a matter of business organization law,
and “private corporate law” became a possibility.15 Each of
these developments has coincided with burst of entrepreneurial
activity.
But that old villain, “red tape,” is still lurking here in the legal
weeds. Whether in the area of firm formation or elsewhere, access
to legal processes and assurances can be expensive and time-consuming. This is true both for large, established businesses and for
shallow-pocketed graduate students with a killer idea. Part of the
solution is the digitization of law.16 Developments in software,
the Internet, cloud computing, and mobile devices are revolutionizing many domains of commercial life, from production to sales,
causing a cascade of disruptive progress. This cascade is beginning to affect the creation and operation of institutions in the
financial and business worlds. We are at the early stages of an
institutional change that has the potential to be equally empowering for innovative business: digital business laws that permit
the formation and operation of “virtual companies.” While the
process is in some ways inevitable, we can improve the outcomes
15 Gillian K. Hadfield and Eric Talley, “On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law,” Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 22, no. 2 (2006): 414-441.
16 Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Brock Rutter and Oliver Goodenough, “Digital Lawyering in the Law School
Curriculum,” (paper, in preparation, 2010).
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and bring them forward in time by taking four action steps as a
society.

ACTION STEP 1: RECOGNIZING THE POTENTIAL
DIGITIZED LEGAL ACCESS

FOR

Computing, the Internet, and related digital technologies are
changing how we conduct our lives, and doing so at a rapidly
increasing rate. Digital communication, via the Internet, cell
phone text messaging, and other emerging technologies, is
reshaping many aspects of life. In a few short years, the relatively simple medium of e-mail has become the primary avenue for
text-based communication—a position already under challenge
from texting on cell phones and other mobile devices and
exchanges posted within Facebook.com or other sites of shared
social contact.
Digital processes are making many economic activities cheaper
and easier as well. In the commercial world, transactions as
diverse as purchasing books, energy trading, and selling the contents of one’s garage are safely and routinely handled via the
web. Internet banking allows digital control over transactions
with a high need for security—and it all works remarkably well.
This revolution ranks with steam power, telegraph and telephone, rail transport, electricity, and the handful of other complete “game changers” in economic history.
Law is beginning to feel the winds of change. Many aspects of
legal services will be affected—including the delivery of previously “bespoke” services in cheaper, and more democratically
available, online forms.17 Businesses like LegalZoom.com and
MyCorporation.com have already sprung up, offering inexpensive—even free—chartering of corporations and LLCs via an
Internet interface. The banner on MyCorporation.com reads
17 Susskind, The End of Lawyers? ; see generally Gillian K. Hadfield, “Law for a Flat World: Legal
Infrastructure and the New Economy,” (paper, 2010) in The Selected Works of Gillian K Hadfield,
http://works.bepress.com/ghadfield/35, accessed November 15, 2010.
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“entrepreneurs welcome,” and so they are. But the end product of
these twenty-first century marketing efforts is still a nineteenth
century artifact—a paper-based corporate charter, in a paperbased minute book, with paper-based bylaws and operating
agreements. These sites are nowhere near to capturing the full
potential of digitization for enabling firm formation and operation. In a sense, MyCorporation.com, like e-mail, is already old
news. We are on the edge of the next big step: fully digitized
business organizations.

ACTION STEP 2: CHANGES TO LAWS AND REGULATIONS
In order for digital business organizations to come about, certain
legal groundwork must first be laid. Under U.S. law, business
organizations with limited liability and legal personification must
receive a government charter of some kind and must fit within a
set of enabling rules, typically granted under state law. While
these rules have become increasingly flexible in recent years,
most still contemplate a world of paper and in-person interaction,
supplemented by the postal service, telephone, and fax. Changes
in state law are then first steps in creating the necessary legal
landscape for digital firm formation and operation.
The default context for deliberative actions by shareholders,
boards of directors, and formal committees is a meeting, with due
notice given and the opportunity for participation by all (e.g., for
directors, Model Business Corporation Act § 8.20 and 8.22;
Delaware General Corporation Law §141). Relaxing this model
somewhat, most, and perhaps all, states allow attendance by telephone conference call (e.g., for directors, Model Business
Corporation Act § 8.20(b); Delaware General Corporation Law
§141 (i)). Most also offer the possibility of an action in writing in
lieu of a meeting, although most require physical signatures and
unanimity, at least for directors (e.g., Model Business Corporation
Act § 8.21; Delaware General Corporation Law §141 (f)). Some,
like Delaware, now authorize consent to be given to this kind
of action through electronic transmission, and permit keeping
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board minutes in digital form (Delaware General Corporation
Law §141 (f)).
On the formation step, some states have already gone beyond
LegalZoom and MyCorporation.com. Rather than working
through such an intermediary, these states allow the direct online
formation of a corporation or limited liability company, using the
government website to fill out the forms and charging the filing
fees by credit card (e.g. Florida at https://efile.sunbiz.org/onlmenu.html). This relaxation is useful, but it is just the beginning.
The full payoffs of convenience and new possibilities grow from
allowing all of the formal, legally mandated relations among
owners, managers, and their agents to be conducted through digital means as well. For instance, the text-based rules set out in
bylaws can just as easily be set out in a computer program that
would direct notices, host meetings, count votes, and authorize
transactions with banks and other financial depositories. In addition to meetings held in person, via phone, or through written
action, allowed by traditional corporate law, the statutes should
be modified to expressly authorize meeting management software that would create a kind of super chat room through which
corporate directors and LLC managers could discuss issues and
arrive at decisions, all managed by the agreed bylaw software.
What these steps need is statutory authorization.
In 2008, Vermont passed the first law explicitly designed to foster
the development of fully digitized business organizations. The
law established the opportunity for businesses to fully integrate
their legal structure with the opportunities of the Internet and
other forms of digital communication. The bill (H.888) containing
these changes, as passed by into law, is available in full at:
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008
/acts/ACT190.HTM.
The Vermont law aimed at three basic steps—steps that should be
part of any enabling legislation in other jurisdictions looking to
authorize digital business organizations. As a first step, it authorized a fully digital formation process for corporations and LLCs.
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As mentioned above, Vermont is not alone in this—other states
have authorized this as well, and LegalZoom and MyCorporation
provide a mediated interface that gives the equivalent experience
for the others. It is nonetheless a necessary part of the full package. (Ironically, implementation in the Vermont secretary of
state’s office has lagged a bit, and intermediation is, for the
moment, still a useful resource.) The second step is the authorization of a wide range of digital communication as ways in which
the formal actions of the corporation or LLC may be taken. While
other states, such as Delaware, have made steps in this direction,
the Vermont law broke new ground in the scope of its authorization. The final step is the authorization to use software as the original means for setting out the agreements and bylaws that govern
the actions of the members and managers of LLCs and of the officers, shareholders, and directors of corporations.
This last authorization has two important effects. First, when coupled with the other steps, it means that the formalities associated
with running a company can be completely migrated to a digital
environment, thus allowing the formation of companies where
digital communication is the only medium of interaction for its
participants. Second, it allows the execution of the formalities to
be fully integrated with the software that describes them. A single
software package can describe the procedures for governing contributions, distributions, and voting, can supervise its implementation, and can keep a record of the process and its results.
Thanks to Vermont, the legal platform for digital corporations
and LLCs has been established—and in 2010 Vermont added nonprofit corporations to the list as well. Other jurisdictions are likely to follow suit in due course.
In addition to these enabling statutes, there are constraints under
other applicable laws, such as the securities regulations (e.g.,
Bradley 2007).18 While small digital companies, with only a few
18 Caroline Bradley, “Gaming the System: Virtual Worlds and the Securities Markets” (paper, 2007),
accessed November 15, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022441 and
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=caroline_bradley.
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directly involved participants, are likely to fall easily into traditional SEC exemptions for active owners and private offerings
(e.g. Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933), realizing the
full potential when the new forms involve many players may
require rule changes. And some developments will challenge the
very assumptions of existing regulation. Consider, for instance,
the digital or algorithmic security, where the master description
of the rights of sharing, voting, and other characteristics of equity participation are denominated and indeed calculated entirely
through an algorithm embedded solely in software. Such a beast
is possible under the new Vermont laws; as examples emerge, our
regulatory structures will need to change to accommodate their
characteristics.

ACTION STEP 3: DEVELOPING THE PLATFORM
DIGITAL ENTERPRISE

FOR

Law changes may permit digital firms, but they don’t bring them
into being. The other necessary ingredient for making virtual
companies a real possibility is a technical platform that can allow
the migration of a company’s institutional rules and formal interactions into the digital domain. What is a “platform”? This muchused word can refer to (1) a type of processor and/or other hardware, (2) software with a wide range of applicability such as an
operating system, or (3) the combination of hardware and software creating the potential for an expansive set of uses. (e.g.
http://www.linfo.org/platform.html). The iPhone is usefully
described as a platform, combing hardware and applications. The
web itself can be considered a platform, as can sub-universes
within the web such as Facebook.com. In the digital firm context,
we are looking at an example of a digitized governance platform,19 a technical combination tailored specifically to the institutional needs of business collaboration.

19 See John H. Clippinger, “Digital Innovation in Governance: New Rules for Sharing and Protecting
Private Information,” this volume, chapter 16.

357

RULES FOR GROWTH
There are several design approaches that can be taken in building
a platform for automating the formation and formalities of a business organization. These range from (1) a fully contained, “cradle
to grave” software package that completely automates the formalities of forming, running, and winding up a targeted form of
business organization through (2) purpose-designed software
that performs only part of the process, such as a digital minute
book, and on to (3) an assembly of “off the shelf” components
from tool kits like Google Wave that performs some or all of the
necessary tasks.
Developing a model “cradle to grave” package for a simple LLC
under the Vermont statute has been a project at Harvard’s Law
Lab, where I am a codirector. A description of our process can
provide guidance to others embarking on a similar project. The
first step involved establishing goals for the scope, flexibility, and
universality of the platform. Going straight for the development
of a fully flexible, general-purpose governance platform was a
possibility. Such a structure would require the modeling and programming of a significant number of processes and requirements
that are common to business organizations generally. The Law
Lab list includes such features as robust identity measures, contribution metrics, reputation systems, benefit assignment rules,
work and information communication channels, decision-making
algorithms, exclusivity and loyalty provisions, and transfer and
expulsion rules.20 Developing a platform that would permit “dial
setting” flexibility across these many domains was initially attractive; it remains a targeted goal for the Law Lab and will be an
important step in the enabling some of the more “exotic” entrepreneurial venture possibilities discussed below.
On reflection, however, a more narrow focus was chosen for the
first effort, targeting the typical small founder group as the first
use case. If the software was to be truly aimed at requiring little,
if any, lawyer intervention as clients put it to use, it needed to be
designed around widely applicable default approaches, rather
20 Ibid.
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than heavily tailorable flexibility. Thus, the initial platform
becomes a web-based application that instantiates rules for a
start-up LLC aimed at a small group of founding members, all of
them active in the business. While flexibility is preserved on contributions and profit sharing, we made the decision to mandate
unanimity as the basis for most decision making. In small, cooperative groups, unanimity provides protection against oppression
by a majority and allows full psychological buy in.
The platform involves a purpose-built software package, allowing a high degree of control over the result and greater protection
against malicious interference as it gets rolled out for commercial
application in a sponsored environment. At this writing, our fully
developed prototype is available for demonstration at
digitalllc.org. The first phase of its commercial rollout is in active
development. It will be a “white label” service, available for offer
in a customized version by such interested companies as law
firms, banks, and other service providers to start-up companies.
A less ambitious step is the purpose-built creation of tools for
parts of the digital company’s activities. Managing and keeping a
record of meetings and other decision-making forums is a source
of annoyance in almost all companies, and a source of low-quality work for lawyers cast in the role of corporate secretaries.
Internet-savvy groups such as the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) are creating their own solutions to these problems, and a
commercial version is likely to emerge soon.
An alternative on the other end of the spectrum from the purpose-built approach is to make use of off-the-shelf functionalities
developed by others. The emerging world of social interaction
tools, such as Google Wave, has elements that can be incorporated into an institutional governance platform. Google tells you
that, “A wave is a live, shared space on the web where people can
discuss and work together using richly formatted text, photos,
videos, maps, and more.” Tools include voting possibilities—
many of the elements are there, but not yet the whole package.

359

RULES FOR GROWTH
The development and proliferation of law-related software solutions like these will be accelerated by the establishment of an
“app store” for legal software. As inventors and collaborative
groups find their own solutions, an established marketplace for
their advertisement and sale will help move the best of them from
a local convenience to an industry changer. Such an app store
would, of course, have an impact on the development of digitized
legal services across a wide range of domains.

ACTION STEP 4: EDUCATING LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
INTO A NEW MODE OF INTERACTION
Our final recommended action step grows out of a question with
Shakespearian overtones: where will this leave all the lawyers?
Why kill them all, as Dick the Butcher advocates in Henry VI, Part
2, when making them irrelevant, as Richard Susskind predicts in
The End of Lawyers, will work just as well? As a professional
teacher of lawyers, I do not think we are really at the end of
lawyers in the formation process, but I do think we are likely to
see the lawyer role redefined, and educating lawyers and clients
into new, less dependent and less expensive modes of interaction
is the final action step on our list.
What will lawyers do to help digitized firm formation? At the
consultative level, the web will offer opportunities for quick and
relatively inexpensive contact with lawyers who will help entrepreneurs to understand and customize largely prepackaged
approaches. Phone calls and e-mails to “technical assistance” are
part of the landscape for implementing all kinds of largely do-ityourself computer applications, and legal-access applications for
firm formation will be no exception. Financial yields per consultation may not be what most lawyers are used to in the current
paradigm of customized service, but volume and the dependability of credit-card payment systems can provide a living wage.
There will also be a role for designers in this process: “knowledge
engineers,” who will set the initial templates, and develop
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standard forms around which entrepreneurial expectations can
coalesce. Conceptualizing rules and approaches for legal service
platforms is an expert task, and Susskind predicts that such
designers will occupy a small but lucrative niche. Much as standardized creative commons licenses have streamlined certain
kinds of deal making in the high-tech realm, so too will standard
terms be developed and applied for digital business organizations, with the help of lawyers expert in both institutional design
and computer programming.
Educating lawyers for these new relationships will require significant shifts in the curriculum at law schools and in continuing
legal education to include these new skill sets. Developing such
approaches for training good practitioners for both the design
and helping stages will accelerate the realization by society of the
gains from digital firm formation and other digital delivery of
legal information and services. Courses such as Vermont Law
School’s “Digital Drafting” offer training at both of these levels
of practice.21
The other side of the coin is educating entrepreneurs to be savvier about the choices they face in setting up companies. Classes on
“Law for Entrepreneurs” too frequently focus on the impediments that law can pose for following up on business opportunities. Training in the institutional design principles that law helps
make possible and in the software that will increasingly be available for their implementation should be a part of entrepreneurial
studies everywhere. An early example of the approach can be
seen in “Law, Technology, and Entrepreneurship,” offered in the
curriculum of Dartmouth’s Thayer School of Engineering, as part
of their Master of Engineering Management program. Its catalog
description reads:
Taking a good idea and turning it into a successful
product and a profitable business poses a number of
21 See http://www.vermontlaw.edu/x303.xml?faculty=x6606&category; see generally Brock and
Goodenough, “Digital Lawyering in the Law School Curriculum.”
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technical, managerial, and financial challenges. The
solutions to many of the challenges of entrepreneurship
in general, and to those of starting up a technologically
based business in particular, are provided by the law. A
grounding in the law of intellectual property, contractual transactions, business structures, debt and equity
finance, and securities regulation, both in the U.S. and
in an international context, will help inventors and
entrepreneurs to manage this part of the process intelligently and with a high likelihood of success.22
Providing clients with both the tools and the knowledge to take
firm formation largely into their own hands, coupled with providing lawyers with the skills to design good platforms and to
deliver short, targeted advice on specific concerns, will help maximize the benefits from digital firm formation both for the individuals directly involved and for the economy as a whole.

THE FINALE: OPPORTUNITIES
EXPLOSION”

FOR A

NEW “CAMBRIAN

So just what are the benefits for entrepreneurship and growth that
can be unleashed by digitizing firm creation and management?
First of all, there is the simple goal described by Baumol et al. of
making firm creation and management “easy and inexpensive to
do.”23 Putting standard approaches onto the web, for little or
no cost, is as good a way to accomplish this goal as we know
about in 2010. But making traditional startups easier is only the
starting point.
If the collaborative mashup of ideas and talents among a group of
people is a frequently recurring pattern for entrepreneurial innovation, then migrating the process to the digital world can open
up an exponentially larger set of innovative possibilities. As the
22 “Graduate Course Descriptions,” Thayer School of Engineering at Dartmouth, accessed
November 15, 2010, http://engineering.dartmouth.edu/graduate/courses/details.html#ENGM188.
23 Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism.
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spread of “Web 2.0”-style social media amply demonstrates,
physical proximity is no longer a requirement for frequent and
even intensive interaction among people. The entrepreneurial
stewpot can now easily include players from around the world,
only interacting through the web; the institutional framework
that gives them the outcome assurance they need to make commitments to each other needs to be equally web-based. Proximity
has often been credited as part of the success story of Silicon
Valley; digital means make virtual proximity a trivial matter.
Furthermore, making digital business organizations available via
the web and via mobile devices more generally has the potential
to deliver good institutions to parts of the world where they are
sorely lacking. Paul Romer has argued that “charter cities” can
help to create islands (perhaps literally) of good institutions—and
particularly good legal institutions—in countries and regions
where they are in short supply (www.chartercities.org). This good
idea has so far run into practical roadblocks. The bad institutions
often help enrich exactly the corrupt governing class that would
have to agree to the establishment of the charter cities. It will be
much easier to end-run the governing class and build these charter cities not in sovereign territory but in the digital “cloud.”
Institutions delivered through “cloud law” can be beneficial both
in their own right and as goads to the development of better institutions in subpar physical jurisdictions.
Yet another benefit is in the kinds of collaborative initiatives that
can be supported. David Johnson and Yochai Benkler have each
argued that web-based peer production and other networks of
cooperation can provide new avenues for innovation and
growth.24 Wikipedia, while nonprofit, is just the most noted
example of this kind of new value creation. Digital institutions
provide the only practical means for structuring an organization
that would include a widely disbursed, web-communicating
24 David R. Johnson, “Virtual Companies” (paper, 2008), accessed November 15, 2010,
http://dotank.nyls.edu/june18virtualcorp.html; Benkler, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
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group of contributors. Nor is communication the only challenge.
Complex problems of contribution assessment and benefit allocation can also be better solved algorithmically in a digital world
than through word-based formulas and paper based agreements.
Coming full circle back to more traditional forms for startups,
such digitized participation formulas also have the potential to
improve the fairness—and performance—of small group innovative companies. Setting start-up participations among founders
by bright-line fractions or other nearly arbitrary means when
shares in a business are first allocated invites defection, slacking,
resentment, and disputes as the work goes forward. An algorithmic ownership definition, incorporating a digitized adjustment
process agreed to in advance and built into the code, can help to
hold everyone to their promises and to reward actual contributions to the common cause, promoting both fairness and efficiency at the same time.25
While the focus of this chapter is on solutions to the challenges of
participants in dealing with each other, digital organizations will
offer innovative solutions to challenges businesses encounter in
facing the outer world as well. For instance, even small digital
firms will have expanded options in raising capital. Digital management of the sale and transfer of participant interests creates
the possibility of continuous equity markets in small company
equity and debt, providing improved liquidity and removing
some of the blocking power of a single important investor, such
as a venture capital firm, a power that allows it to extract potentially “unfair” concessions from founders in subsequent funding
rounds.

25 Clippinger, “Digital Innovation in Governance”; Gavin Clarkson and Marshall W. Van Alstyne,
“The Social Efficiency of Fairness” (paper, 2009), accessed November 15, 2010, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1514137.
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CONCLUSION
New laws in jurisdictions like Vermont are providing a legal basis
for fully digitizing firm formation. And with the spread of software that can exploit these developments, one of the key elements of innovative growth will get significantly cheaper and
easier. Looking a little further into the future, we can envision
that “cloud law” will make good innovation-building institutions
widely available for traditional startups, and that the power,
reach, and scalability of digital interactions will enable entirely
new combinations of people, ideas, and capital—with the potential to unleash new possibilities for innovation and growth. While
movement in this direction is in some ways inevitable, with
thought and intentional action we can create a better future
faster, with concomitant benefits flowing in the United States
and beyond.
If we get it right, soon, when a group of innovative entrepreneurs
meet up in some virtual social-networking café, one of them can
suggest something like: “Let’s structure it on a Vermont equalstart model, adjustable based on earn-in algorithm B, with standard Google Wave majority voting. I’ll tweak the software and
send you the link for the company.” The velocity of innovation
and growth will have increased as a result.
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15:

Can the Patent Office Be Fixed? ∗

Mark A. Lemley∗∗

THE PROBLEM

OF

BAD PATENTS

T

he Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) finds itself caught in
a vise. On the one hand, it has been issuing a large number
of dubious patents over the past twenty years, particularly
in the software and electronic commerce space. It issues
many more patents than its counterparts in Europe and Japan;1
roughly three-fourths of applicants ultimately get one or more
patents, a higher percentage than in other countries.2 Complaints
about those bad patents are legion,3 and indeed when they make
it to litigation they are quite often held invalid.4 Even the ones
∗ © 2010 Mark A. Lemley.
∗∗ Mark A. Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School, and partner, Durie
Tangri LLP. Thanks to Rose Hagan and Stu Soffer for comments.
1 Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, “The Quality Factor in Patent Systems” (working paper
2010-027, European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, 2010).
2 Mark A. Lemley and Bhaven Sampat, “Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?” Emory Law Review
58 (2008): 181.
3 Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004).
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that turn out to be valid are often impossible to understand; in the
information technology industries, there is no lawsuit filed in
which the parties don’t fight over the meaning of patent claim
terms.5 The natural reaction is to say that the PTO needs to do
more than it does to make sure it is awarding patents only to
those who deserve them.
On the other hand, it is not clear that we can or should weed out
bad applications at the PTO. The vast majority of patents are
never litigated or licensed; spending a lot of money to ensure
their validity would be wasted.6 And the structure of the patent
prosecution process makes it very difficult for the PTO to do so.
Patent examiners can never finally reject a patent application;
applicants dissatisfied with the outcome can come back an unlimited number of times to try again through various mechanisms.7
Efforts beginning in 2006 to change that rule upset patent lawyers
a great deal, and were ultimately abandoned.8 And because of the
inability of the PTO to finally reject applications, when the PTO
started making it harder to get patents several years ago, the
result was to create an enormous backlog of patent applications
as examiners would reject applications and applicants would try
again (and again, and again) to get a patent. That backlog in turn
created its own set of problems, delaying the issuance of good
patents and reducing certainty for both applicants and third
parties.
Some have suggested that those delays—and the use of continuation applications more generally—are the result of oddities in
4 John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, “Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,”
AIPLA Quarterly Journal 26 (1998): 185; John R. Allison et al., “Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants,” Georgetown Law Journal (forthcoming 2010).
5 James Bessen and Michael Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put
Innovation at Risk (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
6 Mark A. Lemley, “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,” Northwestern University Law Review
95, no. 4 (2001).
7 Mark A. Lemley and Kimberly A. Moore, “Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,” Boston
University Law Review 84 (2004): 63.
8 Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the system for evaluating and rewarding patent examiners. The
so-called “count” system gave credit to examiners for certain acts;
patent lawyers often complain that examiners “make” them file
continuations in order to boost their counts. Whether or not that
was true, however, it doesn’t appear to be behind the growth of
continuation applications. The PTO changed the count system in
2009 to try to address this problem. And it has been issuing record
numbers of patents in recent months. But preliminary data from
Dennis Crouch suggests that the number of continuation applications is still on the rise, up 27 percent from 2009 to 2010,9 suggesting that the use of continuations is largely applicant rather than
examiner driven.
The evaluation of patent applications in the PTO is further complicated by recent empirical evidence. One recent study shows
that junior patent examiners are a lot more zealous in weeding
out bad patents than senior examiners. The longer examiners
spend in the PTO, the less searching they do, the more likely they
are to grant patents, and the more likely they are to grant patents
on applications that their counterparts in other countries have
rejected.10 A second study shows that whether senior or junior,
examiners pay attention almost exclusively to prior art that they
find themselves, and not to information submitted by patent
applicants, even applicants who are passing on art found by
patent examiners in other countries.11 The implication of this evidence is that we need to pay attention not only to legal rules, but
also to examiner behavior and reward systems.

9 Dennis Crouch, “Requests for Continued Examination Continue to Rise,” Patently-O,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/requests-for-continued-examination-continue-torise.html (2010).
10 Mark A. Lemley and Bhaven Sampat, “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes,”
(working paper 2010).
11 Christopher A. Cotropia et al., “Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the
Presumption of Validity” (working paper, 2010).
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CAN THE PROBLEM BE SOLVED?
How, then, can we fix the PTO, allowing examiners to effectively
distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions,
without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of
money?

What Won’t Work
First, some things that likely won’t work.
Preventing fee diversion. The PTO is funded through user fees
imposed on applicants and owners of issued patents. For much of
the last twenty years, some of that fee revenue (typically 10-20
percent of it) has been diverted by Congress to general federal
revenue. It is a commonplace among patent lawyers that the way
to solve the PTO’s problems is to stop fee diversion, “fully funding” the PTO.
Stopping fee diversion is certainly a good idea. Whatever the
merits of government user fees over taxes as a general matter, it
seems particularly foolish social policy to tax innovators in particular to raise general revenue. But stopping fee diversion is hardly a panacea. In the last several years, the PTO has been fully
funded—that is, Congress didn’t divert fees. Nonetheless, the
backlog grew. The addition of 10 to 20 percent of operating revenue wasn’t enough even to enable the PTO to hold steady.
Fee-setting authority. In recent years the PTO’s efforts have shifted
to seeking permission from Congress to set their own fees.12 This
would allow the PTO to (presumably) raise fees on applicants
and patentees, using the money to pay for a more intensive examination. There is some reason to believe that fee-setting authority,
if nothing else, may result from the six-year patent reform effort
in Congress.13

12 Arti K. Rai, “Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest For
Managerial Control,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157 (2009): 2051.
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Giving the PTO the authority to set its own fees might or might
not be a good idea, depending on the relative incentives the PTO
and Congress have to set fees rationally. But as noted above, it is
likely not a good idea simply to spend more money to weed out
bad patents. Most of that money will be wasted on applications
that are of no consequence to anyone. And because of the structure of the examination system, it might not even succeed in
weeding out bad patent applications.
Even if it did, however, the current fee structure makes patent
quality self-limiting. The PTO is paid by applicants to process
their applications at each stage. But those payments are not
enough even to sustain the limited examination that now occurs.
The difference is made up by patent “maintenance fees”—periodic payments made by the owners of issued patents to keep those
patents in force. Because the PTO’s ability to examine new applications is dependent on revenue from previously granted ones,
the PTO faces a problem: the more bad applications it rejects, the
fewer patents will pay maintenance fees, and the less money it
will have to conduct a detailed examination. The PTO ran into
this problem in the late 2000s, when—as a result of a lowered
grant rate coupled with companies abandoning patents during
the recession—it found itself in a financial crisis. The broader lesson should be clear: the current system for funding the PTO
works only if the PTO continues to issue patents on a large percentage of the applications it receives.
The PTO might begin to address this problem by changing the
way it collects fees. At one extreme, it could abandon maintenance fees altogether, and pay for enhanced examination through
higher application fees. That solves the self-limiting problem, but
13 The issue is bound up with the larger question of the role of the PTO as a full-fledged administrative agency with rulemaking authority. For discussion of that issue, see, e.g., Stuart Minor
Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, “Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective,” George Washington
Law Review 77 (2008): 1; John R. Thomas, “The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17 (2002): 727; Liza
Vertinsky, “Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform,” Alabama Law Review 61
(2010): 501.
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it raises the cost to startups seeking patents at an early stage of
development, which may not be ideal. Alternatively, the PTO
could simply raise the maintenance fees significantly, to perhaps
ten times their current rate. Doing so might make the weeding
out of bad patents revenue neutral, though as more bad applications are rejected the tax on those who actually obtained patents
would have to increase further to compensate. And as the PTO
raises its maintenance fees, fewer people will choose to maintain their patents. Depending on the elasticity of demand, paying
for examination out of higher maintenance fees may or may
not work.
Some have suggested raising maintenance fees for a different reason—to prevent patent lawsuits by trolls who buy up patents in
order to enforce them. But that is unlikely to work. According to
a 2009 American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
report, the median cost of taking a major patent case to trial is $5.5
million per side in attorney’s fees.14 A maintenance fee of $40,000$50,000—ten times the current fee—may weed out more patents
that aren’t being used, but it is unlikely to deter someone considering spending perhaps 100 times that much to litigate a patent.
And the patents that aren’t being used aren’t really the problem.15
Retaining patent examiners. Another problem commonly cited by
patent lawyers is the high rate of turnover at the PTO. Being an
examiner is not an easy job, and it doesn’t pay all that well. Not
surprisingly, examiners often leave relatively quickly for jobs in
engineering, jobs in law firms, or to go to law school. Indeed, one
recent study found the median examiner had been at the PTO for
just over three years.16 The high rate of turnover means that the
PTO needs to hire more than 1,000 examiners a year just to keep
even with attrition. In recent years the PTO has found it virtually
14 American Intellectual Property Law Association, 2009 Report of Economic Activity.
15 Raising maintenance fees would weed out patents that sit on a shelf now but might be sold in
the future to a troll that will assert them against product companies. In that limited sense it might
reduce the number of troll lawsuits.
16 Lemley and Sampat, “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes,” 2010.
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impossible to grow the examining corps. And of course those new
examiners must be trained. Perhaps the solution to the PTO’s
problems, then, is to find ways to keep those examiners from
leaving.
There may well be benefits to reducing examiner attrition. But the
evidence suggests that weeding out bad patents is not among
them. Empirical research by Lemley and Sampat shows that the
longer examiners spend at the PTO, the less searching they do,
the less likely they are to issue initial rejections or demand claim
amendments, and the more likely they are to ultimately grant a
patent.17 It is the most junior examiners who are most likely to
reject applications. The reason is not precisely clear, but may have
to do with increased workloads on senior examiners, or with
acculturation into a corps whose ethos is to grant rather than
deny patents. Either way, keeping examiners around longer may
hurt rather than help the cause of weeding out bad patents.
Outsourcing search. Reacting both to workload and to a sense that
examiners don’t find the most important prior art, a number of
initiatives both within and outside the PTO have tried to relieve
examiners of the burden of searching for prior art. They have variously proposed to require the applicants to do their own search
for prior art,18 to invite the public to review applications and submit prior art,19 or to share the burden of searching with patent
examiners in other countries. These initiatives seem promising
because they outsource a function examiners don’t seem particularly good at—finding the most relevant information on the
ground—to others who are positioned to do it better.
But recent empirical evidence suggests that it might not work.
Cotropia et al. studied the behavior of patent examiners in
responding to applications, and found that they rely almost
17 Ibid.
18 There is currently no such requirement.
19 Beth Simone Noveck, “‘Peer to Patent’: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent
Reform,” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 20 (2006): 123.
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exclusively on art they find for themselves, not art submitted by
applicants. And that doesn’t appear to reflect either applicants
drafting around the art they found or the weakness of that art;
U.S. examiners largely ignored even art that was submitted
because it was found important by a foreign patent examiner during examination of a counterpart application.20 If examiners are
psychologically primed to rely principally on things they find for
themselves, it won’t help to have others provide them with the
best art. And it might even hurt, causing examiners not to focus
on the best prior art.

What Might Work
The problems with the PTO are deep rooted. Increased funding
won’t solve the problem of bad patents, and a variety of other
commonly suggested fixes for the PTO are unlikely to solve the
problem, and indeed could even make it worse.
Other proposals have a greater chance of addressing the problem
of bad patents, though they come with their own uncertainties.
Second pair of eyes. Shortly after the Federal Circuit held business
methods patentable in 1998, the PTO was inundated with business method patent applications. Most of those applications went
to Class 705, which refers to the collection of patent examiners
who focus on business methods. Indeed, by 2001, Class 705 had
the largest application volume. In response to this flood, the PTO
initiated a specific “quality control” measure in this class in
March 2000: the “second pair of eyes” review (SPER), under
which applications are subjected to mandatory assessment by
more than one examiner before being allowed.21 Requiring two
examiners to agree seems to have had a dramatic effect: a 2009
study found that class 705 has the lowest grant rate among high
volume classes.22 One possible explanation for the low grant rate
20 Cotropia et al., “Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?”
21 John R. Allison and Starling D. Hunter, “On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One
Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 21
(2006): 729.
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in this class is that the second pair of eyes is working, and that the
grant rate reflects better rigor during examinations, rather than
application volume.
The fact that SPER leads to more rejections in Class 705 doesn’t
mean it is an unalloyed success, however. Allison and Hunter
demonstrate that its adoption in Class 705 led applicants to try to
characterize their business method patents in ways that got them
out of Class 705. It is possible that the applications that were not
so characterized were systematically weaker (or their lawyers
systematically less skilled) than the ones that avoided Class 705.
The differences Lemley and Sampat found were so striking, however—a 16.1 percent grant rate in Class 705, compared with 72
percent on average—that it seems unlikely this can explain the
full difference.
Allison and Hunter’s objection is significant. But it applies only
to a class-specific use of SPER, and wouldn’t condemn a broader
application of the policy to all art units. Nonetheless, there are
reasons to think carefully before expanding SPER to all patent
applications. Doing so would roughly double the cost of patent
prosecution across the board. It would also delay the prosecution
process further; Class 705 applications are among the slowest to
be processed. Further, at least as currently configured, SPER is
asymmetric—it requires a second hurdle before allowing patents
but not before rejecting applications.23 As a result, it is likely to
weed out bad patents, but also to catch some good ones within
the net of rejected applications. Given the PTO’s historic bias in
the other direction, perhaps that is a risk worth taking, but it is
still a social cost we should avoid if we can. If SPER or some other
review process is to be adopted, it should apply evenhandedly to
grants and rejections.
22 Lemley and Sampat, “Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?” 2008.
23 There is a similar problem with the PTO’s quality review mechanism, which reviews a random
subset of grants. Examiners can be punished for mistaken grants if caught in the quality control
process, but are not punished for mistaken rejections, which are never reviewed (Katznelson 2010).
Effective October 1, 2010, the PTO changed its quality evaluation system to be more evenhanded.
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Interestingly, the PTO recently shut down the SPER program
in business methods. Too much success, it seems, carries its
own risks.
Changing examiner incentives. Recent empirical evidence suggests
that much of the problem with patent examination revolves
around examiner incentives and human resource policies.
Examiners do less well at policing bad patents the longer they
stay at the PTO. The problem could be their distance from the
technology, or a tenure effect, or their increased workload. In any
case, changes in training, workload, or promotion rules could
affect those incentives. Examiners pay attention to their own
searches, and not prior art submitted by others. The problem
could be overconfidence bias, or simply triage. Either way,
human resource policies could be brought to bear, training examiners to search better, or giving them more time, or finding other
ways to eliminate bias. And it seems obvious—though likely
politically infeasible—that the rules should not treat allowances
differently than rejections.24
These are good ideas, and they are worth exploring further. But
implementation may be politically difficult. And some of the possible explanations point in different directions: should we give
examiners more time to search, or less, for example?
Tiered review. The problem is not precisely that the Patent Office
issues a large number of bad patents. Rather, it is that the Patent
Office issues a small but worrisome number of economically significant bad patents and those patents enjoy a strong, but undeserved, presumption of validity.
Framed this way, the solution naturally follows: the Patent Office
should focus its examination resources on important patents and
pay little attention to the rest. But it is difficult for the government
to know ahead of time which patents are likely to be important.

24 Ron Katznelson, “Patent Examination Policy and the Social Costs of Examiner Allowance and
Rejection Errors,” Stanford Technology Law Review (2010).
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There are two groups, however, that have better information
about the likely technological and commercial value of inventions: patent applicants and competitors. To harness information
in the hands of patent applicants, we could give applicants the
option of earning a presumption of validity by paying for a thorough examination of their inventions. Put differently, applicants
should be allowed to “gold plate” their patents by paying for the
kind of searching review that would merit a presumption of
validity.25 An applicant who chooses not to pay could still get a
patent. That patent, however, would be subject to serious—
maybe even de novo—review in the event of litigation. Most likely, applicants would pay for serious review with respect to their
most important patents but conserve resources on their more
speculative entries.26 That would allow the Patent Office to focus
its resources, thus benefiting from the signal given by the applicant’s own self-interested choice. The Obama campaign proposed
this sort of tiered review, and the PTO has recently taken a step
towards implementing a scaled-down version, in which applicants can choose the speed but not the intensity of review.27
Tiered review is only as good as the examination process that creates it, however, and if “gold-plated” patents are too easy to
obtain, the point of the system will be lost. If they are too hard to
obtain or too expensive, no one will use the system. Further,
tiered review can at best be only a partial solution, because applicants do not always have accurate information about the future
value of their applications. These are real objections, but they do
not undermine the value of some sort of targeting in the use of
PTO examination resources.
Oppositions and adversarial evaluations. Competitors also have useful information about which patents worry them and which do
25 Mark A. Lemley et al., “What To Do About Bad Patents,” Regulation Winter 2005-6 (2005): 10.
26 For a more detailed working out of the tiered review proposal, see Douglas Lichtman and Mark
A. Lemley, “Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity,” Stanford Law Review 60 (2007): 45.
27 Unfortunately, that proposal came with a bias against foreign applications that makes little
sense as an economic matter, and may also render it suspect under U.S. treaty obligations.
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not. A post-grant opposition system would seek to harness that
information. Post-grant opposition is a process by which parties
other than the applicant would have the opportunity to request
and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent. A
patent that survives collateral attack would earn a presumption
of validity similar to the one available through tiered review. The
core difference is that the post-grant opposition would be triggered by competitors—presumably competitors looking to invalidate a patent that threatens their industry.
Like tiered review, post-grant opposition is attractive because it
harnesses private information; this time, information in the hands
of competitors. It thus helps the Patent Office to identify patents
that warrant serious review, and it also makes that review less
expensive by creating a mechanism by which competitors can
share critical information directly with the Patent Office.28 A postgrant opposition system is part of proposed patent reform legislation, but at this writing it seems unlikely to pass.
The success of post-grant opposition depends on the willingness
of third parties with good information about the validity of a
patent to challenge that patent in a public forum, rather than settling privately. Some commentators are skeptical; pointing out
that invalidating patents is a public good that the challenger
would share with every other competitor.29
Patent law already has mechanisms that could be used to achieve
the same goal. Some issued patents are returned to the PTO after
issuance and are reevaluated through an adversarial process
known as inter partes reexamination. This is an evaluation to
which some deference is appropriate, though today the law gives
complete deference to that determination. Even traditional ex
parte reexamination, while not truly adversarial, allows the filer to
28 Lemley et al., “What To Do About Bad Patents.”
29 Christopher A. Cotropia, “Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,” Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 24 (2009): 723; Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, “Incentives to
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19 (2004): 943.
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submit an initial explanation of the reasons for reexamination,
and the result has been that in recent years patents fare worse in
reexamination than applications do in initial examination.
The biggest risk with post-grant opposition and related systems
is that we give challengers too many bites at the apple, allowing
them to inundate patentees with an endless set of challenges. To
solve that problem, it is appropriate to place some limits on the
number and perhaps the timing of challenges, and to imbue
patents that survive those challenges with a strong presumption
of validity.

Living with Imperfection
The reform proposals identified in the last section are a start.
They likely will improve the prosecution process and help to
weed out bad patents, and most will do so at an acceptable cost.
But none of them will solve the problem of bad patents, or
even come especially close to doing so. Part of the process of
patent reform must involve acknowledging the inherent imperfections in the patent examination process, and adapting to those
imperfections.
In particular, we will continue to rely on litigation for the foreseeable future as a primary means for weeding out bad patents. That
is as it should be. Litigation elicits information from both patentees and competitors through the adversarial process, which is far
superior to even the best-intentioned government bureaucracy as
a mechanism for finding truth.30 More important, litigation is
focused on the very few patents (1-2 percent) that turn out to be
important and about which parties cannot agree in a business
transaction.
Litigation can be abused, and examples of patent litigation abuse
have been rampant in the last two decades. But a variety of
reforms have started to bring that problem under control, and the
courts have the means to continue that process.31
30 Lichtman and Lemley, “Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity.”
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Part of the process must include a realistic recognition of the
shortcomings of the patent prosecution system. In particular,
courts should weaken the presumption of validity for issued
patents. A presumption like that embraced by the current “clear
and convincing” standard must be earned, and under current
rules patent applicants do not earn it. We should replace that high
hurdle with a more appropriate level of deference such as the
“preponderance of the evidence” presumption currently given
trademarks and copyrights, in recognition of the fact that the
scrutiny given patents doesn’t warrant more. And we should
apply the presumption with some eye toward reality. The current
presumption is so wooden that courts today assume a patent is
valid even against evidence that the patent examiner never saw,
much less considered, a rule that makes no sense.32
But the presumption of validity should be dynamic, not static.
Improvements to the patent prosecution process might justify a
stronger presumption. In particular, surviving more extensive
scrutiny, whether by opting into tiered review, being subject to an
opposition proceeding, or perhaps even getting approval from
two examiners rather than one, should justify a stronger presumption. A dynamic presumption will allow the courts to play
their proper role as the guardians of the public interest while
encouraging applicants and the PTO to shoulder their burden
as well.

31 Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2009).
32 Lemley et al., “What To Do About Bad Patents,” Lichtman and Lemley.
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Digital Innovation in Governance:
New Rules for Sharing and Protecting
Private Information

John Henry Clippinger∗

INTRODUCTION

L

et us begin with a prediction: Within the next five years, the
movements, locations, communications, relationships,
health status, behaviors, finances, interests, purchases, and
civic status of more than two billion people will be monitored, captured, and analyzed on a daily basis. By 2014, 3.6
exabytes (one billion gigabytes) of data will be generated monthly on mobile networks alone.1 This does not include the exabytes
of data generated by wireline broadband networks and corporate
and government networks or cloud computing consortia. The
capture of data from multiple forms of surveillance—satellite,
sensor networks, mobile networks, e-mail, voice, social networks,
corporate networks, intelligence/security RFIP, GPS, video, data
mining—will not just be pervasive, but essential for the functioning of networked public and private enterprises. With these
trends, the Internet becomes not just a global infrastructure, but a
∗ John Henry Clippinger is Co-Director of The Law Lab, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
at Harvard University.
1 Stacey Higginbotham, Cisco: The Mobilpocalypse Is Coming, www.gigaom.com, February 9, 2010.
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collection of many Internets, each with their own policies and
practices for protecting and sharing private information.
The risk of Balkanization is clear and with it the undermining of
those very principles of openness and interoperability that made
the Internet such a global engine of innovation and productivity.
Traditional notions of territorial sovereignty are now asserting
themselves as countries and regions try to exercise control over
digital resources and domestic freedoms in the name of the nation
state. The mounting of the Great Firewall of China, for instance,
is replaying an ancient reflex to have a wholly controlled and
homogeneous—“harmonious”—Chinese Internet. Arab and
Middle Eastern countries are following suit under the banner of
protecting their cultural and religious values. In truth, all countries as well as companies are struggling to discover the boundaries of their autonomy and how to assert effective control over
what they consider their legitimate resources. In both cases, they
are coming up against unresolved issues about how to protect the
privacy of their networks, users, and citizenry while providing
the flexibility and freedoms needed to participate in a rapidly
evolving and increasingly digital global economy.
The goal of this chapter is to propose new forms of governance
and rule making that combine digital and physical means—
frameworks, policies, contracts, and mechanisms—to enable the
protection and sharing of private information. In Western societies, especially the United States and European Union countries,
there are very strong provisions for the protection of the privacy
of citizens and consumers. While the United States and the
European Union have different legal standards and approaches
for protecting, they both, nonetheless, have adopted an approach
of prohibitions that limit the collection and transmission of certain kinds of personal identifying information without proper
consent and oversight. In the European Union, there are prohibitions for the collection of certain types of data and its transfer
across national borders—creating enormous obstacles and costs
to global coordination and integration of financial and health care
information. As digital globalization increases, it is not clear
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whether the harms of failed protections exceed those engendered
by a lack of information sharing and flows. In short, the weaknesses of imposing a uniform privacy standard upon a rapidly
changing field are becoming all too apparent. Even though such
regulations can be written with the intent of anticipating future
innovations and circumstances, they often fall short and impose
costs and impediments without providing the intended benefits
of protections and sharing.

HARMS

OF TOO

MUCH AND TOO LITTLE PRIVACY

Two of the most pervasive means for achieving privacy protections are explicit prohibitions against the uses of certain kinds of
data, and the requirement of informed consent for opting in or
out of a privacy policy. While such practices are pervasive and the
cornerstones of most online privacy practices, they are not only
ineffective, but they also can provide a false sense of privacy protection while in effect providing none in practice. In many cases,
the potential harms that such notifications are intended to protect
consumers or patients from are often not nearly as severe as the
actual harms resulting from the failure to share critical health and
consumer information.
A prime illustration of this point is the Health Insurance
Portability Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which was
intended to protect the privacy of medical information for consumers and encourage the adoption of electronic data transfer
standards for more effective and efficient health services and payment systems.2 This is a complex form of legislation with many
provisions, but of relevance here is Title II, known as the
Administrative Simplification (AS) provisions, which required
the formation of national standards for electronic health care
transactions and national identifiers for providers, health insurance plans, and employers. What were conceived as administrative simplifications proved to be anything but, and, while well
2 For more information on HIPAA see http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/.
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intended, were grounded in technologies and processes that have
become outdated and alien to the ways in which health care practitioners and consumers actually behave. When combined with
stiff enforcement penalties and extensive paperwork compliance,
many HIPAA requirements have become synonymous with overreaching and counterproductive regulations. Rather than acting
as an incentive for innovation and effectiveness, it has discouraged research collaboration and the sharing of data among parties with legitimate needs and interests to do so. Requiring written and authorized consent from a fixed and pre-identified category of stakeholders has discouraged the legitimate sharing of
medical information for research and clinical use. By creating real
and perceived barriers to the exchange and sharing of different
types of medical information, the costs for treatment have ballooned and undermined incentives to act in the best interests of
the patient. In the case of evidence-based medicine, for instance,
where data on outcomes are used to identify new treatments and
best practices, the fear of litigation and the requirement to
sequester patient information have made it very difficult for the
medical profession to learn from its mistakes. Yet with new
encryption and “zero knowledge proof” technologies, it is technologically feasible to share private data without compromising
anonymity. Again, in this case, protections against potential
harms of a “breach” are given greater consideration than actual
harms resulting from not being able to share and analyze data on
the success of different treatments.
Another example of an inappropriate weighting of harms for the
sharing of data is in the area of intelligence and national security.
This is a well-documented failing and is attributed as one of the
causes of the September 11 terrorist attacks.3 Laws written to prevent the inappropriate sharing of data between the FBI and intelligence agencies were so poorly drafted that agencies were unable
to pool and collaborate data to identify and intercept terrorists.
Yet even within the Department of Defense (DoD), the
3 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Nation at Risk,
March 2009, www.markle.org.
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National
Security Agency (NSA), bureaucratic and statutory prohibitions
against the sharing of classified data and the inability to achieve
interoperability of credentials and access privileges have not only
created a huge and unnecessary security risks, but severely inhibited the DoD from working more efficiently with fellow agencies,
contractors, and allies. This issue has become especially acute
when partnering with allies such as the United Kingdom in the
joint development of the F-22 fighter. In this case, it became virtually impossible to share some classified data because of the
absence of equivalent credentials between the United States and
the United Kingdom agencies. As in the HIPAA example, the
harms were weighted toward protecting the status quo. In the
case of the DoD, no senior official wants to be charged with sharing secret information with a potential terrorist or allowing a
breach of highly secret information; so the risk calculation is
made to do nothing, even though the harms of doing nothing
could be far greater than those of a security breach. The iconic
image of a senior official being responsible for a security leak or
breach that resulted in the explosion of a nuclear bomb in a major
city is so strong that there is a “zero risk tolerance” mentality in
the DoD and DHS. Yet in all likelihood, the failure to collaborate
and share information up and down the command chain and
across agencies is far more likely to result in that outcome than a
failure to secure a particular piece of information.
In both the medical and the security scenarios, the probable
harms are more likely due to a failure to share and collaborate
than to secure a particular datum. Yet all the incentives and penalties are weighted toward protecting the status quo, not identifying problems or seeking remedies and implementing them. In all
the examples cited, there are technologies that could both protect
and share sensitive information. Yet they were not and are not
being used. One reason for this is that there are no “risk absorption mechanisms” (like underwriting) for making it possible to
undertake new approaches and for an organization to learn from
its mistakes and improve its processes. Today there are negative
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incentives to innovate. On the other hand, if there were positive
incentives to learn from one’s mistakes, such as safe harbor provisions to reward rapid accountability, finding effective remedies,
and resolving costly disputes over liability and responsibility,
then both national security and national health care would be far
better served.

REVEAL AND CONCEAL: THE DISCOVERY

OF

PRIVACY

In a world where competitive success will increasingly depend
upon countries’ and enterprises’ abilities to share and protect
valuable information, the old privacy and security regulatory
frameworks of uniform standards, top-down policies, and practices that rely upon prohibitions, penalties, and consent notifications simply will not cut it.
To examine an alternative approach for balancing the protection
and sharing of private information, this chapter will discuss how
the notion of “privacy” has evolved over time from oral traditions
to digital surveillance, and then how rule making and regulatory
practices necessarily need to reflect the same level of institutional
and technological innovation to effectively protect individual
freedoms and to enable economic growth. The chapter will propose a new governance framework for “trusted member networks” that is being developed in conjunction with the White
House National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace
(NSTIC), the Federal Trade Commission, the Open Identity
Exchange (OIX), and the World Economic Forum that is potentially applicable not only in the United States but also in the countries of the European Union and elsewhere.
Privacy as it is understood and practiced in developed countries
today is largely an artifact of Western, especially Anglo-Saxon,
cultural experience. In densely populated countries such as India
and China, expectations of privacy are markedly different than
they are in the West, reflecting different cultural experiences and
roles of the individual and the group.
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The first inkling of Western privacy awareness manifested itself
nearly one thousand years ago with the issuance of the Doomsday
Book (so named after the Anglo-Saxon term “doom,” for reckoning, accounting, judgment) by the Norman king, William the
Conqueror, in 1086. For the first time in the West, a ruler had a
written record in Latin of the major property holdings of his subjects. For non-Normans, it was a greatly feared and resented registry, because it gave the Norman king unprecedented powers to
tax properties and assemble armies. Here is an account of it
roughly one hundred years later: “That is why we have called the
book ‘the Book of Judgment’ ... because its decisions, like those of
the Last Judgment, are unalterable.”4
Given that majority of the Anglo-Saxon populace lived within an
oral tradition, and could not read Latin, this registry gave the
king privileged powers of surveillance and social control that he
never had before. What was once was private was now public,
visible, and an instrument of the king. “This change in the
method of obtaining information—from hearing the testimony of
reliable local men to looking up a book kept by the Exchequer—
is one indicator of the transition from memory to written
record.”5
A by-product of this appropriation of oral communications by
written texts, however, was that the Anglo-Saxon subjects became
aware of a natural right that they once had, but now had lost—
that of privacy. Only by having it appropriated by a new kind of
technology did they then become aware of its importance as
something natural, distinct, and alienable.

4 C. Johnson, ed., Dialogus de Scaccario, the Course of the Exchequer, and Constitutio Domus
Regis, the King’s Household (London: 1950), 64.
5 M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066-1307 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1979), 20.
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PRIVACY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
To appreciate how critical the notion of privacy is to Western societies, it is important to consider the origin of the term and its role
in shaping the identity and rights of the individual. The term
“privacy” is derived from the Latin term, privatus, meaning separated from the rest. The right to separate from the rest and not be
subject to the gaze and judgment of the group, be it a clan, tribe,
or secular or religious authority, is foundational to the notion of
the modern individual and democratic state. With the expectation
not to be overheard or seen by others comes the evolution of a
“private” identity that is separate from a public or group identity. Such a notion is foundational in Western societies as it gives
individuals the expectation that they can legitimately have private and separate spaces, personhoods, and rights that are not
wholly subject to the powers and surveillance of the public or
government. By separating out an individual’s right for private
information from that of a group, public, or government, the right
of privacy forms the basis for a broad base of individual rights
such as dignity, speech, worship, and happiness. Hence, under
certain conditions, such as in one’s home, a confidential communication, or in the company of friends, in a secluded setting, there
is the expectation of privacy where one’s communications and
activities are trusted to be protected and not shared outside the
confines of a trusted group or context. The Doomsday Book is an
early example of a Western government being given the explicit
powers to break down informal barriers of expected privacy to
collect information to enhance its powers of taxation, conscription, confiscation, surveillance, and control. What was once
implicitly private and protected by the inherent limitations of oral
tradition and custom was suddenly exposed and made markedly
less private. The written word in this case, a Latin census, created
an awareness of privacy by exposing the weakness of informal,
oral protections.

388

16: DIGITAL INNOVATION IN GOVERNANCE

THE PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

OF

PRIVACY

Before the current digital era, the collection of data about someone depended upon the physical acquisition of documents and
artifacts containing expressions of people’s activities, opinions,
and interests. It required a physical intrusion, a physical breach of
a barrier such as a door, and a physical search, such as the movement and opening of objects and artifacts, and the physical collection and movement of objects such as the seizure of documents,
tapes, or a computer. Hence, Fourth Amendment prohibitions
against unreasonable search and seizure would be tied to rules
that prohibited physical actions of surveillance, search, and
seizure. Even as the digital technology advanced, the legal rule
making still tried to adhere to a model of privacy that was essentially grounded in the physical world. However, by relying upon
this physical typing of the problem, legal and regulatory frameworks have become progressively strained and less effective as
privacy issues became more and more digital. Still, the prevalent
means for resolving privacy issues continue to be based upon
physical objects, equating data with the physical artifacts they
were stored in or used by. The boundaries of private spaces continue to be defined in terms of physical boundaries and devices.
Privacy statutes, policies, and regulations continue to be quite literal, conflating types of technologies with specific technologies.
For example, the Federal Communications Commission has had
different regulatory rules for voice, data, text, and video,
although they all are now processed digitally. Similarly, for many
online transactions, handwritten signatures are required,
although there are more effective digital means for authenticating
a document or individual. Another example is the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for four
“levels of assurance” (LOA) for increasing levels of security that
require digital security certificates and tokens, although less
expensive and potentially more effective methods for achieving
assurance are now available. Here the drafters of the standards
assumed that the only way of achieving assurance was to have
different types of security tokens and digital certificates.
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THE DIGITAL TYPING

OF

PRIVACY

Where the physical typing of privacy totally breaks down is
around physical boundaries—that is, jurisdictions based on sovereignty that are tied to a specific physical border. As is well
known, the Internet is a virtual global network whose boundaries
are defined by transient data packet routes. In this world of cyberspace, what does location really mean? Certainly not physical
location. (Perhaps IP addresses or persistent, power law networks?) As more and more computing and software services
move to the “cloud,” the failures of physical metaphors become
all the more acute. For instance, the definition and enforcement of
property rights for data cannot be tied to where data is located
because data can be dynamically generated, shifted, and stored
arbitrarily around the world. The physical privacy typing problem becomes especially strained when trying to define the actors
and actions around unreasonable search and seizure, when the
actors can be automatically generated “bots” that can number in
the millions, “live” and “die” with impunity around the world,
and be totally anonymous in their origin and purpose. Moreover,
the difference between a malevolent and benevolent “bot” or
“actor” can just be a matter of circumstances and context. A piece
of data in one context may not be personally identifying or damaging, though in another context, or when combined or correlated with another datum, it could be highly damaging. Such circumstances cannot be predicted as data mining algorithms discover novel correlations to expose private data. Unlike physical
artifacts, digital and virtual artifacts can be replicated and distributed at no cost. Hence, once privacy-violating data are released or
“escape,” they may never be returned. Data that is defamatory,
inaccurate, security breaching, and even life threatening, can
travel globally and hide and live indefinitely with impunity. Data
also can be altered—video, pictures, and documents—to fraudulently assert facts, events, quotations, and claims that are dangerously false. The near absence of friction or cost in the generation,
replication, modification, storage, and distribution of digital
media of all sorts—this includes video, computer programs, bots,
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and active forms of digital media—is not to be found in the physical world, and hence, privacy laws, rules, and remedies based
upon these analogues will invariably fail to appreciate the consequences of the mutability and frictionless nature of digital media.

THE DARK SIDE

OF

BEING DIGITAL

As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, more and more of
everyday life is becoming enveloped by data, from something as
simple as Google’s Street View service to ubiquitous surveillance
video cameras to military surveillance satellites. This trend will
only increase. The technology exists today for recognizing people’s faces on three-dollar video cameras, using that image to create a trackable, unique identifier, and then tracking those people
over time. That was done by the Dubai government to the
Mossad-sponsored assassins of the Hamas leader, Mahmoud alMabhouh, in his hotel room in Dubai. Such a tracking capability
could become routine and inexpensive within the next decade.
Similarly, the ability to deploy dust-sized, self-organizing sensing
networks (called “smart dust” or mote networks) that communicate with satellite and drone surveillance systems is another technology that not only significantly alters privacy expectations, but
could give state and nonstate actors alarmingly pervasive and
lethal powers. This again is technology that exists today in its
introductory form and has proven to be successful against a difficult and astute adversary, such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in
Pakistan. Imagine what such technology will do to our expectations of privacy, sovereignty, and individual autonomy in ten
years. The point is a simple one. One can no longer think of the
expectation of privacy as a natural state, something that can simply mimic conventions in the physical world. In the virtual
world, which will increasingly overlay and interact with the
physical world, there needs to be a conscious and explicit effort to
design physical and virtual “spaces” or contexts where the expectations of privacy and security are met and enforced. Statutes and
regulations can no longer be seen as piecemeal, passive “safeguards” to new technologies; rather, they must encourage—
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incentivizing the innovative use of those technologies to create
whole private contexts where the expectations of privacy can be
met and enforced. This is a very different way of thinking about
“privacy” statutes or regulations since the fundamental purpose
of the rule making is not prohibition, notification, and consent per
se, but to effectively encourage rule-making innovations that
enforce general principles of protection and sharing. Rather than
have rules that identify and punish specific privacy violations,
the goal is to encourage the generation of private contexts and
technologies that define and protect privacy-preserving spaces.
Implicit in the design of such generative rules is recognition that
it is impossible ab initio to pre-identify best privacy practices and
threats, as these will change as technology and circumstances
change.
One of the difficulties in moving to dynamic and holistic regulatory frameworks of privacy and sharing is that some of the fundamental principles still in use today for framing and enforcing
of privacy policies are technologically and organizationally woefully out of date. The notion of Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPP) was first developed in 1973 and is the core of the
Privacy Act of 1974, and they still represent the dominant principles for the current privacy practices for the Federal Trade
Commission, the Department of Homeland Security’s National
Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, many U.S. state
laws, and many countries around the world. The FIPP are, in
effect, the “motherhood and apple pie” of privacy principles. Yet
despite their widespread use, they make certain assumptions
about technological functionality and practices that are dated,
simplistic, and limiting, and thereby have limited innovation in
privacy practices.
To see why this is the case, and why subsequent privacy principles should not be based upon FIPP, the eight basic FIPP principles are listed below and are followed by a brief critique that
explains why they should not be relied upon.
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FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (FIPP)
Transparency: Organizations should be transparent and provide notice
to the individual regarding collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of personally identifiable information (PII).
At first glance, this requirement would seem straightforward, but
in practice it makes a number of assumptions about notice and
consent that are simply impractical and ineffective. For instance,
given the volumes of data that will be swirling about on every
person in the very near future, consumers would have to spend
an inordinate amount of time reviewing consent agreements they
simply do not understand. This is one of the complaints about
HIPAA and, increasingly, about privacy notices for websites and
security tokens. These practices really do not achieve transparency, because only a rare few can understand the agreements and
fewer still are interested in reading them every time they are
brought to their attention. Transparency is something much more
subtle than notification and consent. It entails seeing and understanding the consequences of different practices and having the
information presented in such a manner that it does not hinder
effective operations by the organization in question, and at the
same time, achieves accountability and encourages self-correction
and improvement.
Individual Participation: Organizations should involve the individual in the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of
PII. Organizations should also provide mechanisms for appropriate
access, correction, and redress regarding use of PII.
Under the principle of “individual participation,” many complex
and competing requirements are included. People have neither
the time nor the interest in participating in all the decisions
required for consent and methods for redress. Moreover, Personal
Identifying Information (PII) has changed over time from the
obvious candidates of Social Security number, address, and age,
to virtually any combination of sufficient data attributes to identify someone. With new data mining techniques, it is now very
393

RULES FOR GROWTH
hard to find any combination of data that are not personally identifying. So full compliance with this principle would be both
impractical and impossible. Given the fear of severe penalties as
in the case of the breach of HIPAA rules, it is no wonder that
hardly any information is released without an impossible pile of
excessive paperwork.
Purpose Specification: Organizations should specifically articulate
the authority that permits the collection of PII and specifically articulate
the purpose or purposes for which the PII is intended to be used.
This is much more easily said than done. Again, with the volume
of data being collected and innovations in methods of mining and
analyzing data—as well as the number of potentially different
parties involved—compliance could be crippling. Also, as noted
before, it will never be clear as to what PII is since it could change
by context and application. From a compliance and self-interested adversity to risk perspective, it would make more sense to do
nothing. The presumption here, as in the other cases, is that data
have to be collected, held, and stored. This is no longer the case,
as they can be encrypted and used to “ping” against some value
and not retained by any third party, who would not even have to
know, much less store, the “physical” data. That was not the
implied technological model the framers of these principles had
in 1976.
Data Minimization: Organizations should only collect PII that is
directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s)
and only retain PII for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified
purpose(s).
This is a good principle, but again, purposes change and emerge
out of myriads of processes and interchanges, especially if there
are multiple parties involved. Hence, the full enforcement of this
principle could limit sharing since all purposes could not be identified a priori. Since data can be used for authentication, access
approval, and validation without being stored, there may not be
a need to retain it, and hence, little actual harm.
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Use Limitation: Organizations should use PII solely for the purpose(s)
specified in the notice. Sharing PII should be for a purpose compatible
with the purpose for which the PII was collected.
Again, there is a lot of wiggle room for good and ill in defining a
purpose, and it is not clear what “compatible with the purposes”
for which the PII was collected means and whether it can or
should have a precise meaning. Technology could reframe the
issue and provide a solution that was never considered by the
principle but would be precluded by it.
Data Quality and Integrity: Organizations should, to the extent
practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.
A laudable aspiration, but how does one ensure and independently verify that the data are relevant (an especially murky
notion), timely, and complete? Each of these criteria needs a
replicable, evolvable, and independent test. And as before, the
very notion of PII itself is flawed, and hence it is a misleading
notion upon which to rely.
Security: Organizations should protect PII (in all media) through
appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized
access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate
disclosure.
The challenge here is to determine a standard of risk and loss
appropriate to the type of data under consideration. NIST notions
of four Levels of Assurance (LOA) or other notions of Levels of
Protection (LOP) are appropriate here as to considering the security versus privacy harms of a breach. Once again, the notion of
PII is problematic, as data that are not by themselves personally
identifying can become so when combined with other “innocuous” data. Does that mean that all such data need to be appropriately protected? This becomes one of those open-ended requirements that is impossible to comply with. Where security becomes
a real issue is around the integrity of the system so that it becomes
impossible to know—or to verify—that data are not being copied,
modified, or destroyed by an unauthorized third party (such as
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the case of a “rogue bot” or an organized “army of bot mercenaries” without an identifiable human actor or beneficiary).
Accountability and Auditing: Organizations should be accountable
for complying with these principles, providing training to all employees
and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to
demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy
protection requirements.
These ideas are another example of impossible requirements to
comply with, primarily because of the generous use of the quantifier “all” being applied to employees, contractors, and “applicable privacy protection requirements.” Since audits by themselves
do not necessarily create accountability, there is also a need for
consequences, enforcements, and remedies to be part of the
requirement. Likewise, audits need to be wholly independent,
and in intervals and with metrics that effectively regulate and
correct the behavior of the organization.

A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
SHARING PRIVATE DATA

FOR

PROTECTING AND

Within the United States and the members of the European
Union, there is widespread recognition of the need for new privacy and security laws and regulations. Of special concern to the
United States, especially the DoD and DHS, is the scale and constancy of cybersecurity attacks that are not only hemorrhaging
DoD of vital intelligence data, but creating the opportunity for
cyberespionage to threaten America’s critical infrastructure, especially the financial system and the national grid. The integration
of the physical and the digital in banking, intelligence, and the
power grid is happening at an accelerating pace and, unless protected, poses a genuine physical threat to national security.
Some have argued for a laissez-faire, market solution to achieving
a secure cyberinfrastructure by letting market “forces” discover
how to resolve the trade-offs between privacy and sharing, and
appropriately price the risks for levels of investment in a secure
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cyberinfrastructure. Although markets can be highly efficient
resource allocators when there are reliable price signals, cyberinfrastructure investments, such as identity and authentication
platforms, are public goods, for which there are no simple price
signals. There are a variety of requirements—constitutional,
shared access, resiliency, interoperability—that preclude a market
solution. Once established, however, as in the case of open software and services platforms, private actors can compete, innovate, and differentiate themselves by the price and quality of their
services within a secure and trusted cyberinfrastructure platform.
There is no inherent requirement that the government by itself
should necessarily manage or even own an open-identity platform, but rather it can establish the ground rules, goals, and principles by which such platforms should be governed. The government should act as an independent referee, arbitrator, and
enforcer of open-platform rules. Rather than attempting to prescribe or design in advance what the specific rules, technologies,
harms, and remedies should be, the regulatory goal should be to
create the conditions whereby new rules, mechanisms, and policies can naturally emerge.6

OPEN GOVERNANCE PLATFORM: NEW ECOSYSTEMS
OF TRUST
In many industries where new technologies and services are
involved, there is growing recognition that different players need
to cooperate to build a common and open infrastructure that no
one party dominates. If any one party tries to dominate a nascent
market, it will stifle the overall revenue potential and limit inno6 See the literature on complexity sciences and emergent organization: John Henry Clippinger,
Biology of Business, Decoding the Natural Laws of Enterprise (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998);
Clippinger, A Crowd of One: The Future of Individual Identity (New York: Perseus, 2007); Stuart
Kauffman, Origin of Order; Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford
University Press USA, 1993); Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason and
Religion (New York: Basic Books, 2008); John Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds
Complexity (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996); Steven Wolfram, A New Kind of Science
(Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002); and Brian Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What it is and
How it Evolves (New York: Free Press, 2009).
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vation. This was the case with operating system (OS) software,
which Microsoft once dominated. But with the advent of Linux
and new open-source software licensing agreements (GPL,
Eclipse), not only was there increased competition among OS
software, but new markets for applications software and services
flourished. With the success of open source, OS software has
become open-source software in server, database, browser, desktop applications, and cloud computing—and virtually all aspects
of computer software. Instead of there being a closed market
dominated by a few dominant suppliers, a diverse and rapidly
evolving software ecosystem came into being. This model is now
being adopted in synthetic biology, mobile communications,
computer hardware, energy, transportation, media, and other
industries. Rather than turn to the government to determine the
rule sets for new business ecosystems and be the sole arbiter and
enforcer of the public interest and welfare, we have seen
companies, activists, customers, and various stakeholders come
together using an open-source methodology to develop their own
rule sets to make it possible for all stakeholders to effectively
leverage a common infrastructure. As Parker and Van Alstyne
(2009) have argued in their research on platform strategies, there
are clear business models for creating open, multiparty platforms
that have been the source of considerable innovation in diverse
industries.7
The identity and privacy arena has been one area where privatesector, academic, and NGO initiatives have been successful in
coming up with a user-centric, interoperable open platform identity. Starting in 2004 at the Berkman Center at Harvard University
and initially supported by Microsoft, IBM, Novell, and Best Buy,
a series of workshops and conferences were undertaken helping
to spawn a variety of initiatives—Project Higgins,8 Open ID
Foundation, Identity Commons, Identity Gang, Internet Identity
7 Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne, “Six Challenges in Platform Licensing and Open
Innovation,” Communications & Strategies no. 74 (2nd quarter 2009): 17.
8 For more information on Project Higgins, see www.eclipse.org/projecthiggins.
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Workshop, Information Card Foundation,9 and Project VRM. As
open-source software was developed for user-centric identity
management through Project Higgins, I-Card Foundation, and
Open ID Foundation, companies such as Equifax, Google, Bank
of America, PayPal, Microsoft, Verizon, Oracle, and Facebook
started to develop products and services leveraging this new
open-source identity software. Involved in these discussions also
were advocacy groups such as EPIC (Electronic Privacy
Information Center), EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation), and
CDT (Center for Democratic Technology). In 2010, the I-Card
Foundation and Open Identity Foundation jointly formed the
Open Identity Exchange (OIX),10 which became an independent
nonprofit vehicle for certifying different identity “trust frameworks” that identity providers such as Google, Citi, PayPal, or
Equifax would be offering.
The General Services Administration, a federal agency, took an
important step in forming a government-sanctioned trust framework (ICAM) for identity services for the U.S. government. An
important feature of this approach is that the government is not a
provider of identity services, but rather sets standards for private
vendors who are in turn certified by the Open Identity Exchange.
The challenge, however, is to provide a legal framework that is
supportive of this new approach to privacy and identity and can
encourage innovation and adaptation while “reinventing” the
notion of privacy in the context of rapid and fundamental technological innovations. Without strong governing principles, a willingness to let market acceptance alone define norms or expectations of privacy could fundamentally undermine democratic
principles. If people could be enticed to relinquish their privacy
rights in exchange for financial and other incentives, and if governments and corporations could form their own surveillance
and behavior monitoring networks at will, then the citizenry
would over time be relinquishing their autonomy and democrat9 For more information on the I-Card Foundation, see www.informationcard.net.
10 For more information on OIX, see www.openidentityexchange.org.
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ic powers to the government or other entities. Hence, a viable
notion of digital privacy requires a digital form of effective democratic governance whereby not only public institutions but private ones as well are accountable to principles of fairness, choice,
dignity, transparency, and public welfare.
Fortunately, there is a growing recognition among significant policymakers in the United States and the European Union to develop new approaches to protecting and sharing private information
that embodies a more open platform and ecological approach.
The differences between the more holistic and evolutionary
approaches and the more classic mechanistic models of the past
are significant and have broad implications on how to frame,
oversee, and implement complex regulatory policies.
The newly emerging trust framework being developed by NSTIC,
and which is scheduled to have presidential backing in January
2011, provides a set of principles that are clearly informed by new
software design methods, such as open source, as well as ecological principles that emphasize self-organization, resilience, interoperability, and emergence. In its “vision statement” of June 2010,
NSTIC emphasized principles such as “easy-to-use,” “confidence,” “choice,” and “innovation,” which stand in contrast to
the FFIP principles of thirty-four years ago. Given the importance
of this new perspective and its contrast with prior regulatory
principles for privacy, it is worth referencing the NSTIC vision
and principles in their entirety.11

NSTIC VISION
Individuals and organizations utilize secure, efficient, easyto-use, and interoperable identity solutions to access online
services in a manner that promotes confidence, privacy,
choice, and innovation.

11 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, Draft National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace, June 2010, www.nstic.ideascale.com.
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More specifically, the Strategy defines and promotes an
Identity Ecosystem that supports trusted online environments. The Identity Ecosystem is an online environment
where individuals, organizations, services, and devices can
trust each other because authoritative sources establish and
authenticate their digital identities.
The Identity Ecosystem Enables:
Security, by making it more difficult for adversaries to compromise online transactions;
Efficiency based on convenience for individuals who may
choose to manage fewer passwords or accounts than they do
today, and for the private sector, which stands to benefit
from a reduction in paper-based and account management
processes;
Ease-of-use by automating identity solutions whenever possible and basing them on technology that is easy to operate
with minimal training;
Confidence that digital identities are adequately protected,
thereby increasing the use of the Internet for various types of
online transactions;
Increased privacy for individuals, who rely on their data
being handled responsibly and who are routinely informed
about those who are collecting their data and the purposes for
which it is being used;
Greater choice, as identity credentials and devices are
offered by providers using interoperable platforms;
Opportunities for innovation, as service providers develop or expand the services offered online, particularly those
services that are inherently higher in risk.
Note that these principles presume there will not be some independent regulatory body and responsible entity alone, but that
much of the regulatory success will depend upon the quality of
the user experience as shaped by continuous technological and
legal evolution, innovation, and improvement. Also note that
there is no use of the quantifier “all” or even mention of PII. The
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NSTIC strategy also makes use of “use cases” to illustrate how
such an ecosystem might work and what the benefits would be
for the different stakeholders.
What is important is that such principles can be embedded and
tested in different kinds of trust frameworks that can in turn be
branded by different vendors who experiment with and develop
new technologies and services for their markets. How such values and principles are implemented will be left to private innovations in mechanisms of protection, sharing, visualization, and
contract law. But the application of such principles to preserve,
adapt, and further democratic principles should be the province
of government, and it is important that governments understand
how different combinations of policies, mechanisms, and technologies can advance or erode democratic principles. The point of
government in this capacity is to be the innovator in digital governance principles, as these principles will have to be reinvented
to keep pace with the technology. This is a tall order and probably best done through government support of research on opensource governance platforms and activities. Although within the
United States there is a general consensus that new forms of
privacy legislation may be needed, there is still considerable
uncertainty about the scope and nature of what such legislation
should cover.

COMPUTABLE TRUST FRAMEWORKS
SHARING

FOR

PRIVACY AND

With the integration of the physical and the digital over the coming years, pervasive technological change will be a constant
shaper of what is possible. Consequently, it will be impossible to
predict (1) what kinds of technological and policy changes will
either impede or further privacy, and (2) the appropriate information flows to advance new kinds of commercial, personal, health,
educational, and civic services. It must be remembered that we
are using technologies and policies to construct new kinds of privacy, governance, and commercial norms and institutions, and
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hence, continuous innovation is absolutely required, not only at
the service level but at the governance and policy levels as well.
Therefore, there will need to be an open, evolving governance
platform for privacy and security that encourages and enables an
ongoing series of real-world market experiments. Those who are
providing identity and security services should be encouraged
through safe harbor protections to develop competing trust networks to provide branded “rules and tools” that implement different approaches to protecting privacy while providing new
models for sharing and monetizing information. It will be the role
of government agencies to facilitate this process through funding,
research, standards setting, procurement practices, independent
auditing and oversight, and the development of guidelines and
principles for building and hosting identity and security services.
Every effort should be made to prevent the capture of key
processes and technologies by special interests. As in the case of
open software, such as in Linux or the LAMP stack, the core common identity technology should be kept open and subject to an
Eclipse or LGPL license. We would propose having an open identity kernel that would include the software for registering and
authenticating claims about a person’s different “personas,” such
as those associated with health, financial, professional, purchasing, or social activities and information. The identity kernel
would include a “dashboard” for individual and third-party
auditing of how one’s personal information was being used.
Relevant personal data would be “kept” in or accessed through a
Personal Data Store (PDS) where it would be encrypted to all but
the individual and trusted third parties. There also should be different damages and auditing schemes for different types of information—personal, professional, financial, commercial, health
care, and civic. Data would be auditable and traceable so that
there would full transparency on the actions of all parties participating as members of a trust network.
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MEMBER TRUST NETWORK
A key element to making this approach work is the notion of a
“member network,” which is a kind of social network in which all
members are authenticated and identifiable (by a variety of innovative means) and agree to abide by the policies, mechanisms,
contracts, and agreements of the member network. The Member
Trust Network is a kind of member network that uses a combination of governance mechanisms—identity authentication, dispute
resolution, reputation systems, auditing, credit assignment,
voting, and enforcement—to provide a variety of competitive
solutions to privacy, security, and information solutions. There
are technologies such as I-card technologies, zero knowledge
proof technologies, reputation currencies, digital contracting, and
auditing technologies that make it possible to implement trust
member technologies that embody different policy frameworks.
The role of regulatory agencies such as the FTC and DHS
would be to establish policy baselines and safeguards that act as
guidelines to direct new forms of innovation in services and
governance.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper began with a prediction about the future, saying that
in just five years the digital lives of more than two billion people
would be actively monitored, recorded, and analyzed. Data
measured in the exabytes will become the new fuel for a global
economy increasingly shaped by digital technologies. The traditional approach to protecting and sharing private data over the
years has been weighted toward protecting against harms resulting from the exposure of PII. As the amount of data collected on
people around the world has grown exponentially, traditional
protective measures such as prohibition, notification, and consent
are no longer adequate or even appropriate. In the case of medicine and national security, it can be argued that the harms from
not sharing critical information in many cases exceed the harms
resulting from not protecting private information. The challenge
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is to develop governance frameworks for protecting and sharing
private information that are incentivized to create new policies,
rules, private contracts, governance mechanisms, and software
services that are highly adaptive. It is argued that the FIPP principles are grounded in dated technology and are no longer adequate, and that newer principles drawing from an ecosystem
approach are required.
This new approach to rule making was then applied to the area of
digital privacy and security regulation. The argument has been
made that most current privacy protections policies and statutes
are conceived as remedies for preserving privacy in a physical
world. The digital sphere is so radically different in terms of what
is possible from the vantage point of privacy and security that
there are but very few useful precedents in the physical world.
Rather than grounding expectation of privacy upon precedents in
the physical world, it was argued that the point of digital privacy
policy is to encourage the construction of new concepts of privacy that reflect the possibilities of the technology. The rise of cloud
computing, virtual worlds, total surveillance, data mining, and
unforeseen technologies for anonymizing, de-anonymizing,
encrypting, de-encrypting data, and faking authentication make
it impossible for citizens and regulators to predict future events.
Rule sets and regulations, therefore, will need to evolve with the
technologies and services and business models in a principled
basis. The challenge for government is to understand how to
translate democratic governance principles into this fast-changing digital world. In this instance, there has to be genuine exploration and innovation in forms of governance. It was argued that
the best method for doing this has been the development of open
platforms whereby different stakeholders develop a common
infrastructure that supports the emergence of new business
ecosystems. Currently, there is an open-source effort in identity
and security that is being embraced by many major companies in
the private sector as well as by academics, NGOs, the United
States government, and the intelligence and defense agencies.
This effort is in its infancy, but nonetheless represents a major
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shift in how such complex policy issues are being conceptualized
and addressed.
A key challenge for the coming decade for governments will be
how to develop trusted institutions and relationships in a progressively digital and interconnected world. How this challenge
is dealt with will be determinative of growing free, vital, and
innovative networked societies. In light of these challenges the
following near-term recommendations are made.
• Revise FFIP and devise digital fairness principles and practices: These should avoid notions of PII, be technology agnostic, and encourage interoperability with European Union and
other privacy and identity frameworks.
• Develop identity ecosystems using open platform methodologies and technologies: Recognize that solutions need to be
holistic and self-organizing and self-correcting, combining
innovations in governance mechanisms as well as contracts
and policies.
• Conduct large-scale experiments for trust frameworks:
Encourage discovery and innovation in the marketplace that
generate new value and financial incentives.
• Provide safe harbor protections to innovators: Provide protections to those innovators who take legitimate risks to
improve the protection and sharing of private information.
• Encourage the underwriting of authentication risks: Make a
business case and opportunity for absorbing risks in much the
same way that enabled the growth of the credit card industry.
• Encourage the adoption of independent digital auditing and
rating mechanisms: Without full independent audit and rating systems there cannot be trust in the Identity Ecosystem.
Hence, new approaches and technologies should be encouraged.
Taken together and acted upon, these recommendations might
help reframe current policy perspectives toward privacy and
help move them in a direction that combines technology and
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rule making in a manner and at a pace that meets the challenges
of global digital societies and economies.12

12 Additional resources used in the development of this chapter include John Henry Clippinger, “An
Inquiry into Effective Reputation and Rating Systems,” in The Reputation Society: How Online
Opinions are Reshaping the Offline World, ed. Mark Tovey and Hassan Masum (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2011); and John Henry Clippinger and David Bollier, “The Renaissance of the Commons,”
in Code: Collaborative Ownership in the Digital Economy, ed. Rishab Ghosh (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2005).

407

RULES FOR GROWTH

408

17:

Innovation and Growth through
Open Access to Scientific Research:
Three Ideas for High-Impact Rule
Changes

Victoria Stodden∗

O

ur stock of scientific knowledge is now accumulating in
digital form. Our DNA is now encoded as genome
sequence data, scans of brain activity exist in functional
magnetic resonance image datasets, and records of our climate are stored in myriad time series datasets—to name a few
examples. Equally as important, our reasoning about these data is
recorded in software, in the scripts and code that analyze the digitally recorded world. The result is a deep digitization of scientific knowledge, spreading across fields and generating new ways
of understanding our surroundings. With the parallel development of the Internet as a pervasive communication mechanism
for digital data, an unprecedented opportunity for access to society’s scientific understanding is at hand.
At present, the notion of unmitigated access to scientific knowledge largely remains an unrealized opportunity. This paper pro∗ Victoria Stodden is Assistant Professor of Statistics at Columbia University, completing both her
PhD in statistics in 2006 and her law degree in 2007 at Stanford University. Her current research
focuses on how pervasive and large-scale computation is changing our practice of the scientific
method; reproducibility of computational results; understanding factors underlying code and data
sharing among researchers; and the role of legal framing for scientific advancement.
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poses three changes to our current regulatory system designed to
take into account the new reality of scientific innovation in a digital world and thereby promote innovation and economic growth.
Our current intellectual property framework developed with a
view to protecting original expressions of ideas in established
media, such as literature, film, and sound recordings. Scientific
innovations, such as code written to implement a new algorithm
or an image produced for academic journal publication, now fall
within a copyright structure that was developed for an entirely
different normative environment, and the result is the creation of
barriers to scientific innovation.
Part I of this essay explores the mismatch of intellectual property
laws with scientific norms regarding the treatment of ideas, and
proposes an alternative structure designed to facilitate deep sharing of scientific innovation through open code and data, thereby
realigning the legal environment with long-standing scientific
norms.
Part II addresses the role of federal agency policy in funding scientific research. Federal funding agencies create incentives for
openness through their grant guidelines and enforcement.
Changes to both accommodate the impact of computation on
reproducibility, and therefore openness, are suggested.
Part III proposes ideas for the facilitation of code and data sharing through a process of disentanglement of ownership rights
and the establishment of sharing protocols. Scientific research is
becoming increasingly collaborative, particularly with industry
researchers, and without a clear understanding of ownership
rights in data and code, open sharing is hampered, if not obstructed completely. Methods for streamlining this process at the university level to permit the disclosure of the underlying code and
data at the time of publication are presented.
The case for openness in science is not a new one. Scientific
research is predicated on an understanding of scientific knowledge as a public good—this is the rationale underlying today’s
multibillion-dollar subsidies of scientific research through vari410
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ous federal and state agencies. The scientific view is not one of
adding nuggets of truth to our collective understanding, but
instead one of weighing evidence and assigning likelihoods to a
finding’s probability of being true. This creates a normative structure of skepticism among scientists: the burden is on the discovering scientist to convince others that what he or she has found is
more likely to be correct than our previous understanding. The
scientific method’s central motivation is therefore the ubiquity of
error—the awareness that mistakes and self-delusion can creep in
absolutely anywhere and that the scientist’s effort is primarily
expended in recognizing and rooting out error. As a result, standards of scientific communication evolved to incorporate full disclosure of the methods and reasoning used to arrive at the result.
Since the 1660s, the gold standard for scientific communication
has been reproducibility, to create both the greatest chance of the
accurate transmission of the new discoveries and also to maximize the likelihood that any errors in the reasoning would be
identified.
Today, massive computation is transforming science, as
researchers from numerous fields, even historically nontechnical
ones, launch ambitious projects involving large-scale computations. A rapid transition is under way—visible particularly over
the past two decades—that will finish with computation as
absolutely central to scientific enterprise. From the newcomer’s
struggle to make even the simplest computer program run, to the
seasoned professional’s frustration when a server crashes in the
middle of a large job, all is struggle against error. The understanding necessary for reproducibility is typically not transmitted, as
computational results are frequently of a complexity that makes
the effective explanation of the methodology all but impossible in
a typical scientific publication today. To affect reproducibility,
and the transfer of the knowledge embodied in the scientific finding, the code and data on which the result is derived must be
communicated such that the result can be independently replicated and verified.
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As a contribution to society’s stock of knowledge, a scientific
finding has the potential to be both developed and extended into
commercial settings and to become the foundation for further scientific discoveries. Acceleration of innovation is facilitated by the
incorporation of the open release of code and data in today’s computational science practice. A number of changes are essential to
catalyze both scientific advancement and the development of
applications and discoveries outside academia.

PART I.THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENTIFIC
INNOVATION AND DISSEMINATION: COPYRIGHT IS A
BARRIER
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution has been
interpreted to confer two distinct powers: the first power provides the basis for copyright law—securing for a limited time a
creator’s exclusive right to their original work;1 the second power
provides the basis for patent law—giving inventors a limitedterm exclusive right to their discoveries in exchange for disclosure of the invention. Authors do not have to apply for copyright
protection, as it adheres automatically when the original expression of the idea is rendered in fixed form. Many perfectly standard scientific activities, such as writing a script to filter a dataset
or fit a statistical model, will produce a copyrighted output, in
this case the code written to implement these tasks. Building a
new dataset through the original selection and arrangement of
data will generate ownership rights through copyright for the
dataset creator, to give another example.2
The default nature of copyright confers an intellectual property
framework for scientific ideas at odds with long-standing
scientific norms in two key ways.3 First, by preventing copying of
1 For a discussion of the Copyright Act of 1976 see e.g. Pam Samuelson, “Preliminary Thoughts on
Copyright Reform Project,” Utah Law Review 3 (2007): 551, accessed March 7, 2009,
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers.html.
2 See Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), 363-364.
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the research work, it creates a barrier to the possibility of legally
reproducing and verifying another scientist’s results without the
need to obtain prior permission from the authoring scientist.4
Second, copyright also establishes rights for the owner over the
creation of derivative works. Scientific norms guide scientists to
build on previous discoveries—using copyrighted work in derivative research typically requires obtaining the permission of the
copyright holder, thus creating a block to the generation of new
scientific discoveries. Particularly as computation becomes
increasingly central to the scientific method, copyright on code
and the potential for copyright in data are barriers to the advancement of science and economic growth. When scientists share their
research on the Web, for example, the original expression of their
ideas automatically falls under copyright.
Copyright law is often understood as a trade-off between
providing incentives for the production of creative works by
granting the author certain limited-term exclusive rights over
their work, and the public’s desire to access the work. By blocking the ability of others to copy and reuse research, copyright law
acts counter to the prevailing scientific norms that encourage
scientists to openly release their work to the community in
exchange for citation.
An exception is made in our federal copyright code under fair use
for “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,”5 but this does not extend to the full research
project. A relatively straightforward solution to the barrier copyright imposes would be to broaden the fair use exception to
include scientific research that takes place in research institutions
such as universities or via federal research grants.6
3 For a detailed discussion of copyright law and its impact on scientific innovation, see Victoria
Stodden, “Enabling Reproducible Research: Licensing for Scientific Innovation,” International
Journal for Communications Law and Policy 13 (Winter 2008-9), http://www.ijclp.net/
issue_13.html.
4 See Victoria Stodden, “The Legal Framework for Reproducible Scientific Research: Licensing and
Copyright,” Computing in Science and Engineering 11, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 35.
5 U.S. 17 § 107.
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Distinguishing legal fair use is not a clear exercise, and an extension to research more broadly may still not sufficiently clarify
rights. A preferable step would be to include academic research,
identified perhaps by federal funding, directly in the fair use
exception.
Another mechanism for realigning intellectual property rights
with scientific norms is the Reproducible Research Standard
(RRS). The first component of this standard is the application of
an appropriate license to remove restrictions on copying and
reusing the scientific work, as well as adding an attribution
requirement to elements of the research compendium.
Components of the research compendium have different features
that necessitate different licensing approaches. Licensing is given
strength through rights created by the underlying copyright law:
if these licenses are found invalid by a court, the work will still be
considered under copyright. Effectively, this means that even if a
license fails to be recognized as a valid contract by a court, use of
the work will remain subject to injunction and other remedies
associated with copyright violation.7
With myriad options for licensing copyright-protected work, a
principle for scientific licensing can guide choices:
Principle of Scientific Licensing: Legal encumbrances to the dissemination, sharing, use, and re-use of scientific research compendia should
be minimized, and require a strong and compelling rationale before
application.8
The goal of an intellectual property legal framework for scientific
research must be to increase what Benkler terms “that most precious of all public domains—our knowledge of the world that
6 This idea was suggested in Paul A. David, “The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance
between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A
Primer,” Accessed January 12, 2009, http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpdc/0502006.html.
7 This recourse to copyright for enforcement may not be necessary: a recent case (Jacobsen v.
Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) found a software license to be enforceable like a copyright
condition for which courts can apply the remedy of injunction.
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surrounds us.”9 This effort involves an alignment of the private
incentives faced by a scientific researcher and the societal benefit
of increasing our stock of public knowledge. Scientific norms
have arisen to align these interests in practice, and an associated
intellectual property structure should reflect these norms to allow
scientific research to flourish.10

The Paper, Figures, and Other Media Files
For media components of scientific work, alignment with scientific norms is most readily and simply achievable through use of the
Creative Commons attribution license (CC BY), which frees the
work for replication and re-use, with the condition that attribution must accompany any downstream use of the work.

The Code
A plethora of licenses exist that allow authors to set conditions of
use for their code. In scientific research, code can consist of scripts
that are essentially stylized text files (such as MATLAB or R
scripts) or the code can have both a compiled binary form and a
source representation (such as code written in C). Use of the CC
BY license for code is actively discouraged by Creative
Commons.11

8 A research compendium refers to the triple of research paper, and the code and data that underlies its results. See Robert Gentleman and Duncan Temple Lang, “Statistical Analyses and
Reproducible Research” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 16, no. 1 (2007): 1-23,
http://www.bepress.com/bioconductor/paper2/.
9 Yochai Benkler, “Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in
the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 15
(Fall 1999): 3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=214973.
10 See Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), for
a description of the four scientific norms. Of particular interest to us is the “Communitarian”
norm: that scientists relinquish ownership rights over their work in exchange for acknowledgement through citation or perhaps the naming of discoveries. This, in conjunction with the norm of
“Skepticism” that establishes the close inspection and review of research work by the community,
implies open access to scientific research, satisfying the interests of the larger community in the
openness and availability of scientific research work. Paul David has made this observation in “The
Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’,” 5.
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The (Modified) Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license permits the downstream use, copying, and distribution of either
unmodified or modified source code, as long as the license
accompanies any distributed code and the previous authors’
names are not used to promote modified downstream code.12 The
Modified BSD license is very similar to the MIT license, with the
exception that the MIT license does not include a clause forbidding endorsement.13
The Apache 2.0 license is another common method for developers to specify terms of use of their work.14 Like the Modified BSD
and MIT licenses, the Apache license requires attribution. It differs from the previously discussed licenses in that it permits the
exercise of patent rights that otherwise would extend only to the
original licensor, meaning that a patent license is granted for
those patents needed for use of the code. The license further stipulates that the right to use the work without patent infringement
will be lost if the downstream user of the code sues the licensor
for patent infringement. Attribution under Apache 2.0 requires
that derivative works carry a copy of the license, with notice of
any files modified. All copyright, trademark, and patent notices
that pertain to the work must be included. Attribution can also be
done in such a notice file.

Scientific Data
Collecting, cleaning, and otherwise preparing data for analysis is
often a significant component of scientific research. Copyright
law in the United States does not permit the copyrighting of “raw
facts,” but original products derived from those facts are copy11 “[W]e do not recommend that you apply a Creative Commons license to software code,” “FAQ.”
accessed January 5, 2009, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ.
12 “Open Source Initiative OSI—The BDS License,” accessed January 2, 2009, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php.
13 “Open Source Initiative OSI—The MIT License,” accessed March 5, 2009, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
14 “Apache License, Version 2.0,” accessed January 1, 2009, http://www.apache.org/licenses/
LICENSE-2.0.
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rightable. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, the
Supreme Court found that the white pages from telephone directories are not themselves directly copyrightable, since copyrightable works must have creative originality:15
...the copyright in a factual compilation is thin.
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another’s
publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so
long as the competing work does not feature the same
selection and arrangement.16
Currently, the Court holds original “selection and arrangement”
of databases protectable:17 the component falling under copyright must be original in that “copyright protection extends only
to those components of the work that are original to the author,
not to the facts themselves....”18 The extraction of facts from a
database does not violate copyright. Attaching an attribution
license to the original “selection and arrangement” of a database
can encourage scientists to release the datasets they have created
by providing a legal framework for attribution and re-use of the
original selection and arrangement aspect of their work.19 Since
15 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 363-364.
16 Ibid., 349. See also Miriam Bitton, “A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database
Protection Debate” and Hongwei Zhu and Stuart E. Madnick, “One Size does not Fit All: Legal
Protection for Non-Copyrightable Data” (working paper CISL# 2007-04), accessed January 4, 2009,
http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2007-04.pdf.
17 Miriam Bitton, “A New Outlook,” 4.
18 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 340. The full quote reads “Although a
compilation of facts may possess the requisite originality because the author typically chooses
which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the data so that readers
may use them effectively, copyright protection extends only to those components of the work
that are original to the author, not to the facts themselves... As a constitutional matter, copyright
protects only those elements of a work that possess more than de minimis quantum of creativity.
Rural’s white pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short
of the mark. As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 does not afford protection from copying to a
collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality. Given that some works must fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate. Indeed, were
we to hold that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts
could fail.” For a discussion of the Constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to create property
rights in facts see Yochai Benkler, “Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection.”

417

RULES FOR GROWTH
the raw facts themselves are not copyrightable, it does not make
sense to apply such a license to the data themselves. The selection
and arrangement may be implemented in code or described in a
text file accompanying the dataset, either of which can be appropriately licensed.
Since the components of research compendia are varied, licenses
should be applied as appropriate to each component in accordance with the Principle of Scientific Licensing. Using CC BY on
the media components of the research, such as text and figures,
permits other scientists to freely use and reuse this work provided the original author is attributed. The same result is obtained by
using a software license that provides an attribution component
for the code components, such as the Apache License 2.0, the
Modified BSD License,20 or the MIT License. The original selection and arrangement of data can be similarly licensed depending
on whether it takes a code or text format. Since an attribution
license cannot be attached to raw facts, data can be released to the
public domain by marking with the CC0 standard.21 A licensing
structure that makes media, code, data, and data arrangements—
the research compendium—available for re-use, in the public
domain or with attribution, is termed the Reproducible Research
Standard.

PART II. GOVERNMENT FUNDING AGENCY POLICY
SHOULD REQUIRE OPENNESS
Government funding agencies such as the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the
19 See Anselm Kamperman Sanders, “Limits to database protection: Fair use and scientific research
exemptions,” Research Policy 35, no. 6 (July 2006): 854-874 (859 for a discussion of the international and WIPO statements of the legal status of databases).
20 Creative Commons provides the BSD as a CC license, accessed March 5, 2009, See http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/BSD/.
21 For details on the CC0 protocol, see Creative Commons, “Creative Commons Launches CC0 and
CC+ Programs,” news release, December 17, 2007, http://creativecommons.org/pressreleases/entry/7919 (accessed February 12, 2009).
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Department of Energy (DOE) support an overwhelmingly large
percentage of academic research in the United States. They often
have policies that recommend and even require open release of
funded research, including data and code, yet there is very little
implementation or enforcement of these policies.22 Washington is
currently considering the extension of the open access implementation for manuscripts policies enacted by the NIH to other agencies,23 but two things need to occur. Data and code must be
included in the discussion of open access, and these policies of
open access must be extended to agencies beyond the NIH. Each
agency addresses very different bodies of research and thus
implementation of open research may vary by agency, permitting
each to face issues such as privacy, confidentiality, scientific
norms including versioning and citation, and legal issues such as
appropriate licensing of manuscripts, code, and data, as appropriate to the research communities involved. To aid in this effort,
a number of research projects could be selected as pilots for the
implementation of reproducible research thus providing an
experiment in the full release of the code and data. Such carefully chosen pilot projects could help map out needs for open
research, and then support could be given for these projects to
facilitate their production of really reproducible research. This
would create a scenario where it would be possible to learn what

22 On May 10, 2010, the NSF announced that it would require the submission of a two-page data
management plan along with grant applications for funding, beginning in October 2010. The impetus for the requirement is the need for open shared data: “Science is becoming data-intensive and
collaborative,” noted Ed Seidel, acting assistant director for NSF’s Mathematical and Physical
Sciences directorate. “Researchers from numerous disciplines need to work together to attack
complex problems; openly sharing data will pave the way for researchers to communicate and collaborate more effectively.” “This is the first step in what will be a more comprehensive approach
to data policy,” added Cora Marrett, NSF acting deputy director. “It will address the need for data
from publicly funded research to be made public.” See National Science Foundation, “Scientists
Seeking NSF Funding Will Soon Be Required to Submit Data Management Plans,” news release, May
10, 2010, http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=116928&org=NSF.
23 On April 15, 2010, Rep. Doyle reintroduced the Federal Research Public Access Act (H.R. 5037),
seeking to make published papers from federally funded research publicly available over the
Internet. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR05037:@@@P for the full text of
the bill. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate on June 25, 2009 (S. 1373), by Senators Lieberman
and Cornyn.
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support, in terms of repositories, funding, or infrastructure, is
needed and at what expense.24
To give an example, the National Science Foundation (NSF),
through its role as a funding agency, makes a key contribution to
the research incentives faced by many computational scientists
and is in a unique position to address issues regarding verification of results, both through its research funding activities and
policy leadership. There are five interlocking barriers to code and
data release within funding agency purview: crafting appropriate
release guidelines; collaborative tool development; intellectual
property issues; facilitating access to research compendia;25 and
provision of “best practices” statements.

Issue 1: Enforcement of Existing Grant Guidelines
The NSF, for example, requires data and other supporting materials for any research it funds to be made available to other
researchers at no more than incremental cost (with a provision for
safeguards the right of individuals and subjects). The following
passage is from the January 2009 NSF Grant General Conditions:
38. Sharing of Findings, Data, and Other Research
Products
a. NSF expects significant findings from research and
education activities it supports to be promptly submitted for publication, with authorship that accurately
reflects the contributions of those involved. It expects
investigators to share with other researchers, at no more
than incremental cost and within a reasonable time, the
data, samples, physical collections and other support24 On January 18, 2011 the National Science Foundation will require the submission of a two-page
Data Management Plan with every grant, thereby creating a complementary experiment that also
will reveal research needs and the costs associated with supporting reproducible research. See
http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/dmp.jsp.
25 The term research “compendium” was coined by Robert Gentleman and Duncan Temple Lang
to refer to “both a container for the different elements that make up the document and its computations (i.e. text, code, data…), and as a means for distributing, managing and updating the collection.” See Gentleman and Lang, “Statistical Analyses and Reproducible Research.”
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ing materials created or gathered in the course of the
work. It also encourages grantees to share software and
inventions or otherwise act to make the innovations
they embody widely useful and usable.26
This passage requires the release of data collected through NSFfunded activities, and recommends the release of accompanying
software.

Recommendation 1.1: NSF Policy Expression
An important step would be to open the discussion of rewording
the General Conditions to include the release of software, just as
data are required to be released. Section 38 could be modified in
the spirit of the following:
38. Sharing of Findings, Data, and Other Research
Products
a. NSF expects significant findings from research and
education activities it supports to be promptly submitted for publication, with authorship that accurately
reflects the contributions of those involved. It expects
investigators to share with other researchers, at no more
than incremental cost and within a reasonable time, the
data, samples, physical collections and other supporting materials, such as software and inventions, created or
gathered in the course of the work. Data and software
should be made available in such a way that they are easily reusable by someone knowledgeable in the field. (emphasis
added)
Often the steps taken to generate computational results are
embodied in software scripts or code. Computational research
can includes a large number of small decisions—from data collation and filters, to software invocation sequences and parameter
settings used in algorithms—that are impossible to capture com26 National Science Foundation, Grant General Conditions (GC-1), January 5, 2009,
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gc1/jan09.pdf (accessed Sept. 26, 2009).
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pletely in the final published paper, simply due to their multiplicity. A potentially fruitful way of communicating research methodology in these cases is to release the underlying code for inspection. Release of the accompanying data is the second necessary
step for reproducibility of published computational findings.

Recommendation 1.2: Grantee-developed Release Plans
A blanket requirement of code and data release indicates funding
agency intent but is not sufficient to create a regulatory environment in which researchers share easily reusable code and data,
due to the difficulty in preparing code and data for release and
widespread use. The use of computational tools is appearing in
an increasing number of aspects of modern scientific research,
making the myriad research settings in which these tools are used
very complex, highly differentiated, and granular. One size does
not fit all research problems, and a heavy-handed release requirement could result in de jure compliance—release of code and
data—without the extra effort necessary to create usable code and
data that facilitates the verification of the results. A solution partially under way (see footnote 28) would be to require grant
applicants to formulate plans for release of the code and data generated through their research proposal, if funded. This creates a
natural experiment where grantees, who know their research
environments best, contribute complete strategies for release.
This experiment would allow the funding agency to gather data
on needs for release (repositories, further support); understand
which research problem characteristics engender what particular
solutions; identify what solutions are most appropriate in what
settings; and uncover as yet unrecognized problems particular
researchers may encounter. These findings would permit the
funding agency to craft code and data release requirements that
are more sensitive to barriers researchers face and the demands of
their particular research problems, and implements strategies for
enforcement of these requirements. This approach also permits
researchers to address confidentiality and privacy issues associated with their research. This would not be the first implementation
of this approach to policy crafting. The Wellcome Trust in the
422

17: INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH OPEN ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
United Kingdom began requiring grant applicants to submit
comprehensive data release plans more than two years ago, and
they are on the cusp of enforcing and observing these plans in
action as grantees are now beginning to generate datasets from
their funded research.27

Issue 2: Tools for Collaboration and Work Sharing
In the world of computing in general, not just scientific computing, the ubiquity of error has led to many responses, including
special programming languages, error-tracking systems, disciplined programming efforts, and organized program-testing
schemes. These efforts are key in developing a system of code and
data release that does not create an overwhelming burden on the
part of the computational scientist.

Recommendation 2.1: Funding of Software and
Tool Development
Researchers use computational resources in very different ways.
Examples range from short MATLAB scripts to the millions of
lines of code, perhaps spanning several languages, that can
underlie a complex simulation. The underlying software was typically not designed with scientific needs in mind and is generally
a dialog with a single user, who would like to implement an algorithm or other innovation. It is up to the user to take extra steps
to save the coding efforts and decisions taken, to record program
invocation sequences and parameter settings, and otherwise
track provenance of their research. These are exactly the steps it is
important to share for verifiability, yet they are often not recorded as a natural part of the computational research process. In the
heat of a computational project, researchers store many things in
short-term memory that are needed at that moment to use the
code productively. Facilitating the burden of code and data
release means avoiding reliance on this soft, transient knowledge
27 Nicole Perrin, Senior Policy Advisor, Wellcome Trust Limited, UK, “Data Matters: A Research
Funder’s Perspective” (keynote speech at COMMUNIA, Torino, June 29, 2009). See also “Wellcome
Trust, policy on data management and sharing,” last modified August 2010, http://www.
wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Policy-and-position-statements/WTX035043.htm.
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and, more specifically, codifying that knowledge objectively and
reproducibly. An analogy could be drawn to the lab notebook
kept by experimentalists. Its purpose is to record experimental
methodology precisely, and is standard practice for all experimental sciences.
Tools for provenance are emerging but need to be developed at a
much faster rate and for a much wider number of research problems, at a wider range of scales.28 Even the solo researcher running software on his or her laptop can benefit from a system
designed with the understanding that elements of the work that
produce published results will be shared. Version control systems
for code exist but are not routinely used by all computational scientists. Provenance tools must be easy to use since many
researchers who use computational methods are not computer
specialists. Aspects such as unit testing and standardized test
beds (as is typical in open source code development) should be
emphasized and even required for scientific code.
The scope of this problem is broad enough to warrant a discussion of targeted funding from the NSF and other agencies that
fund computational work, particularly as research begins to
move into the cloud and increasingly takes place in shared virtual spaces. Many computational scientists will require retraining in
the use of software that tracks provenance and allows for such
workflow sharing.
In a recent survey of computational scientists, the incremental
amount of work involved in preparing code and data for release
was the primary barrier to open code and data sharing.29
Routinely used software tools typically lack a system of incorpo28 See http://twiki.ipaw.info/bin/view/Challenge/FirstProvenanceChallenge; the UK-funded
Taverna software package, http://www.mygrid.org.uk/; the Sumatra package for reproducible
simulations, http://neuralensemble.org/trac/sumatra; the Pegasus system developed at the
University of Southern California, http://pegasus.isi.edu/; and Galaxy software developed at Penn
State University, http://galaxy.psu.edu/. See Microsoft’s Trident Workbench for an oceanography
example, http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/collaboration/tools/trident.aspx.
29 See Victoria Stodden, “The Scientific Method and Computation: Reproducibility in the
Computational Sciences” (forthcoming).
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rating the preparation of code as data for release, as the research
is progressing. Recreating steps previously taken is difficult for
any scientist when working in a programming environment
designed for running code, but not for sharing or working collaboratively. Such tools will not only facilitate the release of coherent
and reusable code and data, but ease research collaboration and
facilitate communication of work in progress between coauthors.
A challenge for scientific research is developing software environments to enable collaborative research, and facilitating reproducibility of computational results is a key step in this process.

Recommendation 2.2: Funding of Statistical Methods for
Simulation-Based Modeling
An increasingly pervasive methodological tool is the use of massive simulations of a physical system’s complete evolution,
repeated numerous times while varying simulation parameters
systematically. Such models in climate research provide the foundation for some of our most crucial public policy decisions and
are beginning to represent scientific research in the public dialogue. Statistical machinery analogous to such long-standing
tools in conventional modeling as error bounds on prediction,
parameter estimation, and overall model fit must be developed in
the case of computer simulation. An important step is the development of workflow-tracking software environments to facilitate
tracing of error sources as mentioned previously, but further
research is needed to understand how to evaluate the output of
simulations. Since this is a new area of research, framing of the
uncertainty quantification problem should be carefully undertaken as a preliminary step to a broader research agenda.

Issue 3: The Intellectual Property Framework for Code and
Data Release
Even though scientists produce public goods, their work is not
immune to intellectual property strictures, as elaborated in Part I.
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Recommendation 3.1: Adopting the Reproducible
Research Standard
As discussed in the previous section, the Reproducible Research
Standard (RRS) realigns the intellectual property framework
faced by computational researchers with longstanding scientific
norms.30 The RRS suggests a licensing structure for research compendia, including code and data, which permits others to use and
reuse code and data without having to obtain prior permission or
assume a fair use exception to copyright, so long as attribution is
given.31 Using the RRS on all components of computational
scholarship will encourage reproducible scientific investigation,
facilitate greater collaboration, and promote engagement of the
larger community in scientific learning and discovery.

Issue 4: Access to Published Research Papers and
Supporting Materials
Asking computational scientists to embrace reproducibility poses
questions with regard to location of research compendia on the
Internet and access to published results.

Recommendation 4.1: Funding Agency Public Access Policy
Reproducibility requires not only access to underlying code and
data, but access to the original published article. Funding agencies such as the NSF and DOE could create a digital archive, analogous to the National Institutes of Health’s PubMed Central, and
require the deposit of their funded final manuscripts. The NIH
30 For a full discussion of the Reproducible Research Standard, see Victoria Stodden, “Enabling
Reproducible Research.”
31 Fair use is how the U.S. copyright law provides for the use of copyrighted works without the
need to obtain the copyright holder’s permission, in order to provide flexibility in balancing the
interests of copyright holders and the public’s desire to make use of copyrighted works. The copyright statute states that “...the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” (17 U.S.C. § 107). Whether or not use of
copyrighted material can be deemed fair use is fact specific and subject to a four-factor test. How
far the scholarship exception extends is unclear, and scientists may not feel comfortable relying
on it when building on another scientist’s research through, for example, reusing code.
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requires that papers that arise from NIH funds comply with their
public access to policy: final peer-reviewed journal manuscripts
must be submitted to PubMed Central upon acceptance for publication, and become accessible to the public no longer than
twelve months after publication.32
The NIH further requires that copyright be addressed. If publicly
funded research falls under the Reproducible Research Standard
as described in Section 3, articles will be licensed using the
Creative Commons attribution license, therefore removing copyright barriers from the paper. Many journals, however, require
authors to assign copyright to the journal as a condition of publication, but will allow an earlier version to be posted publicly. The
NIH has made publication in journals that permit the article, or a
version thereof, to be posted in PubMed Central a requirement of
funding—this strategy is an option for other funding agencies
as well.
The final requirement the NIH makes of grant recipients is to use
the PubMed Central identifier at the end of citations.
Encouraging the use of unique identifiers of papers, as well as
code and data, can encourage the release and hence citation of all
forms of computational research.33 Such a unique identifier
would indicate compliance with funder agency open-access
policies.
It is important that these requirements be tied to grant funding
and a mechanism established that allows compliance to be reflected in future grant determinations. Strategies for release of code
and data arising from a particular grant should be subject to peer
review in the grant evaluation process.
32 The twelve-month post-publication grace period could be applied to code and data release,
upon researcher request. This strategy was advocated for genome data in “Prepublication data
sharing,” Nature 461, (10 September 2009): 168-170, http://www.nature.com/nature/
journal/v461/n7261/full/461168a.html.
33 See e.g. Altman and King’s Uniform Numerical Identifier proposal for data citation, http://thedata.org/citation/standard. This also can ensure that an unmodified version of a dataset is used in
different research studies, when confidentiality or other concerns prohibit open release of the
dataset.
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Recommendation 4.2: Funding Agencies Support Digital
Archiving for Data and Code
For papers whose results can be replicated from short scripts and
small datasets, many computational scientists who do engage in
reproducible research are able to host their research compendia
on their institutional web pages or using hosting resources their
institution is willing to provide.34 Not all computation research
involves small amounts of supplemental code and data; hosting
very large datasets or complex bodies of code may be necessary
and home institutional support may not be available to the
researcher. A funding agency could create code and data repositories as for papers (perhaps even jointly among agencies), or
seek to increase support of the growing set of data repositories
emerging at institutions.35 Data is necessary for reproducibility of
computational research, but an equal amount of concern should
be directed at code sharing. As yet, code sharing repositories are
not established to the extent that data repositories are.
Tagging of research compendia is an important issue for communicating work, facilitating topical web searches, and aggregating
a researcher’s contributions, including their code and dataset
building activities. Development of a standard RDFa vocabulary
for HTML tags for publicly funded research would enable searches for code, data, and research as well as facilitating the transmission of licensing information, authorship, and sources. That such
a standard would enable searches by author would allow a more
granular understanding of a scientist’s research contributions,
beyond citations. This would provide an incentive to release code
and data, and give groups, such as funders, award committees,
and university hiring and promotion committees, access to a
more accurate representation of the researcher’s work. Such a tagging vocabulary could include unique identifiers for code and
data, ideally the same as those required for repository deposit as

34 See e.g. http://sparselab.stanford.edu and http://www-stat.stanford.edu/~wavelab.
35 See e.g. The Stanford Microarray Database, http://smd.stanford.edu/.
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discussed in the previous section, and thus facilitate and encourage their citation.

Issue 5: Reproducible Research “Best Practice”
Recommendations
Computational scientists may be unaware of the need to work
reproducibly, researchers may be unaware of what it means to do
so, and funding agencies and journals may find it useful to have
a clear explanation of the issue and its implementation at the
funding agency.

Recommendation 5.1: Release of Funding Agency “Best
Practice” Recommendations
Such a document would be publicly available at a stable URL,
updated with versions, and intended to provide clarity on all relevant issues. It would be framed to suggest ideal recommendations, rather than list a series of requirements. Some points that
such a list may wish to touch on follow below.
Reproducibility is a goal of computational science, and practicing
reproducible research means:
• Uploading the final peer-reviewed journal manuscripts that
arise from agency-funded research to a digital archive upon
acceptance for publication;
• Making the code and data required to reproduce results in
agency-funded works publicly available online within twelve
months of publication (or less);
• Utilizing appropriate licensing structures for agency-funded
research, such as the Reproducible Research Standard; and
• Utilizing tagging structures for agency-funded compendia
release, as part of inclusion in repositories or posting on institutional repositories.

The Necessity of a Multifaceted Approach
This discussion is intended to frame issues that arise with the
implementation of reproducibility in computational science.
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These recommendations reflect a set of interlocking issues, and
progress from one recommendation will be facilitated by implementation of other recommendations.

PART III. UNTANGLING OWNERSHIP ISSUES FOR
SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION AND OPEN DISSEMINATION:
A NEW VISION FOR UNIVERSITY LEADERSHIP
With the advent of large-scale data and the pervasiveness of computing in scientific research, ownership issues for code and data
have yet to be fully addressed. Data often are generated in collaboration with co-researchers, who may be in academia, government, or the private sector, and funding sources can be equally as
varied. Copyright endows authors of code with exclusive rights,
contracts with universities often give home institutions a claim,
and evidence suggests that journals are turning their publishing
models for articles toward hosting and releasing the associated
code and data. To make matters more complex, repositories for
both code and data are coming online with their own ownership
and licensing schemes for scientific products.
When data and code are widely shared, such ownership issues
come sharply to the fore. What is missing today is clarity regarding ownership rights, which can vary by case, and one ownership
model may not transfer from one research setting to the next. To
accelerate the wide dissemination of newly discovered scientific
knowledge, an ombudsman position needs to be created at the
university level, perhaps within the Copyright Office or Provost’s
Office, to streamline the process of rights ascertainment and
negotiate agreements for sharing of collaboratively created code
and data. This position would be regarded as temporary, perhaps
lasting a decade, during which a set of typical sharing arrangements would emerge. In the longer term, negotiation over ownership and sharing rights would be shifted to the beginning of the
project, when collaborators could typically adopt one of the small
number of established emergent ownership models.
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There are a limited number of possible claims in data and code
ownership. The scientists themselves, their university, or funding
bodies (public and private) are principal stakeholders.
Ownership rights vested in the scientist present the least complex
case, in that norms of openness in methods and in reproducible
research exist, even if they are not always carefully implemented.
In my recent survey of computational scientists, there emerged a
clear tension between open science and code patenting.36 Some
respondents noted that a reason not to share their code even after
publication was the possibility of patents (and the possibility of
forming a company around the patented technology). A perhaps
unexpected result of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, passed on the eve
of the computer revolution in scientific research, was the creation
of incentives for universities and academic researchers to lock scientific knowledge in patents. With the intention of providing an
impetus for universities to transfer innovations outside academia
and thus facilitate commercial and industrial development, the
result has been the creation of a barrier to both scientific integrity
and openness in the communication of scientific discovery, insofar as innovations are not shared openly.37 For scientific findings
to be reproducible, code and data must be open and verifiable,
and to accelerate scientific innovation the code and data must be
modifiable, reusable, and able to be applied to novel research
problems. Patented code inserts the university’s Office of
Technology Licensing into this process, disrupting the open flow
of downstream scientific research. A second recommendation is
an automatic exception from patent use restrictions on code used
for academic research purposes, still permitting commercial
development of new technologies. This could be achieved
through an open licensing structure that distinguishes between
commercial and noncommercial downstream use of the scientific
output.
36 Victoria Stodden, “The Scientific Method in Practice: Reproducibility in the Computational
Sciences” (MIT Sloan Research Paper no. 4773-10), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1550193.
37 For a further description, see Joseph Stiglitz and John Sulston, “The Manchester Manifesto”
(November 2009), Available at http://www.isei.manchester.ac.uk/TheManchesterManifesto.pdf.
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Open code is emerging as a requirement for publication and is a
clear component of reproducible computational research. A clash
is emerging between the requirements for scientific integrity in
the computer age—open code and data—and the incentives of
the university to extract licensing fees from patented code written
by university researchers. Without the creation of an exemption
for code re-use in the academic setting, including the verification
of published results and the application to new research problems, scientific integrity will suffer, deepening the current credibility crisis in computational science.38 The university is uniquely positioned to play a key leadership role in establishing standard protocols and sharing agreements among scientific collaborators that facilitate the wide dissemination of discoveries and
knowledge, thereby accelerating innovation and growth.

38 An analogous proposal has been made by Paul David, when he suggested expanding the Fair Use
provision in copyright law to encompass all academic research output. See Paul David, “The
Economic Logic of ‘Open Science.’”
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18:

Innovating Our Way to Disasters?
Incentivizing Secure Platforms for
Growth’s Future

Benjamin Wittes∗

INTRODUCTION

I

magine for a moment that the Gulf oil spill had taken place as
a consequence of a premeditated attack, rather than an accident. Perhaps a terrorist group hit the Deepwater Horizon. Or,
if you like, choose your favorite rogue state as the malefactor.
The damage is the same; the oil flowed in the same volume. The
only difference between this dark fantasy and the reality that
unfolded in the summer of 2010 is volition: in the fantasy, someone meant to do it.
A few conclusions and insights would follow ineluctably from
this counterfactual scenario. We would, first, immediately recognize the event not merely as a disaster but as an event of national security magnitude. Indeed, we would understand it as the
most successful assault on the United States since September 11,
2001. We would notice something else as well: the United States
∗ Benjamin Wittes is a senior fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution. He is the
author of Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo, forthcoming from the
Brookings Institution Press, and Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror,
published in June 2008 by The Penguin Press.
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government—despite its ability to project military force anywhere in the world—lacked the capacity to defend the country
effectively and swiftly against this particular attack. The government had no capacity to stanch the flow of oil or to plug the well.
That capacity, rather, lay in the hands of a private corporation,
one of a select group of corporations that have proven enormously innovative in offshore oil drilling. These corporations have
proven so innovative, in fact, that only they, and not the U.S. federal government, have the technological and logistical capacity to
defend the country against the national security events their very
innovations can now bring about. In the BP disaster, the role of
the federal government was largely that of coordinator of privatesector response. Add the element of volition and it becomes obvious that there exists a class of attack using innovation as a platform against which the federal government is no longer capable
of defending the country.
This rather startling conclusion represents a profound challenge
to a country whose constitution vests the power to defend the
nation in a unitary presidency. Indeed, it presents a challenge to
any state that assumes that its government can protect it against
external attack and preserve some measure of internal order.
Over the past several decades—in a trend that is sure to accelerate rapidly with continued innovation—we have developed a category of nonmilitary technologies outside of government hands
and control that, when misused, can threaten extreme harms of
various types, harms which government lacks clear power,
authority, or even simple capability to prevent. BP’s recent disaster is far from the most extreme example of this trend. Though
usefully vivid in our minds now, oil drilling actually exhibits only
some of the features of the innovations that most directly pose
this challenge.
The trend is not futuristic. It already is well under way across a
number of technological platforms—most prominently the life
sciences and networked computer technology. The technologies
in question are widely proliferated. They are getting cheaper by
the day. They are classic innovations of the best, most growth434
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inducing sort. As a global community, we are becoming ever
more dependent upon them not just for growth, jobs, and
development but for health, agriculture, communications, even
culture.
Yet these same technologies—and these same dependencies—
make us enormously vulnerable. Whereas once only states could
contemplate killing huge numbers of civilians with a devastating
drug-resistant illness or taking down another country’s power
grids, we must now contemplate the possibility of ever-smaller
groupings of people undertaking what are traditionally understood as acts of war. The latter part of the twentieth century and
the first few years of the new one saw the migration of the
destructive power of states to global nonstate actors, particularly
Al-Qaeda. The twenty-first century seems likely to continue that
migration, ultimately giving to every individual with modest
education and a certain level of technical proficiency the power—
if he is innovative enough—to bring about catastrophic damage.1
This development obviously raises a serious problem for anyone
interested in fostering long-term growth and innovation. Growth,
after all, does not take place in the absence of some basic conditions of security. Yet a world in which large numbers of individuals and small groups are capable of launching attacks on essential
platforms whose security the state cannot assure is a world which
may not meet the minimum security conditions to support longterm growth. And that possibility raises a deeply uncomfortable
question that we are going to have to address as a political and
legal community: Might we be innovating our way to an environment that is actually toxic to innovation and growth, and can we
innovate our way out? What sort of innovation might it take to
manage security in such an environment? And can the legal system foster such innovation? Put another way, can we grow more
securely, and what innovations would secure growth require?

1 Phillip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2008).
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My purpose in this chapter is to advance the notion that anyone
serious about long-term growth needs to think hard about the
security of the platforms on which that growth will be predicated. We need as a society to begin incentivizing the development
of more secure platforms that minimize our vulnerability to disasters. Toward this end, I mean to sketch out three broad legal
approaches, some of which can reasonably be expected to inhibit
short-term growth to a degree and some of which will deeply
challenge the libertarian ethos of, in particular, the online world.
First, I shall argue, we need to develop clear rules assigning liability for platform vulnerabilities recklessly introduced or maintained in the system. Second, we need to develop a comfort level
with a certain degree of platform surveillance. And third, and
most challenging, we need to come to grips with the fact that certain companies by dint of their businesses may have unique affirmative obligations to the security of platforms. These companies
will inherit certain security functions we traditionally associate
with the executive branch and—just as BP was the so-called
“responsible party” that had to defend the Gulf Coast against its
own oil—may necessarily be called upon to act accordingly.
This may happen even in situations in which the companies,
unlike BP, are not the sources of the disasters to which they alone
can react.

THE PROBLEM
Dwelling on high-impact, low-probability events may seem like a
dissonant note to strike in a volume broadly concerned with the
more optimistic subjects of fostering growth and innovation and
thus improving human happiness and well-being. There is, in
fact, no dissonance at all. Growth and innovation require a measure of stability over time. There’s nothing quite like mayhem to
undermine confidence in the systems, governments, and institutions on which growth depends. An environment in which the
technologies our economic lives depend on become systemic platforms for devastating attacks simply will not support the kind of
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sustained robust growth which the authors of this volume all
wish to see.
The goal, which bears emphasis, is to maximize sustained growth.
It is not to create bubbles. Just as individuals and business happily pay insurance premiums to hedge against disasters that would
otherwise ruin them, we should be willing to grow more slowly
to ensure that the growth in question is sustainable. Investing in
the security of platforms seems to me essential to making sure
that we do not depend for our growth on conditions that will
prove highly vulnerable to bad actors, enemies, and accidents.
Jonathan Zittrain has made this point eloquently with respect to
the Internet. The generative nature of the Internet, he argues, has
given rise to security problems that, if not addressed, threaten to
move us away from generativity, which he regards as one of the
Internet’s chief virtues.2 But the point, I suspect, is broader,
encompassing platforms far beyond the Internet.
The technologies which pose the greatest concern for national
security these days are, perhaps unsurprisingly, also the same
technologies that offer the greatest promise in general. The concern and the promise emanate from the same source: these are
technologies of mass empowerment, and delivering enormous
new capacity to large numbers of individuals creates the certainty that some of those individuals will use that capacity to do evil.
In the absence of particularly resilient systems, these technologies
magnify the cost of accidents, and they both facilitate the activities of those with ill intent and magnify the consequences of their
behaviors as well. The same technologies that can, say, allow two
engineering students to start Google or let biotech entrepreneurs
sequence the human genome also can create a permissive environment for the creation of what Lawrence Lessig calls “Insanely
Destructive Devices.”3 These can take the form of anthrax bacte2 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2007).
3 Lawrence Lessig, “Insanely Destructive Devices: Trying to Defend against Self-Replicating
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Wired 12, no. 4 (April 2004), accessed November 15, 2010,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.04/view.html?pg=5.
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ria sent through the mail, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure,
or most likely something we have not even thought of yet.
Stewart Baker, former policy chief at the Department of
Homeland Security, elegantly described in a recent book cycles of
technological innovation, social excitement about the new technology, exploitation of that technology, and dependence upon
it—all with inadequate appreciation of the degree of vulnerability this dependence generates. We build airplanes and fly them all
over the world, for example. We dramatically lower the price of
commercial air travel until long-distance travel is a norm for people’s day-to-day lives. And nobody spends much time considering the possibility that someone smart and creative can make missiles out of our commercial jets using nothing but box cutters and
ruthlessness. “Technology—cheap commercial jet travel—made
the [September 11] attacks possible. In fact, it made attacks like
September 11 more or less inevitable,” Baker writes.4 The more
dependent we become on technologies available universally, the
more we make ourselves vulnerable to the devastating misuse of
those technologies. This is not a Luddite argument against technological development, just recognition that innovation that creates dependency also creates exposure. A society that stakes its
future on the Internet, as the modern world has, makes itself
enormously vulnerable to those with the will and the capacity to
use its communications architecture to disrupt, say, its banking or
military operations.
Technologies of mass empowerment—of which biotechnology
and globally networked computers are the paradigmatic examples—have certain common characteristics that bear emphasis.
First, they are widely disseminated technologies that depend on
readily available training and materials. Unlike nuclear technologies, they did not develop principally in classified settings at government-run labs with the government’s controlling access to the
key materials. Rather, they developed in public in open dialogue
4 Stewart Baker, Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 12.
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with nonmilitary purposes in mind. Scientists did not discover
the double helix or sequence the human genome in order figure
out how to design viruses to kill people. Nor did engineers build
the Internet so that terrorists or foreign governments could seize
control of the Hoover Dam—or even so that our intelligence
agencies could seize control of some other country’s dams. Yet in
the cyber arena, attacks have grown up alongside the platform.
And in the biotech arena, a public literature now exists to teach
bad guys how to do horrific things—and the materials, unlike
highly enriched uranium, are neither scarce nor expensive.
Second, the destructive technologies are virtually inseparable
from the socially beneficial innovations that give rise to them. In
the wrong hands, the research on how to use genetics to cure and
prevent disease can be used to cause and spread disease. A paper
on how to shield computers against viruses necessarily involves
analysis of viruses that one can use to write stronger ones.
Defensive research in this space will potentially empower the bad
guys too.
Third, the use of these technologies blurs the distinction between
foreign and domestic threats and, indeed, makes attribution of
any attack extremely difficult. As every student in a biological
laboratory and every individual on his home computer becomes
a possible threat to national security, traditional techniques of
surveillance, deterrence, and nonproliferation become increasingly ill suited to detecting and preventing terrorist activity. Large
numbers of cyberattacks already take place with attribution
impossible or long delayed. In the case of the anthrax attacks
in the wake of September 11, attribution took seven years
and remains to this day contested. Indeed, often in these cases,
a targeted entity will not be able to determine whether its
attacker is another state, a political group, a criminal group, or a
lone gunman.
The life sciences present a prototypical case of this type of technological development, threatening realistically to put the power of
a WMD attack in the hands if not of the average person, certain-
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ly of many above-average people with relatively inexpensive
equipment and basic training in genetic engineering. Biological
weapons are unique among weapons of mass destruction in that
they have the capacity, like nuclear weapons, to produce truly
catastrophic damage, yet like chemical weapons, are comparatively inexpensive and easy to produce. The technology required
for their production is generally the same as the technology used
in legitimate life sciences research; indeed, it is the bread-and-butter stuff of the biotech revolution that has done so much good
throughout the world. Precisely because modern biotechnology
has so much promise and offers so many benefits in so many
walks of life, the materials and skills required to develop these
weapons are not rare. Just run a Google search on “gene synthesis companies” and you’ll see a whole industry that will make
DNA sequences for order over the Internet. While it may be difficult for even a highly trained individual to build his own nuclear
weapon, an individual with relatively modest expertise and
resources could potentially obtain or develop his own biological
weapon with worldwide consequences. As costs continue to fall,
the number of people whom governments around the world have
to regard—at least in theory—as capable of having their own personal WMD programs grows commensurately.
The vulnerability of the world’s network infrastructure similarly
illustrates the growing capacity of small groups to become players in international relations and global security issues. The information technology underlying today’s computer and communications networks, like biotechnology, is inherently dual use.
Military IT depends largely on commercial IT developed in the
private sector.5 According to one estimate, 95 percent of the U.S.
military’s information transfers occur on civilian networks.6
The expertise to launch cyberattacks is widely distributed
5 William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, ed., Technology, Policy, Law and Ethics
Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2009), 2.2.1.
6 Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, “Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in All
the Wrong Places?” Naval Law Review 51 (2005): 133.
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throughout the world among states, organized criminal gangs,
and individuals.
Most cyberattacks, of course, are the equivalent of street crime.
Computer crime and identity theft are big business, after all. A
National Science Foundation report in 2006 stated that “nearly all
indicators of frequency, impact, scope, and cost of cybersecurity
incidents show a continuously worsening picture. This is true
whether one considers the losses due to IT-based fraud and theft,
identity theft and attacks on personal information, incidence of
viruses and malicious code, number of compromised systems or
other types of impact.”7 Challenging though this climate is, the
challenge is generally akin to life in a bad neighborhood. It presents personal-security and business-security concerns more than
national security concerns. Like all crime kept at manageable
levels, cybercrime limits growth, but it does not profoundly
threaten it.
But cybersecurity has a more menacing side as well—one that
brings it squarely into the national security arena. At the low end,
this is an espionage problem, and it is going on every day. As Jack
Goldsmith writes,
For the past few decades, and with increasing frequency, many thousands of foreign agents …, sitting before
computer monitors abroad, have “entered” the United
States to steal or to destroy valuable digital assets.
They have raided the Pentagon and other government
agencies to disrupt their communications and to lift
sensitive or classified information. They have attacked
American corporations and taken or destroyed untold
millions of dollars worth of data or intellectual property. They have contacted CEOs and credibly threatened
to destroy their businesses unless the CEOs met the
extortionists’ demands. And they have planted mali7 Seymour E. Goodman and Herbert S. Lin, ed., Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), 32.
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cious software—known ominously as malware—inside
government and corporate headquarters, and in critical
infrastructure systems such as electrical grids and
power plants. Some of this malware allows them to
monitor activities in these places; other malware, called
“logic bombs,” enables them to trigger a destructive
attack years later, if doing so would be useful.
If this were happening before our eyes—if thousands of
foreign agents were physically entering our borders,
breaking into brick-and-mortar buildings, and removing or destroying billions of dollars of proprietary information and monetary assets—the government would
declare a national emergency. But it is happening largely out of public sight, on computers and computer networks, and so most people are not worried.8
At the higher end, the problem involves still-hypothetical attacks
aimed at disabling society’s civilian or military functionality. A
cyberattack could aim at a nation’s military operations or seek to
disrupt its social and economic activity. An attack also could target critical infrastructure, like power-generation facilities.
As with biological attacks, it is hard to estimate the probability of
a truly catastrophic cyberattack; the subject is a matter of earnest
and legitimate debate among experts. The National Science
Foundation wrote in 2006 that “high-level threats—spawned by
motivated, sophisticated, and well-resourced adversaries—could
increase very quickly on a very short time-scale, potentially leading to what some dub a ‘digital Pearl Harbor’ (that is, a catastrophic event whose occurrence can be unambiguously traced to
flaws in cybersecurity)—and that the nation’s IT vendors and
users (both individual and corporate) would have to respond
very quickly when such threats emerge.” (Goodman & Lin 2007,
49). Similarly, former Director of National Intelligence Admiral
8 Jack Goldsmith, “The New Vulnerability,” The New Republic, June 7, 2010, accessed November 15,
2010, http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/75262/the-new-vulnerability.
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Michael McConnell has repeatedly warned of an electronic Pearl
Harbor involving an artificially induced collapse of confidence in
the banking sector.9 And Richard Clarke, the former National
Security Council staffer who most presciently anticipated the
threat posed by Al-Qaeda, writes that “the most likely targets are
civilian in nature. The speed at which thousands of targets can be
hit, almost anywhere in the world, brings with it the prospect of
highly volatile crises.” Clarke describes how coordinated cyberattacks could paralyze the United States on a number of levels
simultaneously.10
Clarke seems to treat a cyberdisaster as a virtual certainty, and
McConnell likewise talks about it with evident alarm as an immediate and very realistic threat. Cybersecurity expert Bruce
Schneier, by contrast, regards the treat of cyberterrorism as
overstated:
I believe that fears about cyberterrorism, or the likelihood of a “Digital Pearl Habor,” are largely the result of
companies and organizations wanting to stoke the fears
of people and of the news media looking for sensationalist stories. Real terrorism—attacking the physical
world via the Internet—is much harder than most people think, and the effects of cyber attacks are far less terrorizing than might seem at first. Cyberterrorism is simply not a problem that we have to worry about….
While people overplay the risks of cyberterrorism, they
underplay the risks of cyber-crime....
And someday, cyberterrorism will become a real threat.
But that day is not coming soon, and even then the
same terrorist would probably have a much easier time

9 I was present at one such speech, a keynote address at the Texas Law Review’s annual symposium in February 2010.
10 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security and
What to Do About It (New York: Ecco, 2010).
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killing the same number of people in a physical
attack.11
My point is not that Clarke and McConnell are necessarily correct
in this debate; Schneier may well prove to have the better of the
argument. The point, rather, is that one cannot correctly plan for
growth without at least taking into account the possibility that
they may be correct. And that raises a difficult question: what
percent likelihood does one have to assign to Clarke’s and
McConnell’s being correct before one regards the security of the
cyber- and bioplatforms as a serious threat to growth against
which one must hedge one’s bets?
It is important to emphasize that cyber- and biosecurity problems
are examples of a class, not by any means the list of members of
that class. One can only assume that the class of technologies that
these examples typify will grow as the pace of innovation grows.
Technologies will continue to develop in the civilian sector that
magnify the power of individuals; those technologies will compound one another; and the magnitude of the damage we can
thus reasonably expect individuals to be capable of bringing
about will grow as well. It was once unthinkable that an individual might kill dozens of people with a single machine gun or that
a single company with a single oil well could despoil the Gulf
Coast. The more technology develops and the more dependent on
it we become, the more it will not merely be conceivable but
inevitable. The broad point is that we must face the possibility
that the innovations that we rightly celebrate have created for us
major new security problems. And we have to consider the possibility that those problems might in the long run poison the atmosphere for further growth. Just as we innovated our way to a massive, uncontrolled oil spill in the Gulf, we should confront that
possibility that we might innovate our way as well to global
11 Bruce Schneier, Overview of the Cyber Problem—A Nation Dependent and Dealing with Risk,
testimony and statement for the record for the House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, 108th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 25, 2003, accessed November 15, 2010, http://www.schneier.com/testimonycommerce.html.
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pandemics, financial crises, and significant assaults on critical
infrastructure.

THE EROSION OF THE GOVERNMENT’S MONOPOLY
ON SECURITY POLICY
It rather understates the matter to say that current governance of
technologies of mass empowerment is hopelessly inadequate to
the task of preventing the disasters one might reasonably fear
from them. This is not chiefly a function of the fact that changing
governance in a fashion that carries real costs in the absence of
some dramatic precipitating event is always difficult—though
that fact plays a big role as well. It also reflects the fact that the
ideal governance approach is far from obvious. Indeed, nobody
quite knows how to attack the problem or even whether effective
governance is possible. Even if one could, for example, classify all
of the relevant now-public literature related to biosecurity and
slap strict controls on the technologies in question, who would
want to? The biotechnology revolution is a wonderful thing, and
it has depended pervasively on precisely the open culture which
has created the vulnerabilities I have been describing. In any
event, this cat isn’t going back in the bag. Too many people have
too deep an understanding of how genetic engineering works.
This point is even more acute in the cybersecurity arena, where
most of us already are constantly using several connectivity
devices to manage much of our day-to-day lives.
The problem with current governance is not that we don’t have
laws prohibiting abuse of these technologies. We do. The law, in
fact, over the past two decades has developed rather admirably,
and nobody now could do anything horrible without running
afoul of it—at least not domestically. Nonetheless, current law
isn’t likely to do much more than inconvenience someone seriously committed to developing or releasing a biological agent
that could do great damage. Nor will it do much to prevent overseas sources of cyberattack. More fundamentally, the law does
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not—and probably cannot—address the attribution problems at
work here effectively.
The lack of promising options gives rise to what I suspect will be
the most profound impact of this class of technologies on our law,
one that touches the very structural arrangements of power in
American life—and the lives of most other states as well. That is,
it stands to bring about a substantial erosion of the government’s
monopoly on security policy, putting in diffuse and private hands
for the first time responsibility for protecting the nation.
There are people who would write that sentence with joy in their
hearts. I am not one of them. My views on executive capacity—
notwithstanding the excesses of the Bush administration—are
unapologetically Hamiltonian. The Constitutional assumption
that the political branches, particularly the executive branch, are
both responsible for national security and have the tools necessary to fulfill that responsibility is a comforting one, the destabilization of which I find scary. “Power to the people!” is a slogan
that has always rung to me of gridlock at best, mob rule at worst.
The Constitution contains very few textual exceptions to the
notion that national security is a federal responsibility. One, the
Second Amendment, embodies the Framers’ reverence for state
militias, both as a means of fending off native attacks and as a
means of preventing federal encroachments on state prerogatives.
The other, the Letters of Marque Clause of Article I, contemplates
a limited role for the private sector in military engagements—
under Congressional supervision. Both involve institutions that
have long since lapsed into disuse. The broader and more lasting
presumptions in the document were that Congress would
make the rules of security and that the president would lead the
armed forces and the larger executive apparatus in a military or
other crisis.
I’m not sure how these presumptions hold in the face of rapid
development of these technologies. This point is perhaps most
vivid in the cyber arena, where huge amounts of traffic into and
out of the United States—including government traffic—now
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takes place over privately owned lines and the government quite
literally does not control the channels through which attacks can occur.
But it’s also true in the biotechnology sphere. Because the revolution has taken place largely in private, not government, hands,
the government employs only a fraction of the capable individuals. And the capacity to respond to or prevent an attack is therefore as diffuse as the capacity to launch one.
This point is crucial and provides the only real ray of hope in an
otherwise bleak picture. The advent of technologies of mass
empowerment has given enormous numbers of people the capacity to do great harm, but it has also given enormous numbers of
people and organizations the capacity to work to prevent that
harm. The proliferation of defensive capability has been as rapid
as the proliferation of offensive capability—only exponentially
more so since the good guys so vastly outnumber the bad guys.
The individual scientist had no ability to prevent the Soviet
Union from launching a nuclear attack against the United States
or invading Western Europe. But the individual scientist and
engineer, and groupings of individual scientists and engineers,
have an enormous role in bio- and cybersecurity—from driving
the further innovations that can wipe out infectious diseases, to
developing security applications that will make the bad guys’
jobs harder, to spotting the security implications of new research,
to reporting on colleagues engaged in suspicious activities out of
sight of authorities. It will, in short, take enormous innovation to
save us from the consequences of some of our most exciting innovations. And the question then becomes how to incentivize
people and companies to defend the platforms that innovation
has created.
This question pulls the mind toward themes and ideas eloquently articulated by scholars such as James Boyle and Lawrence
Lessig in the context of the debate over intellectual property. A
major current of this body of thought involves the protection of
legal space for communities of various sorts to use and borrow
one another’s ideas and work in collaborative efforts to build
things. Boyle’s recent book, for example, contains a spirited
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defense of distributed applications like file sharing, of the opensource software movement, and of Creative Commons licenses.12
Indeed, the world has seen amazing demonstrations of what
large groups of people can do when they pool expertise—even
with very limited coordination. The most famous example is
Wikipedia, but this is far from the only one. Anyone who has
used Open Office—an open-source alternative to the Windows
Office application suite—knows that it doesn’t take a major software company to produce a major piece of software. Indeed, it is
an interesting fact, highly salient for our purposes here—that
open source software tends to be more stable and secure than proprietary code.13 While this point has its dissenters, the famous
line in the open-source software movement that “given enough
eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” may have real application not just
to computer bugs but to viral ones as well.14
Given that security will be, to borrow a term from this lexicon, a
more distributed application than it has been in the past, we
ought to start thinking about it as such. Collectivized individual
security arrangements are nothing new. We see them in neighborhood expectations that people will put locks on their doors and
keep an eye out for suspicious loiterers. Private innovations from
burglar alarm companies to security camera operations to inexpensive fake security cameras are all part of noncoordinated distributed security applications for residential neighborhoods and
business. As a child, I witnessed a particularly striking example
of this sort of distributed security in the absence of a strong executive presence in New York City in the 1970s. I was crossing
Columbus Avenue with my father. As we were crossing the street,
a young man snatched the purse of an older woman crossing
toward us and sprinted northward up the street. The woman
12 James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2008).
13 Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 2000).
14 Eric S. Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” 2000, http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/
cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/.
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yelled, and spontaneously and with no coordination, half a dozen
men in the immediate vicinity (my father among them) sprinted
after him. They ran him down a few blocks later and held him
until the police arrived. This sort of combination of technical
impediments to intruders, an aware citizenry, and both formal
and informal systems of collective action can combine to secure
platforms to one degree or another. The question is how to
enhance this sort of combination in the new platforms we have
created.
Steve Martin, explaining to an audience once how they could
become millionaires while paying no taxes, described the initial
step as, “first, get a million dollars.” It is, no doubt, similarly
glib—and similarly abstract—to describe the initial step in the
project at hand as “first, develop distributed platform security.” It
is a hypothesis, not a certainty, that such development is really
possible. And I, for one, do not claim to know in any detail what
it would look like. The initial challenge is more modest: it is to
create legal incentives and structures that will encourage the sort
of innovation that, in turn, stand to increase the security of these
platforms. We need, in short, to think about platform security as
a security vulnerability against which our laws need to focus the
energies of everyone from system designers to end users.

INCENTIVIZING PLATFORM SECURITY
Even this more modest vision of the project is dauntingly difficult
to imagine implementing. Conditioning a few large state actors
not to use their nuclear weapons is hard enough. Conditioning
billions of individuals against destructive uses of highly proliferated technologies presents a vastly deeper challenge. Anyone
who doubts this proposition should reflect momentarily on
firearms. The most the law has ever been able to accomplish is to
discourage prospectively and create retroactive accountability for
the illegal discharge of firearms. It has never come close to stopping firearms use. The United States alone suffers thousands of
gun homicides per year, despite a range of significant federal and
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state disincentives to fire weapons at people. That fact alone
offers a sense of the magnitude of the challenge.
Moreover, while platform security is a useful way to think about
the general category of security problem I have described, the
platforms in question differ markedly—a fact that has both theoretical and practical implications. Computer technology has proliferated to a degree that bioengineering has not, and it involves
a degree of networking that does not characterize the biological
sciences to date. We all carry around multiple devices that are
connected to the worldwide network of such devices. And in the
cyber arena, the platform is that network, each node being at once
a potential target, a potential weapon, and a potential attacker. By
contrast, in the biological arena, the platform and the network are
literally us; there is no distinction between the platform and the
humans which an attack seeks to injure. What’s more, many
fewer people (though still a great and rapidly expanding number)
are capable of launching or threatening attacks. While biological
attacks have taken place, they have been underwhelming in
impact so far and are in any event far from the sort of routine
events that cyberattacks have become. The debate thus lies in a
different place. In the cyber arena we ask whether the proper
analogy for the problem is pervasive street crime, whether we
have a modest national security threat that’s largely about espionage, or whether we are facing a major national security threat
that can realistically expose us to significant attacks on the country whose impact is felt far beyond the online world. Nobody
doubts that there is some problem. In the biological arena, by contrast, we ask whether we really have a problem at all.
The platforms of concern both today and in the future, in fact, will
differ significantly enough that policies that might make a significant difference with respect to one may be of less relevance to
others. The kind of specific policies that stand to render offshore
oil drilling safer, for example, may have little relevance to biosecurity. And the kinds of policies that stand to insulate critical
infrastructure from cyberattack will look nothing like the sorts of
policies that may allow long-term sustainable growth of indus450
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tries developing nanotechnology. It is thus impossible in practice—and highly undesirable even in theory—to identify a uniform set of rules for this class of technologies. The specific rules
will have to emerge so as to be responsive to the unique circumstances different technologies will pose.
Yet there are, I suspect, certain high-altitude legal principles that
can and should govern platform security in general, and to which
a technology-independent focus on the security of platforms
tends to lead. These principles will apply differently to different
platforms; indeed, some are obvious with respect to certain platforms yet deeply challenging with respect to others. However,
they seem to me to provide some basic building blocks of governance of this difficult space.
The first is that a party negligently introducing vulnerabilities
onto a platform should be liable for the damages that result. It
may seem difficult to object to this point, stated this simply and
in the abstract. And applied, say, in the biosecurity arena, it is
something of a no-brainer. A company or laboratory that, say,
accidently released a pathogen would undoubtedly risk ruinous
liability in tort from those the pathogen harmed. Similarly, there
is no dispute about BP’s general liability as the “responsible
party” in the Gulf oil spill; it is liable both for the costs of the
cleanup and for damages to individuals and the ecosystem.
The principle, however, is deeply controversial with respect to
software manufacturers and Internet service providers. In fact,
the general state of liability law for those whose insecure products expose others to damage is exceedingly protective. As
Michael D. Scott has summarized, “software vendors have traditionally refused to take responsibility for the security of their software, and have used various risk allocation provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to shift the risk of insecure
software to the licensee. There were a few early cases in which
licensees sought to have courts hold vendors liable for distributing defective software. These cases were unsuccessful.”15
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A number of key roadblocks stand in the way of reasonable liability rules for software vendors. The damages that software vulnerabilities cause tend to be economic in nature, not physical
injuries, and are thus barred in tort by the rule against recovery
for economic harms. There is some question as to whether software is even a product, or whether it’s a service. And perhaps
most fundamentally, the contracts to which users agree as a condition of licensing generally contain broad liability shields. The
result, as Schneier puts it, is that “today there are no real consequences for having bad security, having low-quality software of
any kind. In fact, the marketplace rewards low quality. More precisely, it rewards early releases at the expense of almost all quality.”16 Liability, Schneier argues, “will immediately change the
cost/benefit equation for companies, because they will have to
bear financial responsibility for ancillary risk borne by others as a
result of their actions…. The insurance industry will step in and
force companies to improve their own security if they want liability coverage at a reasonable price.”17
The case for liability standards for software is not new. Back in
2002, an expert panel of the National Research Council urged the
consideration of “legislative responses to the failure of existing
incentives to cause the market to respond adequately to the security challenge” of vulnerable software. “Possible options include
steps that would increase the exposure of software and system
vendors and system operators to liability for system breaches and
mandated reporting of security breaches that could threaten critical societal functions.”18 Calls for this sort of policy change go
way back.

15 Michael D. Scott, “Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?”
Maryland Law Review 67 (2008): 424.
16 Bruce Schneier, “Liability and Security,” Crypto-Gram Newsletter, April 15, 2002, accessed
November 15, 2010, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6.
17 Schneier, “Overview of the Cyber Problem,” 2003.
18 National Research Council, Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002), 14.
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We should be candid about the consequences of such policies, for
they are by no means cost free and, indeed, in the short term, will
diminish growth, not enhance it. Forcing software vendors to
take responsibility for the security of their products will reduce
the pace of software innovation. It will make software manufacturers take longer to get products to market and probably will
make software less rich with features—each of which adds complexity and, therefore, vulnerability. It may also make software
run more slowly. All of which could strike the reasonable skeptic
as profoundly antigrowth, antithetical to everything the rules in
this volume are supposed to be cultivating. Unless, that is, one
believes that the contemporary growth of the software industry
on the unaccountable terms we have allowed it to date has created the equivalent of a building boom on a seismic fault line using
substandard materials. In that case, one might choose to view liability standards as the rough equivalent of imposing reasonable
building codes before the earthquake.
The specifics of such a policy are vexing. What does a standard of
care in this arena look like? Given that perfect security is impossible, what separates mere imperfection from negligence? What
degree of protection should vendors be able to arrange for themselves contractually through license agreements, particularly
when they are effectively giving licenses away for free? And what
happens if the United States imposes liability standards and other
countries do not? Does this constitute a form of unilateral disarmament that will merely encourage innovation elsewhere and
discourage it domestically?
Even the broad contours of the principle are contested. It is possible, after all, that a zero-liability regime is actually the optimal
one because the benefits of growth and innovation on the platform so outweigh the risks that the best way to manage those
risks is simply to let growth overwhelm them. This theory would
explain why, despite decades of warnings about computer security vulnerabilities, the problem has remained manageable. And it
offers a seductive logic for its remaining so perpetually—and a
plausible basis to believe that a liability regime of the type I sug453
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gest here may offer only costs and no benefits. Indeed, if this logic
is correct, liability rules might even make disasters more likely by
slowing down growth of the sort that ultimately constitutes our
best protection.
Ultimately, however, this is not the logic the law has followed
with respect to earlier innovations, which it has tended to give a
period of great liability protection and then tighten the reins.
Ultimately, the law tends to settle on the notion that the risk of
using products should be shared between the manufacturer and
the user. And that principle seems appropriate for software as
well. The user of software—the banks, the critical infrastructure
operators, and the individual users—should not bear all of the
risk associated with the platform; rather, those who introduce
new vulnerabilities to the system should bear some of that risk.
This principle has a flip side. It is a responsibility on the part of
those who use a platform to do their part to keep it secure. Most
school systems do not permit children who have not received
age-appropriate vaccinations to show up at school. Yet we think
little of engaging with unsecured computer systems that may be
propagating malware to the systems with which they interact.
Companies that do not take reasonable steps to secure their own
steps should be liable for the damage those systems cause.
For that matter, the system should incentivize individuals to take
reasonable steps to protect the platform as well. This is not, as it
may seem, the equivalent of a seatbelt law or other such nannystate interventions in people’s individual risk management decisions. An individual’s failure to wear a seatbelt or a motorcycle
helmet, after all, affects only his own risk of death or injury. But
the failure to secure a networked computer makes that computer
available for hijacking by an attacker and for use as a weapon
against others. Many of the most common forms of cyberattack
involve distributed, automated attacks by armies of infected computers around the world. So the individual who does not take
reasonable precautions to secure his own computer undermines
the integrity of the system as a system. Operationalizing an
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individual’s duty of care is tough, since one cannot make every
end user liable for the malicious use by others of his computer.
One can, however, erect strong legal presumptions against recovery from software vendors who might otherwise have significant
exposure by end users who do not take reasonable steps to secure
their own systems. The broad rule should be that everyone can
minimize his legal and financial exposure by doing what he can
to make his piece of the system as secure as possible.
The second broad principle is that platforms have no privacy
rights. Individuals have privacy rights and may have them in
their use of platforms, but the platforms themselves are the sometimes-literal and sometimes-metaphorical analogues of public
spaces and commons that authorities should patrol. A few examples make this point vivid. Consider first a playground, a park, or
a neighborhood. Individuals use these spaces in various ways,
and the police cannot simply stop and search anyone at any time
for any reason on them. On the other hand, it is perfectly appropriate, even expected, for a cop on the beat to monitor general use
of the platform—in other words, to hang out and keep his eyes
open and thus both deter wrongdoing by his presence and also be
in a position to stop bad things from happening. If such a policeman has with him, say, a dog trained to sniff for explosives or
drugs, that is fine as well. If the dog gets excited about a particular person, that might justify a search of that person. In any event,
such a cop would need some predication to search or detain an
individual of whom he develops suspicions.
But as long as he’s merely monitoring the use of the platform and
not investigating any particular individual, we don’t see his presence as threatening privacy but, rather, as protecting a public
space designed for general use. Indeed, we often complain that
inadequate monitoring of such spaces leaves them available for
usurpation by the bad guys.
Platform surveillance can be more intrusive under certain circumstances without raising profound legal problems. For example, to
secure the platform of commercial air travel, passengers must
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submit to baggage and personal screening; such surveillance is
lawful because one has no legal entitlement to get on an airplane,
so authorities can require the surveillance as a condition of travel. If an individual doesn’t like it, he can drive or stay home.
Similarly, following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the U.S. Postal
Service began screening letters for anthrax at the giant sorting stations through which mail gets routed. Because postal workers do
not open the mail or look at its contents, and because they are not
investigating any individual but merely monitoring use of
the platform itself, this raises few hackles—even though individuals have a strong Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of
their mail.
The legitimacy of platform surveillance hinges on several interrelated factors. The most important is that the surveillance does not
target any particular individual. The cop on the playground is
watching everyone. The anthrax mail screening system does not
look specifically at whether your mail is giving off spores; it looks
at whether mail in general is exuding spores and only then identifies the offending packages. Everyone goes through a minimum
level of airport screening. Second, platform surveillance is not
concerned with investigation but with deterring and stopping
activity that threatens the platform. The cop does not patrol the
playground in order to investigate a crime. He does it to establish
presence and make the playground an unattractive site for criminal activity. Airport security screeners are not investigating any
particular plot; they are preventing people from bringing dangerous materials onto airplanes. Third, platform surveillance loses
legitimacy when it is abused or comes to focus in a discriminatory fashion on some group or other; airport security officials constantly are fending off allegations that Muslims or people from
particular countries get a tougher look, and police forces get pressured when they give disproportionate attention to those “driving while black.” Platform surveillance only gets accepted when
it is perceived to focus in a nondiscriminatory fashion on all platform users, not on individuals, and when it is focused only on
conduct that threatens the use of the platform itself. But in such
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circumstances, it gives rise to a social comfort level with surveillance we might otherwise find troubling under the Fourth
Amendment or other privacy norms.
This distinction between individual surveillance and platform
surveillance seems to me to be key to developing secure platforms for growth over time. We need to develop a comfort level
with certain programmatic surveillance of new technological
platforms that parallels the sort of platform surveillance I have
described here. A system of sensors that scans Internet traffic in
real time for malware but does not otherwise examine the content
of communications, for example, is much more similar to, than
different from, the anthrax scanning of physical mail. As long as
it does not focus on any individual or group and is operated to
protect the network, not as part of any investigation, the analogy
seems quite close indeed. Yet such ideas, when even suggested,
are treated with horror by many in the business and civil liberties
communities, who regard such surveillance as per se threatening
to privacy.19 This is wrong. Rather, our analysis of such programs
should focus more narrowly. What are the chances of false positives and what are the consequences of them? Is the system prone
to abuse, and are the protections against abuse adequate? Is the
system treating all users alike or is it targeting individuals or disfavored groups for special scrutiny? If these questions can be
answered adequately, such systems should be acceptable.
Similarly, it is possible to imagine technological means of frustrating to some degree the use of gene synthesis equipment for illicit
or unauthorized creation of pathogens. Currently, the major gene
synthesis companies—which sell gene sequences by mail, phone,
and Internet order—screen orders for sequences associated with
certain dangerous agents and refuse to sell such sequences to
those who are not registered to work with those agents.20 At least
in theory, this should prevent a bad actor from buying, say, the
19 Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies,” Wall Street Journal. July 8,
2010, accessed November 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870454
5004575352983 850463108.html.
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smallpox virus genome or sizable segments of it and then assembling them in his or her own laboratory. Yet this system would do
nothing to prevent that same bad actor from using low-cost gene
synthesis equipment in his or her own laboratory to build the
sequence himself. In an article published early in 2009, Ali Nouri
and Christopher Chyba proposed building the screening system
directly into the gene synthesis equipment. Manufacturers would
program the computers that drive the machines to decline to produce sequences associated with certain dangerous agents unless
the user was registered to work with them. The software, in this
proposal, could automatically update its list of prohibited
sequences much the way antivirus software updates the list of
malware it identifies and purges.21 One can imagine further
developments of the technology that would make it far more
robust as a prevention tool. What if gene synthesis equipment
alerted authorities whenever an unauthorized person tried to create a proscribed sequence? More intrusively, what if the equipment reported constantly on its own activities, so that authorities
would have an ongoing audit trail that enabled them to monitor
who was creating what gene sequences? Such approaches may or
may not have promise as prevention methods, but we should not
preclude them in the name of privacy.
The third broad principle is perhaps the most challenging:
Certain companies by dint of their businesses, their technological
capabilities, and their control over certain infrastructure acquire
affirmative national security obligations that have traditionally resided
with the state. We can see this point vividly in the Gulf oil disaster,
particularly if, as I hypothesized at the outset, we imagine the
spill being the result of an attack, rather than an accident. But the
point, as I have argued, goes well beyond oil drilling. If we accept
that the traditional state monopoly on security policy will erode
20 H. Bügl et al., “DNA synthesis and biological security,” Nature Biotechnology 25 (June 2007): 627629. See also Jeremy Minshull and Ralf Wagner, “Preventing the misuse of gene synthesis,” Nature
Biotechnology 27 (September 2009): 800-801.
21 Ali Nouri and C.F. Chyba, “Proliferation-Resistant Biotechnology: An Approach to Improve
Biosecurity,” Nature Biotechnology 27, no. 3 (March 2009): 234.
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as more and more private entities develop functions and capabilities essential to security and yet absent from government, it follows that the law will and should come to oblige these companies
to take responsibility for certain security functions. We already
see this happening to a degree in the surveillance arena. The 1994
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),
for example, created obligations on the part of telecommunications companies to ensure that law enforcement, with an appropriate warrant, retained the technological capacity to conduct
wiretaps as networks went digital.22 The 2008 FISA Amendments
Act required telecommunications carriers to share with the intelligence community large volumes of communications traffic concerning targets believed to be overseas—as did a temporary earlier statute and, before that, the Bush administration’s warrantless surveillance program.23 But the principle may extend far
beyond surveillance.
Consider, first, the previously mentioned fact that the federal
government literally does not own or control the channels
through which cyberattacks take place. The trunk lines into the
country, rather, are private, and the domestic routing infrastructure is private as well. This is the rough equivalent of letting a
group of private entities both monitor the border and manage the
interstate highway system and all local roads. A foreign intruder
can—at least in a digital sense—invade the country and steal or
sabotage valuable property, and it can do so without coming into
substantial contact with government-controlled defenses. If then,
in the digital sense, our border is patrolled not by the Department
of Homeland Security or the military but by Verizon and AT&T,
what obligations to national security do these companies have?
The answer cannot be that they have none. Rather, it has to be that
the fact of control of the pipelines of attack creates some duty to
at least assist in protection against that attack.
22 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-414, 103rd Cong.,
2d sess. (1994).
23 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law110-261, 110th Cong. 2d. sess. (2008).
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Now consider a subtler example, one that involves both the
cyber- and bioplatforms at once.24 Imagine a deranged graduate
student who decides to release a pathogenic organism. Such a
person likely would begin by running a Google search or a search
in one of several scientific research databases for published
papers on the pathogen’s genome. It follows that companies
operating such databases have in their users’ search histories a
unique window into who is conducting the research about which
government should be most concerned. There is no doubt that if
the government were investigating this student and sought his
search history with appropriate evidence, any company would be
obliged to turn it over. But imagine that authorities produced an
algorithm (or more likely a set of algorithms) to identify prospectively highly dangerous work in biotechnology. The algorithm
would flag any IP address or account which requested certain
patterns of information highly suggestive of non-innocent
biotechnology research. And imagine that authorities asked database companies and, more broadly, search engines to deploy this
algorithm and notify the FBI whenever a particular group of
searches triggered an alarm. Most people who triggered an alert
would be legitimate researchers, of course, but a quick check
would verify that. Some would be the merely curious. A small
number of others would be the proverbial needles in the
haystack.
In some sense, of course, this is merely a species of platform surveillance of the type I have discussed already, but there’s a twist:
government would be coordinating the surveillance but not conducting it. It would be the database and search engine companies
who would be policing the platform. And that raises the critical
question of what, if any, responsibility these companies have to
act affirmatively in the interests of national security? In a traditional environment, the answer to that question is easy. They have
none. That is the government’s job. Their job is to maximize value
for their shareholders. Yet in an environment of radically distrib24 I am indebted to Roger Brent for this example.
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uted responsibility for collective security, a more communitarian
ethos seems necessary. By storing users’ search histories, Google
has amassed the largest dataset anyone ever has collected on
what people around the world are thinking. That fact may give it
a role to play in identifying those people plotting to do grotesque
and terrible things. Over time, the law should evolve to require
that companies take on the national security responsibility their
businesses enable.
It is easy to anticipate many objections both to these proposals
and to the fatalism that lies beneath them. Luddites always see
disaster in technological development, the critic will say. Without
any real ability to quantify the risks or estimate the problem’s
magnitude, proposals that will constrain growth may not serve to
protect long-run growth but may only stymie it in the short- and
medium terms. Besides, people have been predicting these catastrophic events for decades now and they have never materialized—a fact which suggests that the predictions have involved a
measure of hyperventilating exaggeration. Perhaps the risk is
lower and our systems are more resilient than we imagine, and a
major investment in what amounts to insurance is a waste. The
argument is seductive because the events in question seem so
much more like science fiction than like the reality to date of the
Internet or the biotech revolution.
Yet it seems to me unwise to bet as a society against the occurrence of the concededly technologically possible. It makes as little
sense to say that the difficulty of quantifying a risk should cause
us to assume that risk as zero as it did for then-Vice President
Dick Cheney to reportedly declare in 2001 that “If there’s a 1 percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al-Qaeda build
or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in
terms of our response.”25 We cannot avoid attempting to quantify risk and acting on our admittedly imperfect probabilistic judgments. In the case of new technologies that radically empower
25 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11
(New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2007).
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everyone from states to disaffected individuals, that means
moving toward accountability for insecurity, a certain transparency in and oversight of the use of platforms, and a set of duties for
those who have custody or control over significant pieces of the
architecture. Sometimes, if something seems inevitable, it’s
because it is.

462

19:

Legal Process and the Discovery of
Better Policies for Fostering
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O

ur topic concerns how legal process can lead to efficient
policies for fostering innovation and growth. Future innovation will depend at least as much on how laws are made
as on a priori analyses of the optimal content of those laws.
Of particular importance, as we discuss in this chapter, is whether
the U.S. legal system promotes an efficient market for law.
Our analysis supports three suggestions for improving the law to
support growth. First, the rules governing the selection of the
jurisdiction whose law governs productive activity can significantly affect growth and innovation. Second, any proposal aimed
at increasing growth through a change in law or legal institutions
should take account of the existence of multiple jurisdictions and
parties’ ability to choose the jurisdiction whose law controls their
transactions. Third, we suggest harnessing the power of jurisdictional competition among the states through a federal law enforcing contracting parties’ choice of law except to the extent that
∗ Henry N. Butler, a leading public policy analyst and specialist in law and economics, is a
Foundation Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Law & Economics Center at George
Mason University. He has devoted much of his career to improving the country’s civil justice system through judicial education programs. Larry Ribstein is Associate Dean for Research and
Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law.
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states legislatively override the choice of law and regulate local
transactions.

LINKING LAW MARKET PROCESS WITH INNOVATION AND
GROWTH:THE INFORMATION PROBLEM IN
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Our analysis begins with Frederick von Hayek’s insight in his
famous article on the “The Use of Knowledge in Society”1 that
experts, academics, and lawmakers lack the necessary knowledge
to make decisions about which legal and regulatory structures
maximize welfare. Even the most brilliant and thoughtful policymakers cannot take account of the enormous number of political,
social, technological, and economic variables that determine how
their plans will operate in the unknowable real world of the
future. In order to deal with this knowledge problem, Hayek
championed the market system as a vast network that can process
the necessary information. Consistent with this approach, consideration of how to alter laws and regulations to increase innovation and economic growth must include an analysis of how to
harness market-like mechanisms to create an information network that leads to the discovery of better policies over time.
To understand the scope of the information problem involved in
regulatory design, consider the broad array of potential legal
rules governing contracts—mandatory versus default rules, optin versus opt-out, disclosure versus substantive duties. In general, legal rules must be designed to solve specific problems in the
market while permitting parties to engage in value-increasing
transactions. These rules sometimes should restrict opportunistic
conduct in order to encourage trade or investment, while at other
times they should enable the parties to craft their own agreements. It is also necessary to promulgate legal rules that reduce
information costs or transactional frictions or increase property
1 Frederick von Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4
(1945): 519-530.
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rights. Individual policymakers, however, lack the knowledge or
foresight to see all the potential alternatives or figure out which
should be adopted. Among other things, they cannot determine
all of the immediate costs of regulation, the interaction among
rules, the effect on incentives, or the long-run value of prohibited
conduct.
In order to solve the knowledge problem and create efficient legal
technologies, the lawmaking process should encourage innovation in the creation of legal rules. It is logical to use the same competitive process that encourages innovation in the private sector—that is, competition among suppliers—subject to rules and
institutions regulating this competition. As we will see, this
entails enforcing contracts among the parties regarding the applicable law.2
Jurisdictional choice and competition is particularly important to
establishing a legal regime that promotes growth. First, the
Hayekian “knowledge problem” is particularly challenging with
respect to the rules appropriate to encouraging growth. There is
much more certainty and information about the rules likely to
maximize wealth over the short term than about those that maximize wealth over time. For example, even if intellectual property rights clearly promote innovation now, the effects of locking up
ownership rights in those innovations for long periods may be
less clear. The greater the knowledge problem, the more necessary it is to unleash markets to solve the problem.
Second, encouraging growth necessitates supplementing the
“voice” of the political process with the power of exit, drawing
from Albert O. Hirschman’s famous analysis.3 The political
process inherently favors the interests of today’s economically
powerful firms over the small and not-yet-existing innovators of
tomorrow’s potentially leading firms. Incumbent firms not only
have significant resources to fund political activities but also a
2 Erin A. O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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strong incentive to spend those resources so as to block innovation. After all, these firms are threatened much more by potential
extinction by brand-new industries and technologies than they
are by their competitors’ potential erosion of their market share.
It is difficult to give future firms more voice without significantly
altering the political system. However, these firms can influence
policymaking by deciding where to locate their businesses. More
specifically, firms’ exit or potential exit can activate interests in
the state who would be injured by this exit, including suppliers,
customers, lawyers, and workers. These groups would then enter
the political mix in opposition to the incumbent proregulatory
interest groups. This process translates exit into political voice.
Critics of our approach may stress the imperfections of jurisdictional competition. Instead of racing to the top and enacting more
efficient pro-growth laws, states may race to the “bottom” and
enact laws that favor particular parties. If the rules on jurisdictional choice emphasize enforcement of the parties’ contracts for
the applicable law, laws might favor expert and economically
powerful manufacturers and sellers, and undermine efficient
state laws aimed at these parties. This could simply replace the
defects of political choice with a different set of defects associated
with exit. On the other hand, as discussed below, if states can
override these contracts, the applicable state law effectively could
be determined by plaintiffs’ trial lawyers’ decisions where to sue.
This could introduce different but equally perverse legislative
incentives. More jurisdictional choice also could mean more confusion and regulatory overlap.
One response to these criticisms is that a system that favors the
dynamic growth potential of the firms empowered by greater
jurisdictional choice necessarily increases social welfare compared to a system that focuses on avoiding static inefficiency
caused by wealth-transferring regulation. To be sure, economically incumbent powerful firms could gain from greater ability to
avoid regulating states. However, these firms already have a say
in crafting regulation, and sometimes use this say to increase
costs for potentially innovative competitors. Increasing the abili466
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ty of innovative firms to choose the applicable law therefore may
increase the political power of these firms relative both to incumbent firms and to other proregulatory groups.
A stronger response is that criticism of jurisdictional choice must
proceed against a background of inevitable jurisdictional choice
and competition in a multijurisdictional world. No single jurisdiction can reach all transactions in a global economy. Nor would
we want it to, since the result would be duplicative regulation
and chaos. Economic actors therefore inevitably can choose the
jurisdiction whose laws govern their transactions. The relevant
question is how to establish the best possible system of jurisdictional choice for maximizing growth in a multijurisdictional system. Our proposal discussed in Part II, and its application in the
contexts discussed below, tries to balance the benefits of exit and
jurisdictional competition against the benefits of empowering
governments to efficiently address local problems. In other
words, what system best channels jurisdictional competition
toward efficient results? Criticism of our proposal should proceed
against this backdrop of inevitable and necessarily imperfect
jurisdictional competition.

RULE CHANGES THAT COULD BOOST INNOVATION AND
GROWTH THROUGH THE LAW MARKET
Regulating jurisdictional competition involves developing efficient rules regarding courts’ choice of the law applicable to particular disputes, the role of federal law, and the development of
alternative adjudication mechanisms. These are the “meta” or
systemic changes we propose. We also examine applications to
specific areas, and discuss the major pros and cons of each idea.

State Choice of Law Rules
Choice of law rules focus on two types of decisions. Under conventional choice of law rules, courts choose which law applies to
a particular transaction ex post when litigating a case arising out
of the transaction. The courts apply vague rules whose applica467
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tion the parties cannot reliably determine prior to litigation.
Courts often apply local law, which effectively lets whoever controls the litigation forum—usually the plaintiff—choose the law.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have an incentive to promote rules that encourage lawsuits in the states where they are licensed, and perhaps
also rules that make these suits more costly for defendants.
Courts and legislatures, in turn, have an incentive to come up
with rules that cater to this powerful interest group.
By contrast, ex ante choice involves entering into a contract that
chooses the governing law when the parties make their deal.
Jurisdictions still would have an incentive to design their rules to
encourage litigation. However, under this choice of law rule jurisdictions would attract litigation through rules that do not unfairly burden either plaintiffs or defendants generally. Regardless of
whether states do not change their laws in response to competition from other states (perhaps because they want to apply the
laws to relatively immobile local parties), mobile firms at least
would be able to be subject to the law of their choice wherever
they choose to do business.
Changing choice of law rules to give greater recognition to the ex
ante approach than is now the case could encourage innovation
and growth. Rules that consider the interests of tort defendants as
well as plaintiffs may constrain the development and liberalization of new causes of action that can inhibit technological innovation. Also, ex ante choice of law can encourage lawyers to develop
new property rights and legal technologies by enabling the parties to ensure that the case is heard by a court that is likely to
enforce the rights. For example, the choice of law rule that
ensures application to business associations of the law of their
formation states has been instrumental in encouraging the development of the limited liability company as well as arbitration and
other informal methods of adjudicating business disputes.
Choice of law contracts might enable evasion of rules intended to
protect the contracting parties or nonparties. The competition
facilitated by ex ante choice of law therefore may turn into a “race
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to the bottom” where jurisdictions adopt socially inefficient rules
to appeal to the parties that control the contracting process.
On the other hand, if courts do not enforce choice of law contracts
they will apply default choice of law rules with the potentially
perverse result discussed above, that the choice is made by plaintiffs’ lawyers. In other words, given multiple jurisdictions, somebody must choose the applicable law, and potential problems
arise no matter who this is. Moreover, parties might react to a
jurisdiction’s non-enforcement of contractual choice of law by
physically avoiding that jurisdiction altogether. As discussed
generally above concerning the effect of exit, this could activate
exit-affected interest groups in the state and motivate the state to
change its policy.
Regardless of whether enforcement of choice of law contracts is
efficient, states have the constitutional power to block erosion of
their regulatory authority through choice of law, and trial lawyers
and other interest groups inevitably influence how this power is
exercised. Accordingly, it is necessary to find some mechanism
for deciding to what extent individual states may regulate or
impose liability on multistate firms and/or transactions that
touch several jurisdictions.

Federal Substantive Regulation
The most obvious approach to resolving the above problems with
state law might seem to be to apply federal law and thereby eliminate both the chaos of regulation by multiple states and the
potential for a race to the bottom. But federal statutes inhibit the
potential for state law competition and discovery.
Federal statutes are not necessarily wholly inimical to Hayekian
processes. Even after Congress passes a federal law, courts must
interpret the statute. Some types of statutory provisions provide
a broad scope for legal evolution through a sort of common-law
process that performs some market-type discovery functions.
Statutes can be designed with this process in view.4
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However, even the best-designed federal statute may allow for
less Hayekian discovery and may be less conducive to growth
than state law dealing with the same subject. The evolution of
common law under federal statutes does not entail the sort of
competition among multiple jurisdictions that can occur under an
efficient state law system. Moreover, even a federal law designed
to enable evolution may involve the antigrowth problem of protecting incumbent firms. Moreover, a federal statute designed to
maximize common-law development may provide less certainty
than state legislation coupled with a federal choice of law statute
as discussed in the next section.

Federal Choice of Law Statutes
Instead of providing for specific regulation, federal law can promote Hayekian discovery by harnessing the state law process
while ameliorating its worst problems. This could be done
through a federal statute that provides for the enforcement of
contracts regarding the applicable law. One approach is federal
legislation designating the types of choice of law contracts that
are or are not enforceable. But designing this regulation would
implicate the knowledge constraints on policymaking discussed
above.
Federal law could instead impose procedural constraints on state
laws blocking enforcement of choice of law contracts. In particular, a federal statute could specify that choice of law contracts can
be invalidated only pursuant to state legislation and not by judicial decisions.5 This would serve two purposes. First, using the
legislative process would promote robust competition among
interest groups, which in turn can maximize welfare.6
Specifically, as discussed above, interest groups who are hurt by

4 Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5 O’Hara and Ribstein, The Law Market.
6 Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, no. 3 (1983): 371-400.
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firms’ exits would join in opposition to the regulation with those
more directly injured by it.
Second, because legislation tends to be more transparent than
judicial decisions, requiring restrictions to be embodied in legislation would better enable firms to select jurisdictions in which to
do business based on their enforcement of choice of law contracts.
This would encourage jurisdictions to take firms’ interests into
account when deciding on enforcement.
The federal choice of law solution could encourage interstate
recognition of contractual choice of law if the federal law were
backed by an implicit threat of federal regulation, and preemption of state law, if the states insist on promoting parochial local
interests and refuse to enforce even reasonable sister-state laws
that parties select in their contracts.
A potential problem with the above proposal is that giving legislatures the exclusive opt-out power foregoes the benefits from
judicial decisions whose random mutations can spur efficient
legal evolution.7 However, these beneficial mutations are more
likely with respect to complex substantive issues than for the relatively simple question of whether or not to enforce contractual
choice of law. In any event, these potential benefits of judicial
mutation must be balanced against the costs of lower predictability, notice, and political transparency.

Federal Choice of Forum and Arbitration
Parties can help ensure enforcement of their choice of law contracts by avoiding non-enforcing courts. They can do this not only
by avoiding contacts with non-enforcing jurisdictions, but also by
contracting for adjudication of their disputes by pro-enforcement
courts or arbitrators. As with choice of law contracts, choice of
forum and arbitration contracts help motivate courts to maximize

7 Henry N. Butler, “Smith v. Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random
Mutations in the Evolution of Corporate Law,” Washburn Law Journal 45, no. 2 (2006): 267-282.
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the welfare of all contracting parties rather than just the party that
makes the ex post litigation decision.
Choice of forum and arbitration contracts may seem to raise the
same issues as choice of law contracts in that courts that do not
want to enforce the latter also will not enforce the former.
However, contracting for the forum adds two new dimensions to
jurisdictional choice. First, some courts that are not willing to
enforce law-choice contracts may be willing to enforce forumchoice contracts because the latter do not require the court to
choose between two competing state policies.
Second, federal law enters the picture with respect to forum
choice through the Federal Arbitration Act, which itself was a
response to global trade competition. Arbitration has become a
powerful mechanism for supporting jurisdictional choice and furthering the Hayekian discovery process. However, prolitigation
and consumer groups are now lobbying to reduce the role of arbitration, particularly of consumer contracts. Regulation of arbitration should take account of arbitration’s benefits in promoting the
law market.

State Initiatives
Federal law is not the only way to improve state legal competition. Individual states have incentives to engage in process innovations that attract firms to locate headquarters or factories in
their states in order to increase the possibility that their cases will
be litigated in the innovating state’s courts. The innovators here
are legislators, individual lawyers, and bar associations who
essentially serve as legal entrepreneurs. Arbitration and business
association law have developed partly as a result of this legal
entrepreneurship. Several states have adopted choice of law
statutes clarifying that choice of law clauses will be enforced in
certain types of contracts, mainly large commercial contracts.
A Delaware court rule8 indicates the potential for process innovation by the states. The rule essentially turns Delaware’s respected
Chancery Court judges into private arbitrators. Contracting par472

19: LEGAL PROCESS AND THE DISCOVERY OF BETTER POLICIES...
ties can agree to have their case governed by the new procedures
before a Delaware chancellor with direct appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court. The new rules represent a convergence of private
arbitration and public judicial procedures. This process theoretically could be taken a step further by Delaware judges retiring
from Delaware public life and going private. Other states also
might hire the judges and adopt Delaware law, thereby competing with both Delaware law and infrastructure. Perhaps a central
agency could be developed for accrediting roving judges. As
more states have an opportunity to become viable competitors in
the law market, they have greater incentives to change the choice
of law rules to better accommodate state competition.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

OF THE

MARKET

FOR

LAW

This part applies the above general principles to a few areas of the
law that significantly affect innovation. The following discussion
attempts to capture the range of applications in terms of the feasibility of applying law-market principles.

Restricted Choice of Law: Noncompetition Clauses
Contracts restricting competition by former employees can significantly affect innovation and growth. On the one hand, noncompetition agreements protect employers’ rights in intellectual
property, and thereby potentially encourage investments in creating that property and therefore innovation. On the other hand,
noncompetition agreements can inhibit the movement of knowledge, skills, and information between firms, and thereby discourage innovation that depends on new combinations of these
resources. Individual firms may be tempted to ignore the effect of
their contracts on innovation because they incur all of the costs of
losing control over intellectual property while capturing only
some of the benefits of innovation.

8 Delaware Chancery Court Rules (February 1, 2010), 96-98.
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The problem of determining the appropriate regulatory approach
to noncompetition agreements illustrates how the law market can
promote innovation while allowing space for reasonable regulation. The dynamic and long-term social costs and benefits of rules
protecting property rights or encouraging the spread of knowledge are beyond the knowledge or foresight of any individual
lawmaker. Indeed, it is likely that no single rule is appropriate.
California’s law making these clauses unenforceable has been
heralded as spurring the growth of Silicon Valley.9 On the other
hand, non-competes may be critical in industries in which developments take longer and patents and copyrights are less available
to protect intellectual property. The law market provides a way to
experiment with a variety of regimes to achieve the optimal progrowth/pro-innovation policy.

Full Enforcement of Contracts: Business Associations
Efficient business structures are vital to innovation. For example,
capital-intensive firms need outside investors. These investors
want rules that balance the benefits of empowering managers to
run the firm against the need to hold them accountable for their
actions. Given the almost infinite combinations of rules that are
possible in structuring the governance of a business association,
the market for state law is especially important in designing business structures. Since large firms can have owners in many states,
each of which can exercise jurisdiction over suits regarding the
firm’s governance, any market for corporate governance law
would be infeasible in large firms unless firms could choose a single state’s law to control their governance. Also, in long-term contracts where parties’ needs may change and litigation may arise
multiple times during the life of the firm, parties have strong reasons for choosing not only a particular law, but a particular jurisdiction with reliable courts, lawyers, and legislature.

9 Ronald J. Gilson, “The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,” New York University Law Review 74, no. 3
(1999): 575-629.
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These conditions justify the strong U.S. rule providing for
enforcement of firms’ choice of the state law applicable to their
governance contracts.10 Under the so-called “internal affairs doctrine,” the parties to a firm can organize in any state and have the
rules of the state of organization apply to their firm’s internal
organization regardless of where they live or where the firm is
based. The internal affairs doctrine has facilitated the evolution of
the corporation from the era of special chartering, when firms had
to seek legislatures’ permission to form, to the adoption throughout the United States of general incorporation laws giving the
parties full contractual freedom to decide on applicable governance rules.11 Broad application of the internal affairs doctrine to
small and unincorporated firms has facilitated efficient contracting for incentives and governance in these firms. This is significant for present purposes because small firms are an important
source of innovation and growth.
These considerations support continued encouragement of the
corporate law market not only by enforcement of the internal
affairs doctrine at the state level, but also by limiting the effect of
federal securities and tax laws that can constrain the state law
market. A positive development along these lines was the promulgation of the “check the box” tax classification rules, which permitted small firms to choose their business form irrespective of
their tax status as corporations or partnerships.12 On the other
hand, the expansion of federal law into the details of corporate
governance in both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
significantly reduced the ability of the state market for law to
experiment with governance provisions and discover the most
efficient provisions.

10 Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
11 Larry E. Ribstein and Erin A. O’Hara, “Corporations and the Market for Law,” Illinois Law Review
(2008): 661-729.
12 Treas. Reg. § 301.77011-3 (2004).
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Innovation in the Legal Profession
Law firms are an important exception to firms’ general freedom
to choose the state governance law. As part of their power to regulate the legal profession, states limit the types of business structures lawyers practicing in the state can use for the practice of
law. Because these rules apply to all lawyers practicing in the
state, lawyers may not choose to organize under the law of State
A while practicing in State B. National law firms therefore must
abide by the laws of all of the states in which they practice. This
rule effectively requires the legal profession to function under
uniform laws proposed by the American Bar Association.
Uniformity, in turn, bars law practice from the competitive lawmaking process that has enabled the evolution of business associations discussed in the previous section.
The purported rationale for having a distinct choice of law rule
for law practice is that states have a special need to regulate the
legal profession. Even if this is true, however, it does not clearly
justify regulating law firms’ structure, as distinguished from
lawyers’ and law firms’ conduct. Firms generally are free to
choose their business structure to best facilitate their business
operations, including the firms’ compliance with applicable regulation of business practices. It is not clear why the same principle
should not apply to law firms.
The availability of a competitive market for law firm governance
is particularly important now because of the pressures facing law
practice. Law firms confront unprecedented challenges to their
business model because of, among other things, changes in technology and increased global competition. Innovations in business
structure facilitated by legal competition would enable the legal
services business to better respond to these challenges.13 This, in
turn, would not only facilitate growth of the legal services industry but provide incentives for the development of more efficient

13 Larry E. Ribstein, “The Death of Big Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 2010, no. 3 (2010): 749-815.
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legal information and services that could support growth
throughout the economy.
An important example of the need for innovation in law firm
structure concerns the sale of equity shares in law firms to nonlawyers. In the United States, only lawyers may own law firms.14
This means that law firms, the largest of which are multibilliondollar operations, can obtain financing only from their lawyers
and bank loans. This limitation effectively forces firms to operate
hand-to-mouth, and can result in their swift unwinding under
financial pressure. It also prevents law firms from financing new
lines of business such as investments in research and the development of new legal technologies, and from fully realizing potential
synergies from combinations with nonlawyer professionals.
A competitive law market for law firm governance would promote the development of financing structures that would meet
the special challenges of nonlawyer financing of law firms. Law
firms need new structural rules that balance outside investors’
demands for power to protect their investments against lawyers’
need for sufficient control to assure clients and regulators that the
firm will maintain professional standards. These structures raise
new issues and the potential problems are unforeseeable.
Effective solutions call for the same sort of Hayekian discovery
process as the competition for business association laws under
the internal affairs doctrine. At the same time, it is necessary to
preserve some role for efficient state regulation of law firm structure. These objectives could be accomplished through a default
rule of enforcing interstate law firms’ choice of state law subject
to each state’s power to enact laws regulating local lawyers.15

Internet Law
The Internet can be a powerful medium for communicating and
gathering information. Because websites place unique identifying
14 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4.
15 Larry E. Ribstein, “Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law,” University of Cincinnati
Law Review 69, no. 4 (2001): 1161-1203.
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numbers called “cookies” on the hard drives of consumers who
browse the Internet, web operators can gather information from
consumers who visit their sites. This enables the operators to
know which pages consumers visit and how long they spend on
each page, and potentially to link this information with customer
identifying information such as e-mail addresses, passwords, and
credit card numbers. This technology offers significant opportunities to reduce transaction costs and increase information. At the
same time, it poses potential problems by enabling sellers to
invade consumers’ privacy.
Balancing these competing concerns raises issues as to what the
applicable rules should be, whether they should be default or
mandatory, whether it is enough to let consumers opt out of
default rules, or whether consumers should have to opt in to rules
that enable sellers to invade their privacy. The answers to these
questions depend to some extent on how individual consumers
weigh privacy interests against the convenience of visiting
websites that know their preferences. Different types of transactions and goods and different types of consumers may call for
different rules.
Developing a competitive legal process would enable experimentation and discovery necessary to determine the mix of rules that
would enable efficient innovation. Each firm could choose the set
of rules that best fits its business model. The industry could grow
and innovate based on these secure and suitable legal platforms.
A fully competitive legal process in this area entails enforcement
of choice of law contracts. If each state can apply its law under
general common-law choice of law rules to transactions that are
connected to the state (which connections states can determine
through modern geographic filtering technologies), sellers might
not know which law applies to any of their transactions and may
have to comply with the strictest rule.16 This would discourage
16 Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, “State Regulation of Electronic Commerce,” Emory Law
Journal 51, no. 1 (2002): 1-82.
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legal innovation and deny firms the secure legal platforms they
need for growth.
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws attempted to achieve interstate enforcement of choice of
law contracts by promulgating the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), section 109(d) of which
would enforce a choice of law clause in electronic consumer sales
unless the contract would vary a mandatory rule in the seller’s
state. Like the internal affairs doctrine applicable to business
associations, the choice of law contract would be enforceable
without regard to the seller’s or transaction’s relationship with
the state whose law is selected in the transaction. This would free
sellers to choose the law of any state. If there is a restrictive law in
the seller’s home state, the seller can avoid the restriction simply
by relocating to another state. A similar rule could be applied to
the “cookies” context.
Only two jurisdictions adopted the UCITA provision and several
adopted “bomb shelter” provisions that explicitly invalidated
choice of law clauses choosing UCITA-based laws. This leaves
firms subject to more open-ended default choice of law rules. This
result arguably indicates the futility of relying on the uniform
lawmaking process to encourage the efficient evolution of state
law. States rejected contractual choice of law that was tied to an
objectionable uniform law. Contractual choice might work if
states were free to develop laws that met sister-state objections
rather than being bound to a single “uniform” solution.
The states’ rejection of contractual choice in the Internet setting
also might reflect the states’ inherent inability to coordinate on
this issue, perhaps because local business interests are able to
override those of out-of-state firms competing on the Internet.
The appropriate solution might be a federal law mandating
enforcement of choice of law clauses except to the extent enforcement is explicitly prohibited by a state statute. This could enable
a competition among state laws, which discovers the right balance between permissive and mandatory rules.
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Insurance
The insurance industry would seem to be ripe for innovation of
numerous kinds of contracts that protect from a variety of risks.
However, the industry is particularly stymied by the choice of
law problem. The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 prohibits federal regulation of the insurance business, thus leaving regulation
up to the states. The states, for their part, are particularly reluctant to cede their regulatory power through enforcement of
choice of law contracts, given concerns about the complexity and
take-it-or-leave-it nature of insurance contracts and consumers’
inability to judge insurers’ solvency. Moreover, many states prohibit arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, thereby blocking
an important mechanism for promoting enforcement of choice of
law and choice of forum clauses.
There currently is a move toward repealing McCarran-Ferguson
and federalizing insurance law. This would protect insurers from
duplicative state regulation and consumers from inadequate state
regulation. However, as discussed throughout this chapter, federal regulation would eliminate the potential for experimentation
and discovery of superior regulatory solutions through state
competition. Dodd-Frank made a move toward federalization but
stopped with the creation of some oversight through a new
Federal Insurance Office.
As with the other contexts discussed above, the various relevant
interests could be addressed through a federal law that requires
state courts to enforce choice of law provisions in insurance contracts unless a statute in the state where the policy is sold explicitly bars such enforcement.17 This would enable firms to choose
the law that suits their business and would encourage states to
adopt the laws firms prefer. States could compete to lead the competition, which is significant in this area given the complexity of
insurance law and the need for regulatory expertise. States’ ability to specialize may increase the quality of regulation compared
17 Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, “A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance,” May
18, 2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134792.
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to the current system of regulation under which parties cannot
choose the applicable law. Also, states’ power to adopt legislation
applying local law to local insureds would help prevent a “race to
the bottom” in insurance law. At the same time, repealing
McCarran-Ferguson and paving the way for potential federal regulation would discipline the states by exposing them to the threat
that excessive regulation could lead to broad federalization of
insurance law.

Property Law
Rights concerning real property—including rules regarding use,
ownership, and transfer of the property—are subject only to the
law of the state where the property is located. This clear “situs”
rule at least reduces the potential for applying multiple state laws
at the time of litigation to a single transaction. However, the
application of a single rule also prevents the operation of a competitive process that can lead to the discovery of the most efficient
menu of rules. As land use is subject to increasing stresses of laws
relating to such matters as the environment, historic preservation,
and restrictions on growth,18 there is a special need for a discovery process with respect to the development of new legal technologies for real property.19 A competitive law process could further this development by making it easier for property owners to
choose among rights available in various states.20
Conservation easements illustrate how such a lawmaking process
could facilitate property rights innovations.21 These instruments
enable property owners to lock in particular uses of their property in perpetuity. Many states have adopted laws providing for
these easements, spurred by a federal tax break for conservation
18 Nicole Garnett, Land Use Regulation, Innovation, and Growth, this volume, chapter 12.
19 Andrew P. Morriss, “The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition,” in
Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, ed. Andrew P. Morriss (Washington, DC: AEI
Press, 2010), 116.
20 O’Hara and Ribstein, The Law Market.
21 Larry E. Ribstein, “The Market for Conservation Law,” May 17, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1609793.
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easements. The complexity and novelty of these property rights
and the federal tax law have induced states to widely adopt the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act. Letting property owners
enter into easements provided for by the law of states other than
where the property is located could spur a competitive lawmaking process and legal innovations. As with the other areas discussed above, states would retain the ability to legislatively block
local property owners from adopting certain types of laws. This
combination of competition and mandatory rules could lead to
the discovery of more efficient rules regarding this relatively new
property right.

Products Liability Litigation
Nowhere is there a greater need for legal process to pave the way
for innovation than in the area of products liability law.
Manufacturers may be significantly discouraged from innovating
because new products pose new risks of liability to consumers for
product injuries. The expansion of tort law is sometimes viewed
as a failure of state law that calls for federal safety regulation to
preempt the states. But before sacrificing the benefits of the market for state law, it is worth trying the choice of law alternative.
Current choice of law rules generally let plaintiffs choose to litigate in states with the most pro-plaintiff laws. Changing the prevailing rule to one that always applies the law where the product
is manufactured could be too favorable to manufacturers.
Applying the law of the state where the product is first sold might
be a reasonable compromise because firms could determine their
prices based on the product liability laws in each state where the
product is sold. However, no states apply such a rule.
A possible solution, as with the other areas discussed above, is a
federal law enabling the parties to contract for the applicable
state’s product liability law. Consumer groups might fear that this
would cause a “race to the bottom” toward the laxest standards
because consumers could be expected to shop on the basis of the
applicable state law. However, states would have an interest in
protecting their own residents from unsafe products rather than
482
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just being states chosen in product liability contracts. Also, manufacturers of high-quality goods have an incentive to avoid
choosing very lax laws because of the negative signal this could
send as to product quality. The press, blogs, and consumer watchdogs could be counted on to alert the market of very pro-manufacturer state laws and the large consumer product firms that
adopt them.
Even if consumers cannot rely fully on the market, the system
applied throughout this chapter—that is, enabling states to enact
statutes blocking enforcement of contractual choice—could provide fallback protection. States could decide whether they want
to adopt relatively lax product standards and enforce contractual
choice in order to attract manufacturers into the state or adopt
strict laws that protect consumers. The federal government could
provide discipline by standing ready to supplant state law if
states prove too obedient to trial lawyers or manufacturers.
This approach would enable states to experiment with various
legal rules and discover policies that optimally balance the costs
and benefits of product innovation. Although this system may
not yield perfect results, it is important to keep in mind the costs
of the alternatives—a chaotic state system that exposes manufacturers to the rules of all of the states in which they sell products,
or a one-size-fits-all federal rule that preempts state law and precludes experimentation.

Franchise Regulation
Franchising is a potentially valuable form of contracting and an
important pathway for innovations in distributing products and
services. However, state regulation has limited the usefulness of
franchising by restricting franchisors’ ability to terminate franchisees, thereby undercutting franchisors’ most important mechanism of policing franchisees’ attempts to cheat on quality.
Proponents of the regulation argue that the laws are necessary to
prevent franchisors from opportunistically using termination
provisions to take over the locations that prove most profitable
(i.e., “cream skimming”).
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State franchise regulation has been tested in the market for state
law. Franchisors have struck back against the regulation by
inserting choice of law and choice of forum clauses in their contracts that avoid the most onerous state regulation. Regulating
states counterattacked by enacting laws invalidating these provisions. Theory predicts that franchisors would then avoid the
states that insist on applying the most onerous laws. This, in turn,
could set off a political backlash by workers, suppliers, and
customers in the state who are injured by the departure of the
franchises.
Indeed, there is direct evidence of the reduction of outlets in regulating states, and indirect evidence of this reduction based on
reduced employment in franchise industries. These effects are
greatest in states that invalidate choice of law and choice of forum
contracts.22 These data indicate that the market for state law can
enable innovation by limiting the effect of regulation.
Our proposed federal law mandating enforcement of choice of
law clauses subject to state opt-out through legislation again provides a useful compromise between the market for law and state
regulatory interests. This approach is particularly valuable in a
context such as franchise regulation where the interest groups
that would face off in the legislature are closely matched and the
threat of franchisor exit could influence the legislative decision.
As discussed in the article footnoted above, franchise regulation
went through a period of back-and-forth between judicial decisions and legislation that left the law unclear and muted interest
group competition. A clear rule providing for enforcement of
choice of law clauses subject to state legislative opt-out could
have shortened the period of uncertainty, encouraged growthenhancing developments in franchising, and helped ensure a regulatory outcome that best reflected all political interests.

22 Jonathan, Klick, Bruce H. Kobayashi, and Larry E. Ribstein, “The Effect of Contract Regulation:
The Case of Franchising,” December 13, 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464; Klick, Kobayashi,
and Ribstein, “Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise Termination,”
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 3, no. 2 (2009), 355–379.
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CONCLUSION
Innovation and growth depend on the existence of a legal environment that allows room for these developments to occur. At the
same time, society demands reasonable regulation even if this
regulation could have the effect of inhibiting some innovation
and growth. Individual lawmakers lack the necessary knowledge
to determine just where to draw the line. This supports the need
for a market-type legal process that enables discovery of optimal
rules. This chapter suggests how the market for state law could be
designed to produce such a process. Even if the suggested
approach is not adopted, the main lesson of this chapter is that
any regime for encouraging growth must take account of the existence of multiple jurisdictions and the potential for jurisdictional
choice and competition.
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20:

The Political Economy of Reform:
Some Concluding Thoughts

Robert E. Litan∗

T

he preceding chapters have outlined an ambitious, thoughtprovoking, and we hope useful guide to the many possible
ways that U.S. laws and legal institutions might be reformed
to generate higher rates of innovation and growth. As we
noted at the outset, the list of legal ideas is hardly exhaustive. Nor
does it include many ways in which expenditures and tax systems
at all levels of government might be changed to generate similar
outcomes. Perhaps most important in this respect, given the legal
focus of this effort, we do not address some of the major long-term
domestic challenges facing the country, notably how to best bring
governmental budgets closer to balance over the long run; reforms
needed to improve education; issues related to climate change; and
the highly controversial problem of illegal immigration, primarily
of individuals with few job skills. Still, while the authors of the
foregoing chapters might not agree with each and every suggestion that has so far been outlined, we all agree that the ideas proposed here, if implemented in part or in whole, would increase the
rate of innovation and growth.
∗ Robert E. Litan is Vice President for Research & Policy at the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
and Senior Fellow in the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution.
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The ambition of the book, however, extends beyond the list of specific proposals—important though we think they are. The collective essays in the book propose a new way of thinking about the
legal system. Over the past forty years, legal scholars and judges
have paid increasing attention to the economic effects of the law
and of legal institutions that have succeeded in converting our
understanding of the law from serving solely moral goals to serving instrumental goals. To date, however, this instrumental view
has been limited to achieving what we called in Chapter 1 “static
efficiency”: efficient employment of currently available resources,
but nothing beyond.
The essays in this book seek collectively to expand our vision of the
economic effects of the law and legal institutions to consider how
the law has in the past, and how it might in the future, stimulate
innovation and economic growth. The normative ambition of this
vision—which, as explained in Chapter 1, is hardly controversial—
seeks to move economic analysis of law beyond static efficiency in
order to more concretely advance societal welfare for all citizens
through innovation and economic growth.
We appreciate that the book is incomplete. It represents just the
beginning of the study of the effects of law on innovation and economic growth. But we hope that it is an important beginning. The
policy proposals of each chapter are illustrative of this hope.
In this concluding chapter, we address, albeit briefly, this important question: how and under what circumstances might some of
these ideas be adopted by the appropriate decision makers. At the
outset, we can safely say that not all of the suggestions will be
implemented in any form, and certainly, even the “best of the list”
will not be adopted at once, simultaneously. Our political system,
with its checks and balances provided by different branches of
government, purposely was created to prevent any such outcome,
no matter how good the ideas.
Indeed, with rare exceptions, government policymaking is inherently reactive, and almost never creative. Congress has a history of
adopting statutes primarily in response to crises, often banking or
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economic crises, or when political forces align in a way so that
elected officials believe they must respond to perceived or actual
action-forcing political pressures. Examples of the former, of
course, include the large body of post-Depression era legislation
and regulation, which transformed the nation’s financial, labor,
and housing laws, and laid the foundation for the modern administrative state; the more modest changes to financial laws after the
savings and loan and banking problems of the 1980s, and later the
financial disclosure and accounting scandals (notably Enron and
MCI) of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century; and most
recently, the almost total overhaul of the nation’s financial regulatory system following the financial crisis of 2007-8. Outside the
economic/financial arena, examples where the political stars have
aligned to induce congressional action include the adoption of
Medicare in 1965; transportation, environmental, and occupational
safety statutes adopted in the 1960s and 1970s; deregulation of the
transportation sector in the 1970s and 1980s (though much of this
was done by administrative action and not just by statutory
change); tax reform in 1986 (though this subsequently has been
undone by a series of tax bills); welfare reform in the mid-1990s;
and, again most recently, comprehensive health reform legislation
adopted in 2010.
Regulatory and judicial decision making also, by design, are reactive. Regulators take their cue from Congress, which often directs
agencies to write rules to flesh out broadly or vaguely worded
statutes (as in the case of the health care and financial regulatory
reform bills enacted in 2010), or from problems that private citizens
or companies, acting alone or through the media, bring to regulators’ attention. Rarely do regulators anticipate issues and try to get
ahead of them. There is not likely to be sufficient scientific and/or
political consensus for them to be proactive.
Judges are even more reactive since, again by design, they are not
policymakers. How often is it said during judicial confirmation
proceedings (especially for the Supreme Court) that “judges
should not legislate from the bench”? Of course, to the extent that
judicial decisions establish legal doctrines that fill in the interstices
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of statutes, regulations, or the common law, judges do perform the
functional equivalent of legislative or regulatory functions. But all
such decisions grow out of the cases that the judicial system passively accepts. Judges do not have the luxury or the charge to write
on a blank slate and affirmatively reach out to “fix” social or economic problems they may see in their midst and want to address.
Likewise, some judges may not see it within their charge to conduct, or ask the parties and their counsel who come before them to
conduct, cost-benefit analyses of what the optimal rules would be
to govern situations that happen to be litigated in particular cases.
To the extent that judicial doctrines change over time, and they do,
this happens incrementally, case by case, and generally not in
response to political pressures to act one way or the other.
Despite these differences in the way the three key decision-making
institutions in our democratic capitalist society make or are presented with decisions, there is one common element among them.
In many or most cases, when changes in policy are made, decision
makers draw upon ideas on the proverbial shelf. More often than
not, the ideas are put there through the research or writings of academic scholars, researchers in think tanks, or intellectual thought
leaders writing for themselves or housed in some other kind of
institution (principally the media), or some combination of these.
The famous economist John Maynard Keynes is well-known for his
many quips, but surely this one ranks among his best: “Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”
We would modify that thought only to cover defunct (and living!)
scholars from the other social and physical sciences and, pertinent
to the subjects addressed here, from the legal academy as well.
This book has been written in that spirit. First, our authors want to
put still more ideas on the policy shelf, hopefully to be picked up
at various points in the future by decision makers in each of the
three branches of government. Second, at the same time, we hope
to stimulate policymakers and professors to reorient their thinking
about the possibilities of law, to move beyond identifying and promoting how law can achieve static efficiency into a new approach:
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to examine how law has in the past and can in the future improve
social welfare by stimulating innovation and growth.
The prior chapters necessarily take as a given, however, the current
legal and institutional framework in each of the areas covered, and
seek to improve upon it. The authors were not charged with writing on a blank slate as it were, as economist Paul Romer has suggested through his proposal for countries (or smaller jurisdictions)
to establish “charter cities”—jurisdictions with only a few necessary rules to maintain social and economic order, but otherwise
highly facilitative toward growth—by selling or extending longterm leases to the land to other nations or even corporations to
make this idea happen.1 We in the United States are not likely ever
to do something as radical as that, although we do have special,
limited “free trade zones” and “enterprise zones” that resemble
Romer’s idea. But it is unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future,
that policymakers are going to be any more adventurous than that.
Working with the existing set of institutions, then, imparts a heavy
bias against change. Indeed, as the late economist Mancur Olson
argued, and as journalist Jonathan Rauch has popularized, as societies and economies age, they harden not only with the growth of
incomes and wealth but also with the number and strength of different interest groups.2 To some extent, the groups can offset each
other, but the more evident pattern is one of growing complication.
Two analogies come to mind: from the health arena, societies come
to resemble plaque-filled arteries in an aging patient; and from
water navigation, one might say that societies grow to resemble
streams with an ever-expanding number of rocks that make navigation increasingly difficult. Pick whatever metaphor you like, the
key point is this: societies, like most people, get more rigid and set
in their ways as they age.

1 For an excellent guide to this idea, its pluses and minuses, see Sebastian Mallaby, “The Politically
Incorrect Guide to Ending Poverty,” The Atlantic, July/August 2010.
2 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Fall of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); and
Jonathan Rauch, Government’s End (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).
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Just look around at some of the major social and economic challenges that the United States has been confronting—or, increasingly, not confronting or resolving—for the past decade or more:
restoring fiscal sanity at all levels of government, fixing our
nation’s broken immigration system, and addressing climate
change in the most cost-effective way. At this writing, resolution of
each one, let alone all, of these highly contentious issues seems
impossible, or at the least highly remote.
But then there are exceptions. Incremental changes in policy—
mostly implemented through regulations and judicial interpretations of those rules or statutes, or even the common law—happen
all the time, in response to new fact situations often driven by
changes in technology. The rise of the Internet, for example, has
aroused concerns about privacy that would not have existed without this new technology (just as the development of telephones
and wiretapping technologies did nearly a century ago). The
genetics revolution, likewise, is raising not only policy issues relating to privacy, but also moral and ethical questions. Ben Wittes in
Chapter 18 wrestles with the new and unanticipated consequences,
especially the downsides, of technological change and innovation.
Nonetheless, the clear consensus of the authors in this volume is
that whatever else they do, law and policy should not preempt
innovation out of fear of what could go wrong, but instead fix
things that do go wrong when that happens. It is these incremental “fixes” that continue to be made by decision makers in different
branches and at different levels of government all the time.
And yet, as suggested at the outset of this chapter, there are cases
where, either in response to a crisis or due to a confluence of
events, Congress has enacted major legislative reforms. Are any of
the ideas outlined in this book likely to be adopted in a similar
fashion?
Since relatively few of the ideas in this book call for legislation, a
crisis is not likely to be necessary for any to attract wide popular
attention, with one possible exception: proposals to liberalize U.S.
immigration laws for high-skill immigrants, especially those with
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entrepreneurial intentions. Although immigration reform generally seems to have become the “fourth rail” that U.S. politicians seek
to avoid at all costs (the “third rail” being the two popular entitlement programs, Social Security and Medicare), a proposal to create
a new visa just for immigrant entrepreneurs eventually could
prove to be politically attractive, especially if the economic recovery from the Great Recession continues to be sluggish. In that
event, a crisis—the recession and its aftermath—eventually may
serve as the trigger for useful legislative reform.
One other major legislative reform suggested here—the replacement and/or augmentation of the federal income tax with some
kind of consumption (or value-added) tax—is not likely to emerge
from a future budget crisis, since either raising taxes or reforming
them is unlikely to be popular in the midst of another recession.
Nor would such a measure make economic sense, unless it were
advanced as part of a plan to fix the nation’s long-run fiscal problems, in which case it would help reduce long-term interest rates
and thus facilitate the recovery. It also is possible, if unlikely, that
elected officials from both parties will muster the political courage
to enact a comprehensive budget bill before any debt-market crisis.
Such a bill could very well include a consumption tax, along with
reform of entitlement benefits.
The rest of the ideas proposed in this book are more incremental in
nature, and thus are better suited for the regulatory or judicial arenas, where decision makers constantly are required to adapt or
develop new rules in response to new factual circumstances. It also
is possible that the few ideas presented that require some incremental legislative change—such as the antitrust reforms offered by
Priest—may be packaged together, at an appropriate time, with
other related reforms that Congress may consider.
Alternatively, or in conjunction with policy changes adopted by
federal decision makers, states may be best positioned to compete
with one another to offer growth-friendly legal environments. This
is more easily done by legislators and regulators who may have
this explicit or implicit mandate than by judges who make case-by-
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case rulings where the advancement of economy-wide growth may
not be uppermost in their minds (or even legally permissible).
Alternatively, and most far-reaching, Ribstein argues in Chapter 19
that the Congress should explicitly allow and even encourage
states to compete in multiple arenas in adopting pro-growth policies or changes in rules. It is not clear whether a crisis of any form
is necessary to achieve this objective, but the notion that states
should be allowed greater freedom to experiment has been a longstanding one, and even recently was embodied in the financial
reform legislation enacted after the Great Recession (which permits
states to enact and enforce more restrictive consumer protection
rules than those issued by the new federal consumer financial
product regulator).
In the end, almost all of the pro-growth proposals advanced in this
book have one important political virtue in common: they cost little or no government money to implement and enforce. At a time
when government resources are scarce—and, if anything, spending growth needs to be reined in as part of long-term deficit reduction—this is a feature that should be highly attractive to legislators
and regulators (albeit less so with judges, whose rulings rarely
involve or require government spending). Given the continuing
need for growth, not just to lengthen the recovery but to sustain
improvements in living standards over the long run, it is the collective view of the authors in this book that the ideas for enhancing
innovation and growth outlined here should attract serious attention and consideration by policymakers, ideally sooner than later.
Moreover, it is our collective view that this recovery, plus the stimulation of economic growth into the future, will benefit from a
reorientation of the study of law in order to consider carefully how
it can be defined to promote innovation and economic growth and
thus enhance the welfare of Americans, and perhaps eventually citizens throughout the rest of the world.
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